Utilitarianism, deontology, and "edge cases"

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

Posting this in kind of a hurry because my new job (public sector, sh**t-tier pay but amazing benefits, I'd prefer not to specify what it is) is kicking my ass and after this I'm going to force myself to be done with "brain work" for the evening so I can get some rest. Bear with me.

Antonio and I were talking about Immanuel Kant off-forum a few days ago, as one does, and he observed that the thing about both utilitarian and deontological accounts of metaethics is that they work very well for most everyday moral decisions, they just break (and break hard) when applied in certain extreme situations. To this I would add that the reason for this is that in most situations in people's normal lives, utilitarianism and deontology are more or less aligned with each other; most things that are inherently wrong to do also harm other people, and most things that harm other people are for that reason inherently wrong to do. It's when one gets to the classic utilitarian thought experiment about organ theft, or Kant's argument against lying to a serial killer about the whereabouts of his next victim, that the mirror cracks from side to side.

(The genesis of this conversation with Antonio was actually Kant's insistence in The Metaphysics of Morals on a purely retributive theory of criminal punishment, which struck both of us as unjustified even by the bloodless FACTS and LOGIC application of his principles that he uses to justify telling the serial killer the truth. A utilitarian example of this kind of moral argument, one that uses the metaethical system to justify what's obviously some sort of personal gripe, might be Peter Singer's argument that it's not wrong to rape cognitively impaired people.)

My instinct about this observation is to hold that it proves that we must still keep a place for intuition and instinct in moral reasoning; if we find ourselves justifying a course of action that "feels off" or that we think "should" feel repugnant, then we should listen to, or at least humor, that unease or that repugnance. Instinct, the nature of an act, and the consequences of that act should all play a part in our moral reasoning. If you believe (as I do) that moral instincts can be developed into virtuous habits and affect people's desires as well as their beliefs, this is as much as to say that intent, act, and outcome are all morally significant.

No less a modern philosophical authority than our own John Dule has rightly observed that we're all utilitarians to some extent; if we were able to know with certainty that our belief systems would cause unimaginable human suffering if implemented, very few of us would not overhaul or abandon them. I would add that we're also all virtue ethicists and deontologists to some extent; some things just feel wrong or "seem like something an asshole would do" even if we can't articulate why, and some actions seem obviously repugnant in themselves even if they're done For The Greater Good. From this we can begin to theorize something of a "pragmatist metaethics"--which I recognize is ironic coming from me as someone who tends to have very rigid positions in applied ethics.

jao

[Alcibiades]

I am always wary of ethical stances purely based on intuition, without any further reasoning. Intuition does play some role, but it is generally more useful to take it as a starting point and try to articulate why you feel that way. Usually, there is an underlying reason to be found, but if not, it’s a good clue that your position is probably not justified.

A good example of this is that until recently, most people in the West considered homosexuality morally wrong because they felt some basic level of disgust towards it. But when one examines it further, the arguments that it is morally acceptable, as it harms no-one yet brings pleasure to some, are much sounder.

[afleitch]

I am always wary of ethical stances purely based on intuition, without any further reasoning. Intuition does play some role, but it is generally more useful to take it as a starting point and try to articulate why you feel that way. Usually, there is an underlying reason to be found, but if not, it’s a good clue that your position is probably not justified.

A good example of this is that until recently, most people in the West considered homosexuality morally wrong because they felt some basic level of disgust towards it. But when one examines it further, the arguments that it is morally acceptable, as it harms no-one yet brings pleasure to some, are much sounder.

And sounder still that to someone who is homosexual, heterosexuality/heteronormativity is counter intuitive.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

That's exactly why I'm advocating a pragmatic approach to metaethics rather than a doctrinaire emotivist or natural-law approach. What is it that tells us that an instinctive revulsion at the idea of telling the truth to Kant's serial killer or euthanizing cognitively impaired newborns is enough to dispense with finessed ethical discourse in those cases, but an instinctive revulsion at LGBT people isn't enough to justify discriminating against them (us)? You could say "non-harm" but then who gets to decide what constitutes harm, other than, well, common sense? Increasingly I think that the answer boils down to "real life" and an everyday sense of having to share the world with people. (Although I think afleitch is getting at something almost Rawlsian; if you were behind a veil of ignorance contemplating life as an entirely hypothetical person in a homophobic society, you wouldn't know whether or not you were one of the LGBT people being discriminated against, and thus whether you might have very different ideas than the majority's about what sexual desires and behaviors are or aren't intuitive.)

Again, bear with me, grain of salt, bearishly tiring day.

[afleitch]

That's exactly why I'm advocating a pragmatic approach to metaethics rather than a doctrinaire emotivist or natural-law approach. What is it that tells us that an instinctive revulsion at the idea of telling the truth to Kant's serial killer or euthanizing cognitively impaired newborns is enough to dispense with finessed ethical discourse in those cases, but an instinctive revulsion at LGBT people isn't enough to justify discriminating against them (us)? You could say "non-harm" but then who gets to decide what constitutes harm, other than, well, common sense? Increasingly I think that the answer boils down to "real life" and an everyday sense of having to share the world with people. (Although I think afleitch is getting at something almost Rawlsian; if you were behind a veil of ignorance contemplating life as an entirely hypothetical person in a homophobic society, you wouldn't know whether or not you were one of the LGBT people being discriminated against, and thus whether you might have very different ideas than the majority's about what sexual desires and behaviors are or aren't intuitive.)

Again, bear with me, grain of salt, bearishly tiring day.

You've pretty much nailed my views on this.

I am unapologetically Rawlsian on a number of issues to the effect it's made me re-evaluate my politics. I am not a free speech absolutist which is currently affecting 'the discourse' because I agree with Rawls' assumption that absolute free speech is neither an equaliser or meaningful to those who are oppressed. In terms of 'property' rights, that is a right to the 'personal property' of your moral capacity and self respect and so on.

To go back to the example (which I like because it flips convention); heteronormativity is to me as a homosexual personally counter intuitive. Heterosexual acts at a very base level to me have a level of sexual 'disgust' to them which should induce a fear of harm (!) But there is such an intuitive obviousness to heterosexuality not being harmful and in fact being conducively good; love, marriage, children etc because human society is heteronormative, that doesn't require the applied reasoning that is required in the opposite direction. Also it's 90% of everyone I encounter.

But like many moral and ethical choices, applied reasoning can create a memetic intuitive response.

It's why it will be very difficult for traditional Christian sexual ethics once ground has been given, to argue against what is now seen as intuitive. 'Othering' or 'disgust' lose their power. Except in times of orchestrated moral panic by those in positions of power.

I think of myself as a base utilitarian; dealing with humanity as it is and looking for outcomes that optimise rather than maximise benefit. I like to think that we exist in a causal world and a morality based on 'useful' and 'non useful' behaviour seems the most open to both almost (general) immovable absolutes, and intuitional differentiation between people.

I agree with Sidgwick in that a reflection on ethics should be rooted in how people think about moral behavior and what they are presented with in their day to day experiences.

In your first post you hit upon the problem of reducing the limitations of ethics to thought experiments or the extremes of situations and then being stumped that they don't 'hold up' and therefore there must be something else or something more, and how that might just be a distraction.

When faced with extremes, human ethics, regardless of what you ascribe to should buckle. Because we are psychologically not in a position to act either rationally or cognitively within any preferred framework when faced with those extremes.

Every single one of us is one heartbeat away from 'I killed him, oh god I killed him' as the result of an immediate extreme situation we find ourselves in. And good secular justice systems tend to be good at mitigating this when it happens. Our intuition is good at mitigating this, even if it is also an agency on making us respond in extreme situations in unexpected ways. Ethics, philosophy etc as 'closed systems' can have issues with this sort of hand waving. But they aren't hard and fast truths.

My own view is that there's subjective ethics in the sense that generally you know 'good' and 'bad' when you see it. And it makes sense to follow that, because in 95% of the situations you face, the human next to you will do the same.

In the same way you can't objectively measure what is art or what is obscenity. But 'you know when you see it'. It's generally intuitive, but with some collectivity; if enough people think the same, then you can reach or enforce a consensus. That in turn can feed back into forming an open or closed subjective view.

In the same breath, we tend to be more accepting of the subjective nature of say art and understand that any attempt to objectively classify it (from 16th century iconoclasm to the Third Reich) is totalitarian and also an affront to intuition. In part because we mostly see art as harmless or passive; it's not a proxy for 'morality'. Sometimes however, in moral panic, it is embued with that.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

Posting this in kind of a hurry because my new job (public sector, sh**t-tier pay but amazing benefits, I'd prefer not to specify what it is) is kicking my ass and after this I'm going to force myself to be done with "brain work" for the evening so I can get some rest. Bear with me.

Antonio and I were talking about Immanuel Kant off-forum a few days ago, as one does, and he observed that the thing about both utilitarian and deontological accounts of metaethics is that they work very well for most everyday moral decisions, they just break (and break hard) when applied in certain extreme situations. To this I would add that the reason for this is that in most situations in people's normal lives, utilitarianism and deontology are more or less aligned with each other; most things that are inherently wrong to do also harm other people, and most things that harm other people are for that reason inherently wrong to do. It's when one gets to the classic utilitarian thought experiment about organ theft, or Kant's argument against lying to a serial killer about the whereabouts of his next victim, that the mirror cracks from side to side.

(The genesis of this conversation with Antonio was actually Kant's insistence in The Metaphysics of Morals on a purely retributive theory of criminal punishment, which struck both of us as unjustified even by the bloodless FACTS and LOGIC application of his principles that he uses to justify telling the serial killer the truth. A utilitarian example of this kind of moral argument, one that uses the metaethical system to justify what's obviously some sort of personal gripe, might be Peter Singer's argument that it's not wrong to rape cognitively impaired people.)

My instinct about this observation is to hold that it proves that we must still keep a place for intuition and instinct in moral reasoning; if we find ourselves justifying a course of action that "feels off" or that we think "should" feel repugnant, then we should listen to, or at least humor, that unease or that repugnance. Instinct, the nature of an act, and the consequences of that act should all play a part in our moral reasoning. If you believe (as I do) that moral instincts can be developed into virtuous habits and affect people's desires as well as their beliefs, this is as much as to say that intent, act, and outcome are all morally significant.

No less a modern philosophical authority than our own John Dule has rightly observed that we're all utilitarians to some extent; if we were able to know with certainty that our belief systems would cause unimaginable human suffering if implemented, very few of us would not overhaul or abandon them. I would add that we're also all virtue ethicists and deontologists to some extent; some things just feel wrong or "seem like something an asshole would do" even if we can't articulate why, and some actions seem obviously repugnant in themselves even if they're done For The Greater Good. From this we can begin to theorize something of a "pragmatist metaethics"--which I recognize is ironic coming from me as someone who tends to have very rigid positions in applied ethics.

jao

This is pretty much "value pluralism" of a kind that e.g. Bernard Williams would subscribe to. I think it's probably correct, but there is a serious and sustainable objection that one still seems to need a single overarching measure of value to decide in what situation is it proper to be a utilitarian, when to be a Kantian etc..

There's a lot written on this but you might like Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy if you haven't read it.

I think of myself as a base utilitarian; dealing with humanity as it is and looking for outcomes that optimise rather than maximise benefit. I like to think that we exist in a causal world and a morality based on 'useful' and 'non useful' behaviour seems the most open to both almost (general) immovable absolutes, and intuitional differentiation between people.

I agree with Sidgwick in that a reflection on ethics should be rooted in how people think about moral behavior and what they are presented with in their day to day experiences.

I think it was Sidgwick who said that according to utilitarianism the world would have the most happiness if everyone was not a utilitarian.

[afleitch]

I think it was Sidgwick who said that according to utilitarianism the world would have the most happiness if everyone was not a utilitarian.

Sort of, due to his esotericism He was certainly left wanting of an external moral arbiter to appeal to even if he couldn't pressupose one. He was important at bringing utilitarianism down from thought experiments to practicality which is why I referenced him here.

[Hnv1]

Seems like you're working with simplified versions of utilitarianism (actually consequentalism) and deontology. Most theorists accept deontology can include consequentialist reasons that can overpower constraints given that they are strong enough.

I would say that the problem of hard cases lies in the false analogy we get from moral objectivists that moral theories and principles are like scientific principles and they apply universally. That is a wrong view for multiple reasons. I think we should treat them as heuristics and move to moral particularism (read what Dancy and others had to say about it), in hard cases.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/

About Moral Intuition, well I am very skeptical of this mystical capacity. If it's not grounded in moral perception or a good argument, then an appeal to intuition for me is just doing bad philosophy. not just ethics.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

Seems like you're working with simplified versions of utilitarianism (actually consequentalism) and deontology. Most theorists accept deontology can include consequentialist reasons that can overpower constraints given that they are strong enough.

I'm discussing specifically Kant, who didn't accept that; hence the "categorical" in "categorical imperative". I'm aware that later deontological thinkers do, due to the wide-reaching influence that utilitarian/consequentialist critiques have had on other moral philosophies.

There's also plenty of empirical research indicating that moral perception can be rapid, subconscious, and thus in some sense intuitive. Insisting that it's an entirely separate faculty from intuition seems wrongheaded to me.

[Hnv1]

Seems like you're working with simplified versions of utilitarianism (actually consequentalism) and deontology. Most theorists accept deontology can include consequentialist reasons that can overpower constraints given that they are strong enough.

I'm discussing specifically Kant, who didn't accept that; hence the "categorical" in "categorical imperative". I'm aware that later deontological thinkers do, due to the wide-reaching influence that utilitarian/consequentialist critiques have had on other moral philosophies.

There's also plenty of empirical research indicating that moral perception can be rapid, subconscious, and thus in some sense intuitive. Insisting that it's an entirely separate faculty from intuition seems wrongheaded to me.

What is mural intuition if not grounded in moral perception or reasoning? This magical ability that we somehow have? A kantian transcendent faculty?
Completely mystical

Also I meant moral perception in the epistemic sense, not moral psychology and experimental philosophy. The claim is simply, what is “given” in our sense-data includes normative content and properties

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

Seems like you're working with simplified versions of utilitarianism (actually consequentalism) and deontology. Most theorists accept deontology can include consequentialist reasons that can overpower constraints given that they are strong enough.

I'm discussing specifically Kant, who didn't accept that; hence the "categorical" in "categorical imperative". I'm aware that later deontological thinkers do, due to the wide-reaching influence that utilitarian/consequentialist critiques have had on other moral philosophies.

There's also plenty of empirical research indicating that moral perception can be rapid, subconscious, and thus in some sense intuitive. Insisting that it's an entirely separate faculty from intuition seems wrongheaded to me.

What is mural intuition if not grounded in moral perception or reasoning?

Did I not just make it clear that (at least when I use the term) it's not a separate faculty from moral perception? I don't claim to know, or particularly care, which is "grounded in" which; as far as I'm concerned, moral intuition is merely the aspect of moral perception that's experienced subconsciously and/or emotionally rather than consciously and dispassionately analyzed.

Completely mystical

I'm not going to take this as the pejorative that you evidently intend it as.

The claim is simply, what is “given” in our sense-data includes normative content and properties

I can't tell from this post if you're affirming or denying that claim, so I can't really respond to it cogently.

[John Dule]

Just saw this post now. Interesting thread. I just wanted to note that humans generally have a strong instinct towards searching for universally applicable truths, even at the risk of extreme reductionism (see, I just did it myself right there). In statistics and physics, we "simplify" things and make certain assumptions that allow our calculations to become easier (i.e. "assume a normal distributional curve" or "assume that the surface has no friction"). I think that our approach to moral and philosophical questions is much the same; our "universal truths" are often predicated on certain assumptions that don't always hold true.

I've met a few people who genuinely believed that scientific advancement is bringing us closer to identifying a universal moral code that can be objectively quantified. I don't know where they get off with this absurd belief-- if we can't even find a grand unifying theory for physics, I don't see why we should be able to find one for ethics.

[Kingpoleon]

Just saw this post now. Interesting thread. I just wanted to note that humans generally have a strong instinct towards searching for universally applicable truths, even at the risk of extreme reductionism (see, I just did it myself right there). In statistics and physics, we "simplify" things and make certain assumptions that allow our calculations to become easier (i.e. "assume a normal distributional curve" or "assume that the surface has no friction"). I think that our approach to moral and philosophical questions is much the same; our "universal truths" are often predicated on certain assumptions that don't always hold true.

I've met a few people who genuinely believed that scientific advancement is bringing us closer to identifying a universal moral code that can be objectively quantified. I don't know where they get off with this absurd belief-- if we can't even find a grand unifying theory for physics, I don't see why we should be able to find one for ethics.

A universal code of ethics and morality, if ever fully transcribed, will rule very broadly in order to establish a consensus that still allows the use of logic, intuition, and reasoning that have guided our morality for so long. As such, it will likely fall short of the current philosophy-based morality that we currently use as a starting place, but such forms of morality will likely end up drawing from it.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     Dule is right: people are obsessed with seeking out universal principles to base moral systems on. The actual business of human morality is much messier than this, which is why I am a fan of Jonathan Haidt's work. He has tried to develop an actual empirical science of human morality, and has identified six factors that each person values to varying extents. It may lack the elegance of deontology or utilitarianism, but it better captures how morality is understood by people who are not philosophy professors, and has the upshot of not being broken by specific edge cases where a doctrinaire approach would lead to obviously evil outcomes.

     The edge cases may seem trivial, but they point to a fundamental aspect of how people deal with morality. Very few self-described deontologists are going to tell the Nazis where Jews are hiding, and very few utilitarians are really fine with a slave being butchered in a gladiatorial fight. In these edge cases the human impulse is to abandon the system and go with the answer that we know in our hearts to be just. In this case the universal principle is just an approximation, and the intuitive answer points us toward the actual moral systems that human beings have relied on for generations.