Venezuela Politics and Elections - Presidential Election (July 28, 2024)

[Mike88]

I was really skeptical about the "negotiations" between the Maduro regime and the Opposition regarding the elections, because it's clear the Maduro will never accept a free and fair election. They know that if there is a fair vote, they will be booted out in the blink of an eye.

[PSOL]

I see the far-left in Venezuela is still the pack of authoritarian, corrupt a-holes they’ve always been. Oh well, clearly another victory for The Global South!

PSUV are now center-left after kicking out the communists, and have especially shifted to a more upscale position in line with other social democratic formations given that the prior patronage machines that resulted in PSUV staying in power are being spared from the onslaught of the state. Look at Zulia or the prison raids, if what they’re doing isn’t trying to increase palatability to the middle class I don’t know what is.

[Jingizu]

I see the far-left in Venezuela is still the pack of authoritarian, corrupt a-holes they’ve always been. Oh well, clearly another victory for The Global South!

PSUV are now center-left after kicking out the communists, and have especially shifted to a more upscale position in line with other social democratic formations given that the prior patronage machines that resulted in PSUV staying in power are being spared from the onslaught of the state. Look at Zulia or the prison raids, if what they’re doing isn’t trying to increase palatability to the middle class I don’t know what is.

 

I think I will let MRCVzla answer this…

[Conservatopia]

I see the far-left in Venezuela is still the pack of authoritarian, corrupt a-holes they’ve always been. Oh well, clearly another victory for The Global South!

PSUV are now center-left after kicking out the communists, and have especially shifted to a more upscale position in line with other social democratic formations given that the prior patronage machines that resulted in PSUV staying in power are being spared from the onslaught of the state. Look at Zulia or the prison raids, if what they’re doing isn’t trying to increase palatability to the middle class I don’t know what is.

Maduro, like Kim Jong-Un, is a Blairite you see.

[Peeperkorn]

I see the far-left in Venezuela is still the pack of authoritarian, corrupt a-holes they’ve always been. Oh well, clearly another victory for The Global South!

PSUV are now center-left after kicking out the communists, and have especially shifted to a more upscale position in line with other social democratic formations given that the prior patronage machines that resulted in PSUV staying in power are being spared from the onslaught of the state. Look at Zulia or the prison raids, if what they’re doing isn’t trying to increase palatability to the middle class I don’t know what is.

That's how "scientific" socialism/communism works. It starts with an idealistic but naive worldview (you're currently in this stage) and ends with an authoritarian corrupt elite living at the expense of  increasingly starving and miserable masses: homo homini lupus est.

[Coldstream]

Surely this act of annulling the opposition primary should invalidate the sanctions deal with the US?

[MRCVzla]

I see the far-left in Venezuela is still the pack of authoritarian, corrupt a-holes they’ve always been. Oh well, clearly another victory for The Global South!

PSUV are now center-left after kicking out the communists, and have especially shifted to a more upscale position in line with other social democratic formations given that the prior patronage machines that resulted in PSUV staying in power are being spared from the onslaught of the state. Look at Zulia or the prison raids, if what they’re doing isn’t trying to increase palatability to the middle class I don’t know what is.

Nah, they are still social conservative "revolutionary" left-wingers who qualify the whole opposition as "extreme right" (and not all the opposition are anti-communists conservatives) and the military side with Diosdado is still relevant, for much PR effort they doing being champions against corruption (same corruption most of their own people do) or cleaning the mess they left to do at the prisons with the organized crime "pranes". You probably also said that due to the high profile they get some of their "civic" ranks who are projecting their own moderate or self-brand populist image rather than the traditional chavista package as Carabobo governor Rafael Lacava, Miranda's Héctor Rodríguez or even the governor of my homestate Anzoátegui's Luis Marcano.

That's how "scientific" socialism/communism works. It starts with an idealistic but naive worldview (you're currently in this stage) and ends with an authoritarian corrupt elite living at the expense of  increasingly starving and miserable masses: homo homini lupus est.

They are in the "authoritarian corrupt elite living at the expense of increasingly starving and miserable masses" stage a long time ago despite still selling at the people the "idealistic" stage, one if not the main reason why there has been a mass migration, sanctions or why there is still no "free elections" yet, more pronounced since Chávez' "planting" in 2013 or when they lost the Assembly in 2015 (and "recovered" with that Constituent Assembly who at the end didn't propose any single change to the Constitution"!)

[brucejoel99]

Surely this act of annulling the opposition primary should invalidate the sanctions deal with the US?

The State Dept. gave Venezuela an end-of-November deadline to allow all candidates the opportunity to run, so sanctions can presumably snap back as early as December 1st if necessary.

[MRCVzla]

Surely this act of annulling the opposition primary should invalidate the sanctions deal with the US?

The State Dept. gave Venezuela an end-of-November deadline to allow all candidates the opportunity to run, so sanctions can presumably snap back as early as December 1st if necessary.

And in a last-minute agreement, the Norwegian representation at the Dialogue Table announced how the mechanism to appeal bans will happen, a note from English-language blog Caracas Chronicles details how:

Appealing Inhabilitaciones

A few hours before the November 30th deadline ended, the mechanism to review bans from running for office was just announced: candidates, like María Corina Machado and Henrique Capriles, must appeal their bans (inhabilitaciones) between December 1st and 15th at the Comptroller’s Office. A Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will rule on the admission of the claim and the requested precautionary protection.

The mechanism is full of tricky points: all parties must accept the ruling of the TSJ on this matter and the institutions cannot be ‘disrespected’ by the candidates. There are also points on “territorial integrity” which could tie the process to the candidates’ positions on the Esequibo referendum, rejected by María Corina Machado and Voluntad Popular. It’s still unclear which candidates will appeal.

“I do not see in this mechanism anything else than a simulation and an ambiguity that is left to the discretion of a politicized body in favor of PSUV. Except for pressure or non-public negotiations, the result seems to be a foregone conclusion”, tweeted political scientist Juan Manuel Trak.

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/el-feed/maria-corinas-adventures-in-inhabilitacion-land/

The consultative referendum (in theory, non-binding) on the Esequibo issue will take place this Sunday. The campaign has been monopolized by Chavismo, its political allies and the rest of the institutions under the slogan "Venezuela All" calling to vote "5 times YES" to all the questions of the referendum, there was a simulation a few weeks ago that the Government ( without data) has been described as a success. The unitary opposition has left its voters in "freedom of conscience", there will be sectors such as MCM or VP that will abstain without making it public but others such as Capriles, Rosales, Caleca or Ramos Allup's AD have made public their intentions to go. to vote in the referendum and not let Maduro and the rest of Chavismo take the credit for participation out of mere and just patriotism.

The questions with the most doubts for those who oppose Chavismo but are nationalist enough to support the consultation are the last 3, in the third (not recognizing the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the territorial dispute) it is likely to vote NO, while in the fourth (oppose "by all means" Guyana's unilateral action to occupy the territorial sea to be delimited) or the fifth (the creation of the Guayana Esequiba State and an accelerated plan to give citizenship to the inhabitants in the area under claim) can be between a NO or allow a null/blank vote, there are still doubts whether the success of the consultation gives carte blanche to the regime to raise the tensions of the dispute, even calling for a "military invasion" to recover Essequibo, calling for a State of Exception that It could suspend the 2024 Presidential Election (if it is moderately competitive) and illegally extend Maduro's mandate. There have been concerns on the part of the Brazilian Armed Forces about the issue, and Guyana has also made "provocations" by raising a flag in the area, giving more oil concessions in the disputed sea and trying before the ICJ itself to suspend the holding of the referendum.

The ICJ itself has unanimously decided a few hours before the referendum was held that both Venezuela and Guyana should not take actions that aggravate the situation regarding the territorial dispute, it has expressed its concerns regarding the fifth question but has not ordered to suspend or eliminate questions from the referendum (Chavismo sells this as a victory). The ClJ concluded that there is a link between the rights claimed by Guyana and the measures requested against the referendum. "Until a final decision on the controversy is adopted, Venezuela will refrain from taking measures that modify the situation of the territory," says the ICJ.

Another note from Caracas Chronicles about the referendum:

What is Venezuela Actually Seeking With the Esequibo Referendum?
Venezuela’s authoritarian regime is holding a referendum over a claim the country has kept for decades. Why? To face the opposition, measure its mobilization power and stroke electoral nationalism before the 2024 elections

Tony Frangie Mawad November 30, 2023

The Guyana-controlled Esequibo region, claimed by Venezuela for more than a century and formally disputed again since 1966, is tacitly included in Article 10 of the Venezuelan Constitution which says Venezuela’s territory follows the borders of the colonial Capitanía General de Venezuela and subsequent “non-vitiated” arbitral awards (Venezuela’s official claim over the Esequibo says the territory was a part of the Capitanía. The country also considers that the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award, which officially handed the Esequibo to Great Britain, is “null and void”). The case at the International Court of Justice has been ongoing since at least 2018 –following diplomatic escalations after Guyana handed offshore concessions to Exxon Mobil and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation. So, why is Venezuela now organizing a five-question referendum –an electoral act that will not dictate the decisions of a militarist-authoritarian regime– on its claimed sovereignty over the Esequibo? There might be three reasons:

A response to the opposition primaries
The referendum is a show of strength to the unexpectedly high participation in the opposition primaries (2.3 million in Venezuela). Maduro has already affirmed that around 3.5 million people participated in the Esequibo referendum drill on November 19th, but the National Electoral Council didn’t publish official results. In fact, while it happened when Guyana handed new oil concessions, the referendum was announced by the Chavista-controlled 2020 National Assembly barely a month before the primaries: when María Corina Machado’s skyrocketing rise was already clear as crystal and the final version of the Barbados agreement was being reached upon.

This approach is clearer in PSUV’s Héctor Rodríguez’s recent statements: “the queues of voters for the mock referendum for the Esequibo were very much longer than the ones in the opposition’s primaries, impressive. The primary does not exist, it was nothing.”

It’s not the first time such a retaliatory display of political muscle takes place. During the 2017 protests, more than 7.6 million people allegedly voted in a self-managed referendum organized by the then opposition-controlled National Assembly to reject the creation of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC). A few days later, Chavismo announced that more than 8 million voted to choose the members of the ANC. The results were denounced as fraudulent, with at least an extra million votes, by software company Smartmatic – which provided the voting machines.

The referendum has already stoked divisions within the opposition. While Machado has called for its suspension, Andrés Caleca has announced he will participate and Henrique Capriles has even promoted it. The Unitary Platform, meanwhile, said that each voter should decide what to vote and if to vote.

Mobilizing Chavistaworld
Chavismo is also seeking to measure its mobilization power in its bases and clientelist networks before the 2024 presidential elections. Chavismo, for example, barely managed to mobilize 3.5 million people in the last regional elections – 2.3 million less than in the 2017 regional elections. The opposition, instead, gathered 100,000 more people in the primaries than the Democratic Unity Roundtable did in the 2021 regional elections.

An example of this mobilization “experiment” is the creation of “Patrol Chiefs” in the National Guard to deploy a 1×10 plan, an old Chavista strategy in which each official must take 10 family members or close friends to vote. The plan was first deployed in the November 19 drill. Similarly, the government announced Communal Councils, the National Militia, the recently created Congress of the New Era and CLAP committees –all part of its clientelist networks and bases– will join ruling party PSUV in the “5×5” strategy to supposedly mobilize the outrageous number of 12 million voters.

This strategy has led to claims of local committees menacing to CLAP food bags away from beneficiaries that won’t vote in the referendum and in an express operation to print IDs (necessary to vote) that has resulted in chaos to some SAIME offices.

Suspending the elections?
While this is still in the realm of the speculative, there is the possibility that Chavismo is seeking to create a climate of war or confrontation to decree a state of emergency and suspend the 2024 presidential elections that –if they are moderately competitive, following the Barbados agreements– could be catastrophic for PSUV. The strategy could be a toned-down version of Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri’s 1982 Falklands War, when the Argentina junta disastrously invaded the disputed British-controlled Malvinas islands to raise nationalist sentiments and mitigate its domestic unpopularity. While a war could blow the sanctions relief, it’s clear Chavismo prioritizes keeping power over ending sanctions.

Frontal warmongering is still low in the dispute, but the Venezuelan Armed Force announced is building airstrips and civilian buildings near the Esequibo, while one of the referendum questions included proclaiming the region as an official Venezuelan state and handing Venezuela IDs to locals. Meanwhile, Guyana met with Brazil in its 26th Annual Regional Military Exchange Meeting, where Brazilian Brigadier General Paulo Santa Barba said that a problem that “affects one country could have repercussions for everyone.” Brazil, which has economic interests in the disputed region, has in fact strengthened its defense in the border region in the last few days.

So, if Argentina’s 1982 war had a festival for the Falklands as a prelude and Venezuela is now organizing the Esequibo Fest, what assures us that the similarities between Galtieri’s and the Maduro regime will end there?

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2023/11/30/what-is-venezuela-actually-seeking-with-the-esequibo-referendum/

[Mike88]

I'm reading in Venezuelan newspapers that turnout is very, very low.

[MRCVzla]

1st Bulletin was out, Turnout of 10.554.320 votes but not necessarly voters, maybe the number is the sum between the 5 questions so actual turnout should be very low around 2-3 million voters, press reports earlier saw few queque lines if not any at many precincts, huge abstention in pro-opposition strongholds, maybe chavismo/PSUV machines tried in the last hours of the afternoon his "operación remolque" with their usual tactics of force public employees to vote... but their still they keep the relate of winning in a unnecessary referendum about a sensitive issue.

(Ratio Yes/No)
Q1: YES 97.83% | NO 2.17%
Q2: YES 98.11% | NO 1.80%
Q3: YES 95.40% | NO 4.10%
Q4: YES 95,94% | NO 4,06%
Q5: YES 95,93% | NO 4,07%

A certain pattern can be observed in the last 3 questions where around 4% who voted NO could be pure opposition voters, many leaders, governors and mayors of the unitary opposition did go to vote but not the vast majority of their voters.

It will dawn and we will see...

[MRCVzla]

Amoroso' CNE announced in a act "updated" results of yesterday' referendum... o better say, yet another electoral-type event, reaffirms what more than 10 million VOTERS went to the polls, but a number sightly reduced than the announced last night: 10.431.907.
Q1: Yes: 10.193.142 | No: 209.600 | Void: 29.165
Q2: Yes: 10.200.364 | No: 181.122 | Void: 50.416
Q3: Yes: 10.009.932 | No: 383.433 | Void: 38.542
Q4: Yes: 10.012.068 | No: 380.877 | Void: 38.963
Q5: Yes: 9.948.430 | No: 378.551 | Void: 104.928

Reminder there was many reports of huge abstention or "more force officials than voters" at the polling stations around the country, with no direct independent observation, a monopolyzed state-funded campaign under a sensitive issue, a Referendum just called to 1) counter-react the Opposition Primary result and 2) express their reject of the actions and deals Guyana does to exploit oil under disputed sea (and mainly against ExxonMobil' concessions). The results of the questions actually doesn't care because everybody knows that would be approved anyway, it's was the turnout who cared to see how much the State/chavismo can mobilize voters under the issue, even if much moderate opposition figures ended showing up for patriotic reasons. This will be the same CNE what Machado and/or the unitary opposition will face next year, so with the Barbados' Agreements in hand they should have to fight more in order to improve electoral conditions (as well the voting rights for the abroad migration), with more independent observation/polling scrutineers, the risk to have "made up" results could be lower and have some moderately competitive election and see actual lines and lines of voters independent of their choices voting and no "ghost lines" raising this doubts.

[MRCVzla]

Today the TSJ has announced "as established under the Barbados Agreement" some rullings related to opposition politicians barred to run. The most important is reafirm the inhabilitation of the main opposition candidate María Corina Machado for 15 years because her request "does not comply with the requirements established and demanded in the Agreement(...)", also former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski got rebanned as well until 2036, many others politicans stay banned but others, more "pragmatic" as Leocenis García, Aragua politician Richard Mardó. former San Cristóbal mayor Daniel Ceballos or former Zulia governor (and 2012 precandidate) Pablo Pérez got their bans lifted. This news may determinate the next proceedings by the opposition to face this year' elections. If MCM will stay "until the end" (as her campaign slogan says) and keep figthing for another hopeful appeal, nominate some other "habilitated" politician to run or we are going headed for another 2018 Nicaragua-esque electoral-type event scenario, were Chavismo continues to demoralize institutionally, calls elections very early without enough guarantees (like secure voting rights/update voting register for the diaspora) and only with co-opted opposition candidates against Maduro... or any other PSUV rank. The Barbados Agreement are mortally wounded, if not ended by those who do not want to give up any power.

During this time between this and the Essequibo referendum fiasco, the outright "symbolic" recognition of the Essequibo as Venezuelan territory in official maps and the meeting between Maduro and Guyana President Ali in order to relax tensions (minor spoiler: not enough). The controversial Colombian-born businessman Alex Saab got released by US authorities and returned to Venezuela (and received like a hero) in an exchange with some jailed US military and political prisoneers, the own TSJ board got some changes as they got another "unknown" pro-government attorney as her new President (and a former MP and CNE rector as President of one of the main Court' chamber)... all this as chavismo itself denounces daily some "magnicide plans" against Maduro in order to continue persecute opposition politicians or experts (even the ones already in exile), feeding this Nicaragua scenario of unfair elections and not giving up power easy, as any statement from Maduro's, Cabello, the Rodríguez brothers or the Attorney General Saab (which the later also is doing some PR stunts in order to resolve the mysterious death of a popular rapper) is taken seriously by the non-polarized part of the Venezuelans still living in the country.

[MRCVzla]

The CNE (following recomendations done by the 2020 elected National Assembly) has called the Presidential Election for July 28. Electoral Permanent Register (REP) for the election will be closed on April 16. Candidates' nominations will be between March 21-25. Campaign will happen between July 4-25.

In my opinion, one of the most convenient dates for the regime (Maduro and co) and the co-opted opposition (the myriad of hopeful pre-candidates they have), the majority of Venezuelans abroad maybe cannot update their register status in order to vote. Probably will not be proper international observation mission, the government has been very vocal against the fact the EU or some "opposition alligned" international organization supervises the process, most likely to see some chavismo friendly "international accompaniment missions" watching on election day.

The date where the election has been called and the election date are not coincidence. Today is Hugo Chávez' 11-year anniversary of "his sowing" and the election would be the day he would have turned 70 years old, kind of symbolic dates for chavismo.

Unitary Opposition (and ofc MCM) has less than 20 days to decide what they are doing, they currently are stick to present MCM "'til the end" despite her ban on March 21, but most likely they will have to nominate a last minute consensus candidate. If they decide to not stand a candidate after the likely rejection of MCM' candidature, this will be another "electoral type event" like 2018.

[MRCVzla]

María Corina Machado has just designated Corina Yoris-Villasana, a low-profile academic member of the opposition' National Primary Commission (also President of the Venezuelan Society of Philosophy) as her replacement candidate by the Unitary Platform for the July Presidential Election, in theory she's not banned to run and will be nominated with the MUD and UNT party symbols (with the possibility of more parties joining), MCM will still fight against her political ban in case she somehow finally made it to July. In the last days, the government' Security Forces had raided and put capture order to many people close to MCM and her party Vente Venezuela, accused of being behind alleged "destabilizing plans" against Maduro and the regime. The operation to register new voters has been underway since a few days, for now only in Venezuelan territory and in selected points, registration points have not yet been opened in the Consulates for residents and other emigrants abroad.

President Maduro will run for reelection with the support of the parties of the Great Patriotic Pole, included the intervened Communist Party (PCV) and a new "Green Party", linked to people close to Miranda State Governor Héctor Rodríguez.

Among the figures already running for the co-opted opposition are Luís Eduardo Martínez (AD), Antonio Ecarri (Lapíz-AP) or former San Cristóbal mayor Daniel Ceballos (with it's own party AREPA), others with intention are José Brito (PV), Javier Bertucci (ELCAMBIO), Juan Carlos Alvarado (COPEI) as well Leocenís García (Prociudadanos*). Still unclear but very likely to run is comedian and entrepeneur Benjamín Rausseo with his own party CONDE (named after his artistic nickname "Er Conde del Guacharo").

*Prociudadanos is allegedly lose his party register, due to low votes obtained in the 2021 elections, other opposition parties like MAS, Convergencia or MPV (most likely to nominate MCM or her replacement) also lose their status.

[Flyersfan232]

María Corina Machado has just designated Corina Yoris-Villasana, a low-profile academic member of the opposition' National Primary Commission (also President of the Venezuelan Society of Philosophy) as her replacement candidate by the Unitary Platform for the July Presidential Election, in theory she's not banned to run and will be nominated with the MUD and UNT party symbols (with the possibility of more parties joining), MCM will still fight against her political ban in case she somehow finally made it to July. In the last days, the government' Security Forces had raided and put capture order to many people close to MCM and her party Vente Venezuela, accused of being behind alleged "destabilizing plans" against Maduro and the regime. The operation to register new voters has been underway since a few days, for now only in Venezuelan territory and in selected points, registration points have not yet been opened in the Consulates for residents and other emigrants abroad.

President Maduro will run for reelection with the support of the parties of the Great Patriotic Pole, included the intervened Communist Party (PCV) and a new "Green Party", linked to people close to Miranda State Governor Héctor Rodríguez.

Among the figures already running for the co-opted opposition are Luís Eduardo Martínez (AD), Antonio Ecarri (Lapíz-AP) or former San Cristóbal mayor Daniel Ceballos (with it's own party AREPA), others with intention are José Brito (PV), Javier Bertucci (ELCAMBIO), Juan Carlos Alvarado (COPEI) as well Leocenís García (Prociudadanos*). Still unclear but very likely to run is comedian and entrepeneur Benjamín Rausseo with his own party CONDE (named after his artistic nickname "Er Conde del Guacharo").

*Prociudadanos is allegedly lose his party register, due to low votes obtained in the 2021 elections, other opposition parties like MAS, Convergencia or MPV (most likely to nominate MCM or her replacement) also lose their status.

the election is going to be frauded in favor of maduro wont it?

[MRCVzla]

the election is going to be frauded in favor of maduro wont it?

Only in the case the regime disqualifies Yoris or any other opposition candidate/party and reaches their goal of desmoralize the "electoral route". As this is not happening yet, the Unitary opposition is doing whatever they have in their hands to "play clean" (respecting international agreements on the issue like what remains of the Barbados' one) and make the election at least competitive and winnable, hence the pressure to have electoral register points abroad, in order to voters who fleed the country can update their electoral status and vote in July.

[MRCVzla]

Last hours to submit the candidatures to the CNE, throughout the weekend since the substitute candidate was announced, the MUD, UNT and the environmental party MOVEV have reported that they have blocked access to the CNE's online platform to be able to nominate Dr. Corina Yoris, which it's still not barred to run and denied a Wikipedia edit-based-fake news about a supposedly Uruguayan citizenship, an until now the system has not yet allowed the application to be made, a 4th party, Fuerza Vecinal has not submit any nomination yet as "their expecting the MUD one" to join them. Meanwhile, President Maduro and 9 other candidates* have been able to run even with public events at the headquarters of the Electoral Power. At the last minute, the CNE, although it did not extend the deadline to present applications, did include two parties so that they could apply, MAS and Centrados, the latter would apparently nominate the former MP and former CNE rector Enríque Márquez, until now a member of UNT and the Unitary Platform, as his candidate, not known if is an "stand-in" or be catalogued as another unrelailable "scorpion".

The entire narrative that is being created is that the regime wants to "impose" the opposition candidate among the various options co-opted or suspected of being so, and yet tell his electorate and related media that the "legitimate" opposition is not on the electoral path and continues to "organize coups and other destabilizing plans from abroad", something of which is not entirely true. The next few hours or days will be crucial to truly determine whether we are facing an "election-type event" or not.

*Among the parties that have been able to nominate there are a couple of "briefcase cards (party symbols)." The FUTURO Movement, which was linked to the former Lara governor and 2018 runner-up Henri Falcón, was ultimately "stolen" by people close to the Miranda governor and thus joining the parties that support Maduro's re-election. Another case is a newly created party called "Popular Democratic Right", one faction supported the unitary candidacy of MCM but the one that has control of the symbols nominated the "independent" Luis Ratti, one of the main promoters of the disqualification of MCM (and the MUD).

[Duke of York]

Sounds like an opposition candidate won’t be allowed to run.

[MRCVzla]

Deadline passed, MUD was not able to register a candidate as they still blocked the access to the CNE server until the end of the process, at last minute with Márquez, Fuerza Vecinal originally nominated Pablo Zambrano as an "stand-in" but his postulation was unprocessed, they joined the one UNT finally can did with not having other option than postulate their leader and Zulia governor Manuel Rosales as mostly their "stand-in" candidate. 12 candidates (all men) would probably be on the electoral machines on July, now wait tomorrow for the reaction of the PUD and MCM, mostly what the chavismo wanted to happen... (?)

1.⁠ ⁠Nicolás Maduro (PSUV and GPP allies)
2.⁠ ⁠Luis Eduardo Martínez (AD)
3.⁠ ⁠Antonio Ecarri (Lapíz-AP)
4.⁠ ⁠Juan Carlos Alvarado (Copei)
5.⁠ ⁠Daniel Ceballos (Arepa Digital)
6.⁠ ⁠Benjamín Rausseo (Conde)
7. Javier Bertucci (El Cambio)
8.⁠ ⁠José Brito (Primero Venezuela and minor allies)
9. Claudio Fermín (Soluciones)
10. Luis Ratti (DDP)
11. Enrique Marquez (Centrados-MAS)
12. Manuel Rosales (UNT-Fuerza Vecinal)

EDIT: Seems at very very last minute, the CNE granted an exception to the MUD (who was unable to register a candidate telematically) to reserve their slot so they can nominate a candidate after all, still unknown if will finally be Yoris, another name endorsed by MCM or support Rosales but seems they will be an ongoing negotiation to found the definitive candidate, calling to abstention (what chavismo wants) is not a likely option yet, for now.

EDIT 2: Former diplomat Edmundo Gonzalez is the MUD' stand-in candidate, the PUD strategy is try to substitute with a consensus unity candidate or at last resource, join an already submitted candidate.