2020 Census and Redistricting Thread: Louisiana

[ProgressiveModerate]

That seems a reasonable decision, and would simply require election from single-member districts. Single member districts had already been ordered in Texas by White v Regester.

Worth mentioning that multi-member districts are fine, just not majoritarian ones.

Precisely which ones would be legal, you think?

MD Legistlature had quite a few iirc.

[Torie]

Could there be an argument that any 50%+ BVAP LA-02 violates neutral redistricting principles given in a nonracially drawn compact and fair map, the New Orleans area would just get it's own dedicated seat rather than attaching black rurals to boost black population? Honestly for the GOP no matter what happens with VRA New Orleans is likely too hard to politically crack down the middle given balancing a bunch of Trump + 17 seats is bound to make someone upset.

That is another issue that is not entirely clear. Is a 50% BVAP CD but no more a safe harbor if sufficiently compact to trigger Gingles, or is one obligated to follow neutral redistricting principles that have a lower BVAP percentage, so long as it is black performing? The legal answer is probably the former safe harbor one, but I think there is some doubt. As a matter of policy, one should of course try to hew to neutral redistricting  as much as one can while preserving a minority performing CD that is Gingles protected. I think it is pretty clear at the moment that the compact standard for Gingles is looser than the one used for purposes of neutral redistricting principles. The issue is how much looser. One hopes SCOTUS will elaborate.

Exactly. I feel like there's ways to go about it that are better than others, and as tricky as it may be, I'd really be happy with the SCOTUS if they come up with some sort of purely mathematical benchmark even if it otherwise loosens things up a bit.

Also I'd argue the arbitrary strandard for 50% black districts by default violates fair redistricting principles cause ina truly natural map, you should have some 40% black seats and some 60% black seats; not just a bunch of 50% black seats and then a bunch of whiter seats.

Like I kinda feel like black communities should as much as possible be left whole, but aiming for a specific 50% standard doesn't make sense when some of those seats would've already been perfoming at 30% black and others would still be iffy at 50%.

Inherently too, just aiming for black functioning districts eliminates political competition in primaries as well. In fair maps, shouldn't all races ahve opportunities to expand or shrink their coalition if that makes sense rather then deadlock 2 black reps and 4 white representatives for example

As I know that you understand, under current law as "explained" by SCOTUS, there is nothing illegal about a 35% BVAP black performing district, nor for that matter a 60% BVAP district, if the latter hews to neutral redistricting principles (putting aside whether the legal result differs per Gingles, if the 60% BVAP CD precludes another black performing CD, that would itself be deemed triggered by Gingles as sufficiently compact.

[ProgressiveModerate]

Could there be an argument that any 50%+ BVAP LA-02 violates neutral redistricting principles given in a nonracially drawn compact and fair map, the New Orleans area would just get it's own dedicated seat rather than attaching black rurals to boost black population? Honestly for the GOP no matter what happens with VRA New Orleans is likely too hard to politically crack down the middle given balancing a bunch of Trump + 17 seats is bound to make someone upset.

That is another issue that is not entirely clear. Is a 50% BVAP CD but no more a safe harbor if sufficiently compact to trigger Gingles, or is one obligated to follow neutral redistricting principles that have a lower BVAP percentage, so long as it is black performing? The legal answer is probably the former safe harbor one, but I think there is some doubt. As a matter of policy, one should of course try to hew to neutral redistricting  as much as one can while preserving a minority performing CD that is Gingles protected. I think it is pretty clear at the moment that the compact standard for Gingles is looser than the one used for purposes of neutral redistricting principles. The issue is how much looser. One hopes SCOTUS will elaborate.

Exactly. I feel like there's ways to go about it that are better than others, and as tricky as it may be, I'd really be happy with the SCOTUS if they come up with some sort of purely mathematical benchmark even if it otherwise loosens things up a bit.

Also I'd argue the arbitrary strandard for 50% black districts by default violates fair redistricting principles cause ina truly natural map, you should have some 40% black seats and some 60% black seats; not just a bunch of 50% black seats and then a bunch of whiter seats.

Like I kinda feel like black communities should as much as possible be left whole, but aiming for a specific 50% standard doesn't make sense when some of those seats would've already been perfoming at 30% black and others would still be iffy at 50%.

Inherently too, just aiming for black functioning districts eliminates political competition in primaries as well. In fair maps, shouldn't all races ahve opportunities to expand or shrink their coalition if that makes sense rather then deadlock 2 black reps and 4 white representatives for example

As I know that you understand, under current law as "explained" by SCOTUS, there is nothing illegal about a 35% BVAP black performing district, nor for that matter a 60% BVAP district, if the latter hews to neutral redistricting principles (putting aside whether the legal result differs per Gingles, if the 60% BVAP CD precludes another black performing CD, that would itself be deemed triggered by Gingles as sufficiently compact.

There's nothing illegal about it ye, but ig what I'm saying is that the 50% standard seems to be the only standard actually upheld.

Take Alabama for instance. The current 6-1 map isn't fair from a racial standpoint because the other 6 districts almost perfectly crack the black community between them'

However, a 5-2 map also isn't fair because one really has to go pretty far out of their way to draw both districts to be 50%, hence violating neutral principles.

In a case like this, it shouldn't be an all or nothing where either you draw a 2nd black seat or don't; draw a black opportunity seat, perhaps based around Birmingham and a rural black seat that is over 50% black. This would be the best compromise in between.

This is obviously pretty idealistic of me, but ig what I'm saying is the trigger shouldn't be 50% or approaching 50% nor should the trigger be finite.

You can make a simillar argument in LA; the current map splits the black votes not in LA-02 evenly between the remaining district rather than make an effort to consolidate them, even though you could argue a 2nd black LA district violates neutral principles.

A state with a good map would be MS where a good chunk of the remaining black population is consolidated into MS-03 even though a 2nd black district obviously isn't warranted and MS-03 obviously isn't a black functioning nor black opportunity seat. There are no real objectable split of black voters in the state without being ridiculous with tendrils to grab black communities

[ProgressiveModerate]

For instance in this slight modification of the map Republicans passed, AL-07 stays as a safely black district that abides to relative neutral principles, but AL-02 is consolidates a lot of the black population not taken in creating an opportunity that would most years still most likely elect a white R (Trump + 9 seat, 40% black), rather than splitting the black community into a bunch of 30% black seats where they literally have no influence.

There's no reason not to consildate black voters into AL-02 even if the seat doesn't perform other than for partisan reasons.

[Oryxslayer]

That seems a reasonable decision, and would simply require election from single-member districts. Single member districts had already been ordered in Texas by White v Regester.

Worth mentioning that multi-member districts are fine, just not majoritarian ones.

Precisely which ones would be legal, you think?

MD Legistlature had quite a few iirc.

They are also one common option at the county and city level when districts get tiny compared to the precincts.

[lividnyx]

Worth mentioning that multi-member districts are fine, just not majoritarian ones.

Precisely which ones would be legal, you think?

SNTV, STV, MMP, Party-list would certainly be legal for non-congressional elections (Constitution requires majoritarian elections for Senate, and an entirely unrelated law requires single member districts for House)

[I’m not Stu]

Worth mentioning that multi-member districts are fine, just not majoritarian ones.

Precisely which ones would be legal, you think?

SNTV, STV, MMP, Party-list would certainly be legal for non-congressional elections (Constitution requires majoritarian elections for Senate, and an entirely unrelated law requires single member districts for House)

Yes, but would SCOTUS uphold that?

[Torie]

For instance in this slight modification of the map Republicans passed, AL-07 stays as a safely black district that abides to relative neutral principles, but AL-02 is consolidates a lot of the black population not taken in creating an opportunity that would most years still most likely elect a white R (Trump + 9 seat, 40% black), rather than splitting the black community into a bunch of 30% black seats where they literally have no influence.

There's no reason not to consildate black voters into AL-02 even if the seat doesn't perform other than for partisan reasons.

For purposes of proportionality, should minorities be treated differently as a matter of law, such that where hewing to neutral metrics affords some options in design, one should go for the solution that moves towards proportionality? That is what you did with your 40% BVAP CD.

[ProgressiveModerate]

For instance in this slight modification of the map Republicans passed, AL-07 stays as a safely black district that abides to relative neutral principles, but AL-02 is consolidates a lot of the black population not taken in creating an opportunity that would most years still most likely elect a white R (Trump + 9 seat, 40% black), rather than splitting the black community into a bunch of 30% black seats where they literally have no influence.

There's no reason not to consildate black voters into AL-02 even if the seat doesn't perform other than for partisan reasons.

For purposes of proportionality, should minorities be treated differently as a matter of law, such that where hewing to neutral metrics affords some options in design, one should go for the solution that moves towards proportionality? That is what you did with your 40% BVAP CD.

This is not about proportionality rather seat distribution.

The current AL map has 1 50%+ black district and a bunch of below 30% black districts. That is an unnatural distribution of seats cause you have a cluster of low black pop seats and an outlier. A fair map should see a variety of black seat %s.

[Torie]

Converting an "unnatural distribution" into some legal standard is problematic, and in some cases, in my opinion, counterproductive, such as using declination to put lipstick on the pig of doing soft gerrymandering that moves away from proportionality where there is a "natural" party packing, e.g. in large inner cities.

I have come to the firm opinion that you just follow neutral redistricting principles, and where there are reasonable almost as equally good options subject to that constraint, you move towards the one that is closer to proportionality. So your suggestion does move to proportionality, and the lines do I think if you minimized chops hew to neutral principles, so I like what you did, but I think it should apply to partisan proportionality in general, and not just for minority proportionality, so thus my question.

[lividnyx]

Worth mentioning that multi-member districts are fine, just not majoritarian ones.

Precisely which ones would be legal, you think?

SNTV, STV, MMP, Party-list would certainly be legal for non-congressional elections (Constitution requires majoritarian elections for Senate, and an entirely unrelated law requires single member districts for House)

Yes, but would SCOTUS uphold that?

Who's to say? It's not like our court really has much interest in upholding the law as of late.

[ProgressiveModerate]

Converting an "unnatural distribution" into some legal standard is problematic, and in some cases, in my opinion, counterproductive, such as using declination to put lipstick on the pig of doing soft gerrymandering that moves away from proportionality where there is a "natural" party packing, e.g. in large inner cities.

I have come to the firm opinion that you just follow neutral redistricting principles, and where there are reasonable almost as equally good options subject to that constraint, you move towards the one that is closer to proportionality. So your suggestion does move to proportionality, and the lines do I think if you minimized chops hew to neutral principles, so I like what you did, but I think it should apply to partisan proportionality in general, and not just for minority proportionality, so thus my question.

Firstly, I would say natural party packing can be accounted for by looking at the distribution of how precincts vote on a more granular level. In NY for instance, you have a massive share of precincts that are Biden + 80-90 or whatever, and hence a bunch of hyper D NYC seats makes sense. This adds a whole other layer of complication though idk if the courts can really deal with and write into law.

This is what's so hard about this case, and what is neutral redistricting principles isn't even very well defined. Look how differently all the Independent commissions went about drawing maps, even though they all follow different sets of supposedly neutral principles.

One question ig I have is if for VRA, one must abide to "neutral redistricting principles" when dealing with minority communities, doesn't that pretty much end extreme partisan gerrymandering in any state heavily impacted by VRA districts, since partisan gerrymanders almost always chop up clear communities of colour that would otherwise be left whole when following neutral principles, or make VRA districts far more complicated than they need to be (see TX-33, TX-35, NJ-08). Technically all 3 districts function as minority districts but don't have to be so complex to do so.

Texas is one place where a loosening of VRA could actually be problematic for Rs because if a 2nd Alabama or Louisiana district is considered illegal racial gerrymandering, then isn't TX-37, TX-33, the whole Houston config, or the fajitas? All these districts twist and turn to get to a certain minority % while being very uncompact and unnatural districts, especially when there are clear alternatives that are far more compact (2 Hispanic seats in Bexar, a Hidalgo based district, a more "quadranted" Houston, ect). In all these cases the GOP did not move towards the more reasonable option in drawing the map.

Another underrated possiblity where this could have an impact is Cali where the commission clearly tried very very hard to create minority districts, though the fact the map was drawn by a commission gives it a better face than Texas's which is clearly just gerrymandered and bad overall.

My guess is what the supreme court will do will just lower the standard for what qualifies as a minority district, not neccessarily force a minority district to be particularly compact or coherently. So a minority district CAN violate neutral redistricting principles, just the trigger is based on neutral redistricting principles. This would both spare the GOP from creating 2nd black districts in AL or LA, but also ensure TX map stays more or less legal.

[lividnyx]

In her order denying AG Landry's motion for an "extension" (read: motion to stay), Chief Judge Dick notes that "the Supreme Court indicated that an immediate stay is not warranted by declining to enter an administrative stay upon receipt of the emergency application, instead ordering a briefing schedule."

the order

the supreme court not immediately entering an administrative stay

[Torie]

In her order denying AG Landry's motion for an "extension" (read: motion to stay), Chief Judge Dick notes that "the Supreme Court indicated that an immediate stay is not warranted by declining to enter an administrative stay upon receipt of the emergency application, instead ordering a briefing schedule."

the order

the supreme court not immediately entering an administrative stay

The opposition briefs are due today.

[jimrtex]

That seems a reasonable decision, and would simply require election from single-member districts. Single member districts had already been ordered in Texas by White v Regester.

Worth mentioning that multi-member districts are fine, just not majoritarian ones.

White v Regester upheld a lower court finding that the multi-member districts in two counties violated equal protection. On remand, the courts found similar violations in every county except Hidalgo (where Hispanic voters were able to elect the candidates of choice on a county-wide multi-seat basis). Texas has used single member districts universally since then.

It is conceivable that there is an equal-protection violation if one county could elect a delegation that acted as a bloc.

What I was saying that Thornburg v Gingles established a metric for determining whether at-large elections might be unconstitutional or violate the VRA.

[jimrtex]

In her order denying AG Landry's motion for an "extension" (read: motion to stay), Chief Judge Dick notes that "the Supreme Court indicated that an immediate stay is not warranted by declining to enter an administrative stay upon receipt of the emergency application, instead ordering a briefing schedule."

the order

the supreme court not immediately entering an administrative stay

The opposition briefs are due today.

Docket Search

Search on "Ardoin" (the Louisiana SOS).

"Docket for 21A814" is the case of interest. The Alabama amicus brief appears to argue that the Louisiana District got the Section 2 Wrong; or alternatively if the court got Section 2 right, Section 2 violates the Constitution - at least when applied to redistricting.

[jimrtex]

This is the proposed remedial map from the plaintiffs.



The defendants said that they were just two of the legislators, and that executive branch defendants were not competent to propose a map due to separation of powers, so that they would not propose a map.

[GALeftist]

This is the proposed remedial map from the plaintiffs.

The defendants said that they were just two of the legislators, and that executive branch defendants were not competent to propose a map due to separation of powers, so that they would not propose a map.

Pretty nice looking map honestly. Certainly better than the current monstrosity.

[Oryxslayer]

My DRA transcription of the map. The Master explicitly went out of the way in his report to not cut VTDs, which is why the map is not zero'ed out like usual with congressional stuff. That said, it is a advisory plaintiff plan and not meant to be final. To this end there are some improvements to be made, like removing the Vernon cut and improving the EBR and Tangipahoa cuts. 

[ProgressiveModerate]

Honestly, this map is miles better than pretty much all the proposed maps by the Dems orginially which really tried to secure the 2nd district to be safe D and hence safe Black at the expense of compactness. This map feels close to what an Atlas user might draw. Yes it still has a few minor annoying parts but overall that's pretty close to the best map you can get if you want a 2nd VRA seat.

Honestly though those black %s on both seats are pretty impressive so they still have a few % to clean the map up if needed.

[jimrtex]

My DRA transcription of the map. The Master explicitly went out of the way in his report to not cut VTDs, which is why the map is not zero'ed out like usual with congressional stuff. That said, it is a advisory plaintiff plan and not meant to be final. To this end there are some improvements to be made, like removing the Vernon cut and improving the EBR and Tangipahoa cuts. 

The map passed by the legislature also did not split VTD's. The deviation in both plans is under 100.

In the mid-decade litigation over the legislative maps in Alabama it was found that many VTD's had been divided on racial lines. This was found to be race sorting. It probably is not worth the risk of litigating over a half dozen precincts split to achieve perfect equality.

Of course they should use whole counties unless necessary to get below 5% deviation.

This is the map proposed by the plaintiffs. A master is someone appointed by a court.

[ProgressiveModerate]

My DRA transcription of the map. The Master explicitly went out of the way in his report to not cut VTDs, which is why the map is not zero'ed out like usual with congressional stuff. That said, it is a advisory plaintiff plan and not meant to be final. To this end there are some improvements to be made, like removing the Vernon cut and improving the EBR and Tangipahoa cuts. 

The map passed by the legislature also did not split VTD's. The deviation in both plans is under 100.

In the mid-decade litigation over the legislative maps in Alabama it was found that many VTD's had been divided on racial lines. This was found to be race sorting. It probably is not worth the risk of litigating over a half dozen precincts split to achieve perfect equality.

Of course they should use whole counties unless necessary to get below 5% deviation.

This is the map proposed by the plaintiffs. A master is someone appointed by a court.

One underrated factor though is that Louisiana precincts are generally significantly smaller than Alabama's, especially in urban communities where one is likely to have significant black population.

I do agree whenever precicnt splits become excessive whatever the reason may be (unless one is following city lines), the map tends to be an unnecessarily bad and complex map.

I'm still amazed at how many precincts the Cali Commission split pretty randomly throughout it's map drawing; another reason why the map is so sloppy.

[Frodo]

In the 2019 elections, Republicans in the Louisiana House came up just two seats short of a veto-proof majority (luckily for Democratic Gov. John Bel Edwards, who had just narrowly won re-election that year).  With redistricting settled at least at the state level, if not for congressional districts, does anyone see them winning in 2023 the magical 70 seats they need to implement their agenda regardless of who wins the governor's mansion? 

[ProgressiveModerate]

In the 2019 elections, Republicans in the Louisiana House came up just two seats short of a veto-proof majority (luckily for Democratic Gov. John Bel Edwards, who had just narrowly won re-election that year).  With redistricting settled at least at the state level, if not for congressional districts, does anyone see them winning in 2023 the magical 70 seats they need to implement their agenda regardless of who wins the governor's mansion?  

In the state Senate, Rs locked in a supermajority more or less by ceding 11 seats to Dems.

In the state house, the 2020 Pres breakdown is 72-33 with few competaive seats so a supermajority is def obtainable for the GOP. Redistricting was actually used as a bargaining tactic on the GOP’s part to try and veto override. A few of the depopulating rural blacks esta could be problematic for Dems by the end of the decade (or sooner). If Dems want to break the R supermajority (which seems to be the default), they’re path would have to run through 3 Trump + 10ish suburban Baton Rouge seats and 1 close Trump seat in New Orleans. After that they don’t have many opportunities. I’d say barring rural comsevadems maling a comeback, the gop should hold the supermajority narrowly most of the time

This is likely the end of LA Dems having any power

[Oryxslayer]

In the 2019 elections, Republicans in the Louisiana House came up just two seats short of a veto-proof majority (luckily for Democratic Gov. John Bel Edwards, who had just narrowly won re-election that year).  With redistricting settled at least at the state level, if not for congressional districts, does anyone see them winning in 2023 the magical 70 seats they need to implement their agenda regardless of who wins the governor's mansion? 

I think they actually recently got to that number through a defection from D -> R in a rural red seat, one of the reasons why Edwards didn't see a reason to veto the GOPs recent culture war package.