I. Jurisdiction
The Lincoln Court's jurisdiction in this case is granted by
Rules of the Lincoln Council Section 7, Subsection C*, which states:
If the Council cannot resolve a rules dispute, Lincoln's chief judicial office may issue a binding decision dictating the proper interpretation.
*Note that this clause is actually numbered 7.3 within the Rules of the Lincoln Council itself, because Section 7 incongruously features numerical designations for its subsections. The consistent style throughout the rest of the document is to label subsections alphabetically. By all appearances this anomaly of Section 7 is a mere typographical error. When referring to 7.3, the court will instead refer to it as 7.C which appears to be its intended designation. This is to provide clarity because most will probably not catch this subtle difference when reading through the document.The Court believes the required threshold -- that the rules dispute is one the council "cannot resolve" -- has been met. The phrase "cannot resolve" is broad and includes no specific qualifications or restrictions. It does not say the petitioner must be a member of the Council (
though such restriction would likely be unconstitutional regardless due Politics Fan v. The South). There is no requirement that the dispute must necessarily be one that the Council has unsuccessfully attempted to resolve. It does not even require the rules dispute originate within the Council itself. For the Court to have jurisdiction for a 7.C hearing, it is sufficient that the rules dispute be one that the Council cannot resolve.
In this particular case, the individual disputing the Speaker's interpretation and application of the rules has no method through which he can even present his dispute to the Council itself, so has no recourse available. The Council itself has no possible mechanism through which to address or resolve the dispute if they even wished to do so. The council cannot resolve this rules dispute, therefore jurisdiction for a 7.C hearing exists.
It is worth noting here that this jurisdiction is strictly discretionary, meaning that even when a situation like this one exists and the jurisdiction is valid, the court still has full discretion to decide whether it will hear the case or not. This is indicated by the use of the conditional in 7.C: "Lincoln's chief judicial office
may issue a binding decision..."; therefore the court's broad interpretation of its jurisdiction in the preceding paragraph is balanced by the court's at-will authority to decline cases meeting this jurisdictional requirement. So while any Atlasian citizen can theoretically demand a 7.C hearing after noticing any trivial procedural error, this court can -- and will -- immediately reject any such litigious spammer.
Regardless: it is within the jurisdiction of this court to judge the case brought by the petitioner, and the court has chosen to exercise its right to do so.
II. Extent and Nature of Court's Authority
The authority of the court in a 7.C hearing is limited to the ability to "issue a binding decision dictating the proper interpretation" of
Rules of the Lincoln Council; the language used here is quite ambiguous. The phrase "issue a binding decision" indicates the court can compel the Lincoln Council to take certain actions, implying the court can (for example) overturn the results of a council vote that was held contrary to the council rules. However, the scope of this authority is limited by the four words that follow: "...dictating the proper interpretation". The court's authority to compel the Council is seemingly limited to providing errata for
Rules of the Lincoln Council, which must thereafter be adhered to alongside all other procedural rules.
An argument could be made that the court has the authority to overturn and/or annul council actions in the event that they violate a "proper interpretation" of rules that have already previously been dictated by the court in a previous 7.C case. The power to issue a binding decision implies the authority to compel adherence to the decision; a ruling can not truly be considered binding if it is unenforceable. However, this is an open question and irrelevant to the issue at hand. For the purposes of this decision, it is clear the court lacks the power to overturn the results of the recent no confidence vote in Chancellor S019.
Pragmatism is an important consideration here as well. Declaring the motion to be void would open a particularly difficult can of worms. It would significantly impede the Council's work if they were forced to overturn the vote and place everything they've done for the last two weeks in a legal limbo, especially when the result of the vote would be a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, as the counsel for the respondent explained, that would only be the tip of the iceberg. If S019's removal as chancellor should be repealed because it was conducted improperly, logical consistency would demand his initial election as chancellor also be repealed, because that vote was conducted in the same manner. Doing this would trigger a constitutional crisis and throw the regional government into chaos -- such an outcome should obviously be avoided.
Ultimately: in this instance the court lacks the authority to overturn the motion at the heart of this case, and even if it did, the court would be extraordinarily hesitant to exercise such authority. Instead, the purpose of this hearing is to examine the rules under dispute and to provide a definitive interpretation for the Council to follow.
III. Facts of the Case and Arguments Presented
Lincoln Council Speaker Dwarven Dragon
posted a thread titled "Motion of No Confidence" on the Regional Governments subforum on March 23 at 10:06 PM forum time. This post included a quote box containing a motion of no confidence against Lincoln Chancellor S019, followed by the instruction, "Members shall cast their votes on this motion." His post concluded with his own vote in favor of the motion.
One minute later, AGA voted in favor of the motion. At 10:36 PM, S019 cast the only vote against the motion. This was followed by the "aye" vote of Brother Johnathan at 10:42 PM. The final "aye" vote was cast by IBNU (current screen name "Liberal Hack") two hours later at 12:28 AM on March 24. Official Council business within the thread ended at 1:13 AM, three hours and seven minutes after the thread was first posted; the Speaker announced the motion passed, four votes in favor to one against.
Later that day, tack50 petitioned the Lincoln Court to overturn the vote, arguing that its passage violated both the Lincoln Constitution and the Lincoln Council's own procedural rules. Specifically, the petitioner asserted the motion's passage contravened Article I Section 12 of the Lincoln Constitution, which states:
12. The Council shall have the power to declare no confidence in the chancellor’s government. A motion of no confidence shall require a sufficient second to be voted on by the Council, and if this is achieved, a majority of the membership of the Council voting Aye or Nay is sufficient to declare non-confidence in the government. If a loss of confidence occurs in the government, the governor must call a snap election or appoint a new candidate for chancellor.
Tack50 also cited 3.A as one of several council rules that had been violated. It states the following:
A. All proposed legislation shall be open for debate for no less than 72 hours after the Speaker places it on the floor.
The respondent, Lincoln Speaker Dwarven Dragon, replied to the petitioner's claims and requested the dismissal of the case. The Speaker asserted the Constitution was not violated with a series of arguments, summarized as follows:
1. a second is still valid even if made off-site, in a private message sent to him on the Discord social networking platform
2. when a vote requires a second to begin, the second to open the vote is valid even if it's made after the vote has already begun without a second occurring. Also this second can take the form of a vote in the affirmative.
3. Rule 3.A does not apply because the motion is not legislation, because it does not require the governor's signature
4. Everything is valid regardless because he decided the rules were suspended at the time, he just didn't announce it, and because no one objected to his secret suspension of the rules, his suspension was valid. And even if someone did object, his secret suspension of the rules would have overridden this objection, because a sufficient supermajority voted in favor of the motion itself and these votes also count as votes in favor of suspending the rules that the voters had no way of knowing were being suspended at the time
The Speaker's counsel and the petitioner concurred most of these claims were not valid, but they are cited here regardless: these rules have still been disputed in this trial, so this opinion will clarify their proper interpretation.
The counsel for the respondent, Oakvale, provided a more substantial argument to support the validity of the contested motion. He posited that the vote of AGA should be interpreted as a de facto second, sufficient to formally open the vote. Neither Dwarven Dragon nor AGA cast a valid vote, as their votes were cast before the vote properly started, but the resulting vote total of 2 to 1 was still sufficient for the motion's passage.
Beyond this debate over seconds, the other central issue for this hearing was the term "legislation" -- specifically, how exactly it was defined by
Rules of the Lincoln Council, whether that definition covered the No Confidence Motion, and which if any of the confusing and often contradictory rules for legislation were applicable here.
These two components of the case, "seconds" and of "legislation", are the most significant points of contention, and will therefore be the primary issues considered by the court.
IV. A Matter of Seconds
When can a second be more than a second? Must a second be explicit, or is it also implied to exist within some other statement of support -- for example, an attempted vote? If one considers intention alone, that is certainly the case. A Council member casting a vote in support of a motion can be understood in more general terms as a Council member acting to support the eventual passage of the motion. Seconding the introduction of a motion expresses the very same intent, just at an earlier step in the parliamentary process. They are not strictly identical, of course, and it's not difficult to imagine hypothetical scenarios where a Council member would be willing to second a motion they intended to vote against, or would deliberately refrain from seconding a motion that they would nevertheless support if it still managed to reach a final vote. These exceptions are however rare, and regardless they are not relevant to the case at hand. The respondent is correct that the invalid vote made by AGA carries the same intention as if AGA had seconded the motion. However, is intention the only relevant factor?
The court would be remiss if it did not consider the procedural implications of the above assessment. Establishing a precedent that parliamentary motions such as a second can be implied could cause significant uncertainty and confusion. Allowing the Speaker to retroactively infer the existence of a second necessarily requires the retroactive invalidation of one or more votes. If one accepts that voting did not truly open until after the vote of AGA, then unfortunately one must also accept that the Speaker closed the vote prematurely with two votes still outstanding. Furthermore, given the "true" final vote of 2 to 1, those two outstanding votes were nominally still enough to tip the balance in the other direction. While in the present case this point is moot, in similar situations the outcome of the vote can be changed this way.
For example, consider the hypothetical of Brother Johnathan voting against the motion rather than supporting it. In such a scenario, the full council would have still passed the motion, 3 votes to 2. However, when the Speaker eventually realizes that they started the vote without a second and interprets AGA's vote as an implicit second, then suddenly the motion will have retroactively failed, 1 vote to 2. The problems could be even worse and result in even more votes being disqualified after the fact; for example, any "nay" votes made prior to the "implicit second" would also be removed. While the respondent's argument is a compelling interpretation of the specific vote currently under scrutiny in this case, applying its logic to other similar situations would instead actively subvert the will of the Council. The court is therefore very hesitant to accept the argument, even just for the specific scenario we now face.
Fortunately, however, the court does not need to accept the argument as a binding precedent in order to uphold its conclusion and validate the legitimacy of the no confidence motion. As established in Part II of this judgement (titled "Extent and Nature of Court's Authority") The Lincoln Court in this case lacks any authority to countermand or repeal the council's actions -- even if the court determines the actions had no legitimate legal basis. Fortunately, therefore, we can avoid a ruling that would destabilize the council without being forced to establish an unsatisfactory precedent in the name of pragmatism.
In the legislative process, proper adherence to protocol is a necessity. Parliamentary procedures are constructed to be clear and consistent so that every participant and observer can remain on the same page. Allowing the retroactive reinterpretation of votes into seconds would open a can of worms that is best left unopened. If a motion requires a second, the second should be explicitly declared as such. If the Speaker neglects to seek a required second before starting a vote, then that vote is simply not valid. The outcome of that vote is null and void; the Speaker's only option is to revert back to before the vote was held (or to not make such mistakes in the first place).
V. Legislation Legislation Legislation
Rules of the Lincoln Council uses the word "legislation" 45 times, the vast majority of which directly contradict one or more of the other 44. The term appears to have several different definitions and it would be exceedingly difficult to discern any sort of internally consistent logic to determine which rules are supposed to apply to which things throughout those 45 references. I fear such an effort is far beyond the scope of my own authority, as it would venture far beyond the scope of this trial. Even if I had the power to do so, however, it would not be appropriate to force upon the Lincoln Council a new edition of the rules it uses for itself. I can only suggest for the council to implement its own revision so that some semblance of consistency can be provided. I can only offer the following guidance.
It appears evident that most references to the word "legislation" refer to a category that includes every type of item the council can consider.
Section 9, "Terminology", provides the following context:
A. All legislation regarding the rules of the Council shall be called the Standing Orders.
B. All proposed legislation that requires the signature of the Governor shall be called a Bill until signed and thereafter an Act.
So items that will need the governor's signature are known as Bills, or Acts. They are explicitly merely a subset of legislation, which also is stated here to include internal resolutions such as the Standing Orders. Section 6 further clarifies that the motions both for electing and removing a Speaker are both considered legislation as well. This last reference is notable because it clarifies that the legislation for removing a Speaker must follow the rules of Section 3 (titled "Legislative Debates and Voting"), quoted below:
E. The Council may, at any time, remove the Speaker by making introducing repeal legislation to the introductory legislation of Section V, Part C.* The motion shall take precedence over all other motions and bills before the Council, and shall be conducted in the manner outlined in the section entitled legislative debates and voting. The Chancellor will designate a Councillor to preside in the place of the Speaker.
*while beyond the scope of this hearing, this reference to a nonexistent "Section V, Part C" most likely refers to subsection C of this very section (i.e. section 6), which describes the special legislation that must be passed before a new Speaker can take office. One can reasonably infer that the legislation to install a Speaker must be repealed to later remove that Speaker. A probable explanation for this error is that at some point an amendment inserted a new section above this one and the following sections were renumbered accordingly, but this specific reference was accidentally missed.This reference allows us to connect the references to "legislation" within Section 3 to the broader and more inclusive definition of the term found in Sections 6 and 9. In fact, once this association can be made, the source of the confusion is clear, as only one part of the
Rules of the Lincoln Council directly contradicts these other portions of the text.
Section 2 of
Rules of the Lincoln Council uses an aberrant definition of legislation fundamentally incompatible with the rest of the document. During the trial, the respondent argued the motion should not be considered legislation by quoting several portions of Section 2. They argued, convincingly, that the rules about "legislation" contained within this section could not possibly apply to the motion under review. However, after examining the full text in detail, it is clear the error occurs not from applying the label of "legislation" to the Motion, but rather from the nature of Section 2. The rules contained therein are not just incompatible with the Motion of No Confidence, they are also incongruous with several items explicitly labeled as legislation elsewhere in the Rules. The Court therefore finds Section 2 to be inapplicable due to its erroneous use of the term "legislation".
If examined closely, one can determine Section 2 does not actually pertain to all legislation like it claims to do; rather, it is intended to be a process for BILLS, not all legislation. Its author seems to have inappropriately used the wrong terminology. The evidence is clear: section 2 describes the consecutive steps required to create new laws by passing bills. One listed requirement is the creation of a thread titled "The BLANK Act", with BLANK being the name of the "legislation" in question. Another requirement is literally submitting it to the Governor for their signature. These both very clearly indicate the described process is only for bills/acts, not any other sort of legislation. This understanding of Section 2's limitation appears to be fully in accord with the existing practices of the Lincoln Council, so this court's interpretation is consistent the council's own interpretation, and likely matches the original intention of the author(s) as well.
Ultimately, The rules of Section 2 should only apply to bills/acts, not motions or the other forms of legislation named elsewhere in the rules. A Motion of No Confidence against the Chancellor should be interpreted as a form of legislation, and must therefore meet all applicable requirements contained within Section 3 that do not contradict the Lincoln Constitution itself.
VI. Preemptively Preventing Shenanigans
Out of an abundance of caution, the court will now consider certain
creative interpretations of parliamentary procedure proposed during the trial that it has not yet addressed, in order to prevent any ambiguity that might occur if not explicitly refuted.
A second must occur on this forum, and in fact must occur in the same thread as the thing being seconded. Furthermore, when a second is required for something to start happening, that second must occur BEFORE the thing starts happening. Assertions to the contrary are prima facie ridiculous and no further elaboration is required.
For a rule suspension under the auspices of Rule 7.B to be valid, the Speaker explicitly announces they are suspending the rules. Before this rule suspension can occur, the Speaker must wait until after the requisite time for objections has elapsed. A vote on suspending the rules must explicitly be declared as such during or prior to the start of that vote. A vote held on any topic other than suspending the rules can never suspend the rules under the auspices of Rule 7.B. A vote does not become exempted from the rules under the auspices of Rule 7.B just because a supermajority voted in favor of it. Any assertions to the contrary blatantly violate the plain reading of the Lincoln Council Rules and no further elaboration is required.
(post character limit reached, opinion continued below)
