Preliminaries for 2024

[pbrower2a]

Blank map:

I have no question that the state lines will remain the same in 2024. Could someone get me a map that includes Puerto Rico in case it achieves statehood?


Some things will not change, such as elections already done. Beginning in 2000 we have had six Presidential elections, only one of them arguably a landslide (2008).

 

Margin

Blue for Trump, Red for Biden

10-15% saturation 8
8-10% saturation 6
5-8% saturation 5
1-3% saturation 4
under 1% saturation 2

(two corrections were made in April 2020:

Gray... completely out of contest, and you know how those states and districts are oriented.

I am guessing, putting the wayward Second Congressional Districts of Maine and Nebraska in the middle category. As I make this map, Biden leads in New York state by 14.75%... but a significant number of votes are outstanding and they are largely in ultra-solid D New York City.*  Ohio slipped a category and New York City will push the state past a 15% category when the votes are fully counted.  

Fully thirty-one states were decided by 15% or more in 2020!  It is possible to say that the Trump Administration flooded some farm states with farm subsidies to distract voters in those states from the damage that his trade war with China caused.  How the states have voted beginning in 2000:

all six for the Republican
5 R, 1 D
4 R, 2D  
(white - 3R, 1D)
4 D, 2 R
5 D, 1 R
all six for the Democrat

That is six elections and the biggest changes since then have been

(1) that several states that once favored Democrats in Democratic wins and that even voted twice for Bill Clinton in the 1990's have swung completely to the GOP and haven't gotten close
(2) the West Coast went from the fringe of competitiveness for Republicans to out of reach for them
(3) Virginia went from the sort of state that never voted for a Democrat except in a landslide (from 1952 to 2004 it had gone D only for LBJ in 1964) to strongly D; New Mexico went from shaky D to strong D; Colorado went from iffy in D landslides to solid D.
(4) the fast-growing Mexican-American vote in the southwestern United States is making Arizona and even Texas shaky for Republican nominees for President.
(5) The Republican Party has lost its appeal to the educated part of the urban middle class.

Not shown on this map: the urban-suburban difference in politics is becoming a triviality as suburban areas lose their old rural character (white populations, low density and relatively recent infrastructure that has low costs of maintenance) and become more urban (less white, higher density as apartment complexes replace the 70-year-old 'starter homes' of WWII veterans, and obsolete infrastructure in need of costly repairs or rebuilding).

If you want to consider the 1990's, in case anyone has any idea that states that went for Bill Clinton, often solidly, in the 1990's, could imaginably go back to the Democrats... I don't see that happening. Clinton won Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and West Virginia twice, and those look like the last times that those states will ever vote for a Democratic nominee for president for a very long time.  Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Montana went for Clinton once in the 1990's.

all six for the Republican
all six for the Republican, but twice for Clinton in the 1990's
all six for the Republican, but once for Clinton in the 1990's
5 R, 1 D
4 R, 2D  
(white - 3R, 1D)
4 D, 2 R
5 D, 1 R
all six for the Democrat

Clinton split in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Montana... and any of those could be D wins in 2024 except perhaps Montana -- and Colorado looks like a sure thing in anything other than the wake of a disaster by Biden. Biden or Harris has a better chance of winning Texas, which has not voted for a Republican nominee for President since 1976 than of any state in green.

*Update: the Biden margin went over 20% in New York State as votes largely from New York City came in to complete the count. New York State was close to close to being in the contest zone, but it proved otherwise.  

[pbrower2a]

Let's look at the Lichtman test already. I am predicting some things based upon the age of the President and patterns of political behavior from the last thirty years. Strange things can happen and change everything. I can imagine scenarios in which President Biden changes many patterns of political behavior and Americans accept such as a new normal. I regret to say that I said much the same about the incoming Obama administration. I thought that Obama would be at least an above-average President because he had much going for him.

red -- probably favors the Democrats under almost any circumstances
blue -- probably favors the Republicans under almost any circumstances
purple -- depends on Biden seeking a second term (positive)
green -- far too early to determine  

1) Party Mandate: After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives than after the previous midterm elections.

This is a tough standard, but Joe Biden has shown weak (if any) coattails. The Party out of the White House almost always gains seats in the House, even if that President is Eisenhower, Reagan, or Obama. This will paradoxically be the first of the keys to be decided once and for all. 
 
2) Contest: There is no serious contest for the incumbent party nomination.

If Biden runs for re-election, but otherwise I can easily see a contested primary among Democrats, which would help the Republican nominee.

3) Incumbency: The incumbent party candidate is the sitting president.

See #2. Biden is past "life expectancy at birth".

4) Third party: There is no significant third party or independent campaign.

This measure would hurt the Democratic nominee on the surface even if it were the Right side of the political spectrum that splintered between a successor to the Trump cult and more conventional (Bush-like Presidents... either one) Republicans.

5) Short-term economy: The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.

Anyone who bets on timing the business cycle except toward the end of a downturn as things start to get better is a fool. Good investments are possible based on the financial strength, marketing competence, and ability to adapt technology for profit.    

6) Long-term economy: Real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth during the previous two terms.

The average of strong and consistent economic growth of the second term of Obama and the erratic growth under Trump likely makes this work against the Democratic nominee of 2024.

7) Policy change: The incumbent administration effects major changes in national policy.

Undoing Trump's perverse changes will be adequate for the Democratic nominee in 2024. Joe Biden has an agenda and he is likely to get something done.

8 ) Social unrest: There is no sustained social unrest during the term.

Biden is Establishment. He's not going to stir up trouble. He's just too cautious to do something really stupid, like getting America into a nasty war. I expect a Biden administration to be far more quiet than what we saw under Trump, and that could make all the difference in the world.  

9) Scandal: The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.

Obama has shown how that is done, and I expect Biden to follow.

10) Foreign/military failure: The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.

Biden isn't reckless, and he knows enough to trust the intelligence services more than his gut feelings. In that I expect basically a "third term" of you-know-who. Note well that Republicans will make a mountain of any mole-hill.

11) Foreign/military success: The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs.

How is your crystal ball working?

12) Incumbent charisma: The incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.

Most likely the Democratic nominee will be either Joe Biden or Kamala Harris, neither of whom exudes charisma. I can't see anyone else in the Democratic Party bringing that to his or her campaign, can you?

13) Challenger charisma: The challenging party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.

See 12. Charisma is in short supply in both Parties.

I have three already blue as most likely to be such (although we shall have a definitive answer on the first one only in November 2022, but that will be one of the first decided that will stick). Two depend upon Biden seeking re-election, and those favor the Republicans in the event that someone other than Biden is the Democratic nominee.

I see four keys likely to work for Biden because those are consistent with his character (I expect unrest that Trump provoked through bumbling or incendiary rhetoric to fade quickly, and Biden has done nothing to enrich himself off his holding of an office in the past. There are plenty of ways, like taking a sinecure at some partisan or ideological institution, profiting off insider information on legislation, directing a highway so that it enriches undeveloped land that he bought for quick appreciation, or selling large numbers of a book that few people read). Still, if Biden should be a one-term President, even if for reasons of health, then five of Lichtman's keys will likely have turned in favor of the Republican nominee, and only one would give the Republican the edge.      

[pbrower2a]

Poll closing times, 2020. These may change. Consider that all states, in accordance with the COVID-19 plague, made voting by absentee ballot or mail far easier than normal; some states could revert to old practices in 2024 in accordance with legislation.

I cannot say that states will complete counting their votes (aside from election-day votes) soon after polls close as they did before 2020. Ignore districts in Maine and Nebraska.

Closing time for the entire state, all times EST or EDT:

7PM  
7:30
8:00
8:30
9:00
10:00
11:00
midnight
1 AM (Wednesday)


Pastel colors: light blue is 8PM; lime green is 8:30 PM; yellow is 9 PM; light orange is 10 PM

*polls close in accordance with local time, so the more westerly zone closes one hour later than the polls in the more easterly zones
**in states that straddle time zones, polls close at the same time across the state
***county option in some parts of the more westerly time zone
! (from the source):

Polling hours end at 8:00p MST (0300 UTC) / 8:00p PST (0400 UTC). Oregon votes by mail. Ballots must be in the hands of election workers or in an official drop-off location no later than 8 PM local time. OREGON is the reverse of the norm because the by far largest portion of the state is in the lagging time zone and the networks have no choice but to not consider the OREGON polls closed until 8 PM Pacific.

Colors shown have no bearing on the partisan lean of the state.

http://www.thegreenpapers.com/G16/closing.phtml?format=gc

Puerto Rico, should it attain statehood:

In 2014, Grand and San Juan counties switched to vote by mail.

Ballots are mailed to registered voters 28 days prior to the election. Returned ballots must be postmarked no later than the day before the election. The final canvass must be completed no later than 14 days after the election.

This is 2016 data, but polls closed at 5 PM Atlantic Time, which is advanced one hour before Eastern Time (4 PM) I would expect changes in the pattern in the event that Puerto Rico is admitted to the Union.

[pbrower2a]

Participation in the Presidential election, 2020:

159.68 million total ballots cast (includes ballots cast for other offices than POTUS + blank votes)

That's 66.7% of the VEP (voting-eligible population => 18+ year-old citizens)

 

Red is for a state that went for Biden, and blue for a state that went for Trump. Ignore districts of Maine and Nebraska.

Maximum; 80.0% MN; minimum 55.0% OK

saturation:
9 for 80% (MN)*
8 75.0-75.9%
7 71.0-74.9%
6 68.5-70.9%
5 66.0-68.4% (this includes the national average)
4 60.0-64.9%
3 55.1-55.9%
2 for 55% (OK)*

Some comments:

1. The highest voter participation rates  are generally along the northern tier of states (except New York, and the East Coast, with extensions or outliers in Iowa, Colorado, Utah, and Oregon.

2. Lowest rates of voting are mostly in an arc from Texas to West Virginia, and these all went R. Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, and New York have rather low rates of voter participation, and nearly uncontested main elections in many parts of their states.    

3, It is easy to see Minnesota as a very liberal state, but without the extreme rate of voting it would be much closer to average in its politics.

4. Democrats won Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Georgia by getting out the vote. With voting closer to the national average, these states would have gone R. See also Arizona and Pennsylvania which also went D (barely); a reduction of not-so-usual votes would have moved the states into the Trump category. Democrats came close to winning North Carolina, and that was on turnout.

5. Texas had below average turnout and was close. More turnout might have flipped the state.

6. Alaska, Montana, and especially Iowa voted firmly R despite high turnout. Ohio was about average, so getting more turnout might flip the state (see Texas and perhaps Florida or North Carolina). Democrats' problems in Ohio and Texas are turnout, but that is the least of Democrats' problems in Alaska, Iowa, or Montana.  
 

 Here's the spreadsheet:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1h_2pR1pq8s_I5buZ5agXS9q1vLziECztN2uWeR6Czo0/edit#gid=2030096602

[pbrower2a]

Handicapping 2024:

31 states were decided by 15% or more. Because practically no state ever moves 15% from one election to the next, this part is easy. No state or district decided by more than 15% that has not gone for a Party other than that for which it voted for President since 2000 has any chance of voting differently  from how it voted in 2020.

Thus:

I'm guessing on ME-01, NE-01, and NE-03.

All are at a saturation of 9. Everything is simply wrong for any state or district in these categories for anything to break them away from their recent patterns of voting. The political culture in the state is entrenched over six elections, and states never swing 15% even for a Favorite Son advantage. Demographic change happens, but not that fast.

The 2020 Presidential election was a 51-47 split, and since 1960 the minimum for an incumbent facing re-election is 41% in a binary election (Carter in 1980), and about 38% as minimum for the party challenging an incumbent (McGovern in 1972). 15% leaves a huge range that includes those extremes. Biden or Harris will get a minimum of 41% of the popular vote should the Biden administration be a catastrophic failure but under no circumstance does either Biden or Harris get more than 61% of the popular vote in 2024. Either way allows a 10% swing, but that might allow a 15% swing in some states and 5% in others.

Symmetry strikes again! So I have two crude depictions of extreme results that one could foresee before Inauguration Day:

Biden/Harris failure:

Dark shades are wins by 10% or more, medium shades are for wins between 5 and 9.99%, and light shades are for less than 5%.

This is a crude 10% even swing toward the GOP nominee who has a bold solution to America's problems (basically, smash every social reform in over 100 years, and things will go right for the people for whom things must go right if any good is to ever happen. Prosperity at any time within the next twenty years (probably more) will be impossible without maximal suffering for everyone else. That is the most reactionary expression of social policy possible, and there are people who believe it.

Now suppose that the Republican nominee offers something like that when things are going fairly well. That would be good for about an LBJ landslide over Barry Goldwater, who scared people with the prospect of nuclear war due to his reckless rhetoric. The same legend applies:

Again, dark shades are wins by 10% or more, medium shades are for wins between 5 and 9.99%, and light shades are for less than 5%.

Well, 10% even swings are never quite so crude from one election to another. Some states are more elastic than others. Cultural trends are real (the rise of the Religious Right may have done more to wreck Carter than anything else by creating a cultural environment in which he could never win even if more things went right), and so are demographic changes.

So... starting with the saturation of 9 for states that I see as 99+certainties for one Party or another, I subtract 2 for being decided between 12% and 15% in the 2020 election or having been decided once or twice for the other Party between 2000 and 2020, inclusively. That means Indiana, Kansas, and South Carolina.  

Longshots happen, but over four years much can happen. I'd say that states at 70% saturation are about 95% chances for their Parties now.

(to be continued)
 

[pbrower2a]

I chose a gap between 90% and 70% saturation for visibility. Lower levels of saturation are easier to distinguish.

A 60% saturation applies to states that either were decided by 10% or more in 2020 and have gone no more than twice in the last twenty years against the Party for which they voted  or by 7% or more for but no more than once for the Other Party.

Longshots happen, but over four years much can happen. I'd say that states at 60% saturation are about 90% chances for their Parties now.

Surprises become more possible as we get into this range. With 50% saturation I can distinguish Iowa from Ohio as having more of a chance of going D in 2024 because it has more of a history of voting for Democrats in the last twenty years. That probably matters at least as much as that Texas was closer in 2020, Texas not having voted for a Republican nominee for president since 1976... and Texas had never been close since 2000. Iowa at least gave a majority of its aggregate House vote to Democrats in 2018, so it is less solid an R state than Texas, Ohio, or perhaps even Florida.

 Trends are real, but so is the Plexiglass principle that Nate Silver's rival (Bill James) uses in analyzing baseball. Bill James puts it this way: did you see the young hitter who went from a slick-fielding, low-hitting middle infielder who changed his swing a little so that he got better plate coverage or started developing more strike-zone judgment and starts fouling off pitches that he has been hitting as weak flies or ground balls so that he has gone suddenly from being a .240 hitter with practically no home runs to a sudden star as a .320 hitter with about 20 home runs a year and 40 more walks? What do you think he will do the next year?  .400 with about 40 home runs a year and 80 more walks than two years earlier? No. Just no. He is not the new Ted Williams.  He's more likely to see pitchers change their ways around him, not throwing pitches that he used to chase, and if he has become really good at hitting fairly-good fastballs, he might quit seeing any fastballs other than the sorts of fastballs that Sandy Koufax used to throw.  He is more likely to hit .290 with 15 home runs. He has gone from being a marginal player to the new Alan Trammell if not the new Cal Ripken. 

Inertia is real, but bounce-back is just as likely. I see more possibility of bounce-back for Democrats in Iowa than in Ohio, and I expect us to see over the next four years why why Texas hasn't gone D over even been close in any but one of the last six elections. The Texas Republican party has institutional strengths such as keeping relatively few drop-off sites in some counties with very large populations. The Plexiglass Principle may work better for the Texas Republican party than for the Iowa Republican Party.  Florida looks like a better chance for the Democrats because it was closer... but Republicans found a way in which to appeal to core fears of many voters, exploiting the fear of 'socialism'. I may not like it, but it was powerful enough to turn Florida from a likely Democratic win into a Republican win. The hatred that Floridians of Cuban and Venezuelan origin toward Commie and near-Commie leaders who have messed up those countries is not going away.  The Florida Republican Party has institutional strengths that can decide a close election in its favor. I put Florida, Texas, and Iowa in the same group of about 70% for the Parties for which the went in 2020.

[pbrower2a]

Now we get into the zone of really-close states. 40% saturation applies to states decided by between 1% and 2% in which the state has gone no more than twice (that applies to Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania). These states clearly give edges to the Party that won in 2020. The margin of less than 1% in Wisconsin requires a lower category at 30% saturation. That is the distinction between a 60% chance for the Party winning the state's electoral votes in 2020 doing so again in states that they won then and about 55%. That Wisconsin has voted 5 times in 6 years for Democratic nominees for President matters more than the tiny margin of Biden's victory.

 

Finally (and I am not going to say anything on ME-02 and NE-02 because I do not know the margins) I can address Arizona and Georgia. I live in neither state, and I have little access to news media from them. They did go for Biden, which counts for something, but so does the fact that those states have voted only once in the last six Presidential elections, and twice in the last eight, for the Democratic nominee. These states have been edging closer toward the Democratic side over recent years from being on the fringe of contest. The margins of Democratic wins are at least on the side that Democrats want, but as D states in Presidential elections they remain on "double-secret probation". I give the Republicans a marginal chance of winning either. 20% saturation.

These two states have had machine politics for the Republican Party for more than twenty years, and political machines can die due to corruption, incompetence, or demographic change. Just look at Arkansas and West Virginia about twenty years ago. The Ohio and Texas Republican machines have much more going for them than do the Republican machines of Arizona and Georgia. Even so, I do not predict trends four years out unless they involve something so inexorable as demographic change.

If anyone has the margins for ME-02 or NE-02 I will be delighted to make the appropriate revision.   

 

[BigVic]

Poll closing times, 2020. These may change. Consider that all states, in accordance with the COVID-19 plague, made voting by absentee ballot or mail far easier than normal; some states could revert to old practices in 2024 in accordance with legislation.

I cannot say that states will complete counting their votes (aside from election-day votes) soon after polls close as they did before 2020. Ignore districts in Maine and Nebraska.

Closing time for the entire state, all times EST or EDT:

7PM  
7:30
8:00
8:30
9:00
10:00
11:00
midnight
1 AM (Wednesday)


Pastel colors: light blue is 8PM; lime green is 8:30 PM; yellow is 9 PM; light orange is 10 PM

*polls close in accordance with local time, so the more westerly zone closes one hour later than the polls in the more easterly zones
**in states that straddle time zones, polls close at the same time across the state
***county option in some parts of the more westerly time zone
! (from the source):

Polling hours end at 8:00p MST (0300 UTC) / 8:00p PST (0400 UTC). Oregon votes by mail. Ballots must be in the hands of election workers or in an official drop-off location no later than 8 PM local time. OREGON is the reverse of the norm because the by far largest portion of the state is in the lagging time zone and the networks have no choice but to not consider the OREGON polls closed until 8 PM Pacific.

Colors shown have no bearing on the partisan lean of the state.

http://www.thegreenpapers.com/G16/closing.phtml?format=gc

Puerto Rico, should it attain statehood:

In 2014, Grand and San Juan counties switched to vote by mail.

Ballots are mailed to registered voters 28 days prior to the election. Returned ballots must be postmarked no later than the day before the election. The final canvass must be completed no later than 14 days after the election.

This is 2016 data, but polls closed at 5 PM Atlantic Time, which is advanced one hour before Eastern Time (4 PM) I would expect changes in the pattern in the event that Puerto Rico is admitted to the Union.

The panhandle closes at 7PM and parts of MI closes at 8AM. Parts of ID reports results at 10PM

[SingingAnalyst]

Now we get into the zone of really-close states. 40% saturation applies to states decided by between 1% and 2% in which the state has gone no more than twice (that applies to Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania). These states clearly give edges to the Party that won in 2020. The margin of less than 1% in Wisconsin requires a lower category at 30% saturation. That is the distinction between a 60% chance for the Party winning the state's electoral votes in 2020 doing so again in states that they won then and about 55%. That Wisconsin has voted 5 times in 6 years for Democratic nominees for President matters more than the tiny margin of Biden's victory.

 

Finally (and I am not going to say anything on ME-02 and NE-02 because I do not know the margins) I can address Arizona and Georgia. I live in neither state, and I have little access to news media from them. They did go for Biden, which counts for something, but so does the fact that those states have voted only once in the last six Presidential elections, and twice in the last eight, for the Democratic nominee. These states have been edging closer toward the Democratic side over recent years from being on the fringe of contest. The margins of Democratic wins are at least on the side that Democrats want, but as D states in Presidential elections they remain on "double-secret probation". I give the Republicans a marginal chance of winning either. 20% saturation.

These two states have had machine politics for the Republican Party for more than twenty years, and political machines can die due to corruption, incompetence, or demographic change. Just look at Arkansas and West Virginia about twenty years ago. The Ohio and Texas Republican machines have much more going for them than do the Republican machines of Arizona and Georgia. Even so, I do not predict trends four years out unless they involve something so inexorable as demographic change.

If anyone has the margins for ME-02 or NE-02 I will be delighted to make the appropriate revision.   

 

Very thorough analysis that I agree with. Things are likely to remain close for the foreseeable future. If each state and district votes in 2024 as it did in 2020, Dems win 302-236 based on projected reapportionment. If GA flips back to R the Dems still win 286-252. Then again, NC could flip to D in 2024 (though perhaps that is unlikely with Haley on the ticket?)

On the whole, very close, with Dems enjoying a slight edge. MI-WI-PA in 2016 was a fluke, and AZ will probably continue to trend D in the near future.

[pbrower2a]

We obviously do not know what the approval ratings will be for Joe Biden or (in the event that something goes terribly wrong with President Biden's health) Kamala Harris, but we should have a reliable idea of who wins based on approval ratings in January or February 2024:

If Biden trys to govern like a wishy washy 90s democrat then he will be in the low 40s but if he actually makes a case for his presidency and works to engage with his base then maybe high 40s wont be too bad.

That being said, I dont think people in the Biden era will obsess over approval rating like they did in the Trump era

Based on early measures of approval for his transition, President-elect Biden has much more room for error than did Donald Trump. The surest way to lose a re-election, other than outright incompetence is to buck a trend when first elected with that trend striking back. Carter may not have been a thoroughly awful President, but he was President when the Religious Right ballooned and quickly found him not Right enough.  Trump won despite demographic tendencies toward a more liberal political environment.

I remind you of what Nate Silver said of incumbents running for re-election: if their early support is 43.5% early in the electoral season (probably January or February) they have about a 50% chance of winning re-election with a competent and spirited campaign. This applies for both Parties and even in wave years. An exception is for appointed pols who never won the race to begin with and have yet to show that they could. A Tim Scott or a Tina Smith gets elected for the first time by having a campaign good enough for someone who won election the first time. Martha McSalley showed that she was not up to it.

Once legislating or governing an elected pol must make choices that will disappoint some of his voters. That's probably good enough to have an initial approval sink from 53 to 47 or so. That is not the end. One will need to campaign to get re-elected. Practically all politicians seeking re-election end up campaigning, as it is not mere habit or for the fun of it; it is necessary for getting re-elected.

Maybe it is not as simple as it seems. Still, Barack Obama got re-elected and Donald Trump didn't. Obama's weakest approval ratings were around 45%, which explains why he could get 51% of the popular vote in in 2012. Trump's approval ratings at a similar time were around 40%. That Obama seemed a better campaigner, less of a trouble-maker, a more coherent speaker, and a scandal-free administrator mattered less for getting re-elected for Obama than did starting the campaign season with about 5% stronger approval than that of Donald Trump.. who likewise parlayed about 40% approval into about 47% of the popular vote. 47% of the popular vote was enough to make the Electoral College fairly close, but it was not enough for a win of the Electoral College.

Obviously, performance matters, and so does some luck. Obviously most of us expect COVID-19 to exit the scene.,, and for some measure of economic rebound as people do again what they did before "Rona" started stalking us. Joe Biden seems to have good political instincts in contrast to Donald Trump, the current President having had no idea of how to be a politician at any level from city councilman to Governor, Senator, or Cabinet Secretary.          

[pbrower2a]

On the day on which Congress officially counts the electoral vote... both Houses of Congress would have to concur that significant fraud took place to the detriment of President Trump for any nullification of the vote of the Electoral College. Republicans will still have an effective 50-48 advantage in the Senate because two Senate seats from Georgia remain vacant pending the run-off election, but Democrats have a clear majority in the House.

On January 6, both Houses of Congress set forth in their appointed, largely ceremonial duties of officially counting the electoral vote before they were... shall I say, rudely interrupted by people who refused to accept that Joe Biden won fair-and-square and that Donald Trump didn't? That could have huge ramifications upon the 2024 Presidential election.

[pbrower2a]

Cook PVI ratings by states:

2020 PVI (change from 16. + for more R; - for more D)

AL- R+15 (+1)
AK- R+8 (-1)
AZ- R+2 (-3)
AR- R+16 (+2)
CA- D+14 (-2)
CO- D+3 (-2)
CT- D+7 (-1)
DE- D+6 (0)
FL- R+3 (+1)
GA- R+3 (-2)
HI- D+14 (+4)
ID- R+19 (0)
IL- D+7 (0)
IN- R+11 (+2)
IA- R+6 (+3)
KS- R+11 (-1)
KY- R+16 (+1)
LA- R+12 (+2)
ME- D+2 (+1)
MD- D+14 (-2)
MA- D+14 (-2)
MI- R+1 (+2)
MN- D+1 (0)
MS- R+10 (+1)
MO- R+11 (+2)
MT- R+11 (0)
NE- R+13 (-1)
NV- EVEN (+1)
NH- EVEN (0)
NJ- D+6 (+1)
NM- D+3 (0)
NY- D+10 (+1)
NC- R+3 (0)
ND- R+20 (+3)
OH- R+6 (+3)
OK- R+20 (0)
OR- D+6 (-1)
PA- R+2 (+2)
RI- D+8 (+3)
SC- R+8 (0)
SD- R+16 (+2)
TN- R+14 (0)
TX- R+5 (-3)
UT- R+13 (-7)
VT- D+15 (0)
VA- D+2 (-1)
WA- D+8 (-1)
WV- R+23 (+4)
WI- R+2 (+2)
WY- R+26 (+1)

Districts:

District level. (Figures calculated. Thanks to DKE elections)

ME-1: D+8 (nc)
ME-2: R+6 (+4)

NE-1: R+11
NE-2: R+1
NE-3: R+30

for the districts whose district-wide votes can go differently from the State at-large and matter

[pbrower2a]

Now we get into the zone of really-close states. 40% saturation applies to states decided by between 1% and 2% in which the state has gone no more than twice (that applies to Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania). These states clearly give edges to the Party that won in 2020. The margin of less than 1% in Wisconsin requires a lower category at 30% saturation. That is the distinction between a 60% chance for the Party winning the state's electoral votes in 2020 doing so again in states that they won then and about 55%. That Wisconsin has voted 5 times in 6 years for Democratic nominees for President matters more than the tiny margin of Biden's victory.

 

Finally (and I am not going to say anything on ME-02 and NE-02 because I do not know the margins) I can address Arizona and Georgia. I live in neither state, and I have little access to news media from them. They did go for Biden, which counts for something, but so does the fact that those states have voted only once in the last six Presidential elections, and twice in the last eight, for the Democratic nominee. These states have been edging closer toward the Democratic side over recent years from being on the fringe of contest. The margins of Democratic wins are at least on the side that Democrats want, but as D states in Presidential elections they remain on "double-secret probation". I give the Republicans a marginal chance of winning either. 20% saturation.

These two states have had machine politics for the Republican Party for more than twenty years, and political machines can die due to corruption, incompetence, or demographic change. Just look at Arkansas and West Virginia about twenty years ago. The Ohio and Texas Republican machines have much more going for them than do the Republican machines of Arizona and Georgia. Even so, I do not predict trends four years out unless they involve something so inexorable as demographic change.

If anyone has the margins for ME-02 or NE-02 I will be delighted to make the appropriate revision.   

 

Very thorough analysis that I agree with. Things are likely to remain close for the foreseeable future. If each state and district votes in 2024 as it did in 2020, Dems win 302-236 based on projected reapportionment. If GA flips back to R the Dems still win 286-252. Then again, NC could flip to D in 2024 (though perhaps that is unlikely with Haley on the ticket?)

On the whole, very close, with Dems enjoying a slight edge. MI-WI-PA in 2016 was a fluke, and AZ will probably continue to trend D in the near future.

Revision: I'm going to put ME-02 in the same category as Iowa and NE-02 in the same category as Arizona and Georgia.

[pbrower2a]

Cook PVI ratings by states:

sat amt

8   15 or higher
6   11 to 14
5     8 to 10
4     6 or 7
3     3 to 5
2     1 0r 2
1 (white) even

[pbrower2a]

So here is how the approval polls go for Biden at the start, with some commentary:

First Reuters/Ipsos poll on Biden-

Approve: 55%
Disapprove: 32%

Trump's first poll had him at 43%.

https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-01/2021_reuters_tracking_-_core_political_presidential_approval_tracker_01_22_2021.pdf

Assessment:

Expectations were far lower for Donald Trump than for Joe Biden. Hillary Clinton tore deeply into Trump without defeating him where it counted (the Electoral College), and Trump started with little room for failure.

Although it is possible to begin with astronomical support at the start of one's Administration and still lose a re-election bid (Jimmy Carter, and had there been polling in early 1929 it would have almost certainly given high hopes for Herbert Hoover) it is far more difficult to be President if one's initial support is shaky.

President Biden has much more political capital at his disposal than did Donald Trump. We all know what Trump did as President  (satisfying his Base but doing little for anyone else)... and it obviously did not work to get him re-elected. It is never enough to please the Base and not seek new supporters unless one starts with a clear majority. Add to this, Donald Trump is a terribly-flawed person who had no preparation for the Presidency. Experience in business has little relevance to success in public office because government does not operate as a profit-and-loss entity. The only political systems in which government activity largely operates on a profit-and-loss basis are "socialist" states in which the government owns and operates practically all economic activity, as in North Korea today and the Soviet Union in its infamous past. 

With more political capital and fewer deficiencies of character (admit it, Republicans -- Donald Trump is a loathsome character, and you would have been better off with someone more like Mitt Romney or the late Gerald Ford as President!) Joe Biden will be able to take more chances to appeal to people not in the Democratic base through legitimate achievement.

At this point I am getting into the realm of prediction without having adequate data. It is possible to have 45% approval at a low point and get re-elected. Incumbents do that more often than not for Senatorial and Gubernatorial offices. There will be people who expect certain things out of President Biden and do not get them. They will not vote for him in 2024.

Cultural change did not work in Trump's favor. I cannot assume that it will for President Biden. I cannot predict how strong an opponent he will face in 2024. I cannot predict whether America will be in hard or easy (or clearly improving) economic times.

We have this poll. President Biden got 51% of the popular vote while barely winning the Electoral College (a 0.32% even shift of the popular vote would have put the election in the House of Representatives in a tie at 269-269, which Trump would have won) which is far better as a prospect of the next election than getting just under 46% of the popular vote but winning the Electoral College because one wins the "right" states.

I do not know what conclusion to draw from Biden getting a share of the total popular vote higher than that of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Nothing says that Joe Biden will be more successful as President than Ronald Reagan in getting re-elected in the next election.

It's too early to say anything that isn't already obvious. This allows one to draw some early conclusions that most likely will not hold. .

[pbrower2a]

Let's look at the Lichtman test already. I am predicting some things based upon the age of the President and patterns of political behavior from the last thirty years. Strange things can happen and change everything. I can imagine scenarios in which President Biden changes many patterns of political behavior and Americans accept such as a new normal. I regret to say that I said much the same about the incoming Obama administration. I thought that Obama would be at least an above-average President because he had much going for him.

red -- probably favors the Democrats under almost any circumstances
blue -- probably favors the Republicans under almost any circumstances
purple -- depends on Biden seeking a second term (positive)
green -- far too early to determine  

1) Party Mandate: After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives than after the previous midterm elections.

This is a tough standard, but Joe Biden has shown weak (if any) coattails. The Party out of the White House almost always gains seats in the House, even if that President is Eisenhower, Reagan, or Obama. This will paradoxically be the first of the keys to be decided once and for all. Well, technically Biden has already settled another one.
 
2) Contest: There is no serious contest for the incumbent party nomination.

If Biden runs for re-election, but otherwise I can easily see a contested primary among Democrats, which would help the Republican nominee.

3) Incumbency: The incumbent party candidate is the sitting president.

See #2. Biden is past "life expectancy at birth".

4) Third party: There is no significant third party or independent campaign.

This measure would hurt the Democratic nominee on the surface even if it were the Right side of the political spectrum that splintered between a successor to the Trump cult and more conventional (Bush-like Presidents... either one) Republicans.

5) Short-term economy: The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.

Anyone who bets on timing the business cycle except toward the end of a downturn as things start to get better is a fool. Good investments are possible based on the financial strength, marketing competence, and ability to adapt technology for profit.    

6) Long-term economy: Real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth during the previous two terms.

The average of strong and consistent economic growth of the second term of Obama and the erratic growth under Trump likely makes this work against the Democratic nominee of 2024.

7) Policy change: The incumbent administration effects major changes in national policy.

Undoing Trump's perverse changes will be adequate for the Democratic nominee in 2024. Joe Biden has an agenda and he is likely to get something done.

8 ) Social unrest: There is no sustained social unrest during the term.

Biden is Establishment. He's not going to stir up trouble. He's just too cautious to do something really stupid, like getting America into a nasty war. I expect a Biden administration to be far more quiet than what we saw under Trump, and that could make all the difference in the world.  

9) Scandal: The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.

Obama has shown how that is done, and I expect Biden to follow.

10) Foreign/military failure: The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.

Biden isn't reckless, and he knows enough to trust the intelligence services more than his gut feelings. In that I expect basically a "third term" of you-know-who. Note well that Republicans will make a mountain of any mole-hill.

11) Foreign/military success: The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs.

How is your crystal ball working?

12) Incumbent charisma: The incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.

Most likely the Democratic nominee will be either Joe Biden or Kamala Harris, neither of whom exudes charisma. I can't see anyone else in the Democratic Party bringing that to his or her campaign, can you?

13) Challenger charisma: The challenging party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.

See 12. Charisma is in short supply in both Parties.

I have three already blue as most likely to be such (although we shall have a definitive answer on the first one only in November 2022, but that will be one of the first decided that will stick). Two depend upon Biden seeking re-election, and those favor the Republicans in the event that someone other than Biden is the Democratic nominee.

I see four keys likely to work for Biden because those are consistent with his character (I expect unrest that Trump provoked through bumbling or incendiary rhetoric to fade quickly, and Biden has done nothing to enrich himself off his holding of an office in the past. There are plenty of ways, like taking a sinecure at some partisan or ideological institution, profiting off insider information on legislation, directing a highway so that it enriches undeveloped land that he bought for quick appreciation, or selling large numbers of a book that few people read). Still, if Biden should be a one-term President, even if for reasons of health, then five of Lichtman's keys will likely have turned in favor of the Republican nominee, and only one would give the Republican the edge.      

Bold is settled. 

[pbrower2a]

This is my interpretation of a 55-45 win for Biden against "Gen. Eric Republican", whatever that is.  

Margin under 1% white

1 to 5% 20% saturation
5 to 10%  50% saturation
10 %+  70% saturation.

I am making no efforts to style the vote; it is all assumed to be an even swing, which never quite happens.  No nominee for either Party has won 55% of the popular vote since Reagan did in 1984. Note the paucity of states that would be close in such an election.

[pbrower2a]

Comment: Trump is toxic, and he will not win if nominated except under freakish circumstances (rigged election or some incredible situation of extreme catastrophe). I have data for one state, but it

(1) is gigantic in significance (38 electoral votes in 2020, probably 40-42 in 2024)
(2) was somewhat competitive in 2020, being decided by 5.52%
(3) is becoming closer to a microcosm of the USA, approaching the US averages in income per capita, urbanization, formal education, and cost of living
(4) is an absolute must-win for Trump. He will be unable to get elected even if he wins 'back' every state and district that swung R to D in 2020 from 2016 (AZ, GA, MI, NE-02, PA, WI) in 2024.

Trump is still popular among Republicans, and if he does run for the Republican nomination for President, then he likely wins it. I'm not saying that he gets the chance, and I am not saying that someone who has much the same ideology but is less erratic and headstrong has no chance of winning the President. Strange things can happen in 45 months, like wars that go badly, natural disasters that hurt huge parts of the USA, diplomatic debacles, and economic meltdowns as that of 1929-1932. Any of those would ensure that Joe Biden be a one-term President.

This said, the state is of course

TEXAS

as if you did not get enough hints from the content.


Hobby School of Public Affairs, University of Houston

https://uh.edu/hobby/tx2021/attitudes.pdf


This may be water over the dam or under the bridge, but at this point if Trump were up for election (he isn't, of course) he would lose... Texas. It's favorability, but with these numbers the difference between approval and favorability cannot mean that much when one has politicians in contrast. This of course follows the insane events at the US Capitol about a month ago. This is not minor drift.

Favorability of selected pols in Texas:

VF  SF N SU VUDK Joe Biden       26 15 11 5 37 6 Kamala Harris 25 14   8 6 37 10 Donald Trump 29 10   5 5 46 5

VF very favorable
SF somewhat favorable
N  (neutral) neither favorable nor unfavorable
SU slightly unfavorable
VU very unfavorable
DK don't know/no response

Biden is at 41-43, but Trump is at 39-51 in favorability. To be sure, that is not approval, but I can see no way of seeing Biden more positively than Trump among Texas voters for now. 

This is not slight drift. It is possible to win a binary election with slightly-lower approval or favorability at the time, but not with a negative difference of 12% for either. Joe Biden has not won Texas over. 

....Note that I see few other polls so far by state. Things do not look good for Trump in either New Hampshire (OK, it has only four electoral votes, and a Trump-like nominee can win without it, as in 2016). But those polls involve approval ratings for Joe Biden, and not Donald Trump.

.... For symmetry in which Biden stares at a sure loss, I would have to offer a state that was about as far from average in its vote in 2020 as was Texas. Depending upon personal taste you could have the state closest in margin to that of Texas for the Democrat (that would be Minnesota, at 7.11% -- Michigan, the state closest to that margin but still "junior" in margin at 2.78%, does not seem to qualify), or the one closest enough to differ from the national average by margin (that would be Virginia, at 10.11%, or 5.56% away from the national margin). If Biden were down 12% or so in a margin of approval or favorability in either state he would be staring at a clear defeat. 
   

[Chips]

Interesting.

[pbrower2a]

I hope that you can read this (problems of visibility):

 

[pbrower2a]

Trends do not predictably continue or rebound. Continuation and rebound themselves contradict. The Favorite Son effect is real, and where relevant it is good for anywhere from 10%  to 20%. As an example, look at how Texas went from 1996 to 2008 in D-R percentage margin:

1996   4.87 R
2000 21.48 R
2004 22.87 R
2008 11.75 R
2012 15.88 R
2016   8.97 R
2020   5.58 R

The Favorite Son effect obviously reverses. Just look at how the Texas vote changed when nobody from Texas was on the Presidential ticket. Consider Georgia between 1980 and 1984.

1980 14.82 D
1984 20.38 R

Obviously the Democrats had big problems with their 1984 campaign about like being a last-place team facing the Detroit Tigers of that year. The Democrats also had big problems in 1980, but not in Georgia. Jimmy Carter may have had a troubled Presidency, but he still was well thought of in Georgia, where he had been a successful pol. Walter Mondale gave few reasons for people to vote for him in 1984 against the electoral buzz saw that was Ronald Reagan. 

Demographics also matter. Democrats seemed to be getting their stuff back together in the mid-1970s  as they pieced together the old New Deal coalition that had made for some spectacular victories in the 1930's. But other things excited the younger voters, including the Born Again movement in Protestant Christianity and the anti-abortion cause. Stagflation demonstrated that the old tricks of liberal pols had returns had gone to near zero. Ronald Reagan offered an economic paradigm that shifted from income for all to wealth for the few, with promises that the workers who accept lowered expectations in life at the time would benefit from the rich getting richer. America had its focus going from the factory to the shopping mall.

Today the original supporters of Ronald Reagan, as was so for the original voters of FDR in the 1930's, are themselves getting old. The Republican Party is as reactionary now as it was in 1980 in its focus on elite wealth at the expense of all else and its contempt for social equality. The GOP is much in line with the anti-intellectual Wealth Cult in evangelical Protestantism as ever. Its problem is that they never asked the youngest voters while their constituents in their now-60+ group die off.  Reagan did well among young voters in the 1980's, and Trump did well with the same voters 30-some years later. Those voters are not getting younger, and the death rates increase for Reagan's young supporters seemingly every year.     

[pbrower2a]

Here is analysis from one of Trump's pollsters on how 2020 really went. It is from December, and it subdivides the states that were within 10% of going to Hillary Clinton in 2016 that went to Trump. The states in question were those, and not others.

https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000177-6046-de2d-a57f-7a6e8c950000S

A synopsis is in this cover article:

Former President Donald Trump has blamed the election results on unfounded claims of fraud and malfeasance. But at the top levels of his campaign, a detailed autopsy report that circulated among his political aides paints a far different — and more critical — portrait of what led to his defeat.

The post-mortem, a copy of which was obtained by POLITICO, says the former president suffered from voter perception that he wasn’t honest or trustworthy and that he was crushed by disapproval of his handling of the coronavirus pandemic. And while Trump spread baseless accusations of ballot-stuffing in heavily Black cities, the report notes that he was done in by hemorrhaging support from white voters.


The 27-page report, which was written by Trump chief pollster Tony Fabrizio, shows how Trump advisers were privately reckoning with his loss even as the former president and many of his supporters engaged in a conspiracy theory-fueled effort to overturn the election. The autopsy was completed in December 2020 and distributed to Trump’s top political advisers just before President Joe Biden’s Jan. 20 inauguration.


It is unclear if Trump has seen the report.

The findings are based on an analysis of exit polling in 10 states. Five of them — Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania — are states that Trump lost after winning them in 2016. The other five — Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio and Texas — are states that Trump won in both elections.

The report zeroes in on an array of demographics where Trump suffered decisive reversals in 2020, including among white seniors, the same group that helped to propel him to the White House. The autopsy says that Trump saw the “greatest erosion with white voters, particularly white men,” and that he “lost ground with almost every age group.” In the five states that flipped to Biden, Trump’s biggest drop-off was among voters aged 18-29 and 65 and older.

Suburbanites — who bolted from Trump after 2016 — also played a major role. The report says that the former president suffered a “double-digit erosion” with “White College educated voters across the board.”

The picture of the election presented in the report is widely shared by political professionals in both parties, if not by Trump and his legions of his supporters. Trump never offered a concession to Biden, and up until his final days in office, he clung to the debunked idea that the election had been stolen.

Fabrizio declined to comment on the post-mortem. A Trump spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.

Trump’s personal behavior, the autopsy makes clear, contributed to his defeat. “Biden had a clear edge over POTUS on being seen as honest & trustworthy,” Fabrizio writes.

Trump’s response to the pandemic was also critical. The autopsy says that coronavirus registered as the top issue among voters, and that Biden won those voters by a nearly 3-to-1 margin. A majority registered disapproval of Trump’s handling of the virus.

Most voters said they prioritized battling the coronavirus over reopening the economy, even as the president put a firm emphasis on the latter. And roughly 75 percent of voters — most of whom favored Biden — said they favored public mask-wearing mandates.

The report also indirectly raises questions about the reelection campaign’s decision to pause advertising on TV over the summer and save resources until the fall. According to the findings, nearly 9-in-10 voters had made up their minds about whom to support by the final month of the race.

Fabrizio isn’t the only Trump adviser who has presented a post-mortem since Nov. 3. John McLaughlin, another Trump pollster, published a report on the conservative Newsmax website the week after the election.

Meanwhile, advisers to former Vice President Mike Pence brought in multiple pollsters to brief him on their conclusions after the election, according to a person familiar with the discussions. Among the takeaways was that Trump was gaining during the final weeks of the race and that his rallies had helped propel Republicans running in House and Senate races. But the pollsters also made clear that while there was substantial support for Trump’s policies, there was widespread exhaustion with the president.

Within Trump’s inner circle, Fabrizio had long espoused the belief that Trump needed to prioritize the pandemic in order to win reelection. Last summer, he penned a 79-page memo arguing that Trump needed to focus first on dealing with the pandemic rather than reopening the economy and recommending, among other things, that he should have been encouraging people to wear masks rather than mocking the practice.


https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/01/trump-campaign-autopsy-paints-damning-picture-of-defeat-464636

Comment:

So this explains why Trump could lose the Presidential election while Republicans did well in gaining House seats and (until the two Senate run-offs in Georgia) holding onto the Senate majority. This analysis comes before Warnock and Ossoff defeated Republican US Senate incumbents in Georgia.

Trump surprised people among Hispanics, who weren't as strongly D as usual. To be sure, the Hispanics in Florida are heavily Cuban-Americans who have a very different political heritage than do the largely Mexican-Americans in Arizona. 

[pbrower2a]

Obviously, some people who voted Trump in 2016 swung to Biden in 2020 and vice-versa--and some people who voted in 2016 didn't vote at all in 2020. Nevertheless, I'm going to assume every 2016 voter cast their ballot this time around for the same party. Considering I'm just using the two party split, this also logs 3rd party '16->Dem/GOP '20 voters as new. Thus, we can determine which candidate actually turned out more new voters in each state regardless of the swing in margin in said state.

From left to right:
Maryland: D+80.4
District of Columbia: D+71.0
Maine 1st District: D+69.4
Massachusetts: D+67.0
Connecticut: D+62.6
Delaware: D+59.4
New Hampshire: D+58.8
Vermont: D+57.6
Maine: D+51.0
Colorado: D+48.4
Rhode Island: D+47.8
Nebraska 2nd District: D+46.0
Virginia: D+38.2
Minnesota: D+36.8
Oregon: D+31.6
Washington: D+26.6
New Jersey: D+24.2
Georgia: D+23.0
New York: D+22.6
California: D+21.4
Maine 2nd District: D+21.2
Nebraska: D+19.4
Nebraska 1st District: D+19.4
Missouri: D+18.8
Hawaii: D+18.6
Michigan: D+18.2
Kansas: D+17.6
New Mexico: D+17.2
Alaska: D+16.8
Pennsylvania: D+13.2
Illinois: D+11.8
Arizona: D+11.0
North Carolina: D+11.0
Indiana: D+9.8
Wisconsin: D+9.6
Oklahoma: D+8.0
Kentucky: D+7.4
Texas: D+6.8
North Dakota: D+5.8
Iowa: D+4.4
Montana: D+2.0
Nevada: D+2.0
South Carolina: D+1.4
South Dakota: R+0.4
Louisiana: R+0.8
Alabama: R+1.2
Mississippi: R+1.6
Wyoming: R+4.4
Ohio: R+4.8
West Virginia: R+8.6
Tennessee: R+9.4
Florida: R+14.0
Utah: R+16.8
Idaho: R+19.8
Arkansas: R+36.4
Nebraska 3rd District: R+35.8

[pbrower2a]

Note well: electoral results are anything but randomly scattered. If you were to tell me that someone will end up with 330 electoral votes like Obama in 2012, then I have reason to suggest otherwise. It has nothing to do with the challenging nominee or the performance of the President.  

Why are people saying 2012 wasn't normal? By that point, the novelty of Obama being the first black president had worn off, and his challenger was just about the most vanilla guy there is. The economy may not have been great, but it wasn't actually in a recession. And there was no large-scale war going on, with Iraq operations having largely ended and Afghanistan not being front and center.

The result in electoral votes was the closest to the mean result over 120 years. Paradoxically, other elections are either decidedly closer or decidedly farther away in the percentage of the popular vote for the winner.

Just take a look at these distributions of electoral votes for the winner:

1916 52.2% Wilson
2004 53.2% G W Bush
1976 55.2% Carter
1968 55.9% Nixon
1960 56.4% Kennedy
2020 56.7% Biden
1948 57.8% Truman
2012 61.7% Obama
1908 66.5% Taft
2008 67.8% Obama
1992 68.2% Clinton
1996 70.2% Clinton
1908 70.6% T Roosevelt

(I am not including the two squeakers in which the winner of the Electoral Vote was different from the winner of the popular vote or any of the electoral blowouts in which the winner got more than 71% of the ELECTORAL vote, or any election including someone who served in the Civil War. Besides, I'm cutting off anything before 1904 because Theodore Roosevelt establishes the role of political professionalism that one adheres to lest one lose the election. Blowout elections indicate that a one of the candidates had big problems that year, one of which could be a complete mismatch to the political culture of the time (Davis 1924, Smith 1928, Landon 1936, Willkie 1940, Stevenson 1952 and 1956, Goldwater 1964, McGovern 1972, Mondale 1984, Dukakis 1988) and another of which could be catastrophic failure of an incumbent President (Taft in keeping his coalition together, Hoover in bungling an economic meltdown, and Carter incredible bad luck).      

What so stands out for 2012? It is alone. One might expect a huge number of elections to get into this zone, but they don't. Elections are close... or they aren't...  except for 2012. It is telling that the 2008 map looks much like an inverse of the 1908 map. But one would expect a large number of elections in which the winner gets somewhere between 311 and 358 electoral votes based on 538 total electoral votes, which is how percentages for Truman in 1948 (really, he clobbered Dewey in electoral votes) and Taft in 1908 relate to 538 electoral votes. Elections in the group up to Truman in percentage are considered close in electoral votes, and those in the group including Taft in 1908 and bigger winners are not close. Random scatter of results in would

OK, 2012 was close to being close, and the difference between 2012 being close and not being close was that Obama barely won Florida that year.  So what is going on? Except for 2012 we would have no electoral results in which anyone gets between 57.8% of the electoral vote and 66.5% of the electoral votes in the last twenty-five Presidential elections?

Let us suppose that the election really is close. You state at a defeat of 275-263. But maybe, just maybe, you might put some effort into a swing state that might be the difference between going 273-265 in a win and 275-263 in defeat. You are not going to take too many chances. Maybe you make more campaign appearances in that one state or your campaign shifts advertising funds. Whatever happens, what looks like a close election that either could win remains that. If your campaign stares at a 290-248 defeat you might have to take more chances to win. Looking good losing usually achieves nothing. Nobody gets a silver medal in electoral politics. You can fall short, you might win, or you might end up losing 304-254.

In the zone between 310 and 360 electoral votes as the most likely result for the Other Side, winning implies taking real chances to win what is barely in range while putting at risk what states in which one has marginal leads. The chance of winning outright is perhaps 2% in September, but that goes to 0% without taking risks of going as easily into a zone of marginal landslides (360 to 380 electoral votes for the Other Guy). Keeping hope alive means taking risks. One will gain toward a closer election or the election will spiral away depending upon how things work out. It is just as unwelcome to lose 380-158 as to lose 320-218.

So what about 2012? Romney had few real options. Florida was the only really-close state that he had a change of winning in which he and Obama were about even in. He still picked up North Carolina. He was not going to win Ohio, Virginia, Colorado, Iowa, and maybe Michigan to make the win. Then again, maybe he is not a competent gambler. There are skills that do one far better. Mitt Romney is a devout Mormon, and according to Mormon rules, adultery, alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, and gambling are streng verboten to observant Mormons.  

[pbrower2a]

Trying to characterize elections beginning in 1904:

A: successor elections. The VP takes over for a President who has died in office or resigned while in office, or has covered for a President with serious problems affecting his ability to perform the functions and gets to run on his own.

1904, 1908, 1924, 1948, 1964, 1976, 1988.

Six of these have been successful for the incumbent's Party.

B: re-election bids for a second full term. Simply enough, the President who won the previous election runs for a second  term. I'm putting FDR's third and fourth terms in their own category as they are no longer replicable. For example, I could see Obama running for a third term if he knew that his opponent would be Donald Trump, but not a second time against Romney.

1932, 1936, 1956, 1972, 1980, 1984, 1992, 1996, 2004, 2012, 2020

Incumbents win six of these twelve times. It's even!

C -- third or fourth terms. Only two, but FDR won both. This may say more about FDR than anything else. 1940, 1944 Two for two for FDR, but nobody else. This will stick until America undoes the 22nd Amendment on behalf of America's equivalent of Vladimir Putin.

D -- elections with independent or third Parties that got electoral votes or at least 5% of the popular vote

1912, 1920, 1924, 1948, 1968, 1980, 1992, 1996, 2016

Incumbent Parties won only three of these nine elections.  

E -- open-seat elections:

1920, 1928, 1952, 1960, 1968, 1988, 2000, 2008, 2016

Incumbent Parties won only two of those nine elections. Just look at Lichtman's keys. Incumbents running for re-election set the agenda.  Even Donald Trump succeeded to an extent just short of re-election despite putrid approval ratings in recent months.  He had his charge. So did Gerald Ford, who also fell short.

F -- blow-out landslides. The second-place finisher ends up with 10% or less of the electoral vote:

1936 1964 1972 1980 1984

Incumbent Parties won three of those five. Oddly the 10% threshold barely includes Carter in 1980 but not Hoover in 1932. The second-place finisher typically has no regional strength. Even in 1964, Goldwater lost 71-47 in the former Confederate states.

G -- cross-regional landslides. The second-place nominee gets 10% to 25% of the electoral vote.

1912 1920 1928 1932 1940 1944 1952 1956 1988

Incumbent Parties win five of the nine. There might be a scattering of support across the country for the loser, and until 1928 the "Solid (then Democratic) South" kept Republicans from winning 45-state landslides

H --  "mild" landslides. Non-winners get between 25% and 35% of the electoral vote.

1904 1908 1992 1996 2008

I -- hard to characterize. Non-winners get between 35% and 43% of the electoral vote.

2012

Only one election, and one state (an electorally big one -- Florida, which Obama won*) was the difference between this being in this category and no Presidential election being in this category. Random scatter of electoral votes would likely put more elections in this range ... but results in the electoral college are anything but random. The incumbent President won this one. Campaign strategies in effectively-campaigned elections make this zone a near-void.

J -- close elections, winner of the popular vote getting the electoral vote and others together getting 43% or more of the popular vote

1916 1948 1960 1976 2004 2020

These split evenly.

K -- very close elections, with the winner of the popular vote losing the majority in the Electoral Vote

2000 2016

Yuck!

*Indeed I was so convinced of the validity of this pattern that as I saw North Carolina slip away from Obama that as Election Day 2012 approached I as sure that Romney would win Florida. I so predicted!