This Once Great Movement Of Ours

[cp]

Maybe it's just an aesthetic preference, but I thought the 'Top Ten List' format was gimmicky and made it hard to take anything in the article seriously. Like James Mills said, it seemed more like the kind of thing you cobble together from floor scraps to meet a deadline before a long weekend.

To the extent it should be taken seriously, the article betrayed the perennial flaw of just not wanting to look seriously at Corbyn or the movement/politics he inspired. That cuts both ways. There were all kinds of missteps Corbyn made, but the article's only criticisms of him are the platitudes about being too radical or not dealing with antisemitism that betray a rather skewed/factional perspective of his tenure.

Conversely, the article only pays lip service to the critique that New Labour, and especially its economic policies, was built on a flawed foundation that wasn't sustainable past 2007. Perhaps an 11th decision point should have been the day the PLP decided to challenge Corbyn's leadership after the referendum instead of cluing in to the fact that, after two 'surprise' results, they clearly didn't understand nearly as much about winning elections in the UK as they thought they did.

There also isn't any mention of the international parallels to Labour's trajectory over the past 20 (40?) years, repetition of the 'they chose the wrong brother' grift at least twice, and ignorance of (as user:Blair points out) extra-parliamentary political developments on the left.

[Conservatopia]

The only things I liked about the article were its analysis of 2001 (which we don't hear enough about) and the fact that it largely avoided going too far down the "wrong brother" rabbit hole.

Apart from that it seemed like it was just saying "ackshully Labour lost power because it was TOO good in government."

[CumbrianLefty]

I actually agree with this. I thought the article was very disappointing, featured too many of the ‘golden gang’ and really didn’t capture the actual issues facing Labour over the last decade. The quote from Douglas Alexander on Scotland was laughable.

Also seemed devoid of the extra parliamentary left and the other liberation politics- something that’s had a huge impact on Labour since 2010 really.

Would be interested what others thought.

https://mobile.twitter.com/JamesMills1984/status/1433580089258749955

What was that?

The "hottest take" for me regarding Scotland was John McTernan's assertion that Labour's collapse there would never have happened.......if only......David Miliband had been elected leader!!

And of course the contributions from "OUR SAVIOUR OVER THE WATER" were typically risible.

(McTernan really is a strange one, though - just the other day he was strongly defending Labour as a "broad church" party, a barely coded rebuke to the macho-rightist tendency in the party who often quite genuinely seem to desire everybody to the left of Starmer expelled)

[Conservatopia]

To state the obvious - had David won we would have called him the wrong brother too.

[Blair]

Yeah the obsession about David is stupid- I think he could have got a better share of the overall vote but the best result Labour was going to get from the 2015 general election in hindsight was to stop a conservative majority government.

I actually take the rather weird view that the leader in 2010 should have been someone who was an MP in 1997. The party skipped a generation and gave power to a frontbench made up of New Labour staffers.

I actually agree with this. I thought the article was very disappointing, featured too many of the ‘golden gang’ and really didn’t capture the actual issues facing Labour over the last decade. The quote from Douglas Alexander on Scotland was laughable.

Also seemed devoid of the extra parliamentary left and the other liberation politics- something that’s had a huge impact on Labour since 2010 really.

Would be interested what others thought.

https://mobile.twitter.com/JamesMills1984/status/1433580089258749955

What was that?

The "hottest take" from me regarding Scotland was John McTernan's assertion that Labour's collapse there would never have happened.......if only......David Miliband had been elected leader!!

And of course the contributions from "OUR SAVIOUR OVER THE WATER" were typically risible.

(McTernan really is a strange one, though - just the other day he was strongly defending Labour as a "broad church" party, a barely coded rebuke to the macho-rightist tendency in the party who often quite genuinely seem to desire everybody to the left of Starmer expelled)

He said that Scottish Labour MPs weren’t actually that out of touch since even the MPs with the best contact rates on voter ID still lost!

Which obviously ignores that Labour MPs did take those seats for granted and the warning signs had been there since 2007.

[Blair]

It always annoys me that no-one mentions Welsh Labour- it’s the most effective part of the party, with broadly the strongest performing MPs and a leader who was popular enough to feature on leaflets.

[Conservatopia]

It always annoys me that no-one mentions Welsh Labour- it’s the most effective part of the party, with broadly the strongest performing MPs and a leader who was popular enough to feature on leaflets.

Tbf this is due in no small part to the hilarious Taff Tory Party.  I've seen it close up and believe me a turnout machine it is not.  The only half decent campaign I've seen from them was 2015 in Gower but of course they didn't even try retain that seat in '17.  Total jokers.

Not saying that Llafur isn't a canny party - it is.  But the Tories there being a disaster doesn't hurt.

[EastAnglianLefty]

To state the obvious - had David won we would have called him the wrong brother too.

In retrospect, the wrong brother did win - because David would have self-destructed long before 2015 and we could have tried something new, whilst still having Ed as an option in future.

Yeah the obsession about David is stupid- I think he could have got a better share of the overall vote but the best result Labour was going to get from the 2015 general election in hindsight was to stop a conservative majority government.

I actually take the rather weird view that the leader in 2010 should have been someone who was an MP in 1997. The party skipped a generation and gave power to a frontbench made up of New Labour staffers.

I actually agree with this. I thought the article was very disappointing, featured too many of the ‘golden gang’ and really didn’t capture the actual issues facing Labour over the last decade. The quote from Douglas Alexander on Scotland was laughable.

Also seemed devoid of the extra parliamentary left and the other liberation politics- something that’s had a huge impact on Labour since 2010 really.

Would be interested what others thought.

https://mobile.twitter.com/JamesMills1984/status/1433580089258749955

What was that?

The "hottest take" from me regarding Scotland was John McTernan's assertion that Labour's collapse there would never have happened.......if only......David Miliband had been elected leader!!

And of course the contributions from "OUR SAVIOUR OVER THE WATER" were typically risible.

(McTernan really is a strange one, though - just the other day he was strongly defending Labour as a "broad church" party, a barely coded rebuke to the macho-rightist tendency in the party who often quite genuinely seem to desire everybody to the left of Starmer expelled)

He said that Scottish Labour MPs weren’t actually that out of touch since even the MPs with the best contact rates on voter ID still lost!

Which obviously ignores that Labour MPs did take those seats for granted and the warning signs had been there since 2007.

I spent a year as CLP secretary of Aberdeen North (because I turned up to a meeting to complain about the CLP secretary not answering emails, it turned out he'd moved to England and nobody else wanted to take over.) Their contact rate was pretty good, but I don't think it actually bore any relation to who they'd actually talked to. The inability of Scottish CLPs to realise that most CLPs in safe Tory seats in rural England could comfortably out-organise them never ceases to amaze me.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

The only things I liked about the article were its analysis of 2001 (which we don't hear enough about)

Unfortunately it's an analysis that relies heavily on teleological fallacies and which can be debunked within seconds. Falls in turnout between the 1997 and 2001 elections were pretty much uniform across the country, which was also the case for the similar, large, fall in turnout between the 1992 and 1997 elections. We have a habit of forgetting this, but at the time turnout in 1997 was regarded as remarkably low, and it was the lowest for a very long time. It has, noticeably, not been reached at any General Election since. It is reasonably clear that most of the people who voted in 1997 and not in 2001 (and also most of the people who voted in 1992 but not in 1997) had died in the meantime. Now, the average age of death in the 1990s was in the middle 70s. Most of the people dying at the time, then, were members of the Wartime Generation, who, and isn't this a funny coincidence, happened to be the single most politicised cohort in our democratic history. The tendency of British political scientists and electoral observers to assume immortality on the part of the electorate is most perplexing.

[CumbrianLefty]

The only things I liked about the article were its analysis of 2001 (which we don't hear enough about)

Unfortunately it's an analysis that relies heavily on teleological fallacies and which can be debunked within seconds. Falls in turnout between the 1997 and 2001 elections were pretty much uniform across the country, which was also the case for the similar, large, fall in turnout between the 1992 and 1997 elections. We have a habit of forgetting this, but at the time turnout in 1997 was regarded as remarkably low, and it was the lowest for a very long time. It has, noticeably, not been reached at any General Election since. It is reasonably clear that most of the people who voted in 1997 and not in 2001 (and also most of the people who voted in 1992 but not in 1997) had died in the meantime. Now, the average age of death in the 1990s was in the middle 70s. Most of the people dying at the time, then, were members of the Wartime Generation, who, and isn't this a funny coincidence, happened to be the single most politicised cohort in our democratic history. The tendency of British political scientists and electoral observers to assume immortality on the part of the electorate is most perplexing.

I mean is this actually true? Its "only" 20-25 years we are talking about - its not *quite* the same as asking "where has the old Labour vote in rural Norfolk gone?" (six feet under, that is indeed where)

Personally always thought the crash in turnout took a lot of the gloss off Blair's second landslide, and despite feigning insouciance at the time (you may well recall the "its because they're all so contented" schtick that was invariably wheeled out at the time) its now clear the leadership knew it was bad too.

And as for turnout drops being uniform - whilst this was *mostly* the case in 2001 it was rather less so four years earlier when the drop was concentrated in safe Labour seats (and some really hardcore areas, eg inner Manchester and Liverpool, had seen a fall against the trend in *1992*)

[Filuwaúrdjan]

I mean is this actually true? Its "only" 20-25 years we are talking about - its not *quite* the same as asking "where has the old Labour vote in rural Norfolk gone?" (six feet under, that is indeed where)

It's the sort of thing that can never be known absolutely, but there is no other explanation that fits the facts and makes any logical sense. Most, of course, does not mean all: there were definitely people who voted in 1997 and were alive in 2001 and did not vote and have voted in some (but we can be fairly sure not all) subsequent elections. But the vital statistics for that decade are what they are, and the same is true of the structural, permanent element to the fall in turnout.

[Geoffrey Howe]

Why do you think most of the change in turnout came from people dying? Is there something in the data which suggests this, or is just a hypothesis based on the fact that the sorts of people dying were particularly politically aware? What about the steady rise in turnout from 2001 to 2017?

[Blair]

On a different note I guess what I didn't like about the piece was the failure to engage in the wider political scene. It's baffling that the trail for the piece talked about the 'death of Labour England'- when it's been clear that Labour England actually died in the 1950s and was buried in the 1970s.

New Labour was an analysis of where the electorate, the economy & the country was in the 1990s, and was then about creating a solution for the Labour party to win a majority through these three solutions. I guess this is why Al refers to Tony Blair as the last Marxist in the Labour party, but it's always annoyed me how few people in Labour seem to have read Anthony Crossland and understood his view that the the party needs to constantly re-assess the conditions in the country and then revise the solutions and policies Labour put forward.

This equally applies to the Labour right who mistake the need to revise as being 'we need to revise & then move to the right'.

The case in point was thinking that the electorate wanted sweeping cuts to tax credits,  further austerity, 'pro-landlordism' and other idiotic concepts after the 2015 loss- when it's very clear from the two parties that the political gravity has moved hugely away from these ideas. The fact that the article failed to talk about John McDonnell was rather shocking- it's not often noted that his Junior treasury team were the two top economic posts first given by Starmer (Johnny Reynolds to DWP & Anneliese Dodds to Chancellor) and even Rachel Reeves as Chancellor seems different to how she would have been since 2015.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Why do you think most of the change in turnout came from people dying? Is there something in the data which suggests this, or is just a hypothesis based on the fact that the sorts of people dying were particularly politically aware? What about the steady rise in turnout from 2001 to 2017?

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does. Turnout rises and falls depending on circumstance (and, especially, on whether people think an election is competitive: people are more likely to vote if they think their vote matters), but during the 1990s there was a structural decline in turnout. The General Election of 1997 saw the lowest turnout since 1935, a fact that was much remarked on at the time. Every single subsequent General Election has had a significantly lower turnout. Just as tellingly, turnout at the 2016 Referendum (often talked about as if it had an extraordinarily high turnout) was only about 1pt higher. So, something significant must have changed during the 1990s, something below the froth of everyday political shifts. The inevitable conclusion must be that the replacement of a cohort of voters who were, due to extreme and unrepeatable circumstances when they were young, unusually politicised* with new voters who came of age in a very different world caused a structural (and permanent) decline in turnout. Are there even any genuinely plausible alternative explanations? Arguments about 'political disillusionment' wont wash: if that were true then turnout would have crashed through the floor in the 1970s and that was very much not the case.

_{*And, we should not forget either, unusually committed to both basic liberal democratic norms and to the two 'big parties'. And unusually hostile to perceived political extremism and even towards 'populist' electoral tactics.}

[Geoffrey Howe]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does. Turnout rises and falls depending on circumstance (and, especially, on whether people think an election is competitive: people are more likely to vote if they think their vote matters), but during the 1990s there was a structural decline in turnout. The General Election of 1997 saw the lowest turnout since 1935, a fact that was much remarked on at the time. Every single subsequent General Election has had a significantly lower turnout. Just as tellingly, turnout at the 2016 Referendum (often talked about as if it had an extraordinarily high turnout) was only about 1pt higher. So, something significant must have changed during the 1990s, something below the froth of everyday political shifts. The inevitable conclusion must be that the replacement of a cohort of voters who were, due to extreme and unrepeatable circumstances when they were young, unusually politicised* with new voters who came of age in a very different world caused a structural (and permanent) decline in turnout. Are there even any genuinely plausible alternative explanations? Arguments about 'political disillusionment' wont wash: if that were true then turnout would have crashed through the floor in the 1970s and that was very much not the case.

_{*And, we should not forget either, unusually committed to both basic liberal democratic norms and to the two 'big parties'. And unusually hostile to perceived political extremism and even towards 'populist' electoral tactics.}

Understood (and agreed). You are referring to the broader climate of lower turnout over a decade or so. I was under the impression you were talking specifically about 2001. (Might have something to do with the fact I haven't read the article which prompted the discussion.)

[Filuwaúrdjan]

To the extent it should be taken seriously, the article betrayed the perennial flaw of just not wanting to look seriously at Corbyn or the movement/politics he inspired.

I'm going to maybe surprise you a little by agreeing with that, at least up to a point. That point being his election as leader: afterwards it was a case of throwing things at walls to see if anything stuck as people screamed at each other in the background and haggled over posts (so much the same as every other Labour leadership since the Financial Crisis struck).¹ But that it happened must tell us something, even if the moment is gone and the edifice collapsed under its own weight. I go back to what I thought at the time, which was that it was the wrong answer to the right question. Much as Modernist technocracy was clearly dead as a means through which to pursue socialist politics by the 1970s and 80s, so has the use of a tidy surplus produced by the financial sector to pursue socialist goals through market mechanisms been since 2008. And there's little doubt that substantial harm has been done to the core of our polity - and also to wider society - by Osborne's 'austerity'... and this changes what can and can't be done politically.² And that there needs to be some way of exploiting the pretty widespread dislike of the practical consequences.

<sub>1. Though there is certainly a case, as for every other Labour leadership in the period in question, to look at what did stick and what definitely didn't.
2. Amongst other things local government can no longer be used (as it always was by Labour in opposition) as a redoubt and a testing ground as local government in the traditional sense effectively no longer exists.</sub>

[cp]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

[Libertas Vel Mors]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

This is a certified Labour Left moment. "the collapse of neoliberalism!" as Britons enjoy prosperity and wealth, "Corbyn got 40%," ignoring his 33% 2 years later. 

[Secretary of State Liberal Hack]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

This is a certified Labour Left moment. "the collapse of neoliberalism!" as Britons enjoy prosperity and wealth, "Corbyn got 40%," ignoring his 33% 2 years later. 

I do think this is a missing factor out of a lot of analaysis. Who were these 7% of voters who backed Corbyn in 2017 but left in 2020. In terms of seat Labour primarly shed working-class red wall seats but in popular conception it seems like most voters who left were pro-EU or middle-class voters disastifed with the parties ambigious brexit poistion.

[cp]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

This is a certified Labour Left moment. "the collapse of neoliberalism!" as Britons enjoy prosperity and wealth, "Corbyn got 40%," ignoring his 33% 2 years later. 

I do think this is a missing factor out of a lot of analaysis. Who were these 7% of voters who backed Corbyn in 2017 but left in 2020. In terms of seat Labour primarly shed working-class red wall seats but in popular conception it seems like most voters who left were pro-EU or middle-class voters disastifed with the parties ambigious brexit poistion.

From what I recall, Labour lost about equal parts of its 2017 vote to the Lib Dems and the Tories, but the biggest fall came from non-voters, i.e. 2017 Labour voters who just didn't turn up at all.

[Conservatopia]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

This is a certified Labour Left moment. "the collapse of neoliberalism!" as Britons enjoy prosperity and wealth, "Corbyn got 40%," ignoring his 33% 2 years later. 

I do think this is a missing factor out of a lot of analaysis. Who were these 7% of voters who backed Corbyn in 2017 but left in 2020. In terms of seat Labour primarly shed working-class red wall seats but in popular conception it seems like most voters who left were pro-EU or middle-class voters disastifed with the parties ambigious brexit poistion.

From what I recall, Labour lost about equal parts of its 2017 vote to the Lib Dems and the Tories, but the biggest fall came from non-voters, i.e. 2017 Labour voters who just didn't turn up at all.

This is correct.  The Tories captured a lot of the fabled Red Wall seats without really increasing their raw votes much.  Rather, a drop in Labour turnout delivered those seats to the blue column.

[Geoffrey Howe]

Once Brexit is out of the way and Labour shift well to the right, they will come flooding back

[CumbrianLefty]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

This is a certified Labour Left moment. "the collapse of neoliberalism!" as Britons enjoy prosperity and wealth, "Corbyn got 40%," ignoring his 33% 2 years later. 

Typically incisive contribution from you

The primary cause of the Corbyn insurgency was that "prosperity and wealth" in the UK is skewed.

[Secretary of State Liberal Hack]

The hypothesis fits the information that we have and nothing else does.

I might be missing something, but isn't it a fallacy to base an argument about turnout off of the number of dead voters?

I don't mean to be rude, but I think you've not thought this argument through. Turnout drops in the UK in the 90s occurred across age cohorts; even the *living* 65+ y/o voters showed up less after 1992. Also, declines in turnout occurred during the 90s and 00s almost everywhere: in the US, UK, Canada, NZ, France (started in the 80s, actually), and even Australia (it was, like, 1 point, but still). If your theory of generational replacement were true - and we're talking about voter age cohort proportions and not turnout because, again, dead people don't vote no matter what the GOP says - then you'd see proportional drops in each country depending on life expectancy and age/population distribution.*

For the hell of it, as an alternative theory based on a modicum of statistical data, perhaps it's the *other* side of the generational span that's the culprit? Starting after the Cold War young people didn't become first time voters the way preceding generations did. That's born out by age-bracketed turnout data in the UK and Canada, but admittedly a lot more analysis would be needed to offer a serious argument.

As for Corbyn, he was clearly closer to the 'right answer' (whatever that's supposed to mean) to the question posed by the collapse of late 20th/early 21st century neoliberalism than the Labour right or the Lib Dems or the Greens or even the pre-UKIP-absorption Tories were able to offer - he did get 40% of the vote, after all. If the pearl clutching centrists of 2015-2017 had had the humility to stop looking down their noses at him, they might have had a chance to use Corbyn to preserve the world they built - and have subsequently lost.

*Also, your subsequent attribution of the pre-baby boom generation's high turnout to formative experiences instilling hostility to 'populism' seems more like wishful thinking (or is it projection?)

This is a certified Labour Left moment. "the collapse of neoliberalism!" as Britons enjoy prosperity and wealth, "Corbyn got 40%," ignoring his 33% 2 years later. 

Typically incisive contribution from you

The primary cause of the Corbyn insurgency was that "prosperity and wealth" in the UK is skewed.

Again this militant rhetoric isn't helpful "insurgency" and other such terms make you look like a radical loon. Labour can't win an election without winning moderate voters.

[gerritcole]

gaitskel and wilson wouold mop the flloor with bojo