Is it a smart strategy of the SPD choosing a member of Merkel's administration?

[buritobr]

SPD kanzlerkandidat in 2021 will be the Minister of Finance Olaf Scholz. It is not the first time the SPD candidate is a member of Merkel's administration. Don't you think that people happy with Merkel's administration will vote for... Merkel's party?

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

Maybe they enjoyed losing 76 seats in 2009?

[Clarko95 📚💰📈]

My understanding is that over the past 8 years, but especially over the past 4, the SPD has actually gotten quite a bit of what they want in terms of actual policy. So from that standpoint, sure.

But agreeing to yet another grand coalition has been disastrous from an electoral standpoint. So from that standpoint, no. With the CDU occupying the centre, Grüne snatching up young left-leaning and environmental voters, and Die Linke capturing the disaffected left wing voters, there is no guarantee that the SPD will regain its strength in opposition. Its brand could be permanently damaged and seen as a party of the past, and going forward it could find its position vis-a-vis die Grüne reversed compared to the 2000s (i.e. die Grüne is the largest centre-left party, the SPD its junior).

Of course, had it chosen to form a Red-Red-Green coalition in 2005 or 2013, this could have invited a backlash if the government was seen as too extreme, and  there is no guarantee that its relationship with die Linke would have been stable and productive, given that it would have been a 180-degree U-turn from the Schröder years. And that's IF they managed to agree to a government deal at all in the first place.

Perhaps if it had emerged as the largest party in 2005 and the CDU made the junior partner, the roles may have been reversed. Who knows.

EDIT - i realize now that i completely misread the question above

[CumbrianLefty]

Maybe they enjoyed losing 76 seats in 2009?

"More of the same that has got us where we are now - that will work!!"

[Middle-aged Europe]

The SPD essentially nominated a Chancellor-candidate for this election because "they had to". I think one of the current co-leaders had originally suggested not to nominate a Chancellor-candidate at all this time around, but that had generated some backlash within the party. The nomination then happened very quick, way in advance of the other (now) two major parties and without much of a debate, discussion, or even a contest. It has must have gone down like this:


Esken or Walter-Borjans: We need a Chancellor-candidate for next year's election. Is propose Olaf Scholz. Any further suggestions?

*silence*

Esken or Walter-Borjans: So is anyone opposed to Olaf Scholz becoming Chancellor-candidate?

*silence*

Esken or Walter-Borjans: Then it is decided. Congratulations, Olaf. Whats's next?

[Former President tack50]

Of course, had it chosen to form a Red-Red-Green coalition in 2005 or 2013, this could have invited a backlash if the government was seen as too extreme, and  there is no guarantee that its relationship with die Linke would have been stable and productive, given that it would have been a 180-degree U-turn from the Schröder years. And that's IF they managed to agree to a government deal at all in the first place.

Perhaps if it had emerged as the largest party in 2005 and the CDU made the junior partner, the roles may have been reversed. Who knows.

To be honest my argument in favour of a SPD-Linke-Grune coalition in 2005 (or 2013 but that one is harder and arguably undemocratic but still doable) is basically what happened here.

There are lots and lots of clips of Pedro Sanchez arguing "I will not do a coalition with UP"; "I will not make talks with Bildu"; "There will be no deals with the Catalan separatists", etc.

What did he do? He did a coalition with UP and did talks with Bildu and the Catalan separatists.

Of course the opposition uses those as attacks, yet the attacks don't really seem to stick all that much.

Hindsight of course, but Pedro Sanchez learned the lesson from the German SPD and the Greek PASOK; and he learned it the hard way after the 2016 Spanish election. A coalition with the far left is always going to be the lesser evil electorally. A coalition with them might hurt your polling numbers slightly. A coalition with the centre-right will sink your party forever.

Current Spanish polling does reveal that those decisions were unpopular, even among PSOE's electorate; yet the party is still polling decently well and has completely defused the possibility of UP beating PSOE. Meanwhile the fact that Grune will beat SPD is essencially a certainty now.

[Clarko95 📚💰📈]

(Just realized that I completely misread the title as "choosing to be a member of Merkel's administration" so my answer above makes no sense when read as a response to the original question and comes off as a total non sequiter, oopsies)


But to actually answer the question this time: perhaps. On one hand, Schulz is trusted, competent and known, on the other hand there is a desire for change among the electorate. But at the same time, no one else seemed to want it, and everyone seems to understand that it really doesn't matter because the CDU is almost certainly going to have the Chancellery after the election no matter who they go into coalition with. On the other hand, perhaps not having a chancellor candidate would be seen as an admission that they have no chance and are in decline, so having a candidate is just playing along.

So I would say "no", but simply because it doesn't matter and the SPD will almost certainly be in opposition after September.

[Astatine]

Of course, had it chosen to form a Red-Red-Green coalition in 2005 or 2013, this could have invited a backlash if the government was seen as too extreme, and  there is no guarantee that its relationship with die Linke would have been stable and productive, given that it would have been a 180-degree U-turn from the Schröder years. And that's IF they managed to agree to a government deal at all in the first place.

Perhaps if it had emerged as the largest party in 2005 and the CDU made the junior partner, the roles may have been reversed. Who knows.

To be honest my argument in favour of a SPD-Linke-Grune coalition in 2005 (or 2013 but that one is harder and arguably undemocratic but still doable) is basically what happened here.

There are lots and lots of clips of Pedro Sanchez arguing "I will not do a coalition with UP"; "I will not make talks with Bildu"; "There will be no deals with the Catalan separatists", etc.

What did he do? He did a coalition with UP and did talks with Bildu and the Catalan separatists.

Of course the opposition uses those as attacks, yet the attacks don't really seem to stick all that much.

Hindsight of course, but Pedro Sanchez learned the lesson from the German SPD and the Greek PASOK; and he learned it the hard way after the 2016 Spanish election. A coalition with the far left is always going to be the lesser evil electorally. A coalition with them might hurt your polling numbers slightly. A coalition with the centre-right will sink your party forever.

Current Spanish polling does reveal that those decisions were unpopular, even among PSOE's electorate; yet the party is still polling decently well and has completely defused the possibility of UP beating PSOE. Meanwhile the fact that Grune will beat SPD is essencially a certainty now.

A coalition in 2005 wouldn't have worked for various reasons:

- The SPD's surprisingly good result can mostly be attributed to Gerhard Schröder's personal popularity. While the majority clearly disapproved of the red-green governmental performance, Schröder himself was still far more popular than Angela Merkel. The thing is... The Left Party (or alliance, as PDS and WASG had not merged yet) in that form was basically founded by Schröder's biggest rival, Oskar Lafontaine, who abruptly resigned from his position as Finance Minister in 1999 due to disagreements with Schröder. As far as I know, they haven't talked in years. So either Schröder - who almost won the election against all expectations - would have to go or the Left would have fallen apart before it was even formed as party.
Especially on foreign policy, parts of the Left are still considered unreliable (especially by Greens and centrist SPD members).

- A coalition with the Left/PDS was not as acceptable at that time as it is nowadays. The PDS was still widely seen as the successor of the DDR state party SED, and the CDU regularly did negative campaigning against a constellation in which SPD and PDS would cooperate ("Rote-Socken-Kampagne"/red sock campaign). In 1994, the SPD in Saxony-Anhalt ousted the CDU from the state government by forming a minority government tolerated by the PDS, and that might have been a factor that cost SPD/Greens a win in the federal elections later that year. Opening up towards the PDS/Left Party was a long process, and I believe that the country was simply "not there yet" in 2005.

With hindsight, calling the snap elections at that point might have been Schröder's dumbest move. If he had waited until the regular end of his term, the SPD would have either lost quite badly, but could recover as major opposition force (if a Union/FDP coalition had imposed the radical reform programs they intended to realize, there would have likely been a strong backlash) or would have become largest party based on the first signs of economic recovery.

[Pick Up the Phone]

It's not like any other SPD candidate would have better chances. Poor Olaf Scholz is just this year's sacrificial lamb.

[buritobr]

The possible scenarios for Germany in 2020 are:

1) Keep the grand coalition (CxU/SPD), under the leadership of CxU
2) Jamaica coalition (CxU/FDP/Grünen)
3) Black red green coalition, maybe Libya coalition (CxU/SPD/Grünen), if the sum of the Volksparteien fail to reach >50%

Any other possible scenario?
SPD+Grünen+Linke will not reach >50%
CxU+FDP will not reach >50%
CxU, FDP and AfD will not build a coalition

[Alcibiades]

The possible scenarios for Germany in 2020 are:

1) Keep the grand coalition (CxU/SPD), under the leadership of CxU
2) Jamaica coalition (CxU/FDP/Grünen)
3) Black red green coalition, maybe Libya coalition (CxU/SPD/Grünen), if the sum of the Volksparteien fail to reach >50%

Any other possible scenario?
SPD+Grünen+Linke will not reach >50%
CxU+FDP will not reach >50%
CxU, FDP and AfD will not build a coalition

You didn’t mention the most likely scenario, which is a black-green coalition.

[jaymichaud]

The possible scenarios for Germany in 2020 are:

1) Keep the grand coalition (CxU/SPD), under the leadership of CxU
2) Jamaica coalition (CxU/FDP/Grünen)
3) Black red green coalition, maybe Libya coalition (CxU/SPD/Grünen), if the sum of the Volksparteien fail to reach >50%

Any other possible scenario?
SPD+Grünen+Linke will not reach >50%
CxU+FDP will not reach >50%
CxU, FDP and AfD will not build a coalition

#2 wouldn't require FDP

[buritobr]

Sure, according to today polls, CDU/CSU+Greens have >50%

[Former President tack50]

On these notes, can someone tell me why Linke is doing so poorly while it is Grüne the one that is gaining from the SPD collapse?

If you are one of the people abandoning the "SPD sellouts who always go with CDU" it makes no sense to vote Grüne, who will just as easily do coalitions with CDU?*

Is Linke still suffering from DDR stigma? Fear of Linke being a pariah party like AfD? Or is it something else?

*: Or actually even more so, one of my impressions from green parties in Europe is that they tend to "sell out" even easier than the socdem parties

[Alcibiades]

On these notes, can someone tell me why Linke is doing so poorly while it is Grüne the one that is gaining from the SPD collapse?

If you are one of the people abandoning the "SPD sellouts who always go with CDU" it makes no sense to vote Grüne, who will just as easily do coalitions with CDU?*

Is Linke still suffering from DDR stigma? Fear of Linke being a pariah party like AfD? Or is it something else?

*: Or actually even more so, one of my impressions from green parties in Europe is that they tend to "sell out" even easier than the socdem parties

Because the Greens and die Linke are completely different parties. Die Linke is unambiguously a left-wing, socialist party, whereas it is doubtful whether the Greens are even to the left of the SPD any more; they are essentially a moderate social liberal party. Their voter bases are completely different; the most fundamental difference is that die Linke are an East-based party, whereas the Greens’ strongholds are in the West, and more broadly the Greens’ coalition is significantly more upscale and educated. Whereas die Linke are probably competing with the AfD for a good amount of votes, the Greens have been able to pick off upper middle class professionals from the CDU. I would say that the Greens now have the bulk of younger centre-left voters, and it is mostly older people sticking with the SPD.

[palandio]

On these notes, can someone tell me why Linke is doing so poorly while it is Grüne the one that is gaining from the SPD collapse?

If you are one of the people abandoning the "SPD sellouts who always go with CDU" it makes no sense to vote Grüne, who will just as easily do coalitions with CDU?*

Is Linke still suffering from DDR stigma? Fear of Linke being a pariah party like AfD? Or is it something else?

*: Or actually even more so, one of my impressions from green parties in Europe is that they tend to "sell out" even easier than the socdem parties

The SPD has lost voters for all kinds of reasons into every immagineable direction.

I would think that voters that recently abandonned the SPD for the Greens don't really have a big problem with the politics of the SPD, Greens or moderate parts of the CDU. It's just that being a potential challenger to CDU/CSU was an electoral asset in itself and without that you can take the younger, hipper feel-good option that is also the natural choice if you care about climate change and similar issues.

Die Linke in its current outlook is just not what many who are discontent with the SPD and the government are looking for. Die Linke might try to fight for a just world and a better life for everyone. But many potential voters just don't think that Die Linke cares about the same things they care about. Plus due to Germany's Cold War history there seems to be a natural ceiling for parties that are (rightfully or not) associated with the radical left.

[palandio]

On these notes, can someone tell me why Linke is doing so poorly while it is Grüne the one that is gaining from the SPD collapse?

If you are one of the people abandoning the "SPD sellouts who always go with CDU" it makes no sense to vote Grüne, who will just as easily do coalitions with CDU?*

Is Linke still suffering from DDR stigma? Fear of Linke being a pariah party like AfD? Or is it something else?

*: Or actually even more so, one of my impressions from green parties in Europe is that they tend to "sell out" even easier than the socdem parties

Because the Greens and die Linke are completely different parties. Die Linke is unambiguously a left-wing, socialist party, whereas it is doubtful whether the Greens are even to the left of the SPD any more; they are essentially a moderate social liberal party. Their voter bases are completely different; the most fundamental difference is that die Linke are an East-based party, whereas the Greens’ strongholds are in the West, and more broadly the Greens’ coalition is significantly more upscale and educated. Whereas die Linke are probably competing with the AfD for a good amount of votes, the Greens have been able to pick off upper middle class professionals from the CDU. I would say that the Greens now have the bulk of younger centre-left voters, and it is mostly older people sticking with the SPD.

Die Linke has been changing though for the last decade. The party and its electoral base are becoming younger, more Western and more educated. The problem is that the new base of very progressive voters is growing but limited and that competition by smaller parties like DIE PARTEI, Pirates, Volt, Democracy in Movement, Animal Welfare, etc. can lead to electoral desasters like the last European Elections.

[njwes]

Do *Live~Laugh~Love* Chardonnay white girls constitute a notable Grüne constituency? 

[Astatine]

On these notes, can someone tell me why Linke is doing so poorly while it is Grüne the one that is gaining from the SPD collapse?

If you are one of the people abandoning the "SPD sellouts who always go with CDU" it makes no sense to vote Grüne, who will just as easily do coalitions with CDU?*

Is Linke still suffering from DDR stigma? Fear of Linke being a pariah party like AfD? Or is it something else?

*: Or actually even more so, one of my impressions from green parties in Europe is that they tend to "sell out" even easier than the socdem parties

Because the Greens and die Linke are completely different parties. Die Linke is unambiguously a left-wing, socialist party, whereas it is doubtful whether the Greens are even to the left of the SPD any more; they are essentially a moderate social liberal party. Their voter bases are completely different; the most fundamental difference is that die Linke are an East-based party, whereas the Greens’ strongholds are in the West, and more broadly the Greens’ coalition is significantly more upscale and educated. Whereas die Linke are probably competing with the AfD for a good amount of votes, the Greens have been able to pick off upper middle class professionals from the CDU. I would say that the Greens now have the bulk of younger centre-left voters, and it is mostly older people sticking with the SPD.

Die Linke has been changing though for the last decade. The party and its electoral base are becoming younger, more Western and more educated. The problem is that the new base of very progressive voters is growing but limited and that competition by smaller parties like DIE PARTEI, Pirates, Volt, Democracy in Movement, Animal Welfare, etc. can lead to electoral desasters like the last European Elections.

Created this little map to visualize the performance of the Left (respectively PDS/WASG alliance) in 2005 and 2017. The national result (8.7 and 9.2 % respectively) was almost identical, but you can clearly see how the Left lost ground in the East (+Saarland with the vanishing Lafontaine factor) while simultaneously gaining support in the West.

[Middle-aged Europe]

I can say that it is certainly intent and strategy of the Greens to harvest former SPD voters, including older ones. Why do you think they recently introduced legislation to raise the Hartz IV unemployment benefits from the current level of 439 Euro to 603? To troll the SPD who can't possibly pass something like this while being in a coalition with the CDU. Whether and to what extent this strategy will be successful remains to be seen... on September 26, to be precise. It is a bit of a challenge because it is an attempt to acquire new voters who are culturally pretty far away from the more traditional Green voter.

[palandio]

[...]
Created this little map to visualize the performance of the Left (respectively PDS/WASG alliance) in 2005 and 2017. The national result (8.7 and 9.2 % respectively) was almost identical, but you can clearly see how the Left lost ground in the East (+Saarland with the vanishing Lafontaine factor) while simultaneously gaining support in the West.

Which reminds me of the following map I created in 2013:


Basically 2009 was peak "populist voter coalition" for the Left. E.g. the Left got results of 17% in several villages in the Bavarian Forest and other Western German places where it was below 5% before and afterwards.

2013 meant a reversal to the mean in many of these places. On the other hand you can already see that the Left was holding up much better with the urban alternative crowd and with educated voters. The East was still relatively stable.

2017 brought severe losses in most of the East (not so much in the hip parts of big cities and university cities). On the other hand the Left gained in the West, not only in the cities but also to some degree in areas where it had been very weak before, the only exception being the poorest parts of the Ruhr area where the Left actually suffered modest losses.

[buritobr]

I remember the discussions in this forum in 2013. Some people told that a red-red-green coalition, although possible, would look like a coup and there would be many protests. The FDP and the AfD had 4.5% each one and failed to reach 5%. So, 9% of right-wing vote went to the garbage can. The sum of SPD, Grünen and Linke was ~42%, so, this left-wing coalition would not represent the will of the majority of the german people. But well, voting systems have loopholes...

In 2005, the results were different. SPD+Grünen+Linke had >50%. But the problem was that even if Die Linke was not anti-SPD, Die Linke was anti-Schröder.