Supreme Court of Atlasia
Nyman, DC
Beck v. Atlasia
Opinion of the Court
(Justices ilikeverin and Bacon King delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, save for Chief Justice windjammer, who recused himself from the case)
I
We must begin by noting the unorthodox nature of the suit at hand and its presentation to the court: namely, the nominal petitioner does not exist. Mr. Beck is a fictional creation of Oakvale, the true petitioner. Notably, neither Mr. Beck’s existence nor any facts of his case have been authorized by Atlasia’s GM. Nevertheless, the court affirms the legitimacy of Beck v. Atlasia as Oakvale himself has standing to sue. The nonexistence of the petitioner is immaterial. "Mr. Beck" is nothing more than a harmless flourish to the case as the specific details of his case are irrelevant to the constitutional issues under consideration. The court also notes, approvingly, that this practice would allow case names to be more distinct and varied, which is a benefit to the Atlasian jurisprudential tradition.
II
While their the arguments before the court were detailed and nuanced, perhaps the most prominent disagreement was determining which of the aforementioned cases was a more important precedent for this court.
Petitioner Oakvale argues the Hate Crimes Prevention Act is unconstitutional because an alternative sentencing schedule based on motive violates the constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and infringes upon the right to free speech. He cites the 2014 case of Snowstalker v. The Midwest as the most relevant precedent, which unanimously overturned a regional law concerning hate crimes.
The respondent, represented by Ted Bessell, counters that consideration of a suspect’s motive is a fundamental element of our criminal law tradition and inherently a crucial element of sentencing. He cites the 1993 United States Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v Mitchell as the most relevant precedent, which unanimously upheld a state law concerning hate crimes.
III
We find that neither case has status as binding constitutional precedent, as neither case was argued nor decided under the current Constitution. The jurisdictions described above did not operate under the same constitution. Thus, we are bound instead by common law principles derived from and relevant to our own Constitution.
This does not forestall our ability to use previous decisions under common law when determining our own interpretation of these systems. It is an intentional feature of common law legal systems such as our own that judges are permitted to look for answers in the jurisprudence of other common law systems whenever their own court's jurisdiction has no relevant law or jurisdiction of its own. This can be seen, for example, in the common law system of the United States, which in Evans v. Eaton and Pennock v. Dialogue, two of the most important foundational cases of United States patent law, relied on much older cases from courts in England. But the flexibility of this system does not require the idea that foreign precedent can be copied willy-nilly into our own courts; instead, it may be one factor of many that we as a Court are allowed to consult as a part of our deliberation and decision.
IV
Common law helps guide our thinking in the current case. It has long been established that motive can be a part of sentencing guidelines in criminal cases within common law jurisdictions. A gift to an elected official with one motive might be a "25th anniversary present", and in another be a "bribe", worthy of criminal prosecution. Entering someone's domicile is "trespassing" if done with one motive, and "burglary" if done with another, even if nothing is actually taken. The legislature is empowered by the common law tradition to take motive into consideration in determining sentencing guidelines. Hate crime statutes assign a different punishment based on the motive of the criminal, in line with numerous other laws. As our authority depends solely on the current constitution, we are not bound by either of the introduced precedents above but may instead rely on common law precendents enshrined in the present constitution.
V
The petitioner brings forward two claims for injury sustained under the current constitution. We find them both lacking.
(1) The petitioner indicates his client's free speech rights are violated by the hate crime legislation. But, as indicated above, this is a case about
motive, not about speech per se. It is true that Mr. Beck has espoused beliefs considered loathsome. Many members of the public may wish for him to be punished as a result of those beliefs. But the Hate Crimes Prevention Act does not punish Mr. Beck for having loathsome beliefs. Instead, it assigns him a punishment in line with the motives expressed around the crime. It is true that Mr. Beck spoke those motives in words; but this is an identical process to that which occurs to determine, say, premeditation in the case of murder. "I hope you die" is a loathsome statement when a murderer runs someone else over with a car, but the subsequent crime of "murder" (rather than "manslaughter") is not an impingement on free speech rights.
(2) The petitioner also argues the statute in question is a violation of equal protection rights under the Constitution. To be sure, those rights are of vital importance, but they are not at question in the case here. Mr. Beck is not being punished or privileged for being a part of a protected class, nor are constitutional rights being denied to him because of being a part of a purported group of "holders of certain beliefs". Many murderers have loathsome beliefs. Many people who are murdered are gay. Those two facts are not what the statute in question punishes. Instead, the statute assigns a punishment based, in part, on the motive for the crime, and says that some motives are to be punished more than others, just as occurs for bribery, trespass, homicide, and numerous other offenses.
Thus, the Court satisfies itself that there are no constitutional violations in the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, and allows the common law precedent above to be binding.
VI
We therefore
uphold this law on the grounds that common law considerations allow motive to be considered as a part of criminal sentencing. There are no relevant constitutional questions under the current constitution, and no binding precedent from the current constitution. This means that common law is where we must look for answers, and, when we do look there, the implications are clear: this law, as written, may stand.
The Supreme Court would like to thank the lawyers for their arguments in this case.
