1964 Goldwater counties

[Hnv1]

Beyond the Deep South and Arizona there were the odd Goldwater counties.

Why did he do so well in Nebraska? And what’s with those small enclaves in Pennsylvania/Wisconsin/Michigan/Minnesota?

[Podgy the Bear]

Nebraska: there was a shift by 15% in the vote, well in line with the national trend.  Nixon had won 62% of the vote in 1960; Goldwater dropped to 47%.  In several western Nebraska counties which normally deliver huge Republican margins, Johnson did double the vote.

As for the enclave pockets--I suspect it's a combination of conservative dominance, more religious, libertarian, etc. in areas that delivered huge margins to Johnson.  Even in these areas, there was a signficant shift to Johnson.  The Democrats won Lancaster County, PA (home of the Amish) for the first and only time.

[Calthrina950]

Beyond the Deep South and Arizona there were the odd Goldwater counties.

Why did he do so well in Nebraska? And what’s with those small enclaves in Pennsylvania/Wisconsin/Michigan/Minnesota?

Pennsylvania: The four Goldwater counties in Pennsylvania (Snyder, Union, Wayne, and Lebanon) are rock-ribbed Republican strongholds. As was mentioned above, Johnson managed to break into many of the other staunch Republican counties, such as Lancaster County (where he won by only 793 votes). Snyder and Union Counties haven't voted Democratic since before the Civil War. Snyder County last did so in 1856 for James Buchanan (Pennsylvania's native son), and Union County last did so in 1832 for Andrew Jackson. Wayne County hasn't gone Democratic since Grover Cleveland carried it in 1892, and Lebanon County hasn't gone Democratic since Franklin D. Roosevelt won it in 1936.

Michigan: The three Goldwater counties in Michigan (Sanilac, Missaukee, and Ottawa), are similarly rock-ribbed in their Republican voting habits. Sanilac County has voted Republican in every election since 1856 except for 1912, when it went for Theodore Roosevelt on the "Bull Moose" ticket. Missaukee County has never voted Democratic since its formation in 1871, and Ottawa County hasn't done so since voting for George McClellan in 1864.

Wisconsin: Walworth County has only voted Democratic once in its history, for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, when the Republican vote was divided. Waupaca County was won by Barack Obama in 2008, and he was the first Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932/1936 to carry it. And Waushara County went Democratic in 1996 and 2008, but before those years, last did so in 1932 for Roosevelt. I find it interesting how Obama managed to carry 2/3 of Goldwater's Wisconsin counties in 2008, but he did extraordinarily well in rural Wisconsin that year thanks to the Great Recession.

Minnesota: Carver and Otter Tail Counties last went Democratic in 1932 for Franklin D. Roosevelt, while Martin County has gone Democratic only twice since 1936-in 1948 and 1996. Sibley County gave pluralities to Bill Clinton in the 1990s, but has not given Democrats a majority of the vote since 1936.

The similarity which all of these counties possess are that they are rural, predominantly white, and Protestant in their orientation-in other words, counties that have long fit the demographic and political profile of the Republican Party.

[SingingAnalyst]

Beyond the Deep South and Arizona there were the odd Goldwater counties.

Why did he do so well in Nebraska? And what’s with those small enclaves in Pennsylvania/Wisconsin/Michigan/Minnesota?

Pennsylvania: The four Goldwater counties in Pennsylvania (Snyder, Union, Wayne, and Lebanon) are rock-ribbed Republican strongholds. As was mentioned above, Johnson managed to break into many of the other staunch Republican counties, such as Lancaster County (where he won by only 793 votes). Snyder and Union Counties haven't voted Democratic since before the Civil War. Snyder County last did so in 1856 for James Buchanan (Pennsylvania's native son), and Union County last did so in 1832 for Andrew Jackson. Wayne County hasn't gone Democratic since Grover Cleveland carried it in 1892, and Lebanon County hasn't gone Democratic since Franklin D. Roosevelt won it in 1936.

Michigan: The three Goldwater counties in Michigan (Sanilac, Missaukee, and Ottawa), are similarly rock-ribbed in their Republican voting habits. Sanilac County has voted Republican in every election since 1856 except for 1912, when it went for Theodore Roosevelt on the "Bull Moose" ticket. Missaukee County has never voted Democratic since its formation in 1871, and Ottawa County hasn't done so since voting for George McClellan in 1864.

Wisconsin: Walworth County has only voted Democratic once in its history, for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, when the Republican vote was divided. Waupaca County was won by Barack Obama in 2008, and he was the first Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932/1936 to carry it. And Waushara County went Democratic in 1996 and 2008, but before those years, last did so in 1932 for Roosevelt. I find it interesting how Obama managed to carry 2/3 of Goldwater's Wisconsin counties in 2008, but he did extraordinarily well in rural Wisconsin that year thanks to the Great Recession.

Minnesota: Carver and Otter Tail Counties last went Democratic in 1932 for Franklin D. Roosevelt, while Martin County has gone Democratic only twice since 1936-in 1948 and 1996. Sibley County gave pluralities to Bill Clinton in the 1990s, but has not given Democrats a majority of the vote since 1936.

The similarity which all of these counties possess are that they are rural, predominantly white, and Protestant in their orientation-in other words, counties that have long fit the demographic and political profile of the Republican Party.

This, and at least with the 3 Goldwater counties in MI, Goldwater did 20-22 points worse than Nixon in 1960. These were not Dixiecrat counties, and were scattered throughout the state (the Thumb, suburban Grand Rapids, Northern Michigan).

[eax]

One of the strangest ones is Emmons County North Dakota, which went for Kennedy and then Goldwater, 53-46 both times. What happened there?

[lfromnj]

Al smith won it so probably Catholic.

[Calthrina950]

Al smith won it so probably Catholic.

This is exactly correct. I remember seeing the Gallup exit polls for 1960 and 1964, and Goldwater actually improved over Nixon among Catholic voters (a point that Kevin Philips highlights in The Emerging Republican Majority as well). Kennedy won Catholics 78-22% in 1960; Johnson won them 76-24% 4 years later. Emmons was one of only four counties (Camas and Custer Counties, Idaho, and Dorchester County, Maryland were the others) outside of the old Confederate South that shifted from Kennedy to Goldwater.

Another fascinating thing to me about 1964 is the shifts towards Goldwater among pro-segregationist whites even in the Southern states that Johnson carried. In Virginia, for example, Goldwater won several Southside counties that Kennedy had carried in 1960; Johnson flipped the state because of winning the Northern Virginia suburbs and Richmond, which Nixon had won. In North Carolina, Goldwater improved significantly over Nixon in the Tidewater and Black Belt regions, though he still lost those counties, but Johnson gained heavily in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and Durham, which Nixon had won or come close in 1960, and also gained normally Republican voters in the western regions of the state.

In Florida, Goldwater gains in the Panhandle were canceled out and overridden by Johnson gains in Miami-Dade and in several counties carried by Nixon, such as Volusia and St. Lucie. And in Tennessee and Arkansas, Goldwater flipped segregationist rural counties that had gone for Kennedy, but Johnson regained several counties where voters had bolted over anti-Catholicism (the same also happened in Oklahoma).

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

Al smith won it so probably Catholic.

This is exactly correct. I remember seeing the Gallup exit polls for 1960 and 1964, and Goldwater actually improved over Nixon among Catholic voters (a point that Kevin Philips highlights in The Emerging Republican Majority as well). Kennedy won Catholics 78-22% in 1960; Johnson won them 76-24% 4 years later. Emmons was one of only four counties (Camas and Custer Counties, Idaho, and Dorchester County, Maryland were the others) outside of the old Confederate South that shifted from Kennedy to Goldwater.

Another fascinating thing to me about 1964 is the shifts towards Goldwater among pro-segregationist whites even in the Southern states that Johnson carried. In Virginia, for example, Goldwater won several Southside counties that Kennedy had carried in 1960; Johnson flipped the state because of winning the Northern Virginia suburbs and Richmond, which Nixon had won. In North Carolina, Goldwater improved significantly over Nixon in the Tidewater and Black Belt regions, though he still lost those counties, but Johnson gained heavily in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and Durham, which Nixon had won or come close in 1960, and also gained normally Republican voters in the western regions of the state.

In Florida, Goldwater gains in the Panhandle were canceled out and overridden by Johnson gains in Miami-Dade and in several counties carried by Nixon, such as Volusia and St. Lucie. And in Tennessee and Arkansas, Goldwater flipped segregationist rural counties that had gone for Kennedy, but Johnson regained several counties where voters had bolted over anti-Catholicism (the same also happened in Oklahoma).

Goldwater did worse in Southern states with at least some history of competition. Previously, Black belt whites were seen as the tribalistic enemy of the mountain vote and those more urban and commercially oriented who did vote Republican (prior to Goldwater). Phillips noted this as well and noted that Goldwater's perceived catering to the black belt whites, alienated much of the traditional Republican base in the South (to the extent that it had existed in the mountains, cities and suburbs) up to that point.

While it is common place to lump Goldwater in with "the Southern Strategy" a good portion of Phillips book is emphasizing just how ill conceived Goldwater's approach was and contrasting it with the much more measured conservatism of Nixon, especially since Wallace was running and eating up much of that deep south vote. Nixon for his part did extremely well with and improved upon Republican strength in more traditionally Republican areas (Mountains, Suburbs, Urban Middle Class). The Mountain vote, whose isolationism is certainly well established had the Vietnam War boosting its turnout. Meanwhile, Nixon's use of issues like busing to dog whistle to the more subdued racism of the suburbs (North and South for that matter) was far more effective at both milking such race resentment while at the same time not overtly crossing the Civil War battle lines, putting on a grey uniform and waving the Confederate flag as Goldwater had done figuratively speaking.

Many of these areas voted as they shot and still did as late as the 1960's, Republican bastions were the unionist ones for the most part and as they were shut out of the Solid South power structure, both loathed the Planter class and their sycophants and the Democratic Party that they had dominated especially further South. Northern transplants onto this scene also despised the good ole boy network that kept them from the levels of influence they had up North. Goldwater's strategy was a boot through the teeth of these heretofore drawn battle lines in states like Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia.

At the same time, Republicans knew that the planter class, the black belt whites (whose power was being erased by the VRA, ending the era of their rotten boroughs that I have mentioned so much in the past year) and urban elites (those that weren't cast to the sidelines of the local power structure) were themselves alienated from the Democratic Party by the New Deal, the failure to win in Vietnam and the big elephant in the room, the fact that the Democratic Party had given up on being the vehicle for maintaining the race structure in the South as far back as 1948, in favor of maintaining said New Deal Coalition (Truman had proved the combined power of unionized workers, with strong black majorities and once Ike flipped a number of cities the necessity of this for the likes of Daley in Chicago and Clark in Philly and Democrats in NYC to survive dictated that approach be taken).


In 1968, while Republicans were certainly desiring to break into the South, they had to subdue their appeal to the black belt whites and segregationists to avoid alienating their own traditional  "conservative" base (by this point, anyone who is upscale and living in a suburban area and while still largely protestant in character, that was changing in 1968), which consoled itself by expressing nominal support for Civil Rights while taking a Nimby approach to subject (Also if you think this is new or a shift for the GOP, you didn't pay attention to how Lincoln got elected or why he had to get the 13th Amendment through before the end of the War. Its even in the movie and it is completely accurate), which is why busing worked so well as a wedge issue as it rallied the base and peeled of both the disaffected working class suburbanites and also the Segregationists in the South. "Their is a not a dime's worth a difference between the two parties" originates from Wallace in this election and it was aimed at discouraging segregationists from settling for the lesser of two evils" on race issues, ie Nixon busing opposition paired with nominal support for Civil Rights.

[TDAS04]

That Kennedy/Goldwater County on Maryland’s Eastern Shore seems somewhat puzzling.

[Calthrina950]

That Kennedy/Goldwater County on Maryland’s Eastern Shore seems somewhat puzzling.

I recall reading somewhere that Dorchester County was rocked by racial unrest during the early 1960s, which intensified in 1964 because of the Civil Rights Act. In fact, when projecting Maryland for Johnson on Election Night, CBS News briefly discussed the turmoil which had taken place in the state, and the fears of a white backlash. Johnson's landslide margin there was a surprise. Moreover, George Wallace had performed strongly in the Democratic primary in Maryland, obtaining support from white working-class voters opposed to civil rights; Johnson won the primary thanks to black voters. Thus, Goldwater's victory in Dorchester County was a product of these tensions, but the landslide precluded him from making any gains in the remainder of the Eastern Shore.

[mianfei]

Dorchester County was certainly rocked by much racial unrest. In essence, the whole Delmarva Peninsula is part of the plantation South with its strict racial codes and segregation laws. In fact, Wallace ran second in Dorchester County in 1968, and Humphrey probably won less than 10 percent of the white vote there (vis-à-vis circa 25 percent in all of Virginia and 30 percent in all of Maryland).

What I have noted about the Goldwater counties in the Midwest and West is that they have been either:

• historically Southern or Mormon-settled parts of the West that had been trending Republican since World War II broke out or;
• German- or Dutch-settled areas of the Midwest that had long been Republican and characterized by powerful conservative dominance

The effect of Dutch settlement, which in the United States has been typified by very conservative and religious values, is particularly noticeable with Ottawa and Missaukee Counties in Michigan, and also with the western Iowa counties – Cass, Page, O'Brien, Sioux and Lyon – that Goldwater won and have not voted Democratic since 1936. Sioux County and O'Brien County have further parallels with Ottawa County in that they voted Democratic in 1864 but turned solidly Republican after the Civil War. The Yankee areas of central Iowa swung towards Johnson by as much as 29 percent in Marion County, where Nixon won 62 percent but Goldwater just 33 percent. Goldwater’s losses in western Iowa were about 19 percent in rural counties and only 11 percent in more urban Plymouth and Pottawatamie Counties. It’s often forgotten that Goldwater declined much less in urban counties than in culturally similar rural counties, though that may reflect rural voters’ generally greater propensity to swing.

Some of the Midwestern counties that voted for Goldwater were German Lutheran and voted Democratic until the 1890s or even until World War I. Carver and Sibley Counties were amongst the most Democratic in Republican Minnesota until the First World War, when they turned abruptly against Wilson and their Lutheranism limited support for Smith.

If we turn to Ohio, we see this again. Of the five Goldwater counties in Ohio (none of which he held by so much as 5 percentage points):

• Allen and Hancock Counties even voted for William Jennings Bryan as late as 1908, but became solidly Republican from the 1940 election onwards.
• Delaware and Union Counties were part of the Virginia Military district Whig stronghold in antebellum Ohio and turned Republican when the Whig Party effectively split up and have remained extremely loyal to the GOP since, as discussed here
• Fulton County – in that era normally the banner Republican County in Ohio – is in the Yankee far northwest of the state, had voted 74 percent Republican in 1960, and may have been influenced by more conservative Indiana voting patterns. (In the Northeast, many counties that were more than 75 percent Republican in 1960 voted for Johnson)

Why did he do so well in Nebraska?

Essentially, Nebraska is more Southern and more Western than any other Midwestern state (if we treat Missouri as a Southern state). The Cornhusker State was virtually devoid of the Yankee and Scandinavian voters who bolted the Republicans en masse in 1964.

Nebraska never attracted New England settlers as northeastern Kansas, central Iowa, or parts of South Dakota did. Apart from a few German Catholic areas like Butler, Howard and Greeley Counties, Nebraska was largely settled by southerners from the Ozarks. These voted Republican all along except for the period between the Populist movement and 1936 when they constituted a volatile swing vote. Their attachment to Goldwater’s Western anti-government sentiment was strong enough to resist substantially anti-Goldwater trends found in Yankee and Scandinavian areas, or in earlier-settled parts of Appalachia and the Ozarks.

[Alcibiades]

I have always wondered why Goldwater did so well in suburban Chicagoland. This was pretty much the only non-Sunbelt wealthy, WASPy suburban area he won (the only other was suburban Indianapolis, which has remained far more conservative); he even lost in WOW. In fact remarkably the only congressional districts he won outside the South and West were four in the area (two in suburban Cook County, one comprising Lake and McHenry and one made up of DuPage and Will). There is nothing in its subsequent voting patterns to suggest it was much more conservative than similar areas. What exactly made it so receptive to Goldwater?

[DINGO Joe]

Al smith won it so probably Catholic.

Another fascinating thing to me about 1964 is the shifts towards Goldwater among pro-segregationist whites even in the Southern states that Johnson carried. In Virginia, for example, Goldwater won several Southside counties that Kennedy had carried in 1960; Johnson flipped the state because of winning the Northern Virginia suburbs and Richmond, which Nixon had won.

While the city of Richmond swung to Johnson, the suburbs swung to Goldwater and cancelled out much of the overall swing.  The swing in NOVA was across all parts towards Johnson.  In fact NOVA has had considerable influence on VA for some time now.  Nixon in 60 Johnson in 64 Ford in 76 all won in large part to winning NOVA.

The other part of the state that uniformly swung towards Johnson was the traditionally Republican Old Wagon road from the Shenandoah on down through Roanoke and beyond.  Plus the Appalachian parts to the west, though many of those already voted for Kennedy.

[mianfei]

I have always wondered why Goldwater did so well in suburban Chicagoland. This was pretty much the only non-Sunbelt wealthy, WASPy suburban area he won (the only other was suburban Indianapolis, which has remained far more conservative); he even lost in WOW. In fact remarkably the only congressional districts he won outside the South and West were four in the area (two in suburban Cook County, one comprising Lake and McHenry and one made up of DuPage and Will). There is nothing in its subsequent voting patterns to suggest it was much more conservative than similar areas. What exactly made it so receptive to Goldwater?

Firstly, Northern Illinois outside the core of urban Chicago was before 1964 as rock-ribbed Republican as those famous Southern Unionist bastions like East Tennessee, south central Kentucky, Avery County in North Carolina or Grant County in West Virginia. Boone County, the banner Republican county in Illinois at that time, had never given a Democrat thirty percent since James Polk in 1844.

Secondly, as I said earlier, urban and suburban voters in the northern states swung much less against Goldwater than rural Yankee and Unionist Southern voters did. Thirdly, these historically Republican counties have been much more economically conservative than socially conservative, which is why they have trended Democratic since the 1990s (if we exclude Trump’s recent “Rust Belt” appeal in the area’s more rural counties).

[Calthrina950]

Al smith won it so probably Catholic.

Another fascinating thing to me about 1964 is the shifts towards Goldwater among pro-segregationist whites even in the Southern states that Johnson carried. In Virginia, for example, Goldwater won several Southside counties that Kennedy had carried in 1960; Johnson flipped the state because of winning the Northern Virginia suburbs and Richmond, which Nixon had won.

While the city of Richmond swung to Johnson, the suburbs swung to Goldwater and cancelled out much of the overall swing.  The swing in NOVA was across all parts towards Johnson.  In fact NOVA has had considerable influence on VA for some time now.  Nixon in 60 Johnson in 64 Ford in 76 all won in large part to winning NOVA.

The other part of the state that uniformly swung towards Johnson was the traditionally Republican Old Wagon road from the Shenandoah on down through Roanoke and beyond.  Plus the Appalachian parts to the west, though many of those already voted for Kennedy.

You're right, because Henrico and Chesterfield Counties (suburbs of Richmond) were heavily Republican at that time, and both gave Goldwater more than 60% of the vote. And Johnson did do very well across Appalachia that year-West Virginia was among his best states, he is one of only two Democrats to have won Whitley County, Kentucky (alongside Woodrow Wilson), and he did the best any Democrat has ever done in Leslie County. My guess is that Johnson's Great Society programs and Goldwater's economic conservatism helps to explain the result in these regions, which were not as affected by the racial politics of the Civil Rights Movement, given their small black populations.