Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited

[Pyro]

Congressman Thomas Franklin Conway (D-NY), Hearst Ally and Co-Founder of the Civic League - Source: Wiki Commons

From December of 1912 to February of 1913, the clashing campaigns worked strenuously to tempt members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Congress was now forced into daily relevance as the officeholders of the 62nd class looked eye-to-eye with an inconceivable task. The lower legislature would designate the next president whilst the upper chamber was scheduled to allot a new vice president. Keeping in mind the creeping realization that it may take more than a single ballot to approve the chief Executive officer, senators were granted, perhaps, an indispensable duty. "Whichever path they take and whomever they choose," offered a Washington Post contributor, "we pray it is expeditiously over and done with."

The days dragged on as an uneasy normality hung low over the country. Most Americans were not witness to the extensive lobbying overtaking congressional offices. The populace was expected to sit idly by and allow for the fate of the election to be decided by exiting public officials. Voters were rendered powerless, and that perturbed some a great deal. Progressive activists, especially, cried foul. Pennsylvania State Progressive Party Chair Alexander Dover explained, "(The 62nd Congress) is expired. Voters have elected a new Congress. It is outrageous that retiring and defeated conservatives should decide the election. [...] America voted for Progress." Those favoring the ascension of Butler disagreed, often stating in printed rebuttals that the Constitution outlined the contingent process expressly to preserve stability. Forsaking the intention of the founders, they asserted, amounted to abject treason.

Headed into the contingent election, Socialists settled on a sly tactic. Debs was roundly booted from presidential consideration and needed to process a strategy for the six House Socialists. Of the three viable candidates, Debs and much of the party leadership believed Roosevelt would be their best choice. Butler was a proud servant of Wall Street while Marshall was handcuffed to a states' rights fetishizing Southern base. The Socialist Party indeed recognized that Roosevelt failed to sufficiently acknowledge the plight of workers in his previous term, and they outwardly condemned the former president's abandonment of the eight-hour working day.

Simultaneously, the SP viewed Roosevelt as the most likely of the three to deliver even the barest crumbs to a struggling American workforce. At the very least, the famed 'trust-buster' would voice opposition to consolidation in a manner alien to the Democrats. Furthermore, so-called business socialists like Berger thought it pure insanity to allow either of the two parties to overrule the interests of the democratic Popular Vote. It all boiled down to choosing a "lesser evil" for four years, or to use an alternative idiom, "Better the devil you know than the devil you don't." Pledging their allegiance under the expectation that the Progressives would jointly fight for economic democracy, the Socialist delegation in the House temporarily aligned to vote Roosevelt.

President Hearst, ad interim, sought to satisfy his own interests. He deeply resented Roosevelt politically as well as personally, so he could never claim to support his selection in the House. Marshall, a figure Hearst deemed a pawn of a criminal class of Democratic overseers and managers, was equally out of the question. He likewise could never bring himself to earnestly support a man like Butler, who not only represented all Hearst hated in Washington but directly played a role in bringing down the president's legislative agenda. The only remaining choice was to opt against an endorsement altogether, but that risked relinquishing an opportunity to influence the next administration. It took careful consideration and a documented meeting of the Hearst Campaign staff, but the outgoing president eventually arrived at an answer.

Just as Congress convened to begin the validation of the Electoral College votes, a memo reached the hands of Hearst's allies among the legislators. This note is widely believed to have altered the shape of the ensuing congressional battle. "Foment disorder," it read. "None support intervention (into Mexico). None fight the bosses. Do as you will to delay." In no uncertain terms, President Hearst requested of his supporters in Congress to needle misconduct and break decorum. He did not demand lawlessness, though he may as well have. An incumbent inciting flagrant legislative anarchy was unheard of to say the least, but to Hearst this was the only sensible scenario. According to Alexander, "Historians have differing opinions on Hearst's infamous memo to Congress. Some deem it child-like, akin to a temper tantrum - pure emotion and chaos. Others have cited it as an adept play, albeit soaked in revenge. The 61st and 62nd Congresses robbed Hearst of an accomplished presidency. Therefore, Hearst robbed Congress of its agency to appoint a new president. Tit for tat."

The Legislative Branch set in motion the procedure to conduct the contingent election on Monday, February 3rd, immediately following the confirmation of the Electoral Vote. Speaker Butler then prepared to call upon each state, alphabetically, to declare its choice. At this step, and all those which followed, the Hearst men jumped in and demanded the floor. Commanded by Representatives Daniel Driscoll and Thomas F. Conway (D-NY), about one-third of the New York Democratic delegation and a smattering of Democrats in California and Ohio stayed loyal to the president and thusly adhered to their leader's instructions. 25, all in all, played part in the charade (sixteen either lost re-election in 1912 or retired with the remaining nine transferred to the Civic League Independents). Their delay pushed the first ballot in the House to Tuesday, but the first major stall thence ended. Representatives of all 48 states issued their vote per Butler's order.

1913 United States Contingent Election

PRES BALLOT		1st Call		States		48 Delegations
Thomas R. Marshall		17		AL, AZ, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, MO, NE, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA
Thomas S. Butler		14		CT, DE, MA, MI, MN, MT, NV, NH, OH, PA, RI, UT, VT, WY
Theodore Roosevelt		07		CA, ID, IA, KS, SD, WA, WI
Divided/Tie		10		CO, IL, IN, ME, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OR, WV

The first ballot did not designate a president with majority support. Many states landed precisely where most analysts predicted, including the Solid South standing firm alongside Marshall. Some of the most heavily populated states, like Illinois, were divided betwixt the candidates. Illinois had 9 Progressive representatives, 9 Republicans, and 7 Democrats. As a natural result, 9 votes went to Roosevelt and 9 to Butler, resulting in a tie. For instances in which a state professed a divided delegation, it awarded no one candidate its support. States in the mold of Illinois, of which 10 provenly existed, would be burdensome to budge.

New York surprisingly ended in the divided column as well. Democrats in the Empire state's House delegation held a two-seat advantage over the other parties in the 62nd House, yet a portion of Hearst's allies consciously voted in favor of Butler to leave the state tied. Corruption was undoubtedly amok; however, Congress was now locked into the voting cycle. Legally, the deliberative body was not permitted to move forward on to other items until the presidential vote was set.

[Elcaspar]

I have feeling that this is going to be absolute chaos, especially if Roosevelt doesn't get chosen as President.

[Pyro]

Contingent Election Underway in the U.S. Congress, 1913 - Source: LoC

In response to the failure of the first tally, the House devolved into an unsettling uproar. Democratic House leaders confronted the Hearst men for their reprehensible tactics at the close of the kick-off ballot, most notably epitomized with the choice of Minority Whip Edwin Webb to engage in a shouting match with Congressman Conway on the floor of the legislature. Pounding his fist onto a desk and interrupting regular procedure, Webb yelped, "You blind fools! Do you have no shame?" Similar verbal sparring and shouting over the speaker's gavel encircled the divided delegations as respectable behavior faded to dust. When regained of his authority some thirty minutes later, Butler quieted the halls and led the congressmen to its second vote. Once more, ten states were tied.

An evaporation of decorum in the 62nd Congress was, play-for-play, precisely what Hearst desired. The president's actions effectively muddled the shape of the contingent election and decimated hopes of an orderly process. Democrats were extremely unhappy with the latest developments and acknowledged their chance at victory sharply diminished. The likelihood of Republican or Progressive victory appeared equally unreachable. Regardless of one's candidate preference, none were satisfied. Hearst had searched for this exact outcome, and now the figurative train was planted firmly on those tracks.

Speaker Butler placed a controversial lid on the boiling legislature as successive House ballots showed little movement and the presidential campaigns scrambled to alter the course. Urged behind the scenes to calm fears of an endless congressional session, Butler formally restricted the balloting to two per day. In the mix of Hearst-driven delays and an escalating Democratic schism, the reputation of the House of Representatives as a responsible authority dwindled by a discernable degree. Governor Marshall and Speaker Butler attempted to calm national fears with incessant pledges to "respect and honor" the selection mechanism, but there is little historical evidence that this type of messaging proved effectual.

A synchronous Senate too found itself stuck in a tar-laced electoral trap. No one party in the upper chamber held a clear majority, and the burden was placed on the Republican senators to choose either Democratic vice-presidential candidate George McClellan or Progressive Hiram Johnson. The GOP detested both rather severely and had difficulty stomaching the promotion of either to higher office. The Democratic Party was trekking along an unmitigated path to disaster and a complete sacrifice of federal power. Apparently, if left to its own devices, the multi-sect political organization could drown itself.

Republicans were not about to assist their political nemesis by tossing a self-defeating lifesaver. Therefore, repeating the essence of what had materialized in the House, the Senate failed to select its White House occupant on the first ballot. All 34 Republicans abstained as guided by the Republican National Committee and the Butler Campaign. The 43 Democratic votes went to McClellan and the 19 Progressives chose Johnson. The winner required a majority vote of 49 senators, so it was the duty of the Republican Party to side with one option or another. On the first ballot they outright declined to choose, and that strategy was replicated on the second, third, and fourth as well.

Deputies of the Hearst Campaign were later revealed to have offered a compromise to their Democratic counterparts in Congress at the height of electoral uncertainty. In several documents that came to light some decades afterward, Hearst's team pledged to support Marshall for president and McClellan for vice president if, and only if, President Hearst could be allowed the position of State Secretary. We do not know, for certain, what the Democratic response entailed, but historians have wagered that both candidates heartily turned down the opportunity. McClellan was no friend of Hearst's, and the former had gone through an extensive effort to expunge all relations with Tammany Hall since being elected in 1904. Marshall, of course, was not inclined to bargain. Be that as it may, as the days marched on near the end of February, the Marshall Campaign should have probably accepted the offer.

Time was running out. A Constitutional crisis was on the horizon in the event that neither chamber of Congress selected a new leading official. The next in line, by succession law, was the Secretary of State. Yet, recognizing Hearst's term expired on March 4th, his entire administration too would dissolve. Present statute did not outline a concise path for this dangerous eventuality. Senate Republicans understood the risk of a permanent stalemate and a drawn-out court battle over succession law, and came to terms with the options laid before them. As commanded to do so by Conference Chairmen Shelby Cullom of the GOP and Robert La Follette of the Columbians, a bipartisan group of six Republican and Progressive senators met in late February to reach a compromise. Roosevelt and Butler were informed of this as well, and each remained on call as needed. In the end, the group succeeded in forging a sufficient agreement. It mainly concerned the makeup of the next president's Cabinet (namely, a minimum of two appointees from the opposing party), but it did finally settle a long-standing dispute.

On February 28th, the Senate selected Governor Hiram Johnson for vice president on the 27th ballot with full-fledged support from all but three Republican incumbents. With the House deadlocked, the vice presidential choice would very likely serve as acting president as well. The Progressive governor, immediately thereafter, professed his understanding that the language of the 12th Amendment did not overrule the prospect of continued balloting in the House. In other words, an "acting president" was a temporary president, and it did not supersede the ongoing congressional sparring.

The House remained unmoving, though, locked in a state of chaos masterminded by the exiting president. Heightened tension and animosity shifted to quiet uneasiness with no end in sight for the presidential election. The puppeteer president accomplished just as he desired, to an extent, and the contingent process showed itself to be innately flawed. Albeit knowing full well who the eventual pick would be, Hearst was ecstatic to learn that the 62nd Congress would expire without choosing a new president. That responsibility now automatically changed hands to the new, 63rd Congress. In due time, Progressive Californian Congressman Wesley L. Jones would step into the role of House speaker and Thomas Butler would be completely stripped of his status within the party ranks. All things considered; the final line of Hearst's Memo now made perfect sense. "The people will have their say."

Washington, March 4. - William R. Hearst has said farewell to public life to-day and became a plain citizen of the republic. The twenty-ninth President handed the reins to acting President Hiram Warren Johnson, duly elected Vice President per his election in the United States Senate. Johnson has claimed his role shall be temporary. The inauguration took place in a private Washington office with a standard inaugural ceremony planned for next week. "I will do all that is required," he said. [...] The New Congress was inaugurated this morning to celebratory acclaim by the public at large. Congressman Jones of California tell us that the first order of business will be a resumed balloting. With a decisive advantage by the Progressive Party, it is expected that Theodore Roosevelt shall win on the first round. [...] Democratic losses in Illinois, New York, and many other states will all but assure an adequate number of votes for the Columbian nominee.

         Charles A. Green, "A New President At Last" The Washington Post, March 5th, 1913

1913 United States Contingent Election

PRES BALLOT		44th/1st Call		States		25 Required
Theodore Roosevelt ☑		25		AZ, CA, CO, ID, IN, IA, IL, KS, ME, MI, MN, MT, NE, NJ, NM, ND, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, WA, WI, WY
Thomas R. Marshall		13		AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, MO, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA
Thomas S. Butler		09		CT, DE, MA, NH, NY, RI, UT, VT, WV
Divided/Tie		01		MD

[Lumine]

Hearst vanquished and Teddy Roosevelt back where he belongs, quite an excellent outcome! (though somehow I suspect it won't be a successful administration if Europe goes up in flames)

[Pyro]

Hearst vanquished and Teddy Roosevelt back where he belongs, quite an excellent outcome! (though somehow I suspect it won't be a successful administration if Europe goes up in flames)

It will be a wild ride, especially with TR in charge!

[Pyro]

Theodore Roosevelt, 28th and 30th President of the United States - Source: Wiki Commons

Part 6: Hail, Columbia

Chapter XIX: Beacon for Progress: The New Roosevelt Presidency

William J. Bryan's The Commoner printed a series of articles from February 4th to March 6th centering on the contingent election in Congress and speculating who the presumptive winner would be. It began with a standardized summation of current events, leading squarely into a lengthy endorsement of the Marshall/McClellan Democratic ticket. As the weeks shuffled by and the deadlock rose to prominence, the tone of the newspaper hardened against President Hearst and his revenge-fueled tactic to rob Governor Thomas Marshall of the presidency.

The Commoner rallied vigorously for its favored candidate but was ultimately witness to the expiration of the 62nd Congress and the subsequent election of Roosevelt by the new class of representatives. Perhaps framing the conversation and foreshadowing an eventual Democratic talking point, the final piece in Bryan's series relented, "The forces of regularity, once against [Roosevelt] are now behind him. His attitude on the trust question seems no longer to alarm those who appreciate the menace of private monopoly. His devotion to the progressive cause and the propagation of popular government is questionable. It is no wonder he excelled."

The above reaction was indeed one shared by most progressive Democrats. Bryan's party saw in Roosevelt the potential for a resurgence of a normalized Republican Party. Democrats understood the stakes of the arrangement reached in the U.S. Senate, one that essentially tied the Progressives and the GOP far closer together than ever before. Once there had been room for doubt regarding Roosevelt's affiliations with the leaders of the Republican Party, but with the Six Kingmakers willingly granting power to the Progressives (an event named by some Bryan and Hearst followers as a "Corrupt Bargain"), scarce few Democrats trusted in the validity of the Columbian position. Governor Marshall himself did not motion to such a charge, and in his concession respectfully recognized the party's defeat as a "rational conclusion to months of divisiveness and unfaithfulness."

Former Speaker Thomas Butler met with Theodore Roosevelt just after the House vote confirmed the election result, however all we know for certain of this engagement is that it lasted about an hour and presumably finalized the senatorial deal. Just as confirmed by Senate leaders La Follette and Shelby Cullom, Roosevelt was bound to promote at least two Republicans to the presidential Cabinet upon its creation. The left wing of the Progressive Party feared that their leader was dipping back into the days of the Grand Bargain, thereby fretting over the plausibility that his message would be softened. After one of the mostly hotly contested elections in history, succumbing to the demands of a bygone political faction seemed unfathomable to a sizable chunk of the Progressives. Roosevelt truly had no such intention and looked to solidify his progressive credentials at the inaugural event.

The official inauguration for President-elect Roosevelt took place on March 7th - about 48 hours following the final congressional contingent ballot. The Roosevelt and Johnson families gathered in Washington beside honored guests, Supreme Court justices, and an enormous crowd of onlookers. Chief Justice Edward D. White administered the Oath of Office to the incoming leader, followed directly by Roosevelt's Second Inaugural Address. Upon thanking the new Congress for following the people's will and Vice President Johnson for serving in the brief interim, the Rough Rider conducted the speech. The energetic and spry 54-year old recounted his support for a completed Square Deal, the enactment of a New Nationalism, and economic security for all Americans.

The great fundamental issue now before our people can be stated briefly. It is, Are the American people fit to govern themselves, to rule themselves, to control themselves? I believe they are. I believe in the right of the people to rule. I believe that the majority of the plain people of the United States will, day in and day out, make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than any smaller class or body of men, no matter what their training, will make in trying to govern them.

I have scant patience with this talk of the tyranny of the majority. Wherever there is tyranny of the majority, I shall protest it with all my heart and soul. But we are today suffering from the tyranny of minorities. It is a small minority that is grabbing our coal-deposits, our water-powers, and our harbor fronts. A small minority is battening on the sale of adulterated foods and drugs. It is a small minority that lies behind monopolies and trusts. It is a small minority that stands behind the present law of master and servant, the sweatshops, and the whole calendar of social and industrial injustice.

Friends, every good citizen ought to do everything in his or her power to prevent the coming of the day when we shall see in this country two recognized creeds fighting one another, when we shall see the creed of the "Have nots" arraigned against the creed of the "Haves." When that day comes then such incidents as this to-night will be commonplace in our history. When you make poor men - when you permit the conditions to grow such that the poor man as such will be swayed by his sense of injury against the men who try to hold what they improperly have won, when that day comes, the most awful passions will be let loose and it will be an ill day for our country.

Now, friends, what we who are in this movement are endeavoring to do is forestall any such movement for justice now - a movement in which we ask all just men of generous hearts to join with the men who feel in their souls that lift upward which bids them refuse to be satisfied themselves while their countrymen and countrywomen suffer from avoidable misery.

          Theodore Roosevelt, Inaugural Address Excerpt, March 9th, 1913

[Pyro]

The Second Roosevelt Cabinet, Approx. 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Theodore Roosevelt was thrilled beyond words to return to the White House. It had been a rough four years for the United States, from the discrediting of the Hearst Administration to an unceasing legislative paralysis. Time was nigh for a change, the Progressive believed, and it seemed a plurality of the country concurred. Columbian voters were likewise relieved when the contingent results concluded in a Roosevelt victory, and furthermore ecstatic during the new president's populistic inaugural address. The 1910s generally had a rather rocky start. Americans hoped that the worst was over and done with.

Hearst's departure from Washington represented a significant shift in American politics beyond partisan bickering and this-or-that legislative proposal. The Californian businessman was drenched in the stink of corruption from his days as governor. Hearst's shady business dealings and maligned yellow journalism may as well have foreshadowed the Manhattan Scandal: a proper culmination of his life's work. As was revealed in the latter part of the year, the Bureau of Investigation unearthed an additional chapter of misdeeds by the former president. An investigation found evidence of Hearst covertly funding Mexican rebellion in an area just adjacent to his estate in Mexico. If true, he most likely did so to whip up a growing fear of lacking national security and feed into anti-revolution hysteria. It was this exact brand of chicanery that Hearst fittingly embodied.

Contrary to the decomposing honor of the Hearst era, Roosevelt intended to provide the United States a federal government worthy of their trust and admiration. He fought for progressivism, certainly, but after witnessing the now-exiting calamity and an incredibly fractious election, the returning president plainly wished to unite a limping America. "Of course I would greatly have preferred if we could have made the Republican Party a Progressive party," Roosevelt penned in the autumn of 1912. "It was so when founded by Lincoln, and it could have been so today. As we are, the future cannot yet be determined, but at the moment our task is to try and make the Progressive Party the exemplary American organization." Reflecting that final line, President Roosevelt's first written appeal to Congress was the codification of "Hail, Columbia" into an official national anthem. Thus far, he had adopted the patriotic march as a campaign theme. Now, "...it belongs to all of America."

In shaping the Cabinet, Roosevelt adhered to the bipartisan pledge and reached out to several high-profile Republican politicians with regards to federal appointments, most of whom respectfully declined out of a clear desire not to be associated with the left-leaning party and president. Three responded in the affirmative, and that was a satisfactory figure to Roosevelt. First, he designated Representative James Jefferson Britt (R-NC) as the new Postmaster General. Britt was a moderate, Southern Republican, and most recently had ran for the U.S. Senate against incumbent Furnifold Simmons. The closeness of the race prompted a group of Carolinian Republicans to request Britt for a federal position. Killing two birds with one stone, Roosevelt easily convinced the congressman to take the role. The president also chose Republican farmer and journalist Henry Cantwell Wallace of Iowa to take up control of the Department of Agriculture, a nod to dairy farmers the Iowa Farm Bureau.

Roosevelt's last Republican appointment, and the most irksome to the Progressive Party's Left, went to Representative George B. Cortelyou (R-NY). Cortelyou worked within government for over two decades, and served under and alongside Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives alike. He was hired by President Cleveland as chief clerk, then for a brief period worked as Governor McKinley's personal secretary. In 1902, Cortelyou was brought into the Treasury Department of President Beveridge and stayed as a high-ranking official in that field for six years. Following the ascension of Hearst, the New York Republican successfully ran for an open congressional seat as a stout enemy of crooked politics. Now, Roosevelt called on Cortelyou to return to the Treasury. Upon confirmation, he would serve as Roosevelt's new Treasury Secretary.

The returned president made it a point to bring in as many members of his original Cabinet as possible. He did manage to re-appoint former War Secretary Leonard Wood to his original position, as well as Attorney General Joseph McKenna and Navy Secretary George von Lengerke Meyer. Unfortunately, Roosevelt's preferred State Secretary, John M. Hay, had died shortly after the expiration of his tenure in 1909. After immense consideration and a fair number of impromptu interviews, President Roosevelt chose to nominate Senator James R. Garfield. The two were close friends in the prior decade, with the latter serving previously as Interior Secretary in Roosevelt's first presidential term. Since 1908, Garfield had been elected to the U.S. Senate from Ohio and served on the Foreign Relations Committee alongside Senators Lodge and Bacon. The Ohioan supported moderate expansion abroad, both in terms of land as well as influence, and complied with the direction of the wind in affirming the protection of Pacific trade relations with Germany.

The Roosevelt Cabinet II

Office		Name
President		Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.
Vice President		Hiram W. Johnson
Sec. of State		James R. Garfield
Sec. of Treasury		George B. Cortelyou
Sec. of War		Leonard Wood
Attorney General		Joseph McKenna
Postmaster General		James J. Britt
Sec. of the Navy		George von Lengerke Meyer
Sec. of Interior		Henry W. Temple
Sec. of Agriculture		Henry C. Wallace

[Pyro]

Conservative Cartoon Mocking Roosevelt and the Square Deal, c. 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

Running for office is one thing, but governing is another entirely. Presidencies typically do not or cannot deliver upon promises made in a campaign. This was plainly and thoroughly exemplified by the tenures of Bryan and Hearst. Roosevelt did marginally succeed on that front in his first term, but an uncooperative Congress stalled a great deal of progress and fed directly into the Democratic narrative of executive shortcomings. Having been re-elected to his old post, the two-termer sought to push for the widest possible array of progressive policies whilst staying within a realistic framework. He later humorously termed his 1905-1909 period as an "educational experience". It was time to put his knowledge to the test.

Congress was a tricky horse to break for the young, idealistic leader not too long ago. Overcoming the imperial rule of Joseph Cannon and toppling the Old Guard of the Senate meant sacrificing much of his political capital, resulting in several smaller achievements in addition to the passage of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. Roosevelt had not budged from his original conception of the socio-economic landscape of the United States. To him, the old natural laws of the marketplace were ill-suited to address the concerns of workers and the unquestioning rule of big business threatened socialistic revolt on an unprecedented scale. Aside from Attorney General McKenna's triumphant prosecution of Northern Securities and Standard Oil, little regarding economic reform was set in stone. That facet had become a priority.

The Roosevelt Administration, voiced by the governing House Progressives and Speaker Wesley Jones, introduced the top-line of legislative proposals to Congress. As a test run, they offered to an always-wary congressional delegation a bill allowing for the creation of three novel units to add to the executive branch: The Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Social Welfare. These offices would assist in the administration's goal to found agencies based on the public good. Establishing two separate economic facilities district from the Treasury and Interior would, in the eyes of Roosevelt, dedicate crucial resources toward the fair facilitation between labor and capital. Likewise, a potential Secretary of Social Welfare could provide oversight on any future federal programs meant to increase the standard of living and provide a minimum standard of protection for the poorest Americans.

In essence, these bills did not explicitly change any federal policies on their own. The nature of the legislation was designed to keep in tow persuadable members of opposing parties, and thusly avoid the type of congressional deadlock that had plagued past presidencies. A small assortment of progressive Democrats and a core contingent of moderate Republicans did indicate a mostly positive reception to the opening legislation from the newly inaugurated administration. Both parties were dragged slightly leftward since the last decade, therefore allowing Roosevelt to act a touch more ambitious with the administration's projects. Not all were convinced, of course, including a deeply opposed bloc of Southern Democrats. When inquired as to their strategy to prevent passage, Senator William Stone answered, "We will do all we can." Others joined in the opposition, but the persistence of the Progressives in both houses of Congress to counter the conservatives' attacks and continue coalition building disallowed a complete stoppage.

The 63rd Congress more than quadrupled the output of its predecessor. Not only were the above proposals passed with room to spare, but a respectable selection of others eased by as well. The Progressive House coalition was extremely amenable to the president, and the early move to moderate legislation as necessary made it an arduous task for the Senate to bottleneck the process. In its first normal session lasting from April to December of 1913, Congress approved 17 bills. This included five national parks projects, a federal waterways commission, funding for roads and trails, an incentive system for factory construction, and the authorization of an investigatory, solidly anti-trust Bureau of Corporations managed by the Department of Commerce. In a far closer vote than in any of the above instances, Congress also passed the Federal Employers Liability Law which mandated public employers provide compensation to workers injured on the job. It initially granted this right to all workers, but the language was eventually amended in order to avoid a challenge in the courts.

Roosevelt was furthermore made to contend with an issue that seemed to loom over Washington, that being the question of suffrage. Ever-growing women's rights organizations consistently and heavily rallied for the right to vote. They held tremendous parades in city centers and mobilized their workforces to emerge in favor of enfranchisement. Women also composed a weighty segment of the Progressive Party base and ensured that a plank concerning universal suffrage remained locked-in when the 1912 delegation approved of its platform. Middle and upper-class women were especially pleased at the prospect of a new Roosevelt presidency, knowing that pivotal suffrage advocates like Jane Addams had become key components to the Progressive National Committee.

The president was more than merely familiar with that issue in particular. He indeed roared approval at the idea since the founding of the Progressive Party. However, never had the heat been turned up to the nth degree. The Workingwomen's Craft and Industrial League, the Women's Trade Organization, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association signed off on a joint statement in early 1913 asking Congress to approve a Constitutional amendment pertaining to voting rights. In their terms, as women composed an increasingly sizable portion of the American workforce and, as evident by the Triangle Strike, politicians elected by an all-male electorate tended to ignore women's issues, they too deserved the right to vote. Roosevelt and the Progressives were already in favor. The problem came down to congressmen with no interest whatsoever in the matter.

Radical women's organizations participated in varying methods of resistance and protest over the years, and not always restricted to the vote. Some simultaneously supported equal pay for equal work, an abolition of child labor, and an end to gender discrimination in labor unions. Universally, the fight was directed to grant suffrage to all women. Theodore Roosevelt took seriously the plight of women demanding to vote. He incorporated women into the presidential campaign and expressed admiration for Alice Paul on more than one occasion. Whether it be for political purposes or an honest wish to see it done, Roosevelt called on the Columbians in Congress to draft a resolution.

Over the entirety of 1913, the draft was amended, clarified, and finally brought before a vote. It passed on January 13th by one vote in the House [290 to 141, with 4 abstaining]. [...] Southern Democrats in the Senate filibustered, and thence the measure stalled. The Progressives' 28 seats were not sufficient to end the filibuster, and more than two-thirds of elected Republicans voiced opposition to the resolution. Roosevelt personally wrote to all remaining fence-sitters to beseech their vote, but to no avail. The measure never did reach a vote in the upper chamber. Suffrage activists were not pleased.

         H. William Ackerman, Columbians in Washington: Great Expectations and the Hope of a Nation, 2013

[Pyro]

Art Young's "Speaking of Anarchy," The Masses, June 1913 - Source: Wiki Commons

Recollecting the fateful decision by House Socialists to constitute a provisional pact with Progressives during the contingent election, President Roosevelt remained under considerable pressure to move on labor reform. He lightly committed to an eight-hour working day during the campaign, but the likelihood of passage was not so bright in the right-leaning U.S. Senate. As a temporary substitute, the Roosevelt Administration tackled the unaddressed, stark absence of labor arbitration on the federal level. Within the Department of Labor, federal officers were instructed to offer their assistance as a neutral third party to businesses saddled with workplace unrest. Initiating or offering an even-handed level of arbitration had the potential to stave off an ongoing spike in labor disputes and work stoppages stirred by a slight economic contraction, as well as stun detractors and critics in the Socialist Party who commonly upheld the notion of a federal government owned by corporate interests.

In February, just before the settling of the election, union organizers in a northward New Jersey city led a stunning work stoppage. Having been inspired by the successes in Lawrence and New York, the Industrial Workers of the World began recruiting downtrodden and mistreated workers operating in the prolific silk mills of Paterson. The working-class mill operators and weavers hoped to end a recent strain of factorial injuries and cut back on the unreasonably high productivity rates required by mill owners. More than anything, garment and textile workers aspired for the institution of the eight-hour workday. IWW organizers explained that such lofty life improvements were only attainable through agitation, organization, and protest. According to Bill Haywood, collective solidarity was the only tool suitable to fight back. "An irreconcilable class struggle existed between workers, who had nothing but their labor power, and the capitalists, who controlled the means of production as well as the forces of law."

Thousands of workers joined in a general strike. 25,000 in all. Scared stiff by the rise of the left-wing IWW, local law enforcement wasted no time in involving themselves in the affair. They arrested famed feminist organizer Elizabeth Gurley Flynn on charges of inciting a riot, and thereafter sought to bring down the entirety of the local leadership in a similar fashion. Flynn had not, in fact, broken any laws at the time of her arrest, and the actions of the police only served to illuminate the injustices taking place in Paterson. National IWW and SP officials including Bill Haywood, Max Eastman, and journalist John Reed traveled to the strike venue as the events gained national attention. The union continued its tried-and-true strategy of distributing multi-lingual speakers to match the multiple languages spoken by the workers (in this case, predominantly Italian and Polish), breaking through ethnic divisions.

In response to an assertion by Haywood that the flags of the world would someday soon be red, "the color of the working man's blood," city officials adjusted their calendars to schedule Flag Day three months early. They presumed that the brandishing of American flags by silk mills would counter the strikes and deem them 'un-American.' Taken aback but not completely off-guard, the IWW used this dirty ploy to their advantage. Workers marched in the streets of Paterson on Flag Day holding American flags of their own. Within the march, two individuals held up a banner reading, "We Weave the Flag. We Live Under the Flag. We Die Under the Flag. But Dam'd If We'll Starve Under the Flag." In a spectacular play, the IWW turned the tables on the city managers and redefined patriotism. Observant of the tide, Secretary of Labor Raymond Robins reached out to mediate the strike. In early June, as national sympathy lied exclusively with the strikers and a concurrent pro-worker pageant in Madison Square Garden captivated over 280,000 attendees, federal arbitration betwixt the novel silk union and the Paterson mill owners calmed the air. In the end, the workers did not win their eight-hour day, but they were no longer forced to run 3-4 simultaneous looms and the union itself won recognition.

Starting in late September of 1913, the United Mine Workers too became entangled in a new series of labor battles. The IWW-affiliated union, witness to the abysmal working conditions of the Western miners, struggled in dealing with unmovable mine owners. Coal companies repeatedly rejected proposed reforms by the labor organization, finding fault in their pleas for one reason or another. For instance, the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company claimed that it would be unable to afford refined compensation for coal digging or for so-called "dead work" like identifying coal impurities. Workers desired an end to the feudal company town system as well, including the abolishment of restrictive "scrip" as payment. The UMW made one final attempt to reason with the owners, but they would not agree to come to the bargaining table. Even messages from Secretary Robins went unanswered.

The miners struck for their demands, and in doing so were promptly evicted from their homes and forced to settle in make-shift tent villages. These camps were, purportedly, deliberately placed to impede the traffic of hired strikebreakers. Company agents and Pinkertons brought on by the CF&I countered with destructiveness. This hired militia consciously utilized vicious tactics against the strikers, raiding the tent colonies and assaulting men, women, and children alike. They deployed gatling guns, armored trains, and even sniper rifles against the tent-housed families threatening Rockefeller profits. Strikers persevered through the barrage of bloodshed, yet morale declined as the outnumbered and outmanned United Mine Workers tried to fight back to the best of their ability.

The Roosevelt Administration monitored the situation as it developed, unsure how best to go about ending the Coalfield War. UMW men, Haywood among them, lettered the president and plead for the safety of the workers, though the latter stayed uncharacteristically silent. Roosevelt regretfully observed as the ordeal unfolded, personally disgusted by the violence but hesitating to outwardly side with the strikers in violation of state encampment laws. It appeared the strike was dwindling as springtime rolled in (due primarily to National Guardsman protecting an influx of strikebreakers), so initially the president felt as though he would not need to act. Then, around the first week of April, newly stationed federal agents in Colorado learned that a small clan of camp guards and hired guns planned to forcibly eliminate the largest tent village located in Ludlow, Colorado. From their insight, it seemed a massacre was in the works.

Roosevelt had had enough. He communicated with Colorado Governor Moses Lewis and informed him that the United States Army would soon arrive at Ludlow to extinguish the chaos if nothing was done. "[Roosevelt's] record on the labor question is and will always remain mixed," wrote Thomas O'Conner. "His administration opting to intervene in Colorado, however, was unmistakably the correct move at the correct time. The strikers were facing an unmitigated avalanche, and it would only have grown worse if federal authorities neglected their duty to the American worker. It seemed a polar reverse of the Grover Cleveland perspective in regards to Pullman. Unlike Cleveland, Roosevelt comprehended the consequences of disrespecting labor. Violence could only stir more trouble for the president. If settling the conflict blockaded the potential for a sympathy strike wave, it was worth the conservative criticism."

Defeated and not keen on provoking the president, Governor Lewis quieted the National Guard and demanded the CF&I issue a ceasefire to its private detectives. Thenceforth, no additional violence plagued the impromptu tent villages. On April 20th, Roosevelt authorized the Labor Department investigate the Colorado strikes and reach a prompt conclusion on how best to remedy the tension. That commission found, some months after the fact, that the speech rights of the workers were flagrantly violated and that the violence had been a natural result of strikebreaker and law-enforcement provocation. Its end conclusion: Protect collective bargaining, restrict private land use, prohibit the use of armed guards, and redistribute company wealth. Results from the commission would not be released publicly for over a decade.

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Geographic Conception, Panoramic View of the Nicaragua Canal - Source: LoC

The Roosevelt Administration undertook the president's most well-known foreign policy proposal within days of the swearing-in. Presidential predecessors championed a wide variety of tactics in dealing with other nations, including limited interventionism, aggressive expansionism, "open door" diplomacy, and all-out war both in the Caribbean as well as the Pacific. Years had passed since the closing of the Philippine-American War, but the memory of that event appeared to repress a drive for overseas growth. Some contemporaneous analysts once theorized that the entirety of the Americas and Pacific island territories would one day adorn the Red, White, and Blue. Other than the United States' capture of Guam, the annexation of Hawaii, and its de-facto control over the economies of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, this speculation did not yet come to pass.

Roosevelt's major transatlantic success thus far was the mediation of the Morocco Crisis at the 1906 Algeciras Conference. That managed to conclusively award his nation a fair share of prestige as well as cement economic ties with friendly European powers, but it did not have the aura of a lasting monument. For the 1910s, the president's new international project consisted of an isthmian canal meant to bridge the gap between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. A cross-oceanic canal, in concept, could reduce travel times by a significant amount and grant the U.S. far more influence and economic value than anything yet accomplished in the twentieth century. U.S. strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere would also greatly benefit from such a path, and considering the understood reality of the nation as a regional powerhouse and overseer, the only true point of concern was where the canal ought to be constructed.

The choice narrowed down to two options, those being a route through Nicaragua or one through Colombia. Each had their dedicated backers who lobbied the administration intently. The conceived Nicaraguan waterway seemed the safe option with land surveyors having plotted the entirety of the project since 1825. It stood to be about 170 miles lengthwise and precisely at sea level, thus precluding any need for expensive canal locks. The San Juan River region was extensively mapped out by an isthmian canal commission authorized by President Beveridge, though the overall plan died with the former leader. Alternatively, the administration could side with the Colombian route. Colombia was more southward than Nicaragua, but due to a previous construction effort (since abandoned), part of the trench had already been dug out in the former location. More so, geologists estimated that the length of the canal would be discernably shorter, allowing for cheaper building and maintenance costs. The true downside with the Colombian plan involved the country itself and its associated caveats.

Colombia as a state was not particularly stable in the early 1900s, and its government was unlikely to relinquish existing deals in the name of supporting an American intervention. Rival powers in Colombia warred for control over the mechanisms of power from 1899 to late 1902, resulting in over 100,000 deaths and rampant destruction all throughout the country. This civil war was subsequently expanded with an uprising along the Isthmus of Panama, of which the ruling conservative government brutally suppressed. President Carlos Restrepo resented the United States for its frequent interference in the affairs of neighboring nations and would hardly be willing to allocate land use. Most significant of all was the fact that France currently held canal construction rights in Colombia. France was not on stellar terms with its Western acquaintance since the outcome at Algeciras, and attempted negotiations with Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the French manager of the New Panama Canal Company, were unable to move the needle so much as an inch.

It is not easy to understate the perilous state of uncertainly centered on (France and the United States). Theodore Roosevelt was a universally despised figure within the Poincaré Government for his needless meddling in Morocco and status-seeking venture in Central America. French political cartoons depicted him as a quintessential cowboy, commonly donning either his Rough Rider uniform or less subtle imperial attire. An emerging narrative of American irresponsibility and recklessness thrived in part due to cartoonist Jean-Luc Laurent, a vicious opponent of U.S. intervention on the world stage and the prodigal son of a wealthy landowner with vested interests in an occupied Morocco. He blamed the collapse of 1912 treaty discussions and increasing resistance on the part of Sultan Abd al-Hafid exclusively on Roosevelt.

France, by all accounts, did not intend on resuming construction in Colombia, but sacrificing the opportunity to the United States was frankly out of the question. The State Department's approach to unquestioningly act on the whims of the president backfired tremendously and led to an all-encompassing sense of belligerence.

         Brian Steel, Foreign Relations: A Summary of War, Peace, and Everything In-Between, 2015

Angered though unsurprised by the turn of events, Roosevelt tossed aside the Colombian option and settled wholeheartedly on Nicaragua. He was eager to press on and thereby treated the matter with a sense of supreme urgency, knowing from his first term how fast these opportunities can slip away. Secretary Garfield formulated a concise land lease agreement with input from others tied to the project, and swiftly departed to Central America. In August of 1913, President Adolfo Diaz Recinos of Nicaragua, a man referred to by Roosevelt as "the most reasonable leader in all of the Americas," signed off on the deal. This accordance granted the United States full canal rights in exchange for several million dollars. The venture came into existence without a hitch and work began almost immediately as the administration started its national recruitment drive for infrastructure workers. Congress soon signed off on the final deal with bipartisan support, awarding the administration its sole planned foreign policy victory.

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Author George Robertson, Chicago Tribune Columnist, c. 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

George Robertson of the Chicago Tribune released an article on June 12th, 1914, reflecting on the first full year of the new administration and all that had been accomplished. It was unapologetically optimistic and left no question as to the author's personal leanings. "Mr. Roosevelt," the piece read, "has risen to the occasion. Brushing away the cobwebs of a static government and cleaning house of naysayers and unpatriotic scoundrels, our captain charts a course along the route of a New Nationalism. Our destination, so says the president, is America's Promised Land. With clear skies and a sturdy vessel, we may just arrive on time." This above celebration of President Roosevelt paints a rosy picture of an American future, brought into existence out of the pure willpower and patented charm of President Roosevelt. That somewhat featherbrained suggestion was not entirely exclusive to the Tribune's editorial staff.

Progressives insisted on framing the incumbent's leadership as the onset of a peaceful American Golden Age unseen in a generation. Analysts, writers, and ideologues in this vein considered the contemporaneous trends unstoppable and they relished in the associated Victorian positivity. Their country was trending leftward, that cannot be denied. One unaligned with progressivism in the early 1910s may as well have tossed away any chance of attaining elected office outside of conservative strongholds in the South and Northeast. The American march to Progress was too mirrored in other parts of the world, as in the United Kingdom where the novel Labour Party continuously gained steam and in Russia with the growth of the Constitutional Democratic Party (also known as the Kadets). Some historians note a generally wider acceptance of reform, the gradual lessening of political corruption, and a sense of mutual harmoniousness taking root in this period as well.

As if to put a feather in the cap of the administration, economists noticed signs that the mild recession of the past four years was finally nearing its end. Gross national product declined by a noteworthy amount during the Hearst President, leading to a steady monetary contraction, a slight increase in joblessness, and a deflation of the dollar. Production rates and unemployment figures remained unchanged in 1913, but an uptick in median income bolstered confidence. Treasury Secretary George Cortelyou presented these encouraging signs to the president, and Roosevelt, in turn, exclaimed the onset of a complete recovery to an insatiable press corp.

Democratic and Republican party leaders begrudgingly acknowledged the early success of the Roosevelt Administration, knowing full-well that any follow-up act to the embarrassing Hearst era would be greeted with open arms. The incumbent had not introduced an unreasonable agenda to Congress, so the opposition could not blame the president for acting out of step with the country. His labor department's measures to mediate workplace disputes may have been an overreach of executive authority to some (especially Southern Democrats), but settling strikes was a healthier alternative than allowing workers to be massacres by gangs of hired guns. Even to the most hardened partisan, Roosevelt and Garfield's management of the Nicaragua Canal ordeal was exemplary and epitomized the type of foreign policy admired by the forces of capital. Typically, a midterm election awards the opposition a weightier say in Congress. In the forthcoming race, a Progressive upsurge seemed extraordinarily likely.

Representative Champ Clark (D-MO), the former vice president and a commanding voice within Democratic ranks, wrote that he maintained a fear far more insidious than a Columbian tilt in the midterms. To Clark, the perception of the incumbent as a wise and patriotic entity, contrasted with his bullish, devil-may-care persona as once exhibited in the Spanish-American War, "leaves us with a president that may transcend party biases." That is, the popularity of Theodore Roosevelt, "risked not merely control of Congress, but all branches of the government." If, perchance, Roosevelt desired an additional term in the White House, winning it would be all but guaranteed. Senator Stone, furthering this point of view, was reportedly overheard in a meeting concerning his re-election campaign stating, "[Mark] Hanna was right to fear this godawful curse accumulating power for himself. He'll be made emperor by Christmas."

As insinuated in the aforementioned Tribune piece, few pictured the present administration in a negative light, and fewer still stood with Clark and Stone in devising a Roosevelt-led dystopia. Evidence is scarce that the American populace thought as far ahead, electorally, as Democratic congressmen fretting over future losses. George Robertson's Pax Americana may seem fantastical and rather unscientific to us today, but the prospect of unceasing progress beneath the umbrella of capitalism was indeed an accepted, apt outcome to the Americans of 1914. Students of U.S. History frequently judge this moment in time as the definitive peak of the Progressive Era, citing that exact rationalization. Nevertheless, it is an absolute truth that any peak must precede a fall. Even Robertson considered the feasibility that an ideal period of fairness and reason could one day meet its untimely end. That conclusion arrived sooner than he preferred, and not with a whimper. Courtesy of one Gavrilo Princip, it ended with a bang.

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The Capture and Arrest of Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo, June 28th, 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XX: Land That I Love: The War to End All Wars

Unbeknownst to much of the United States, tensions had been subtly rising abroad for some time. The great powers of Europe periodically spared over land, influence, and colonial investments, and that trend had not stalled by the twentieth century whatsoever. Market competitiveness and an urge to remain dominant in the affairs of the world drove European leaders to press on in that exact fight. For centuries, Great Britain ruled the game. From its multi-billion holdings overseas to its reputable naval power, it was often said, "On her dominions the sun never sets." Directly contesting her geopolitical throne was Germany: a nation formally founded less than a century ago, yet by 1914 an industrial powerhouse in iron and coal production. Unlike Britain, Germany did not possess a vast colonial empire, and as such it depended on continental expansion in order to bolster its prestigious position.

Germany linked itself tightly to its neighboring empire, Austria-Hungary. The latter nation was a patchwork of nationalities and ethnicities centrally controlled by the Hapsburg dynasty in Vienna, and its fate became intrinsically intertwined with that of the Germans. Austrian possessions along the Adriatic Sea and a joint venture with the Ottoman Empire to seep their influence into the Middle East amounted to a discernable threat to British hegemony over the global economy. France, Britain's closest ally and a living testament to the might of the German military (see Alsace-Lorraine and the Franco-Prussian War), naturally viewed the expansion of the German Reich as an inherent danger. Over the course of the previous decades, each of the above powers steadily increased armaments, naval expenditures, and recruited sizeable standing armies - all meant as a supposed preventative measure.

Nowhere was pressure closer to a boiling point than in what historians refer to as the Balkan "Powder Keg," a region embroiled in territorial claims, spikes of ethno-nationalism, and the cite of two fresh wars. Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir to the throne, made the fatal mistake of visiting this area in June of 1914. While traveling within a motorcade in the streets of Sarajevo, a Yugoslav nationalist named Gavrilo Princip stepped up to the car's footboard and shot Ferdinand and his wife with a pistol at point-blank range. The imperial couple lost consciousness and died shortly thereafter. In the moment, the event was treated as an unexpected and chaotic affair, accompanied soon after with the death of Princip in prison and anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo. In speculative theory, this spark could have failed to light the powder keg if the proper precautions were taken, but no such result came about.

Imperial powers throughout Europe reacted with utter shock and disgust, but most Europeans (and Americans) treated the matter as just another ordinary headline. Few journalists imagined it as particularly cataclysmic or with any long-lasting implications. In the words of suffragette Rheta Childe Dorr, "The Hapsburgs were always being assassinated." Of what importance is the untimely death of a Central European prince to a factory worker or a social reformer? President Roosevelt paid the event relatively little mind as well, requesting updates on the situation as it unfolded but otherwise focusing more intently on domestic reform measures in addition to responding to a downtown fire in Manchester, New Hampshire. As the days ticked by, however, and the government of Serbia refused to comply with Austrian prodding to either investigate or condemn the assassination, the ordeal evolved into something far more significant.

Austria-Hungary submitted a letter to Serbia on July 23rd demanding it combat anti-Austrian propaganda, arrest all participants in the plot, curb the trafficking of explosives, and allow Austro-Hungarian delegates to take part in an investigation. Serbia declined to acquiesce to Austria's ultimatum, prompting the latter to break all diplomatic channels. Prime Minister Nikola Pašić authorized the mobilization of the Serbian armed forces on July 24th. Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary responded with a mobilization of their own on the following day. This chain triggered an accelerated crisis that culminated in the involvement of allied parties. Russia began a partial mobilization, eventually stirring Germany and France into action.

The fact of the matter is war did not break out all at once. That high-school level concept is a simplified explanation of the July Crisis and is completely inaccurate. Granted, the span of time between the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum and the eventual declaration of war is short, but European powers truly did take extensive efforts to stall an eruption. (British Foreign Secretary) Edward Grey offered to calm Serbia and settle the air, but Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed him. Britain repeatedly warned that the potential for a localized conflict was null and that Russian mobilization was all but imminent. Roosevelt too openly asked for neutral mediation, but British and French ministers were said to have refused the notion of American intervention.

         Historian John Dickinson, Roundtable Discussion on the First Great War, Aired 1989

At last, the steam escaped the kettle. Austria-Hungary issued a declaration of war on Serbia on July 28th. Due to the mess of entangling alliances circulating throughout the continent like arteries in a body, war was swiftly inevitable. German troops advanced into Luxembourg and Belgium starting on August 1st, therefore leading to Britain's declaration of war on Germany. The stage had been set. The Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire now existed in a state of war with the British, French, and Russian Entente. President Roosevelt thereafter called a meeting with his military advisors to prepare all available options.

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Trade Unionist Keir Hardie Addresses the Trafalgar Square Peace Rally, 1914 - Source: Corbis

The world now plunged into war. European populations reacted with a mix of shock and perturbation, unsure as to why diplomatic negotiation failed so miserably to curtail the disastrous July Crisis outcome. Continental pro-war sentiment was, at first, largely restricted to conservative groups and the upper-middle class, though socialist and pacifist protest organizations ultimately failed in preventing this mood from seeping into the countryside and working classes. The prospect of British intervention manifested numerous peace demonstrations in early August, including one particularly massive London rally at Trafalgar Square, but, nonetheless, the government eventually voted in unanimity for war. In a matter of weeks, Princip and Ferdinand faded to the background. The march to battle now revolved around resolving old disputes and capitalizing on uncertainty for the purpose of imperial and commercial pursuits.

The United States was caught entirely off-guard, and like the men and women of Europe responded in astonishment at the crumbling of harmony. Samuel Gompers asserted that he had not considered it possible for "civilized nations" to wage war in the age of science. Industrialist Andrew Carnegie, a notable member of the Anti-Imperialist League and a purported pacifist, grew despondent in the face of global foolishness and the failure of negotiation. Well-known ranking Democrats, including a stunned and appalled former President Bryan, likewise expressed a strong distaste for European conflict. Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes, an anti-war proponent, famously described the outbreak of war as a doomsday scenario. "Suddenly, in the wink of an eye, three hundred years of progress is tossed into the melting-pot. Civilization is all gone, and barbarism come."

President Roosevelt met with his Cabinet in a string of meetings beginning on July 29th. He provided no official comment to the press at the onset of back-and-forth war declarations in Europe, hoping to draft a coherent response alongside knowledgeable input from Secretaries Garfield, Wood, and Meyer. Roosevelt understood that an enormous majority of the country desired the U.S. to stay neutral in the fray. Zero to none wanted involvement in the European theater, knowing the Atlantic Ocean guaranteed isolation by default. That is not to say, however, that Americans did not overtly favor one side or the other. Many empathized with the interests of their respective home countries, thus consulting cultural and ethnic identities. Most aligned with Britain, seen by a fair portion of Americans as their "mother country". To the 32 million Americans with roots in Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Ireland, however, supporting anyone apart from the Central Powers was absurd. This held true for the millions of Jewish Americans who opposed the vitriolic, autocratic, and fervently anti-Semitic Russian Empire.

The Roosevelt Administration settled on an option it deemed singularly appropriate for the unique position of the United States: Preparedness. In their view, it was fundamentally necessary for the federal government to do all it could to prepare for the eventuality of war. Imbedded in the national plan was economic and military readiness. If the country should find itself at the threshold of conflict, the greatest risk would be inattentiveness. Roosevelt had long since been an advocate of militarism and the expansion of the armed forces, and an outbreak of an overseas war presented a serendipitous opportunity to aggressively champion that idea. They deemed the oft-neglected Army and Navy insufficient for the modern era. In the words of Senator Lodge, an undefended and helpless nation, by its very nature, "invites aggression." Leonard Wood concurred on the need to substantially bulwark the nation's military, and indeed that notion unified Republicans and Progressives in a manner yet unseen.

In late August, as war raged betwixt the great powers of Europe, Roosevelt committed to the Preparedness program in a highly reported public address. He sustained the need to remain neutral for the purpose of national security and economic longevity but insisted that the country ought to remain vigilant regardless.

We need, more than anything else in this country, thoroughgoing Americanism - for unless we are Americans and nothing else, we are not a nation at all - and thoroughgoing preparedness in time of peace against war - for if we are not thus prepared, we shall remain a nation only until some more virile nation finds it worthwhile to conquer us. Americanism means many things. It means equality of rights and therefore equality of duty and of obligation. It means service to our common country. It means loyalty to one flag, to our flag, the flag of all of us. All privilege based on wealth, and all enmity to honest men merely because they are wealthy, are un-American - both of them equally so. [...] I advocate military preparedness not for the sake of war, but for the sake of safeguarding this nation against war, so long as that is possible, and of guaranteeing its honor and safety if war should nevertheless come.

         President Theodore Roosevelt, Preparedness Speech, August 27th, 1914

The presidential address encompassed a broad list of objectives for the federal readiness program, including not only military expansion (though it did mention Roosevelt's desire for a navy second only to Great Britain), but compulsory military training for all school-aged children. Comparing it to the Swiss system, Roosevelt stated that all young men, as a requirement for educational advancement, must serve at a West Point-like training center followed by six months of actual service in the field. Military preparedness advocates insisted on this point as one vital to the growth of the armed forces. Obligatory, universal service spat in the face of pacifism, a concept dubbed by Roosevelt an "utter folly" and stood to strengthen bonds that circumvented cultural ties and social identities. Knowing the fierce objection Democrats would invariably have to the above proposals, the speech also included a slight digression pertaining to the need for a Progressive Senate majority.

"Your Congress is tasked with the patriotic duty to enact Americanization," the president postulated. "The Party of Columbia is the party of one national identity, of one American language: the language of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Our citizens must be Americans, and nothing else, and if they try to be something else in addition, then they should be sent out of this country and back to the other country to which, in their hearts, they pay allegiance. This is not an age of cowardice, it is one of courage, of honor, truth and hardihood - the virtues that made America."

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1914 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Republican: 34 (+2)
Progressive: 31 (+3)
Democratic: 30 (-6)
Socialist: 1 (+1)

House
Progressive: 158 (+10)
Republican: 135 (-4)
Democratic: 117 (-4)
Socialist: 18 (+2)
Civic League: 6 (-3)
Independent: 1 (-1)

  Senate Leadership

Senate President Hiram W. Johnson (P-CA)
President pro tempore Eugene Hale (R-ME)
Conference Chairman Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN)
Conference Chairman Robert La Follette (P-WI)
Caucus Chairman Robert L. Owen (D-OK)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader James R. Mann (R-IL)
Minority Leader Oscar Underwood (D-AL)
Minority Leader Victor L. Berger (S-WI)
Minority Leader Daniel A. Driscoll (CL-NY)

The Roosevelt midterm elections seemed to exacerbate 1912 voting trends. A quick glance at the 1914 results explained no less than a hearty examination of state-by-state vote totals. More Americans favored President Roosevelt's agenda than they opposed it, evident by the ten-seat expansion of the Progressive delegation in the House and three-seat boost in the Senate. The Columbians were united and did not allow for the war in Europe to disrupt that unity. Democrats, meanwhile, stayed very much divided throughout the 63rd Congress as in-fighting brewed continuously between Bryan Democrats, who empathized with the Progressive social and economic platforms yet held a hardline against the idea of Preparedness mobilization, and frustrated conservative Democrats that rejected the Progressive program in its entirety. Struggling to conceive a uniform messaging on the national level, the party had immense difficulty holding onto its slim senatorial plurality. An ascendant Progressive tide washed over Democratic officeholders, resulting in a six-seat loss in the upper chamber. In addition to factionalism endlessly plaguing the old bastion of Jeffersonian ideals, a component operating outside of the Democratic party also played into the inter-party divisiveness.

The non-affiliated Civic League of Independents in Congress attracted scores of candidates in hotly contested districts, as well as in a fair few senatorial and gubernatorial races. Despite former President Hearst's fourth-place finish in the 1912 presidential election, the 1.5 million voters that buoyed the Hearst candidacy now followed his plea to defend the young political faction. Those candidates in favor of the anti-establishment reform program exhibited much of the same style-over-substance approach to politics of the former president, lambasting Roosevelt for coordinating with Republicans and commonly citing corruption within the Democratic leadership. The Civic League of America fielded over sixty candidates for office in 1914, including the nine congressional incumbents. Thirteen altogether managed to secure electoral success that year, such as former Navy Secretary Lewis Nixon in an open race for a New York State Senate seat, but dozens of high-profile office-seekers like petroleum producer Thomas L. Hisgen in the Massachusetts governor's race failed to overtake leading Progressives and Republicans. Hearst personally devoted his time and capital into the CL, so it must have been dreadfully discouraging to learn that his congressional faction lost a third of its members on Election Day.

Western Populists, seated in Congress as Democrats, faced intense scrutiny from their own party for voting approvingly on Roosevelt's Square Deal legislation, and as a natural result lost in their respective primary bouts. Therefore, incumbent senators John C. Bell of Colorado and Henry Heitfeld of Idaho suffered for their voting patterns. Each were brought into Washington as members of the Populist Party, gradually transformed into Bryan-molded Democrats, and by 1914 were as faithful as anyone to the national committee. Senator Heitfeld served as the Class 3 senator of the Gem State for about 12 years and not once heard a word of caution of the state apparatus, leaving the incumbent completely unprepared when former Governor James H. Hawley (D-ID) launched a surprise crusade against him. Hawley won the nomination, but, to his discredit, failed to curb the seemingly insurmountable campaign of Idaho House Speaker Paul Clagstone (P-ID).  

Likewise, Senator Bell was felled by challenger Charles Spalding Thomas (D-CO), a former governor and Confederate Army veteran. Thomas, a thoroughbred conservative, obviously did not meet the criteria traditionally expected of Colorado Democrats, but indeed took home the nomination in a textbook upset. Thomas faced off against Republican State Chairman Hubert Work (R-CO) and reformist labor attorney Benjamin Griffith (P-CO). Utilizing a campaign fresh with references to a glorified U.S. military under the guidance of President Roosevelt, the politically inexperienced Griffith nearly toppled the poll-leading Democrat at the last minute. The final count put Thomas ahead, however, 40% to 39%, with Work catching up the rear with 11%. Thomas claimed the victory in the name of preventing U.S. entry into the European war, stating, "Sanity in Congress is all that prevents Colonel Roosevelt from dragging us into a fight that does not whatsoever concern us."

Senator James Garfield's transition to the State Department left that seat vacant at the start of the 63rd Congress. A subsequent special election for that seat led to victory for GOP candidate and former governor Myron T. Herrick (R-OH). Herrick soon opted in favor of running for a complete term, giving the conservative financier the opportunity to grip onto Garfield's old seat for another six years. His senatorial colleague, Theodore Burton (R-OH) made the fateful decision to retire in 1914, thereby leaving an open contest alongside the potential re-election of Senator Herrick. The recent inductee was considered a shoo-in for his election, but Burton's seat seemed a toss-up. Industrialist Arthur Lovett Garford won the Columbian nomination while Democrats settled on progressive reformer Representative James M. Cox (D-OH) for their choice. The Republican Party nominated incumbent Governor Warren G. Harding (R-OH) to succeed Burton - a nightmare scenario for Cox and Garford. The sitting Ohioan governor was tremendously popular in his home state and delivered safe, patriotic platitudes as opposed to the sweeping legislative pledges offered by his opponents. Skillfully lassoing mountainous Republican turnout, Harding handily defeated Cox and joined fellow victor Herrick in the all-GOP Senate delegation.

As with Ohio, the Republican Party experienced a political miracle in New York. Incumbent Governor Lewis Chanler (D-NY), who in 1912 hung onto the Governor's Mansion by the skin of his teeth, believed a third full term was untenable and announced his bowing-out in early 1914. Sensing an opportunity, Representative William Sulzer, then considered a prominent face of the New York Democratic Party, declared an intent to run. His chief competitor would be a returned and reinvigorated Charles Evans Hughes (R-NY), the anti-corruption GOP nominee who narrowly lost to William R. Hearst in 1906. Espousing a pledge to fulfill a progressive agenda that included cracking down on Tammany Hall interference in the political process and ramping up military recruitment efforts in conjunction with the Preparedness Movement, Hughes easily won the endorsement of President Roosevelt and the New York Progressive Party. Sulzer had not anticipated a unified opposition and was unequivocally decimated by the mammoth competitor in a 60-40 race. Likewise, New York Assemblyman and Republican Leader Elihu Root, a virulent Hearst opponent and champion of readiness in the war, demolished incumbent Senator William Sheehan (D-NY) for a seat in the Senate.

Lastly, perhaps the most influential race of 1914 took place in Nevada. Jingoist and white supremacist Senator Francis G. Newlands (D-NV) prepared to take part in the toughest re-election fight of his career. Newlands served in the Senate since 1902 and had yet to fall below 50% in an election. It would not be so easy in 1914, however, when he dealt with a repertoire of anti-incumbent opponents. Carson City attorney Samuel Platt (R-NV) ran harsh, negative advertisements against Newlands with assistance from a Vanderbilt-backed war chest. The Columbians ran local business owner James Johnson, who too held nothing back in criticizing Newlands above all else. Former Governor Denver S. Dickerson (D-NV), a beacon in statewide politics, even withheld an endorsement of the sitting senator, provoking outrage by the Nevada Democrats. Polling put Newlands neck-in-neck with the competition, with all candidates roughly within a point or two of one another. Reverend Ashley Grant Miller (S-NV), the Montcalm County Assistant Prosecutor and active member of the Socialist Party, initiated the surprise upset of the election and, by a margin of fewer than one percent of the vote (30.01% to 29.69%), defeated Senator Newlands and delivered the SP with its first ever win in the upper legislature.

Senators Elected in 1914 (Class 3)

Francis S. White (D-AL): Democratic Hold, 85%
Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ): Democratic Hold, 49%
James P. Clarke (D-AR): Democratic Hold, 72%
George C. Pardee (P-CA): Progressive Hold, 47%
Charles S. Thomas (D-CO): Democratic Hold, 40%
Frank B. Brandegee (R-CT): Republican Hold, 55%
Duncan U. Fletcher (D-FL): Democratic Hold, 89%
Thomas E. Watson (D-GA): Democratic Hold, 67%
Paul Clagstone (P-ID): Progressive Gain, 42%
Charles M. Thomson (P-IL): Progressive Gain, 38%
Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN): Republican Hold, 38%
Albert B. Cummins (P-IA): Progressive Hold, 58%
Joseph L. Bristow (P-KS): Progressive Hold, 57%
Augustus E. Wilson (R-KY): Republican Gain, 40%
John R. Thornton (D-LA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
John W. Smith (D-MD): Democratic Hold, 45%
William J. Stone (D-MO): Democratic Hold, 53%
Ashley G. Miller (S-NV): Socialist Gain, 30%
Jacob Gallinger (R-NH): Republican Hold, 55%
Elihu Root (R-NY): Republican Gain, 52%
Lee Overman (D-NC): Democratic Hold, 57%
James H. Sinclair (P-ND): Progressive Gain, 40%
Warren G. Harding (R-OH): Republican Hold, 56%
*Myron T. Herrick (R-OH): Republican Gain, 48%
Thomas Gore (D-OK): Democratic Hold, 44%
William D. Hanley (P-OR): Progressive Gain, 39%
Gifford Pinchot (P-PA): Progressive Hold, 41%
Coleman L. Blease (D-SC): Democratic Hold, 98%
Philo Hall (P-SD): Progressive Hold, 50%
Reed Smoot (R-UT): Republican Hold, 54%
William P. Dilingham (R-VT): Republican Hold, 59%
Ole Hanson (P-WA): Progressive Hold, 44%
Isaac Stephenson (P-WI): Progressive Hold, 50%

*Special Election

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The British Grand Fleet Sailing in Parallel Columns, c. 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Secure in the knowledge that the U.S. voting population sanctioned President Roosevelt's call to action, the exiting 63rd Senate reluctantly agreed to take up the legislative proposals offered by the head of state. Preparedness, an idea that had gained a torrent of traction since the president's August address on the subject, seeped into the daily American lexicon and bubbled into a full-fledged movement by the conclusion of 1914. Advocates for war readiness spurred the growth of a handful of local and state "Defense Clubs," manifesting a lobbying force aside from war-hungry weapons manufacturers. Senator Fairbanks, the univocal leader of the Senate Republicans during Roosevelt's tenure, voiced his favor with the program and urged his party to follow suit. The Falconer-Colt Bill, also known as the Preparedness Bill, reached the floor of the Senate on December 10th.

Falconer-Colt, named for Senator LeBaron Colt (R-RI) and Representative Jacob Falconer (P-WA), furnished a base level of preparedness that included a dramatic upsurge in military spending, a wide-ranging expansion of federal recruitment efforts, the renewal of naval contracts, and a numbered increase in State and War Department officials. When Roosevelt took office, the State Department operated with a meager, bare-bones budget and employed only about two hundred workers. In the case of unexpected conflict, such an abysmal figure would leave the U.S. far below the typical requirements of a capable and advanced, industrialized nation. Falconer-Colt also outfitted expanded presidential powers in the eventuality of war involving the United States: a prospect exceedingly unacceptable to the Democratic Party. Indeed, congressional Democrats fought vehemently against Preparedness at every turn, exhaustingly reiterating their perspective that enlarging the scope of the Executive branch and dedicating a higher percentage of the national budget to the military would not stave off war, but perhaps have the opposite effect.

A secondary aspect to the bill in Congress concerned the economy. At the outbreak of war in August, insanity struck the London Stock Exchange and forced its indefinite closure. Demand for raw gold shot through the roof, draining U.S. reserves and stirring bank runs and panic hoarding by the American citizenry. Stocks crumbled, food prices rose, unemployment figures skyrocketed, and the export market dissipated short of nothingness. Any small chance of recovery appeared to evaporate, or at least that was how it seemed. Alongside its war fever, the late-summer Roosevelt Administration primarily focused on how best to deal with the national economy in a world rife with bloodshed and mistrust. Roosevelt and his political comrades believed that the answer to the United States' economic woes lied with its root problem: the war. After all, once the pure shock of the world plunging into a deadly battlefield wore off, someone needed to produce the means necessary to conduct said war. Therefore, the president insisted that the Preparedness legislation incorporate a portion that entailed looser restrictions on overseas trading and light subsidies for steel and cooper manufacturers (a major turnaround from Roosevelt's belligerent legal assault on U.S. Steel).

Roosevelt placed all of the nation's metaphorical eggs into the export basket, explicitly refusing to either advise the New York Stock Exchange to close or order the Treasury seize on depleting gold reserves. Some Progressives joined with Democrats in deriding the president's choice, albeit in private correspondence, wary of rolling the dice on exports. Fortunately for Roosevelt, the drying up of industry in Europe and a sudden rise in demand of most raw goods validated his decision. If managed and coordinated properly, the U.S. was on track to be a significant economic player despite its poor contemporaneous condition. Furthermore, the warring continent was ripe for investment, and that caught the eyes of Rockefeller and Morgan interests. Between 1910 and 1915, U.S. banking forces invested millions into various European governments and often served as their purchasing agents. Especially in the wake of favorable trading conditions with Germany, Morocco, and China from years of open-door negotiations and diplomatic endeavors, the House of Rockefeller operated as a benevolent, non-aligned lender to these countries. Historians estimate well over two billion dollars in loans were dispersed to the Central Powers prior to, and too at the start of, the Great War.

Congress signed off on Falconer-Colt in December, altering very little of the text and complying to much of the president's demands (it did not include universal conscription). Just as predicted, the American economy underwent an industrial boom in the first half of 1915 partially due to the Preparedness doctrine. Steel and oil demand bounced back from sharp cutbacks and overall unemployment dipped slightly with the reinforcement of naval bases, speedy construction of a revitalized Navy, and, of course, rising enlistment figures. The only piece of the puzzle that stayed unresolved was the stunted American exports wing. European need for American goods was at an all-time high due to the wartime draining of resources and ever-higher manpower costs, but Great Britain tactically made international trade abundantly nightmarish. The British Naval Blockade, established at the onset of war in August, effectively blocked off German ports from receiving any outside trade whatsoever, including from neutral powers. Britain forbade all commerce with Germany and mandated all merchant vessels, even if they held cargo unrelated to the war, dock in Entente-controlled ports for examination. For Americans, the Royal Navy exhibited especially strict scrutiny. It was not unheard of for seafaring traders to have their stock depleted or ruined in that process.

U.S. traders were endlessly frustrated at the idea that British intrusion culled profiteering opportunities, and many avoided the North Sea completely to stave off the risk of losing cargo. Britain and France were, in theory, more easily accessible trading partners with the restrictions of the blockade in mind, but German rates had been massaged over the last decade and U.S. industries preferred existing arrangements over being bullied into accepting uglier rates for the same work. Commercial forces had no love for Britain prior to the war, but this development sickened them and drove many to lobby the Roosevelt Administration to act. The president delayed the choice as long as possible, but now he either needed to acquiesce to British demands and start from scratch or bully London right back. Truthfully, Roosevelt's less-emphasized imperial ambitions, that of the United States as a world power, counted heavily on utilizing its standing deals with the Kaiser as a foundation. Trade with the British Empire and France was miniscule by comparison. Endangering relations with an amiable German Empire at a moment when France acted in an outright antagonistic manner to the administration and Britain mocked the U.S. with its snatching away of the "Freedom of the Seas" was no option at all.

Before the United States laid a golden valley. The omnipresent powers of international commerce, those interests that greedily profited off exploitation in the Philippines and colonialism in South America, viewed the Great War not as a catastrophe, but as an opportunity for new profits. In the unquestioning service of their home countries, men were driven off to war to die in one of the most inhumane conflicts in human history. They were ordered to dig their own graves, and capitalists happily sold the shovels. [...] U.S. financiers, banks, and investors long since coveted a plate at the table in Europe. Germany was their entry-point to total economic domination in the Eastern Hemisphere. Once the Ottomans completed their Bosporus-to-Baghdad railway, and forcibly swung open the doors of the Middle Eastern markets to plundering, investing in the Central Powers was all but inevitable. Desperate American merchants were offered fabulous riches by these same investors if they dared to traverse the Mediterranean or the North Sea. It just so happened that the Captain of the Rose took such an offer.

         Benjamin McIntyre, The Workers' Struggle: The Birth of a Columbian International, 2018​

Over the objection of Anglophile Leonard Wood, Theodore Roosevelt chose to, quite literally, test the waters. In a fateful, controversial move that has since become one of the most oft discussed resolutions of the Columbian president, Roosevelt personally sent notice to London that American commercial ships would no longer abide by the blockade. He decreed that the American economy would not "kowtow to [...] an assault on our freedom," insofar as the intercepting and forced docking of commercial vehicles was concerned. Noting the innate neutrality of the seas and the unprecedented nature of enforcing a blockade against peaceful traders, Roosevelt stated that vessels containing no war materiel had no reason to abide by the British government. He did not pass a formal issue contesting the status of European waters or otherwise officially challenge the blockade, but instead sent the above memorandum and waited for a return letter - presumably anticipating the British would back down from their hardline offensive. Secretary Garfield followed-up with a more cordial message, but that too was seemingly ignored.

Four days later, on April 30th, 1915, a transatlantic ship named "The Yellow Rose," sailed into the North Sea. According to a copy of its manifest, it contained fourteen crew members, twenty passengers, and a diverse stock of foodstuffs and medical supplies. The Yellow Rose was bound for the seaport town of Esbjerg in Denmark but was stopped by British authorities along the Western blockade just South of Dover. Reports vary, but the official assessment by the Dover Patrol was that the ship refused standard orders to dock at Dover and continued pressing East (though some historians assert that the shipping vessel was first halted and boarded). Declaring the rogue captain in criminal disregard to submit to their jurisdiction, and apparently under a premonition that it was carrying more nefarious goods than wheat and medicine, the Royal Navy unceremoniously fired upon the ship. The Yellow Rose sunk into the English Channel, and all onboard perished on that April afternoon.

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San Francisco Preparedness Parade, June 2nd, 1915 - Source: SF Chronicle

News of the Yellow Rose soon reached American shores. A horrified public had trouble comprehending the disaster. Humanists and intellectuals perhaps disbelieved the story, but learning of the tragedy was unavoidable. Plastered across every major newspaper read some variation of the same headline, accompanied by either a photograph of the ship itself or of its captain. The New York Times printed, "Yellow Rose Sunk By Royal Navy, 34 Aboard Believed Dead," and followed with a smaller subtitle remarking, "A Grave Crisis Is At Hand." Indeed, the unjust murder of American citizens did not merely invoke alarm, but immense anger at the perpetrators for ordering the assault. Editorials universally condemned the officers responsible for the deaths at sea, yet hundreds of publications took the extra step in insulting the British government for instituting the blockade to begin with.

The American answer to the destruction of the Yellow Rose in the English Channel was outrage and acrimony as much, if not more so, than it was grief and sadness. Not entirely unlike the Austrian knee-jerk reaction to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the people themselves demanded retribution. A wave of anti-British emotion washed over the United States at a level unseen in a generation. Articles from reputable sources freely referred to sailors aboard the blockading vessels as, "pirates," and "barbarians." The Nation famously named the event, "a deed for which a Hun would blush, a Turk be ashamed, and a Barbary pirate apologize." No longer were concerns about the blockade limited to commercial interests - the policy of interdiction was now personal.

Insofar as political leaders responded, they certainly proved more divided than the public at large. The Great War saturated political discourse since, at the latest, the debate over Falconer-Colt, and now that debate overshadowed all other issues. Five full months of preparation lessened war anxiety to an extent and left the country in a far better position, militarily, that it would have been otherwise. Few in Washington wanted U.S. involvement in the affairs of Europe, but at least the Army no longer upkept nineteenth century weaponry as it did at the dawn of the 1910s. Democrats who had fought the president on Preparedness struggled to gain a worthwhile foothold in the foreign policy debates moving forward. Former President Bryan consistently advised against the Roosevelt position on war readiness and stressed the need to establish diplomatic channels as an alternative. His fledgling Commoner, reduced by 1913 to a milquetoast, pro-Democratic paper, printed each week a heartfelt plea for arbitration. "Militarism will not stop militarism," it read.

Bryan and fellow war-wary advocates like Governor Woodrow Wilson labored twice as hard to silence the march to war after the sinking of the Yellow Rose. Before British authorities delivered their non-defense on the atrocity and hours prior to the official presidential statement, Bryan spoke to a gathering of the neutral Friends of Peace association. He indicated sorrow for the lives lost and empathy with those desirous of revenge, but urged a calm, measured counter. "Accountability can be achieved," he explained, "without rushing headlong into war." Millions of Europeans were already slaughtered in the bloody overseas conflict, lost in the spray of machine-gun fire and artillery shells. Europe was at a stalemate wrought with deplorable trench-warfare and poison gas attacks. No reasonable American, Bryan thought, could possibly crave embroilment in such a fiasco. That too quickly became the mindset of pacifists and proponents of international cooperation, but Roosevelt disagreed.

British officials and representatives reportedly touched base with the Roosevelt Administration on the morning of May 1st, regretting the sinking of the commercial ship but stopping short of apologizing or renouncing their ongoing naval policies. U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom Paul Drennan Cravath warned President Roosevelt that the British were unwilling to alter the state of their blockade. According to Cravath's testimonials, Prime Minister H.H. Asquith spared few words for the 34 American deaths, and in fact planned to coordinate with the recently created War Propaganda Bureau to frame the incident in a manner that reflected negatively on the United States. Cravath, as well as the presidential Cabinet, implored the president exhaust diplomacy. "[Wood and Garfield] advised against a sudden, emotion-driven reply," wrote Ackerman, "but one does have trouble reasoning with the unreasonable. Roosevelt itched for war, and he rebuffed every point against declaration. If Wood brought up the German advance in Belgium, Roosevelt retorted with reports of French and British atrocities in occupied Greek territory. When asked about the unstable U.S. economy, the president could answer that the recovery counted on the success of Germany. The dominoes fell one by one, and perhaps all it took was a smidge of disrespect by Asquith to push him over the brink."

Gentlemen of the Congress.

In their respective lifetimes, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln confronted crises of different types, and therefore in any given crisis it is now the example of one, now the example of the other, which it is most essential for us to follow. Each stood absolutely for the National ideal, for a full Union and of all our people, perpetual and indestructible, and for the full employment of our entire collective strength to any extent that was necessary in order to meet the nation's needs. The lesson of nationalism and therefore of efficient action through the national government is taught by both careers. At the present moment we need to apply this principle in our social and industrial life to a degree far greater than was the case in either Washington's day or Lincoln's.

Washington loved peace. Perhaps Lincoln loved peace even more. But when the choice was between peace and righteousness, both alike trod undaunted the dark path that led through terror and suffering and the imminent menace of death to the shining goal beyond. We remember that Lincoln said that a government dedicated to freedom should not perish from the earth. Our sacred past guides us to this day. Peace cannot reign where evil prevails. Freedom cannot breathe when tyranny looms near. On the 30th of April, we as a nation endured tremendous loss at the bequest of a tyrannical policy distilled by pirates on the open sea. American lives and property were ruthlessly and without provocation stolen away in a senselessly cruel and unspeakable act that exhibits an innate threat on our independence. This belligerence, an inhumane assault on neutrality and our right to free commerce, has made neutrality impossible.

          Theodore Roosevelt, War Message to Congress, May 8th, 1915

At once, upon learning that diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were formally severed, sprawling Defense Club branches, the pro-war Patriotic Society for American Security, the munitions-minded Navy League, and other such groups sprang into action. Congress, they understood, would only concur with the president on the need for war if swayed to do so by the people. Inspired by the enormously influential, Bryan-esque style of presidential campaigning, these groups initiated mammoth-sized parades featuring jingoistic speakers in the same vein as Albert Beveridge and his "March of the Flag." Processions donning patriotic themes reminiscent of Independence Day (Nostalgic banners with depictions of the Founding Fathers, the Betsy Ross flag, etc) flooded the streets of St. Louis, Chicago, Sacramento, New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., throughout May of 1915. In the words of one propagandist, "We're no strangers to British subjugation. Our forefathers wrestled for independence and for economic liberty from those blasted redcoats, and now we do the same. [....] Hail, Columbia, now and forever, land that I love."

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Peace Advocates in New York, June 11th, 1915 - Source: BoweryBoys

American popular opinion demonstrated a clear, intense disfavor with the prospect of entering the war at the start of 1915. Most preferred staying neutral, or, at the extreme end of the spectrum, siding with the Central Powers economically. Polling projects found public approval for war declaration hovering in the high teens. The Yellow Rose disaster shifted that figure upward, and President Roosevelt's speech further rocketed interest in engaging in the conflict. Enacting revenge seemed a more enticing plea than protecting the economy. Preparedness began to place the U.S. on relatively equal footing with the belligerents, and the growth of pro-war organizations and city-wide demonstrations increased notoriety of the militarist movement as it unfolded. In cities with substantial Irish Catholic, German, and Scandinavian communities, ever-larger Defense Clubs were especially vitriolic toward Britain.  

The Roosevelt Administration, in the immediate aftermath of the presidential address to Congress, worked to engineer the prevailing narrative concerning entrance in the war. Roosevelt founded an independent agency via executive order named the United States Information Council. Headed by Brigadier General William Wright Harts with assistance from illustrator Leon Barritt and "Cowboy Artist" Charles Marion Russell, the USIC sponsored a spree of propaganda to promote the administration's point of view. USIC materials flooded the mainstream press and blanketed prominent parks and city centers, all with positive, patriotic messaging aimed at young adults to enlist. On the flip side, the committee would seek to censor all British media that countered the administration. Some of the more blatant propaganda issued by the agency depicted imagery like a British lion tearing apart Europe with its teeth and claws. The sometimes-shocking illustrations incensed a public ill at ease with neutrality. "How many men must die before we act?" asked one pro-intervention editorial. "The English do not own the sea and they ought never to control our trade." All in all, it worked. Before much time at all had passed, the Republican Party and most Progressives pledged to support Roosevelt's War Declaration.

Even as the airhorns blared and the war drums thundered, an unmoving segment of the population refused to get caught up in the fervor. Swathes of working Americans (like working Europeans) were unaffected by the propaganda. Protestant religious leaders were vocally opposed to any involvement overseas, as was the brunt of the women's movement. Women, especially, became the centerpiece of an anti-war appeal to the president in 1914 and 1915. Notable social reformists like Lillian Wald and Jane Addams, individuals who had joined with the Progressives and fueled their push for universal suffrage, now broke with Roosevelt and incessantly urged he reconsider the choice to plead Congress for military action. Lasting members of the Republican Old Guard, labor union officials, progressive journalists, and industrialists like Model-T automobile developer Henry Ford denounced war as a waste of human lives and intervention as a thankless task. Adams frequently wrote to the president on such topics as isolation and rekindled diplomacy, but by April she no longer received return messages.

Of all four of the major American political parties, only the Socialist Party emerged forcefully and consistently against the U.S. dipping its toes into the cesspool of war. Socialist leaders like Eugene Debs quickly came to recognize the gigantic problem of warring nations and escalating jingoism in relation to cross-national working-class solidarity and international cooperation. In stark contrast to socialists in Europe who capitulated to patriotism and nationalist sentiment, Debs, and the majority of American Socialists (apart from a few Preparedness advocates like Mayor Daniel Hoan (S-WI) of Milwaukee), fended off any such inclination. Debate pertaining to their official position on the issue would not be cemented into party policy until 1916 at their national convention. Debs, however, jumped the gun, refusing to shy away from taking a stand on this delicate and malleable issue.

It is "patriotism" of the workers of one nation to fall upon and foully murder the workers of another nation to enlarge the possessions of their masters and increase the piles of their bloodstained riches, and as long as the poor, deluded toiling masses are fired by this brand of "patriotism," they will serve as cannon fodder and no power on earth can save them from their sodden fate. Ours is a wider patriotism — as wide as humanity. We abhor murder in uniform even more than we do in midnight assassination. Preparedness, from the working-class point of view, means for the workers that they are to cease fighting and losing for their masters and for once in the world’s history fight and win for themselves. [...] I am not a capitalist soldier; I am a proletarian revolutionist. I am opposed to every war but one; I am for that war with heart and soul, and that is the world-wide war of the social revolution.

         Eugene V. Debs, Socialism and Patriotism, May 29th, 1915

Looking to copy the seemingly fruitful tactics of the Preparedness and pro-war advocates, about 8,000 activists stemming from a variety of local organizations took to the streets of New York in a contentious march for peace. Dressed in monochrome attire to honor the fallen soldiers in Europe, as well as to signify future deaths of American enlistees, the collective of marchers stepped silently and in unison along busy metropolitan streets. This cadre included members of the New York Socialist Party, the Workingwomen's Craft and Industrial Union League, the New York Board of Women's Suffrage, and well-known figures like antimilitarist Crystal Catherine Eastman and suffragette Carrie Chapman Catt.

The Women's March for Peace was designed to promote peace and solidarity with grieving mothers off in Europe, and to the participants they anticipated quiet solidarity by observers. Still, regardless of the event's intent, the country was now more equally divided on the issue. War hawks equivocated pacifism with cowardice and a lack of patriotism. For them, marching for peace was outright traitorous. Therefore, marchers crossing the intersection of West 47th Street and 5th Avenue were greeted with blowback in the form of an attack by opposing war proponents. Banners were ripped from women's hands and promptly destroyed as marchers were pushed to the ground and berated. The situation devolved into panic and the scattering of activists, though local police on standby intervened and broke the engagement up. Officers arrested forty-two women marchers and three oppositionists. The New York Police Department went on to cite the Women's March for Peace as an instigator of "street violence and thuggery" and recommended the women abstain from repeating the event. Mayor John Mitchel (P-NY), a close ally to Roosevelt, went as far as to advise the city government to consider "preventative measures" to deter future incidents.

The failure of the Women's March, juxtaposed with the invariable success of the Preparedness parades, epitomized the transformation taking place within the country. Patriotism and Roosevelt-branded progressivism, sometimes viewed as one in the same, influenced the United States to an extent that cannot be underestimated. Swept up in the propaganda and vengeful, post-Yellow Rose sprit, the U.S. Congress brought to a vote a formal declaration of war. Overruling an attempted filibuster by Democratic Caucus Chairman Robert Owen, the senatorial Progressive-Republican coalition passed the proposal, 64 to 32. Senator La Follette famously cast his vote against the measure following a heartfelt plea to deny Roosevelt the war, although only two other Progressives joined the Wisconsinite in that direction. The House passed the proposal with minimal fanfare, 302 to 133. That evening, on June 28th, 1915, President Roosevelt announced that the United States now existed in a state of war against the United Kingdom. He finally had his war. Next came the tricky part.

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Benedict Crowell, Co-Architect of the Canadian Plan, c. 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XXI: In Service of the Nation: Breaking the Washington Doctrine

Officially embroiled in the Great War as of June 28th, the United States required nimble reflexes and a quick wit in order to gain an early upper hand. President Roosevelt authorized mass mobilization of the armed forces and put into motion a military operation meticulously constructed by his team long before entering the fray. Via secret diplomatic channels, the U.S. government was later revealed to have communicated back-and-forth with the German Foreign Office in the weeks preceding the passage of war declaration in Congress. Secretary of State James Garfield and German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow partook in this series of coded telegraph conversations through May of 1915, articulating their strategies and hypothesizing how best to bushwhack the overconfident Entente. This channel provided for the exclusive, direct input from President Roosevelt, Assistant War Secretary Benedict Crowell, and General John J. Pershing at the outset. Knowing Secretary Leonard Wood's objection to binding relations with Germany, the president deliberately kept him out of the loop on this matter. Shortly after the U.S. declared war on the United Kingdom, Roosevelt reassigned Wood to a co-commanding position under Pershing and, thereafter, called on Crowell to serve in Wood's place.

The Roosevelt Administration established these links with the German government for military as well as commercial purposes. According to historians dedicated to understanding the events leading up to U.S. entering the war, the president primarily aspired to supply the Central Powers with much-requested export goods like steel, cooper, and wheat. Collapsing the British blockade would be the easiest and most straightforward way to accomplish such an aim, but an overt combined naval offensive would likely spell disaster for all parties. A mutually beneficial economic assistance program counted on either discovering an alternative trade route or otherwise dismantling the Royal Navy's dominance of the seas. In cooperating with the German Empire, Roosevelt settled on, perhaps, the only available path to overcome the hurdle outlined above.

Insofar as the military-centric details of the communications were concerned, the two de facto allies covered a range of subjects. Crowell urged Germany more stringently monitor its submarine movements via tighter restrictions and discipline. He also recommended German troops focus their fight almost entirely on the Western Front while leaving the Eastern Front to the other Central Empires. More so than all else, the powers discussed the manifestation of the Canadian offensive. Crowell and Pershing conceived of a rapid, northward campaign tactic that could be developed and jumpstarted without interception by British officers. It was inspired, in part, by Alfred von Schlieffen's envelopment strategy as well as the German advance in Belgium. Due to Canada's lower base population and the shipping off of much of its military forces to engage on the tumultuous European front, the northerly neighbor of the United States was left vulnerable. Britain had not ended its diplomatic efforts to calm American leadership until June 28th, thus leaving more than enough room for the U.S. to prepare its clever play in secrecy.

Within days of announcing war, the president launched a lightning attack along the International Boundary. The maneuver propelled dozens of trained regiments across the border and into the neighboring nation whilst simultaneously dispatching a supportive fleet along the Eastern coastline. Unsuspecting British-Canadian police could not withstand the influx of American troops, and in the opening days of the offensive often surrendered without conflict. Canadian Minister of Defence Sam S. Hughes scurried to awaken those soldiers present nearest to the border and organized a swift, though disordered, defensive line.

By July, a section of the U.S. Army under direction of Generals LeRoy Eltinge and William H. Carter broke through the last of the often-criticized "hodgepodge of a garrison" and reached the city limits of Toronto, Ontario. Canadian military personnel stationed around Toronto managed to stall the American advance for roughly four days with pluming artillery fire, allowing for the evacuation of city residents. It was a true and honest effort, but the sheer abundance of practiced U.S. regiments easily overwhelmed the defenders. Military historian John Altmin summed up the engagement as a "shellacking of epic proportions. The decisive U.S. victory set the tone for the Northern Front as their lightning warfare thundered on through the provinces." Southeastern Ontario was fully captured and occupied by Carter and Eltinge's battalion within weeks, as were portions of Manitoba and Saskatchewan in a joint assault.

The invasion of Canada was swift, unforgiving, and viewed by contemporaneous war-skeptics as a unnecessary onslaught. It resulted relatively few U.S. deaths, but did end in massive casualties on the Canadian side (a fact mostly censured in the United States press). Still, these American victories on the battlefield, secured far ahead of schedule, boosted morale among the soldiers and fed into Roosevelt's projection of an unstoppable and unafraid league of warriors. Accompanying the ground assault was an active portion of the U.S. Navy commanded by Admiral William Sowden Sims. Sims' Northern Armada protected soldiers as they passed beyond the border into Canada and interrupted the North American supply route to Great Britain. Standing alongside Sims was fellow Admiral Hugh Rodman, a veteran of the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars and an individual well-experienced in naval combat. Rodman and Sims recognized that the amplification of the Navy was a work in progress, and not enough time had passed since the enactment of Preparedness to sincerely benefit from the law's advantages. Victory on the open seas against the Royal Navy, for instance, was an absolute pipe dream. The sheer number of British armored cruisers and destroyers outsized that of the U.S. almost 5 to 1. All depended upon a smart strategy.

Admiral Rodman oversaw a secondary operation: one built out of necessity rather than shock-and-awe. On the West Coast of the U.S., fortified naval bases constructed during the Beveridge and Depew presidencies launched a separate fleet of warships and cruisers to protect its Pacific territories and holdings - specifically, its puppet government in the Philippines. Rodman guided the mission throughout, ensuring the safe passage of his navy to the archipelago. The U.S. Pacific Fleet met with a small contingent of aggressive Australian cruisers en-route to Manila, but the U.S. vessels handily defeated them. Following that brief morning of combat and the hasty retreat of the Australian vessels, Rodman's crew safely entered Manila docks. The now-bolstered island brigades were now free to plot their next move. That aspect, one of a sitting tiger in the Philippines, terrified an Entente hyper-focused on the war effort in Europe.

With the summer overrun of Toronto imminent and Rodman's naval contingent muddling the security of Britain's Eastern allies, British commanders had little choice but to abandon a segment of their blockading fleet to reinforce Canada. Elsewise, they risked total capitulation in North America. Britain too called upon its Pacific allies, Japan as well as satellite governments in Australia and New Zealand, to prepare defensive campaigns. John Fisher, British Admiral of the Fleet, originally assumed that Japan could launch a counter-offensive from a presupposed base in British Columbia, but news of the U.S. Pacific advance scuttled such plans. The speed at which the U.S. forces descended upon the Pacific left Japan scrambled. Japanese officials did not wish to dedicate troops to a rag-tag venture in Western Canada if that risked losing control of their ongoing occupation in German-leased Shandong settlements and German Marshall Islands. At the close of August 1915, the United States, having made its rambunctious debut on the global stage, successfully jostled a rather hubristic Entente. In the words of President Roosevelt, "It is futile to speak softy while the world howls. Our lungs may be untested, but will produce a mighty roar."

[Atlas Has Shrugged]

It’d be really interesting to see possible territorial gains!

[Pyro]

It’d be really interesting to see possible territorial gains!

I agree! It'll be a long and windy road, though

[Pyro]

Wallace Morgan's "American Soldiers on the March," September 18th, 1915 - Source: Smithsonian

As the United States dizzied Canada and barreled its way into the Pacific, the British Empire was forced to reckon with the frightening new reality of a new front in the Western Hemisphere. Prime Minister Asquith had tasked a squad of foreign policy professionals to ease tensions with President Roosevelt in the aftermath of the Yellow Rose catastrophe, specifically naming the British Ambassador to the U.S., Cecil S. Rice, responsible if all should fail. Rice was a close personal friend of Theodore Roosevelt for decades, perfectly illustrated when the former served as the latter's best man during his 1886 marriage to Edith Carow. Their bond kept U.S.-U.K. relations afloat despite the destructive outcome of the Morocco ordeal, but it could not deter Roosevelt's eventual decision to declare all-out war. The diplomat did everything possible to decelerate the process and soothe the wailing president, but his breathe was ultimately wasted. Asquith sacked Rice for it, and thereby braced for the sudden stoppage of goods arriving from the West.

Asquith anticipated economic war, and though he did indeed receive that, he was also greeted with news of the American shock offensive. The economic state of United Kingdom slipped into one of destitution over the course of the year. British GDP shrunk by about 3% by 1915, the London Stock Exchange stayed shuttered, and the nation became saddled with increasing loads of debt. Private credit was thoroughly shattered. Domestic production remained on schedule, however, as the country continuously reported greater shares of its industry focusing on munitions. Still, whereas Britain once depended heavily on some measure of trade from the Americas (especially in oil, lumber, and food) the Entente power prayed that local materials, as well as supplies imported from France and Italy, could withstand its war effort. By all accounts, the clock was ticking for the British Empire as a productivity powerhouse, and France fared no better.

Militarily, the status of the European War was abject deadlock. Soldiers on both sides of the conflict sunk deep into abysmal trench warfare along the Western Front with no clear end in sight. Strong defense systems made possible through technological advances at the turn of the century kept the stalemate steady. Neither the Central Powers nor the Entente had the capability to break through enemy lines, with occasional advances only serving to raise the death count. During the late-September Second Battle of Champagne, for instance, French forces worked to penetrate German ground and force a breakthrough. Infantry led by XXXIII Corps Commander Philippe Pétain managed to briefly gain the upper hand, but reinforcements courtesy of German reserves plugged any gaps in their lines and drove back the assault. For their tried-and-failed offensive, the French Army suffered extremely high casualties (commonly numbered at around 145,000).

The Entente, a coalition plagued with tunnel-vision honed in on Europe, severely underestimated the potential of the United States to expand the war. "The Allied leadership," wrote Altmin, "foolishly discarded Theodore Roosevelt's bravado and any early signs of a supposable mobilization. That Old Guard was said to have disbelieved reports which did not fall into their preconceived stereotypes of a plucky, backwater U.S. military. Plenty knew better, and advised accordingly, but they were an overruled minority. General Henri Putz, if the tale is to be believed, guffawed in the face of his subordinates at the thought of the United States as a worthy foe. 'Let us see the Rough Riders gallop through the trenches,' he is said to have remarked. Affable anglophile Sam Hughes was no less guilty of forsaking sensibilities for the benefit of a pat on the back by British high command. The clues were in their midst, if only they cared to look closer." As one may imagine, the war in North America burdened Britain much more so than it did France. Not only did London need worry for their soldiers falling by the thousands in the death spiral of Europe, but now a perilous occupation of lower Canada seemed a genuine possibility. They miscalculated the risk once. They now pledged to never do so again.

Grand Fleet Commander and Admiral John Jellicoe issued the final order to divert ships away from the Blockade of Europe in a tactical decision to aid the Canadian counter march. This, of course, meant partial segmentation of the patrolling fleet. He knew this endangered dictatorial blockade effectiveness, but Jellicoe nonetheless settled on that choice as the best course of action. Portions of the British Grand Fleet sailed out of their reinforced seas in small, chaperoned columns. For Germany, the dumbfounding predictability of the Royal Navy was a surprise, to be sure, but a welcome one. Intervening in Britain's fallback maneuver, German U-boats took flight. The submarine campaign in the English Channel and the Celtic Sea took full advantage of the situation at hand, resulting in the total annihilation of several ships as well as seriously damaging multiple vessels beyond repair.

The Autumn U-Boat Campaign. An obvious ploy in hindsight. Rescuing Canada from a brutish invasion was never in question. Neither was the inevitability of German submarines. The mission undoubtedly necessitated this calculated loss, yet it was just that: Calculated. A touch morbid, perhaps, but scores of men died at sea as a consequence for Jellicoe's gambit. Today we may view this as confirmation of the ironfisted nature of Old World naval command, a relic of a bygone age. Thousands, abiding by their orders, clung to the hope of survival, all the while knowing certain death loomed ahead. Whether it be at the hands of a U-boat operator or an American infantrymen, the reaper was on call. Gallantry or misplaced obedience - you decide.

         George E. Smith, "War is Hell: The Great War", American Review, 2005

By the end of October, the Canadian offensive slowed to a standstill. The arrival of British ships along the Eastern seaboard led to a brief, albeit painful, naval battle betwixt the warring fleets. Admiral Sims conducted as well of a campaign that the outclassed American Navy could hope to accomplish, but the Battle of Cape Breton ended in a stalemate with equal losses apiece. Thereafter, several British divisions (as well as a bundle of returned Canadian veterans and new enlistees eager for revenge) disembarked at Quebec City and raced to join their comrades-in-arms at the Northern Front. Reinforced and reorganized defensive lines on the outskirts of Campbellford, a township mere miles from the strategically advantageous Prince Edward county and the much-coveted metropolis of Kingston, dug in and pushed back hard against the U.S. Army, promptly resulting in a complete deadlock. Eastern Ontario became the chief battleground in Canada for the remainder of the year with supplementary, immobile contests fought on the far side of Lakes Superior and Huron and the westernmost part of the 49th parallel. The Great War had indeed come to North America, bringing with it all associated idiosyncrasies, tactics, and nightmares.

[Snazzrazz Mazzlejazz]

Well, this should be fun.

[Pyro]

The U.S.S. San Diego Led the Cruiser Vanguard and Symbolized U.S. Strength at Sea, 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons

The United States dove headfirst into a war-centric economy as its people worked strenuously to supply the front with the all necessary resources. Production in the latter half of 1915 fixated in totality on the needs of the front over all else. Munitions and food supplies were indispensable for the soldiers in the field, and the federal government ensured that productive authorities of said stock doubled, or tripled, factorial efficiency. Soldiers served on the battlefield while workers served in their factories, and those unable to do either contributed elsewhere. Older Americans unfit to join the military and middle-class families uninterested in joining the assembly lines committed on an individual basis. Some fostered economical "victory gardens" to reduce domestic demand on the nation's food supply. Others cheerfully purchased celebrity-endorsed liberty bonds to assist in U.S. finances. All the intricacies of the war economy, from top to bottom, were laced with a hefty serving of patriotism that hoped to instill in American civilians the sense that the national interest was too their interest. "Abide by your patriotic duty" a common advertisement for war bonds read.

Local and state governments significantly ramped up recruitment efforts as trained men were shipped off to the Northern Front. With the popularity of intervention ever-growing, enlistment offices in well-populated areas filled to the brim with young men eager to fight as well as women ready to serve as military nurses. This phenomenon had an inverse effect on the labor supply, as men joining the front left behind empty positions at their workplaces. These gaps were, in turn, speedily filled with scores of working women ready and willing to take jobs along factorial assembly lines that were typically, exclusively designated for male employees. Women were already a sizeable portion of the total domestic workforce, especially so by the 1910s, but their share increased dramatically in virtually every industry from weapons manufacturing to grain harvesting. Synchronous with this development was a stark, month-by-month drop in unemployment rates that came to epitomize this moment of near-full employment.

Apart from a progressively nationalistic American populace, an overall economy on the rebound rejoiced with the latest news. Government demand for war goods from greatly assisted thousands of businesses as well as umbrella industries like steel and lumber, but now a glistening new prize was finally within the nation's grasp. Late-breaking news of the division of the British blockade opened the doors to Roosevelt's fabled export boom. Indeed, plentiful and somewhat exaggerated reports of apparent holes in the fortification reached U.S. shores before long. Navigating either the North Sea or the English Channel was still a plenty dangerous voyage with British fleets breathing down the necks of most transports, but the columns were not quite as secure as they once were. Due to the reduced and newly porous Northern Patrol, over a dozen commercial vessels (ten of which stemming from the United States) made their way through once-impenetrable waters from September to November, 1915. The brunt of the blockade stayed close to chief German ports along the Wadden Sea, but unsuspecting port towns like Husum in Southern Schleswig became prime game for international trade. When British patrols adjusted formations to compensate, new gaps appeared in at the mouth of the Skagerrak straight, therefore allowing trade into Kiel and Flensburg in Northern Germany.

True profits generated from these early treks were not particularly remarkable by any means, but the simple rebirth of U.S.-German trade unlocked an avenue few believed possible. The British roadblock starved Germany of foodstuffs and other rations for over a year. In that time, the total percentage of imports halved. German children suffered from malnutrition on a scale never before documented, and illnesses began to spread in urban communities. The depravation of staple goods harmed the civilian population both physically and psychologically, but that period waned with the arrival of fresh imports from the U.S. and other countries. The dissipation of food shortages coincided with a gradual depletion of munitions as the tide of imports inflated (Britain's greatest fear realized), and its end result led to refreshed confidence in the war effort in addition to heightened morale among the troops themselves. A similar spirit spread to Prime Minister Carl Zahle of Denmark, who in 1916 answered the plea of U.S. commercial interests to open their port cities for trade goods destined for Germany. Denmark itself pledged neutrality in the war, but its resistance to interfere with the trade restriction vanished with the blockade's impermeable reputation.

For this, President Roosevelt reached record public approval and favorable opinion on the armed conflict met its highest mark. War coverage had been exclusively positive whether it be regarding Europe or the Northern Front (an initiative demanded by the United States Information Council). News media insistent on its optimistic message kept the limelight on victories in Canada long after the advance in Ontario slowed. There was no shortage of coverage when Roosevelt unveiled the completion of five new destroyers on Christmas Eve: a solid victory for U.S. naval power as well as the steel industry. Distilling patriotic imagery and pressing it hard onto the public, the narrative was unmoving, thereby ensuring virtually no dissent apart from the occasional pacifist rally or anarchist agitator. Little news arrived from the Pacific, however, where progress was nonexistent and seafaring forces struggled to keep a lock on the Philippines, but that subject was often relegated to the editorial dustbin.

The United States' operation was proceeding satisfactorily at the close of the year. Roosevelt signed new legislation in the December session of Congress that marginally and temporarily rose the national tax rate on incomes over $100,000. Proceeds from the tax hike were directed squarely to better fund the war, namely, to expand the scope of supplies purchasable by the U.S. government. It also provided for a variety of improvements to existing military bases along the American coastlines and in states bordering Canada. Camp Grayling, a recently constructed National Guard training facility in Grayling, Michigan, received a hefty federal grant in 1916, as did Fort Drum in New York and Camp Perry in Ohio. These funding initiatives were applauded in near unanimity by Congress, as even the strictest Southern conservatives would not allow themselves to appear unpatriotic with an election around the corner.

Confident in the Canadian advance and comforted by overwhelming public approval, Roosevelt began floating to his Cabinet the idea of sending an expeditionary force into the Western Front. Pershing, restless as usual, advocated in favor of the plan and, furthermore, volunteered to lead an auxiliary squadron abroad. Critics like Garfield profusely recommended against it and brought to the president's attention the risk of stretching assets and manpower too thin. "Objectionists" in the Cabinet warned that expanding hostilities was a mighty gambit considering the plausibility for a drawn-out conflict along the Northern Front (and the death it would inevitably bring). The president was persuaded of the need to hold off for the time being, but the cloud of uncertainty hung over his head as the New Year rang in. Optimism and self-assuredness, in the end, can only bring one so far before reality rears its ugly head. Fortunately for Roosevelt, that occurred sooner rather than later.

[Pyro]

The 165th Infantry Regiment in Crowe Bridge, Ontario, January 19th, 1916 - Source: USArmy

When winter reared its head and blanketed the Northern Front in fresh sheets of snow and ice, any slim shot of infantry movement, let alone a meaningful advance, froze in the chilled weather. Reinforced defenses on the part of Canadian troops weaponized the local climate. Americans exerted tremendous effort just to keep up. For the invaders, especially, conditions deteriorated fast. Food remained in fair supply due their nearness to the home front, but little was done to curtail trench-borne disease from taking a foothold. Great War historians have explained in detail that soldiers died more commonly from shell fire than illness, and that is indeed the case. However, ailments like trench fever, often spread via lice, incapacitated regiments to no end. The bitter cold made recovery increasingly difficult, and the shoulder-to-shoulder proximity of some trenches rapidly spread bouts of pneumonia and meningitis.

Commander of the 2nd Canadian Brigade Sir Arthur Currie took charge of the defensive operation upon his return from France. Currie's presence did wonders to restore morale and inspire beaten-down, resisting Canadian battalions to remain vigilant in the face of seemingly unlimited American might. He studiously oversaw the installation of heavy artillery and machine gun posts when under the cover of snowy nights, and retrained his divisions on the lessons learned from his time on the Western Front. Some military analysts speculate that without Currie's arrival, General Carter may have broken through enemy lines and continued the in-land assault. As it was, the Canadian general held off the numerically superior Americans and crumbled their hope of a quick and simple war.

Whether it be on the meatgrinder of a battlefield in eastern Ontario or the freezing offensive locked in-place outside of fiercely defended cities like Winnipeg, leading U.S. strategists had trouble envisioning a silver lining.  Poor logistics plagued Army brigades along the Western part of the offensive, leading to a bungling of epic proportions. An inexcusable number of strategic mishaps came about in this area by the handiwork of a less-than-adept leadership. During the Battle of White Rock, to name one, soldiers of the 5th Division operating under the cover of night opened fire on a residential building believed to have contained a small enemy bunker (field intelligence indicated combatants had entered it day before). Instead, it housed a civilian family of four who screamed in terror as their home was doused in bullets and plundered for non-existent clues. These types of tragic errors sickened Roosevelt and, in his mind, underscored the need to cleanse the officer class. "Start with [5th Division Commander Walton] Walker," he requested of Major General Wood in early 1916, "and work your way down."

U.S. destroyer and dreadnaught construction was proceeding at double-time, but even with additional federal funding and an engorged staff, many of these vessels were not anticipating completion until sometime in 1917 at the absolute soonest. As it stood, Sims' Fleet defended American shores from British and French intrusion, but as previously indicated, they were in no shape to destroy incoming transport convoys from the East and were likewise unable to prevent capitulation in Puerto Rico and Cuba. As troubling as the situation was along the Atlantic, the light dimmed further on the West Coast. British-Canadian ships climbing down from Prince Rupert in British Columbia pummeled Major General Fox Conner's divisions as they repeatedly fought to push inward along the 49th. Not too long ago it seemed plausible that the U.S. could take Vancouver, but now, between an undisputable gap in naval power and overall war experience, the brawling pulled backward almost to Washington State. The time for mass wave tactics was over.

As if a second bullet to the head, disaster soon struck the United States in the Pacific theater. On January 5th, a combined naval force composed of Japanese, Australian, French, and British fleets bested the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a outright and decisive victory for the Entente. Admiral Rodman was purportedly finalizing plans to launch an attack on Entente shipping lanes when he caught wind of the planned bombardment. It was far too late to wire for reinforcements from the continental harbors. Thus, Rodman was forced to make do with what he had at his disposal. Outgunned almost 3-to-1, the Pacific fleet had not a prayer of triumph. Rodman consequently piloted a retreat from the Philippine archipelago at the conclusion of a humiliating loss. Japan planted their flag on the shores of Manila hours later. Months of work went to waste for the U.S., and the Pacific admiral had nothing to show for it apart from several doomed ships, a monumental bill, and a military loss for the ages. This was a low point, a devastating blow, for an America that considered itself invincible.

Per communications from the British Foreign Office to their Far East ally, Japanese forces indicated immense frustration at the idea of conscientiously waiting to invade U.S. held Pacific properties, as trepidation did not much factor into their expansionist military philosophy. For victory to be assured, British Ambassador Conyngham Greene emphasized, the Allies must utilize a combined naval strike. Japan's naval prowess equaled that of the United States, but an overwhelming assault with allied assistance could take down Rodman's legion at a glance. Greene's arithmetic was correct. The semi-independent nation was delivered to the Entente on a silver platter. British military leadership was overjoyed, and the Canadians ecstatic. When news of this striking defeat found its way to the president's ear, an enraged Roosevelt unhesitatingly fired Admiral Rodman, citing gross mismanagement and criminal negligence.

Although Roosevelt was furious with the inability of the United States to hold its Pacific territories, the president's personal documents reveal that he recognized the low chance of victory in the East China Sea. "My sole aim is to help in the successful prosecution of the war," he wrote, "and in this matter I must be as effective and efficient a leader as great men before me. I will be displeased by any defeat, but it will not serve the national interest to fall into sorrow. If we lose a thousand times, we will win ten thousand after." Roosevelt called on the overextended Pacific Navy to return to the West Coast at Port Hueneme for repairs. The fleet must, he figured, be ready at a moment's notice for defense-minded redeployment. The likelihood of Japanese occupation in Hawaii and Alaska or assistance in British Columbia seemed frighteningly real, as if it could rain down at any moment.

The stress of these losses skewed the swell of optimism that appeared to categorize the U.S. in 1915. Exports held out through the winter with occasional disruption by a now-belligerent Northern Patrol, but antagonistic raids and a new wave of British submarine attacks discouraged the recent bump in trade. In virtually all avenues confidence dipped. Public favor of Roosevelt slipped as the public learned of the Rodman's firing: a rare sign of weakness from the executive. Some citizens along the West Coast now overtly feared that the offensive into British Columbia was inverting as the line seemed to fall back into U.S. borders. For the first time (at least apart from socialists and pacifists) a perception arose that involvement in the war was a mistake.

[Pyro]

"Take Up the Sword of Justice" U.S. Propaganda Poster Depicting Yellow Rose Fatalities - Source: LoC

The war in Europe teeter-tottered in 1916 with neither the Entente nor the Central Powers possessing the clear initiative. Italy, a once-neutral country that joined on the side of Great Britain shortly before U.S. entry, directed its ground forces into an offensive along the Isonzo River in Slovenia. Austrian divisions kept the Italian advance largely at bay throughout successive weeks and months. Over 60,000 men in General Cadorna's Italian battalions perished in that operation. Regardless of the stronger manpower capabilities harnessed by Cadorna's divisions, the two sides found themselves sunk deep into trench warfare not unlike mirrored travesties in France and Canada.

This development taking place on the border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy epitomized the trouble with advanced warfare. Battles fought in the trenches could drag on for months at a time, and when all was said and done, they generally resulted in disappointing standstills.

Verdun, a small city on the Meuse river, would soon be known all around the world. In a strategic sense, this blip on the radar actually sat on a rather crucial location. Yet, the French forts enjoyed an uneventful war up to this point. A German offensive would soon change that. They designed a plan of attack deemed their "trial of judgement," which, in theory, concluded in the capture of Verdun as well as its key position along the river. Germans used an interconnected network of railway lines to bring supplies to the battlefield: Everything from howitzers to canned goods. The entire operation was kept under-wraps until the artillery fire rang out on the morning of February 21st. German weaponry burnt the forests to cinders and bombarded defensive fortifications as waves of infantry advanced. French forces under Pétain countered, firing artillery across from the West bank of the Meuse into the plainly visible German lines. By April, 88,000 French soldiers and 80,000 Germans were killed. Another planned shock offensive devolved to a stalemate.

         Brian Steel, Foreign Relations: A Summary of War, Peace, and Everything In-Between, 2015

The ever-shifting tide of war finally presented a bit of encouraging news to the United States as the snow melted and spring arose on the horizon. Once its repairs were completed and new vessels were integrated into its composition, the Pacific Fleet set sail. Admiral Austin M. Knight, then the President of the Naval War College, was granted control of a novel coastal procedure. Stern, authoritative, and an upstanding war tactician, Knight impressed Roosevelt with his offerings and the two soon became close confidants. With its clever utilization of a two-pronged attack featuring torpedo gunboats, the restored fleet was able to outperform British pre-dreadnought battleships and force their retreat (at least for the time being). With the barrage fleet removed from the shores of British Columbia, Major General Conner green-lit an effective counter-offensive. Soon the U.S. pushed its neighboring combatants well beyond the 49th and back toward Cloverdale. In an additional success that was widely attributed to Knight's input, Marines managed to snag an edge in the Great Lakes territories and, thanks to in-land naval superiority, took Thunder Bay and the bulk of central Ontario. Canadian supply lines were now severed down the center of the continent.

A concerned British high command was forced to issue greater and greater portions of their Grand Fleet, as well as the blockade patrollers, to North America. Commander Jellicoe was confident in the belief that even their somewhat outdated Pacific-based navy would be more than enough to eliminate U.S. counterparts along British Columbia, but he worried for the paltry Atlantic fleet and countless reports of efficient naval construction in the states. An acute loss of faith in the Asquith government, spurred in part by his inability to keep the Americas under control as well as the colossal error of assuming U.S. neutrality, carried through to his eventual resignation from office in January of 1916. Asquith was succeeded by Secretary of State David Lloyd George, a figure more in line with the military establishment. The fifty-three-year-old politician, a proud and self-righteous man through and through, assiduously gained sufficient support from both parliamentary Conservatives and anti-Asquith Liberals. Lloyd George promised an unrelenting, driving policy at sea and pledged to eliminate U.S. naval lines before the end of the year. Thereafter, Britain rapidly sunk state funds into dreadnaught construction and unquestioningly complied with Jellicoe's call to send more vessels to the Northern Front.

On the domestic front of the United States, recent gains as outlined above were not nearly comforting enough to console war critics. A new fear had arisen at the calamitous winter defeat in the South China Sea. Few dared to say so aloud, out of respect to the men and women on the front and those family members praying for their safe return, but some pondered whether entering the mess of global war was truly worth the fight. This attitude centered around an overarching worry that the U.S. was ill-equipped to handle a combined discharge of Allied power. Jingoist Americans traditionally held up the Pacific Fleet as a symbol of naval power, but if it could not withstand a joint attack by the Entente (a coalition consistently belittled in U.S. propaganda), then what hope remained of victory? Roosevelt worked to assuage fears to the best of his ability but reports of a Japanese invasion in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands begged to differ. In 1916 with war favorability slipping back down at a steady rate, the president's political opposition was positioned to take the lead.

Worse of all, an accelerating, gruesome death count at the Northern Front drove down voluntary enlistment rates since the start of the year. Patriotism was tempting to the average, glory-seeking adventurer, but stories of a nightmarish frontline made the whole idea much less appealing. Returned soldiers called it "Man's imitation of Hell," and that phrasing circulated faster than trench fever. President Roosevelt knew their chance as success shrunk to invisibility if recruitment drives came up short, and in that frame of mind he requested a brand-new, congressional war initiative. Expounding the triumph of the war economy (an exaggeration) and the bright future for the military after recent wins at the Battle of Thunder Bay and in British Columbia, the president exclaimed the necessity of increasing total enlistees. It was then that Roosevelt implored passage of a full conscription measure. He attempted crafting his message in tune with the balancing act required of him, both proclaiming that victory was all but assured whilst expressing a degree of urgency if recruitment failed.

War Secretary Crowell had floated the idea to the president at the start of the war, and again when the number of service volunteers dwindled in January. Congress was reluctant to accept the proposal, though the administration expected this. As such, Crowell spoke with the USIC leadership to promote and better guide the bill through the legislature, invoking their plea that failure to pass the bill meant likely defeat. They proposed registering and enlisting all men between the ages of 18 and 45, with the first wave to be called for action before the end of summer. For every volunteer in the U.S. Army, he estimated, the military could stand to gain the same in triplicate with conscription. Democratic opposition kept an easy passage from taking place, but a collective desire to see the war effort through with the expansion of military personnel made it difficult to stand against the measure. Still, the votes were not yet there, and the measure thusly stalled out.

"Discussions with Pershing and Knight assured the president that the national strategy was working," wrote Ackerman. "The 49th Parallel would be protected and the British blockade eliminated. Apart from trench-warfare in eastern Ontario, all was going surprisingly well. Even if the public could not see or understand it just yet, they mollified Roosevelt of his fondest wish: to lead the United States to wholesale fame on a global scale. The thousands of lives lost thus far must not die in vain. Roosevelt oversaw the admittance of the country to an unknown frontier, and damned if he would allow some wishy-washy Democrat from meddling in that process." Four days following the introduction of the conscription bill to Congress, President Roosevelt let it be known throughout the world that he would seek an extended period of rule for the sake of war supervision. He announced, in no uncertain terms, an intent to run for a third term as president.