2020 Texas Redistricting thread

[muon2]

Having a CD built on growth in the Pub-leaning HCVAP population may not pass muster.

First one identifies whether a district must be drawn to meet VRA section 2 using the Gingles test: Is there a compact district with 50%+ HCVAP? Is the Hispanic population politically cohesive (does it mostly vote the same way)? Does the white population vote sufficiently together to defeat the preferred choice of the Hispanics in the area.

As long as the Hispanic population in an area is still strongly in favor of a Dem and the white population is Pub enough to defeat the Dem, then a 50% HCVAP CD is not necessarily sufficient to meet the VRA. Counting on a growing Pub fraction among Hispanics doesn't cut it until they are prevalent enough to make Hispanics no longer politically cohesive. Then the Gingles test no longer applies.

[muon2]

Having a CD built on growth in the Pub-leaning HCVAP population may not pass muster.

First one identifies whether a district must be drawn to meet VRA section 2 using the Gingles test: Is there a compact district with 50%+ HCVAP? Is the Hispanic population politically cohesive (does it mostly vote the same way)? Does the white population vote sufficiently together to defeat the preferred coice of the Hispanics in the area.

As long as the Hispanic population in an area is still strongly in favor of a Dem and the white population is Pub enough to defeat the Dem, then a 50% HCVAP CD is not necessarily sufficient to meet the VRA. Counting on a growing Pub fraction among Hispanics doesn't cut it until they are prevalent enough to make Hispanics no longer politically cohesive. Then the Gingles test no longer applies.

I think 60D 40 R is clearly at the point where they aren't politically cohesive. This would be like saying Missouri 1st failed as a VRA seat due to Clay losing while still slightly winning the black vote.

Unfortunately there hasn't been a case to directly test what a cohesive minority means in this context. However the cases in the last decade make it clear that one cannot rely on a numeric target for a minority population but must rely on election data to support the claim that the minority has the ability to elect the candidate of choice. Which leaves open the question of how to determine when the minority no longer has a candidate of choice.

[muon2]

Having a CD built on growth in the Pub-leaning HCVAP population may not pass muster.

First one identifies whether a district must be drawn to meet VRA section 2 using the Gingles test: Is there a compact district with 50%+ HCVAP? Is the Hispanic population politically cohesive (does it mostly vote the same way)? Does the white population vote sufficiently together to defeat the preferred choice of the Hispanics in the area.

As long as the Hispanic population in an area is still strongly in favor of a Dem and the white population is Pub enough to defeat the Dem, then a 50% HCVAP CD is not necessarily sufficient to meet the VRA. Counting on a growing Pub fraction among Hispanics doesn't cut it until they are prevalent enough to make Hispanics no longer politically cohesive. Then the Gingles test no longer applies.

1. Where is the case that held illegal a 50% HCVAP CD that was (1) "compact," (2) not gerrymandered in any unreasonable way, (3) 80% of the Hispanic voters preferred a Democrat, (4) those voters could not elect a candidate of their choice, because 20% of the Hispanics voted Pub, and their relatively turnout percentages were low? A case with different percentages than mine that elucidate the underlying issue will be accepted.

2. Where is the case that held a 50% HCVAP CD was illegal where the Hispanics were legally entitled to a CD because of the 50% CVAP Gingles trigger, and where it was not something that looked outrageous, but was not performing due to low Hispanic turnout, and/or some Hispanics voting in Pub primaries?

3. Is there any case that dealt with the issue of playing the game of seeking out minority precincts that had a low percentage of CVAP's voting and avoiding those with higher CVAP turnouts, for partisan reasons? I noticed in Texas per the 2016 election results, that in some precincts Hispanic CVAP turnout was shockingly low. Ditto for the blacks as well to a lesser degree in some places. It has not been mentioned much, but doing Texas, I realized that playing the gerrymandering game involves seeking out such hostile to the gerrymanderer's party precincts that are low turnout. The best precincts of all for the Pubs are prison precincts, but it would be a very  easy lift for SCOTUS to hold that you cannot count prisoners not eligible to vote in CVAP figures.

4. Even if there is not such a case, yet, what I would anticipate is that where you can draw a compact minority CD, where the Gingles trigger has been met, particularly if it also hews to neutral redistricting metrics, what you cannot do is demonically change the lines around to get the CVAP down to 50% CVAP or whatever, and/or systematically seek out the lowest turnout precincts, so that it ceases to be performing, due to low minority turnout. I tend to doubt that has ever been done by the Pubs however. Historically they minority CVAP up, not down, to more effectively Dem vote sink. Which raises the question, that if you can draw a compact 50% HCVAP CD, but it is not performing, and no such compact performing Hispanic CD in fact can be drawn, do you need to draw it anyway? I do appreciate that if some erose monster were deemed "compact"under the Gingles test, and only that CD were performing, you would have to draw it. Less clear to me is whether or not if such CD were deemed "compact," but is nevertheless an obvious gerrymander by all other metrics, you have to draw something less gerrymandered that gets the HCVAP or BCVAP way down, but is still performing (a variant of the packing issue).

In TX the most relevant case is LULAC v Perry (2006). In that case Dems were gaining in the 1990's in TX-23 (Rio Grande Valley) and in 2001 the Pubs substituted a new TX-25, drawn to neutralize the growing Dem power in TX-23 and create an opportunity district elsewhere that they would also likely win based on partisan voter turnout. It seems not unlike your item 4.

In the opening of LULAC, J Kennedy laid out a number of points, one of which was "Another relevant consideration is whether the number of districts in which the minority group forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population in the relevant area. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 ." Note that the minority group must form an effective majority to be considered as performing. A 50% HCVAP district that is not performing would presumably not count towards the rough proportionality of VRA districts. Cooper allows that a crossover or coalition district can be performing even if the minority is not over 50% VAP.

However, it seems that LULAC would support what you drew in Dallas county, as the facts seem similar to LULAC and they found for the state in the Dallas area. The key is if there is a performing Hispanic VRA CD, don't mess with it, but if there is at best a crossover, coalition, or opportunity district where the Gingles test finds no majority those lines are fair game for political gerrymandering. Note that if the new apportionment dictates that rough proportionality is better served by increasing the number of performing Hispanic CDs, then the burden would be on the state to show why they didn't create one, if a plaintiff shows that it was possible. As in LULAC performing means electing a Dem supported by the majority of Hispanics in the district.

[muon2]

In TX the most relevant case is LULAC v Perry (2006). In that case Dems were gaining in the 1990's in TX-23 (Rio Grande Valley) and in 2001 the Pubs substituted a new TX-25, drawn to neutralize the growing Dem power in TX-23 and create an opportunity district elsewhere that they would also likely win based on partisan voter turnout. It seems not unlike your item 4.

In the opening of LULAC, J Kennedy laid out a number of points, one of which was "Another relevant consideration is whether the number of districts in which the minority group forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population in the relevant area. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 ." Note that the minority group must form an effective majority to be considered as performing. A 50% HCVAP district that is not performing would presumably not count towards the rough proportionality of VRA districts. Cooper allows that a crossover or coalition district can be performing even if the minority is not over 50% VAP.

However, it seems that LULAC would support what you drew in Dallas county, as the facts seem similar to LULAC and they found for the state in the Dallas area. The key is if there is a performing Hispanic VRA CD, don't mess with it, but if there is at best a crossover, coalition, or opportunity district where the Gingles test finds no majority those lines are fair game for political gerrymandering. Note that if the new apportionment dictates that rough proportionality is better served by increasing the number of performing Hispanic CDs, then the burden would be on the state to show why they didn't create one, if a plaintiff shows that it was possible. As in LULAC performing means electing a Dem supported by the majority of Hispanics in the district.

Shouldn't the compact area of minority CVAP predominance be identified before the districts are drawn?

That can be helpful and even ideal, but then the mapmaker must be careful not to let the bias of knowing those areas predominate the plan. That could be construed as a racial gerrymander.

[muon2]

One last thing I didn't mention in the first post, the folks drawing the map aren't the state party leaders. It's not a top-down process to draw a redistricting map, but a bottom-up one. The members of the party all give their input, demands, wants, needs, etc, and the map is drawn from there. If the members agree, then there may be some broader goal to the map (such as the NC redistricting plan among Republican members), but otherwise the incumbents and their allies are the ones who draw the map.

I can't speak to TX, but in many states the map is drawn from the top down. The state party and legislative leaders decide what their objectives are and the hire an expert to draw in a way to meet those goals. Rank and file members are shown the draft product and can provide input as to adjustments they wish, but they rarely get a say at the start of the process.

[muon2]

One last thing I didn't mention in the first post, the folks drawing the map aren't the state party leaders. It's not a top-down process to draw a redistricting map, but a bottom-up one. The members of the party all give their input, demands, wants, needs, etc, and the map is drawn from there. If the members agree, then there may be some broader goal to the map (such as the NC redistricting plan among Republican members), but otherwise the incumbents and their allies are the ones who draw the map.

I can't speak to TX, but in many states the map is drawn from the top down. The state party and legislative leaders decide what their objectives are and the hire an expert to draw in a way to meet those goals. Rank and file members are shown the draft product and can provide input as to adjustments they wish, but they rarely get a say at the start of the process.

That is kinda what I was getting at. The top leaders can decide broader goals for the map (as it is with the initial draft), but after that initial draft is shown to the members of the legislature, its the incumbents who make all the changes and improvements, to the point that the final product looks nothing like the initial and instead follows their wishes and demands. From what I know, which admittedly may not be too much, only NC's map was not substantially changed by the incumbents, due to the fact that there were not many R incumbents in NC to appease at the time. Texas and Florida do not fit this image.

My experience is that the rank and file make requests, but they don't all get accepted by the leadership. Many requests are ignored if there are larger issues and they deem the member suitably secure.

[muon2]

One last thing I didn't mention in the first post, the folks drawing the map aren't the state party leaders. It's not a top-down process to draw a redistricting map, but a bottom-up one. The members of the party all give their input, demands, wants, needs, etc, and the map is drawn from there. If the members agree, then there may be some broader goal to the map (such as the NC redistricting plan among Republican members), but otherwise the incumbents and their allies are the ones who draw the map.

I can't speak to TX, but in many states the map is drawn from the top down. The state party and legislative leaders decide what their objectives are and the hire an expert to draw in a way to meet those goals. Rank and file members are shown the draft product and can provide input as to adjustments they wish, but they rarely get a say at the start of the process.

That is kinda what I was getting at. The top leaders can decide broader goals for the map (as it is with the initial draft), but after that initial draft is shown to the members of the legislature, its the incumbents who make all the changes and improvements, to the point that the final product looks nothing like the initial and instead follows their wishes and demands. From what I know, which admittedly may not be too much, only NC's map was not substantially changed by the incumbents, due to the fact that there were not many R incumbents in NC to appease at the time. Texas and Florida do not fit this image.

My experience is that the rank and file make requests, but they don't all get accepted by the leadership. Many requests are ignored if there are larger issues and they deem the member suitably secure.

Interesting, our experiences appear to differ on the subject. Perhaps, if I may posit a theory, it has to do with the power each party holds in a state. A party that holds a supermajority in each chamber will be less likely to care about individual member concerns than a party with a slight majority.

Do you have a particular state/cycle that reflects your experience?

In 2011 the IL Dems had only a modest majority in the House (64-54) and they still drove the process from the top down. Some Dems didn't get what they wanted, but no one failed to get reelected if they ran. Interestingly the Dem leaders showed some of the Pubs the draft and adjustments were made to accommodate them as long as it didn't interfere with the big picture. The legislative map also was amended a week after it was originally presented since that first version toyed with the Pub spokesperson (ie the ranking member) and it was corrected just before passage.