Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited

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Rogers Cartoon Depicting Hearst Struggling with the Democratic Party, June 2nd, 1909 - Source: HarpWeek

The Hearst Administration considered the passage of the Hammond Tariff a tremendous success and, as previous inferred, it was lauded by the president as a sign of things to come. With the tariff question supposedly settled, the impatient leader instructed his allies in Congress seek progress in the fields he cared most for. Judging by Hearst’s campaign and inaugural speech, matters of labor disputes and anti-trust measures were deemed significant, but he seemed far more intent on reforming the political system itself. As thus, on May 6th, shortly following its passage of the tariff, the House leadership brought forth an ambitious legislative package to the floor collectively dubbed the “Civic Liability” bills.

Hearst wrote to Congress and described in-depth his view that legislation promoting purer republicanism necessitated urgent action. His take on a Square Deal-style program held several monumental proposals that sought to totally change the trajectory of American democracy, political campaigning, and transparency. "In the fight against corporate corruption," he wrote, "it is pivotal we wrest the conduct of public affairs from the hands of selfish interests, political tricksters, and corrupt bosses. The government must serve the people and the people alone, and our duty is to guarantee this promise. I ask of Congress to pass legislation centered at expelling the black cloud of malfeasance from atop Washington."

Out of every item listed in Hearst's Civic Liability plan, perhaps the most contentious and consequential was a stipulation mandating federal oversight of all electoral donations. The idea essentially mirrored Hearst’s push as governor to prohibit corporate contributions to campaign expenses. This included a Cabinet-level board within the Department of Justice to monitor donations, guidelines for how all federal candidates must report their campaign earnings, and strict limitations for how much an individual or corporation could donate to a single candidate or organization. Its text detailed a method of enforcement, cited disclosure requirements, and did not exempt state primary elections. In short, it was meant to tackle corporate influence in the democratic process and provide for greater transparency.

The second component to Civic Liability included noteworthy proposals relating to electoral procedure on the federal and state level. One piece of the puzzle had been a resolution calling for all major parties to conduct public primaries for their political candidates for office: demanding it as a prerequisite for all elected officials to be viewed as legitimate. Hearst's sweeping legislative package also contained an outline to secure the rights of Americans to invoke a recall vote for all officeholders and, furthermore, demand referendum votes on statewide issues. None of these ideas had a modicum of support in Congress, and the latter two fell into a legal grey area concerning their Constitutionality. From the reveal of the recall plan, for instance, legal publications began questioning whether the Supreme Court would be forced to involve itself in settling the rights of voters to impose qualifications on federal officials.

Speaker Sulzer read aloud Hearst's letter to the legislature. Shouting over a mixed reception, he preceded to direct the rather uninterested House delegation to support these initiatives they otherwise opposed. The House leader echoed the president's position and urged the speedy adoption of the proposals. Needless to say, Congress was wholly unhappy with the direction President Hearst was plowing ahead with.

House Republicans were bewildered by it all. They fully anticipated labor issues to come at the forefront, and the GOP had already worked out a defense of the status quo in that regard. Few expected the president to come forward with a plan to alter huge portions of the entire electoral system and allow citizens to recall anyone at will. Prim and proper (Thomas) Butler fastened in for the ride and headed the resistance effort as he had done during the tariff debates. What frankly surprised the minority leader, who, by all accounts, counted himself out as an ineffective commander of legislative debate, was the sudden breakdown of the Sulzer Coalition and the expansion of anti-administration sentiment.

        Jay R. Morgan, The American Elephant: A Study of the Republican Party , 1980

Reaction was swift and unforgiving, and proved far more volatile than anything seen in Congress in contemporaneous memory. What began as criticism of the program as a "jumbled mess of Unconstitutional hogwash," colorfully described as such by Representative Randell, quickly devolved into broader critiques of the Hearst Administration and the president's misunderstanding of the political system. As Ways and Means Committee Chairman Oscar W. Underwood (D-AL) remarked during congressional debate, "The President of the United States does not write the law, nor can he override the Constitution. The federal government is not one of his newspapers to be ordered around." Progressive Charles H. Burke (P-SD), a member of that delegation who broke with the Democratic-Progressive coalition, flatly stated his reasoning for opposition. "He has no mandate."

Debate escalated into more of an uproar that Sulzer painstakingly put down time and time again. Detractors from the Democratic and Progressive aisles joined a unified GOP resistance and significantly damaged the chances of passing even one segment of the Civic Liability program. During discussions pertaining to the Keliher Bill, the (aforementioned) campaign funding reform measure named for co-author Representative John A. Keliher (D-MA), machine-beloved and corporate-friendly politicians held nothing back in verbally beating the supporters into submission. The idea that the federal government would monitor and discredit certain types of campaign funds especially did not sit well with conservative Southern Democrats. "The South will riot if Washington tries to tell us how to run our campaigns!" one congressman was heard shouting on the floor.

Hearst fought back, decrying hostile Democrats as "dimwitted" and "mindless servants of the trusts." He, as well as the Hearst press, keenly directed attention to Representative Underwood, deeming the conservative Alabaman a, "Plutocratic Pied Piper, attracting the very worst of Democracy." The Journal printed a series of articles throughout 1909 and 1910 critiquing the motives of those opposed to the Keliher Bill, digging into their histories and unearthing connections to state machines and corporate interests. If none were found, the editor simply fabricated an element to the story to press the point. This occurred so frequently, and singled-out so many adversaries of Hearst's program, that it drove former President Roosevelt to comment on the affair. As he penned in a correspondence with Taft, "If Hearst succeeds in this devilish yellow reform, and does so with intimidation and ruthlessness, I fear for the future of our country and our democracy."

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Internal View of the House of Representatives during the Keliher Bill Vote, August 5th, 1909 - Source: Wiki Commons

By July of 1909, the House of Representatives had debated and passed nearly two dozen amendments to the Keliher Bill. The legislature gutted key components to the legislation, removing controversial portions relating to the regulation of expenses raised for primary bouts and the opening of loopholes in the type of funding that was required to be reported to federal officials. Speaker Sulzer and the bulk of the Progressive and Democratic delegations fought against altering the bill, yet in successive slim votes, these amendments passed to whittle the measure down to its bare bones. Now expertly edited to lessen the effectiveness of enforcing campaign contribution fairness, it appeared to the president and his base that Congress had torn apart the first meaningful attempt at sweeping campaign reform in a generation.

Sulzer articulated to the president his absolute certainty that the vote remained promising, citing numerous, encouraging meetings with fellow congressmen leery, albeit open, of the concept of governmental transparency. He assuaged Hearst's fears over the amendment procedure and upheld the notion that it was the natural course of Congress to make the bill more appetizing to political moderates. Resisting an all-or-nothing approach was fundamental to dismantling cries of tyranny from the anti-Hearst Republicans, and compromising was necessary if the administration hoped to defeat growing Democratic opposition in the Senate to Hearst's agenda. In a worrying development, Senator Bailey forcefully rallied against the Keliher Bill since the introduction of the Civic Liability program. In order to have any chance at reforming the system, Sulzer implored, the president needed to concede the rigidity of his program.

As the day drew nearer when the House prepared to call for a final vote on Keliher, President Hearst learned from his senatorial allies that the steadily rising Bailey opposition now attracted 14 Democrats in total. Speculating ahead to a vote in the upper chamber, Senator Owen concluded that if every Progressive and all remaining Democrats voted approvingly on the bill, the majority would constitute a frighteningly perilous 49 votes (the slimmest possible margin for passage). In other words, if the rumors held, Bailey's reactionary movement would need to stall completely for Hearst to come out on top. That did not sit well with those House Democrats wary of alienating their corporate donors and ties to state machines, and it absolutely jeopardized the entire operation.

Representative Webb assured Hearst that they had enough support to pass the measure, and proceeding to a final vote was the correct position. According to congressional biographer Jason Sullivan, "Webb put his position and career on the line, guaranteeing an outcome that could soften senatorial opposition and present the president with a serious accomplishment to add to his legacy. The Hammond Tariff, having been only partially birthed by the administration, was more so viewed as a Democratic victory - not a Hearst victory. Lowering the tariff was a subject with which nearly every Democrat concurred. Securing a campaign promise was far more important to the leader who made his political fortune through positive press coverage."

At zero hour, following Sulzer's final consultation with Webb, the final tally commenced. Democratic spirits were high as members of the 61st House cast their votes. However, the mood abruptly darkened as the entire Alabama delegation voted against the Keliher bill. 9 Democratic Nay votes quickly became 13, then 17. Several Midwestern Democrats submitted abstentions, including Illinois Representatives James T. McDermott (D-IL), Henry T. Rainey (D-IL), and Martin Foster (D-IL). As it turned out, Webb's information was not entirely accurate. This miscalculation by the leadership, perhaps a simple tallying error or an unanticipated change-of-heart by a select few Democrats, cost the administration dearly. The Keliher Bill was defeated, 185-205-7, humiliating Edwin Webb, William Sulzer, and, more so than anyone, President Hearst.

As the president well knew, the failed vote relegated not only the rather milquetoast reform bill to the scrap heap, but too the ambitious Civic Liability program. Any hope of reconciliation was finished. Regardless of months of debate and endless amendments, the bill failed miserably. Hearst, never one to abandon a grudge, tackled the issue head-on. He released a blistering criticism of Congress upon the end of its first session on August 5th, centering his rage on disloyal Democrats and disruptive Republicans alike. Any anger that had been repressed by Sulzer and Webb exploded to the front-page of the Hearst papers. It was as if he shifted back into a campaign mode, enlightening his base with a thundering sermon.

According to American principle and practice, the public is the ruler of the State. I fear that may no longer be the case. The political machines have taken complete control over the government of the United States. Progress is impossible under these conditions. [...] Congress has rejected the people's demand to repudiate the trusts and the corrupt corporations. We asked of Congress to rebuke corrupting influence, to adhere to the doctrine of the Republic, and that deliberative body has dishonorably turned away. Therefore, as promised, I will see to it that the Justice Department arranges for the indictment, prosecution, and conviction of the bosses who stand in our way. They will be imprisoned, and our nation will be restored.

         William R. Hearst, "A Response to Congress", New York Journal, August 15th, 1909

As Hearst raised the stakes in the fight for his vision of a purer democracy and his congressional allies attempted to restart negotiations pertaining to campaign finance reform, some Democrats considered breaking from Sulzer's leadership and demanding a new speaker election be held. Others, including Progressive moderates, hoped to sew up the wounds and build toward a compromise in order to forestall a midterm backlash. In the midst of the post-session turmoil and directly subsequent to the president's printed rebuttal, a report was released by The New York Times that sent the Hearst Administration into a frenzy.

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Headquarters of Tammany Hall on East 14th Street, c. 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XVI: Crimes Against the People: The Manhattan Scandal

On September 2nd, 1909, an editorial was printed in that morning's issue of The New York Times containing a rather revealing exposé of the William R. Hearst Campaign. The story was published by an anonymous author, a man purportedly close to the central organizing machine of the presidential candidate. Lettered beside the editorial was an emboldened statement warning the reader that the allegations contained in the text could not be substantiated. Exploring several facets of the Hearst Campaign, the piece covered one individual's personal experience from Hearst's gubernatorial campaign, to the Democratic National Convention, and through the general election. What had caught the public's eye and generated the most controversy had been a curious section devoted to the campaign's complex New York State operation.

According to the author, the legendary and rather infamous Society in St. Tammany functioned as a mantelpiece of fraudulent activity for the benefit of the Democratic Party and then-Governor Hearst. Tammany Hall had lone-since played a role in commanding Democratic Party politics in New York and symbolizing the textbook example of a "political machine." At about the turn of the century, however, it had gone through a marked transformation of public perception. Tammany was previously known as a mighty, exploitative force under the leadership of "Grand Sachems" William M. Tweed in the 1860s and Richard Croker in the 1880s and 90s, but the political machine had undergone a significant facelift. Its Bryan-inspired leaders hoped to renovate the institution's poor reputation by implementing progressive reforms and uplifting the five boroughs. Charles Francis Murphy maintained leadership of Tammany Hall in this period, and he nourished a cozy relationship with Hearst upon the latter's ascension to the Governor's Mansion in 1906.

Murphy looked to scrub clean the pressure group of any remnants of Croker's minions and revitalize Democracy in the Empire State. He seemed to accomplish just that by the early 1900s, with most local publications acknowledging Tammany's newfound respectability. Boss Murphy, albeit initially suspicious of his intentions and vocally preferring a more level-headed nominee in the 1906 gubernatorial race, did come around to support Hearst against Hughes. The new governor introduced to the Democratic boss his comrades-in-arms, including Joseph Willicombe, Clarence J. Shearn, and Lewis S. Chanler, Hearst's personal secretary, attorney, and lieutenant governor respectively. Shearn, in particular, worked closely with Murphy in finessing borough governments to acquiesce to Governor Hearst's reformist policies, and, as later noted in the Times piece, the Grand Sachem began walking back his pledge to purify the halls of East 14th Street.

The anonymous writer alleged that in the weeks leading up to the election, as Hearst campaigned vigorously in California, Charles Murphy and state party Chairman Norman Mack consciously selected "men they trusted and confided in" to monitor polling places and volunteer to count votes on Election Day. These individuals, named in the article as "Tammany Rats," signed up as either independents or members of an opposing political party in order to present a guise of customary non-partisanship. The author asserted that Brooklyn Boss Patrick McCarren and Bronx President Louis Haffen played central roles in their boroughs' operation to fulfill this task, apparently made evident with Democratic returns far outpacing historical trends. Shearn was allegedly involved, as were Chanler, Willicombe, and perhaps Hearst himself. "The conspiracy to commit city-wide voter fraud," read the article, "spread far and wide, with all of its tentacles originating from Tammany Hall and the Hearst Campaign." If true, these voting irregularities may have flipped the state of New York (won by Hearst by a mere 20,000 votes).

This tale validated the assorted claims of voter fraud initially asserted by Republicans at the time of the final electoral count. Back when the results were first announced, a slew of Republicans and Progressives came forward with accusations of vote-buying in New York City. Roosevelt, at the time, refused to contest these results, likely considering the controversy a side effect of the Popular Vote loss. Now, as new evidence came to light, those who cried foul back in November of 1908 were seemingly justified. At a time when the Republican Party was at its lowest point in a generation, the Times story validated their claims and significantly bolstered their image.

For the most part, Democrats on the national stage ignored the article. It was written by an anonymous source, with no tangible evidence to back up any of the accusations. Even Hearst's most vicious opponents in Congress had little interest in playing ball with a baseless editorial featurette. "It's unsubstantiated," stated Representative Underwood. "If further information is uncovered, my office will request a detailed analysis." President Hearst, meanwhile, laughed off the story as irrelevant filth and lambasted its author as cowardly for refusing to come forward with his or her identity. He stopped short of criticizing the newspaper itself, recognizing the danger and frank foolishness of targeting a fellow newspaper chain, but he did hint his disfavor with the story for its unsubstantiated nature.

The splash of that first article did not appear to ripple. In the hay-day of yellow journalism it was not uncommon for sensationalized or fabricated stories to pop into the public consciousness. Politicians were naturally the easiest targets. Only the most adventurous Republicans declared the anonymous editorial worthy of increased investigation, and even they were mostly disregarded by the congressional press corp. [...] When the second and third letters were published, initially thought to be from the same author, it gave more credence to the allegations. The affair did not bode well for Hearst, and it bode worse for a post-Croker Tammany organization looking to restore its image.

         Robert Espejo, Breaking News: The Role of Journalism in Washington, 2003

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Treasury Secretary Louis F. Haffen, c. 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

House Republicans claimed outrage at the release of the third consecutive Times article, demanding Congress open an investigation into the matter without delay. Acting in unison, members of the GOP named the successive articles as legitimate and called upon Speaker Sulzer to adhere to their plea. Representative Frank D. Currier (R-NH), the typically meek and soft-spoken House Republican Conference Chairman, broke decorum to demand the very same. He verbally assaulted the Democratic leader for hindering a bipartisan vote to adequately examine the Manhattan Scandal, and for this was loudly heckled by his pro-Hearst colleagues "How are we meant to legislate, Currier was later recorded pondering, "when we have this shadow darkening the halls of Congress?"

Senator Fairbanks, effectively the chief Senate Republican ringleader in the 61st Congress, concurred with the House minority delegation and likewise called upon the Democratic Party to thoroughly inspect the affair. Republicans generally rallied behind this motif from late 1909 onward as flashes of evidence began building up. They cited the initial editorials in the early days of the kerfuffle, but soon adopted the words of former New York Mayor Seth Low who expressed his own feeling that Tammany had resorted to its old tricks. "Tammany Hall and the New York State Democratic Party are one in the same," Low argued. ”They are and always have been a criminal enterprise. I believe an investigation will reveal this to be the case, which is why they oppose it.” Progressives similarly sought to learn the truth of the controversy. As it became evident that nothing further could be done legislatively to promote their goals, an overwhelming majority of Columbians in both the House and Senate stood beside the Republicans in their demands for federal insight.

Sulzer refused to budge. Flatly refusing to proceed with such an investigation, he uncompromisingly blocked any motion related to the scandal. The bulk of House Democrats reluctantly agreed with their leader, again finding it unsuitable to investigate an unverifiable state matter. The consistent rallying cry from fierce pro-Hearst defenders in the House was to restate the president's own words: Insofar as the original author refuses to come forward, their material is not credible. Some Democrats, Underwood among them, broke from the pack and requested written testimony from Governor Chanler, exiting Mayor Ed Shepard, and leaders of the five boroughs. Unwilling to associate themselves with a political faction teetering on the brink of obscurity, these conservatives implored all parties be cooperative in order to prove their innocence.

Simultaneously, as anti-Hearst forces converged in Congress during its second session, a new element was introduced. John J. Baker, a former staffer to the municipal administration of Mayor Shepard, personally attested to his knowledge of fraudulent activities in a statement he signed and submitted to Harper's Weekly. He reinforced much of the original letter's allegations and confirmed the use DNC intimidation tactics to favor Hearst's nomination. In addition to this, Baker seconded the notion that Willicombe, Shearn, and Chanler each had their "unkempt paws tied up at the mayor's office." The staffer, although he did not expand upon the original author's assertions regarding fraudulent voting practices in the presidential election, singled-out Louis Haffen as the party most likely to pursue such a method. "[Haffen] coerced state delegates into voting Hearst at the convention. For this he was gifted power over our nation's finances. [...] Who is to say he did repeat that nefarious task at Bronx precincts?"

With the congressional midterm in sight, President Hearst tried to alter the prevailing narrative.  Publicly, Hearst continued to brush off the incessant negativity laid at his campaign's feet. Privately, he issued to his media empire an order to print headlines critical of prominent Republicans and anti-Hearst Democrats. If he could succeed in demoralizing the opposition, Hearst conspired, then perhaps the ongoing scandal would wither away from the public psyche. However, to his detriment, the Californian's strategy ultimately failed in putting a cork in the controversy, and Congress proceeded unabated. By the summer of 1910, the Senate voted unanimously in favor of a resolution creating an investigatory committee: The first official act that legislative body passed in its second session.

The Hearst Administration, backed into a corner, reacted intuitively. Attorney General Silas Holcomb followed a directive from the president to launch an internal investigation into the ordeal. Explaining to the White House press, in no uncertain terms, that the resources of his department would respond appropriately, Holcomb remarked, "We will take the proper steps to study the case in question and determine whether any illegal, unethical, or improper activities were engaged in by any persons, acting either individually or in combination with others, in the presidential election and preceding events. Once the facts are made clear, the Justice Department shall recommend specific action be taken." Needless to say, this pronouncement recognized the gravity of the situation and highlighted the president's retreat on the topic.

With polling appearing bleak and sensing the tide turning against the administration, President Hearst took one final precaution to potentially brighten the outlook. On September 6th, 1910, Treasury Sectreary Haffen resigned. Since the reveal of his part as a central figure in the electoral scene leading up to the election, Haffen was unable to effectively manage the Treasury Department nor serve to benefit the Democratic agenda. The Bronxite disappointingly accepted Hearst's order to resign with few words said between the two. Is it important to note, as offered by historian R. Edward Taylor, "Haffen was removed from the Cabinet because he became a liability for Bill Hearst. It had nothing to do with Haffen's possible criminal activity nor his role in the Manhattan Scandal, but artlessly because the Treasury head was politically unpopular. Hearst very clearly believed that eliminating the most blatant fixture of corruption in his administration would shift the course of public favorability and avert political disaster. Of course, it did no such thing."

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1910 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Democratic: 43 (-6)
Republican: 34 (+1)
Progressive: 19 (+5)

House
Republican: 148 (+33)
Democratic: 136 (-46)
Progressive: 101 (+9)
Socialist: 6 (+3)
Independent: 2 (+1)

  Senate Leadership

Senate President James 'Champ' Clark (D-MO)
President pro tempore Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA)
Caucus Chairman Joseph W. Bailey (D-TX)
Conference Chairman Shelby M. Cullom (R-IL)
Conference Chairman Robert La Follette (P-WI)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Thomas S. Butler (R-PA)
Minority Leader William Sulzer (D-NY)
Minority Leader Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader John C. Chase (S-NY)

A staple takeaway from the 1910 congressional and gubernatorial elections was unquestioning frustration with President Hearst. Even if a majority of the population possibly concurred with the need for governmental reform and new methods to bring about transparency and direct democracy, compounding elements presented to the public over the course of the prior two years revealed the two-face essence of a demagogue presidency. Policy was not a central component to these elections. These midterm contests represented a national referendum on President Hearst and the direction of the country.

Disunified Democrats succumbed to swiftly recovering Republicans and powerfully perceptive Progressives. The opposition skillfully took advantage of national division and managed to effortlessly trounce the party of the president. The 61st House, especially, with its noted Democratic leadership, was eyed as a chief obstacle to uncovering the truth of the Manhattan Scandal. Speaker Sulzer needed to be removed from his position to ensure an investigation could be created, and so Democrats naturally suffered across-the-board. In a dramatic flip to the 1908 results, nearly every freshman Democrat elected that year (mostly Northern and Midwestern-based) lost to challengers from the Republican Party. Sulzer squandered his tenuous majority coalition and forfeited the speakership back to Butler for the 62nd Congress, as Progressive representatives overwhelmingly voted for the more moderate Republican.

Republican senatorial incumbents fared far better than their counterparts two years earlier. For every Republican-held seat that swapped to the Progressive Party, the Republicans gained a seat challenging an incumbent Democrat, therefore concluding in a +1 end-result. A larger-than-anticipated number of Democratic senators found themselves lost in the anti-Hearst tide, including the once-popular Attorney General George Gray and Confederate Brigadier General Francis Cockrell (D-MO). Gray's successor was none other than septuagenarian Henry A. du Pont, the exiled Delawarean businessman and former arch-conservative senator. Du Pont effectively purchased his way to the GOP nomination, and the lack of a genuine Progressive challenger gave Du Pont the victory on a silver platter. In 1906, Du Pont could only manage 30% of the state vote. In 1910, through tying Gray together with a vast Tammany conspiracy by the Democratic Party to corrupt the voting process, he won 52%.

Senator Franklin P. Flint, the sitting Republican incumbent from California, opted to retire in 1911 instead of running for a second complete term. In this period, following Knox's conscious decision to back off campaigning along the West Coast, the Californian Republican Party operated as a shell of its former self. Most state offices were run by either Progressives or Democrats by 1910, leaving the panicked Senator Flint and bankrupt Governor James Gillett as the last of a generation of GOP officeholders in the Golden State. With Democrats struggling to move past the emerging presidential controversy, Progressives sailed to the open seats. John D. Works (P-CA), a former California justice and Los Angeles City Councilman, handily won the open Senate seat. For the gubernatorial race, Roosevelt-ally Hiram Johnson took the crown in a landslide.

In Nevada, Senator George S. Nixon (R-NV) was overwhelmingly favored to win re-election. As Nixon did not identify or associate himself with the Old Guard of the Republican Party, his record remained relatively spotless. He also proved his moderate nature by voting in favor of the Hammond Bill despite party-wide opposition. As such, his youthful and rather inexperienced Democratic challenger, Key Pittman, did not possess much of a chance to topple the incumbent. One facet of this race that raised some eyebrows had been the stellar candidacy of Socialist Jud Harris for Nixon's seat. Harris gained a significant audience throughout the Silver State who relished in the activist's demand for a minimum working wage and an eight-hour day. More Nevadans voted Socialist in 1910 than in any year prior, and although Harris was ultimately unsuccessful in that race, he managed to capture an unprecedented 21% of the vote (compared with Pittman's 30% and Nixon's 49%) and likely boosted fellow union activist and labor attorney George Conrad (S-NV) in narrowly overtaking Representative George A. Bartlett (D-NV) for the state's lone, at-large House seat.

During what would have been an otherwise uneventful election, Senator Andrew L. Harris (R-OH) thrust the political landscape of his state into an uproar with an announcement that he would retire at the end of his term. Harris was thought to be a no-brainer for re-election, encompassing a moderate streak in the GOP with enough support from progressives to guarantee an additional term. Now, with the race open for all entrants, the parties scrambled to draft serious contenders suited for the job. The Ohio Republican Party, privately thrilled with Harris' stepping down, promoted conservative, McKinley-endorsed Assemblyman Harry M. Daugherty. Democrats chose Governor Judson Harmon's (D-OH) second-in-command, anti-corruption advocate Atlee Pomerene. Lastly, the Progressives designated President Roosevelt's Interior Secretary, James R. Garfield. This three-way race proved incredibly vitriolic, and it ended in an exceptionally slim win for the Progressive nominee. State officials recounted the votes twice, yet the result held. Garfield won by 1,013 votes over Daugherty.

Regarding gubernatorial elections, the two contests most frequently cited by historians as politically significant were those in Ohio and New Jersey. In the former state, sitting Governor Harmon fought to retain his seat in power against stark odds courtesy of the national environment. Harmon was no progressive, and in fact actively rallied against Garfield's senatorial run as a "vanity mission" aimed at crumbling Wall Street for personal benefit. It would be foolish to assume that the state Democrats did not stand by the incumbent governor for lack of timely political instincts, however. Governor Harmon locked up the Democratic nomination (thereby eliminating the prospect of a unified Progressive-Democratic ticket), and went on to lose to the dignified, well-spoken former Lieutenant Governor Warren G. Harding (R-OH). Simultaneously, in one of the only net gains for the Democratic Party in 1910, social conservative Princeton University President Thomas Woodrow Wilson defeated the opposing candidates to secure the uninterrupted state-wide control of New Jersey by the Democratic Party. Wilson and Harding were each thought of as potential candidates for national office, and, along with Hiram Johnson in California, this freshmen class would play an essential role in future events.

Senators Elected in 1910 (Class 1)

*John H. Bankhead (D-AL): Democratic Hold, 90%
Henry F. Ashurst (D-AZ): Democratic Hold, 55%
John D. Works (P-CA): Progressive Gain, 57%
George P. McLean (R-CT): Republican Hold, 66%
Henry A. du Pont (R-DE): Republican Gain, 52%
James Taliaferro (D-FL): Democratic Hold, 83%
James A. Hemenway (R-IN): Republican Hold, 51%
*John R. Thornton (D-LA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Eugene Hale (R-ME): Republican Hold, 74%
Charles J. Bonaparte (P-MD): Progressive Hold, 46%
Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA): Republican Hold, 73%
Roy O. Woodruff (P-MI): Progressive Gain, 44%
Moses E. Clapp (R-MN): Republican Hold, 49%
James K. Vardaman (D-MS): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
*LeRoy Percy (D-MS): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
John C. McKinley (R-MO): Republican Gain, 50%
Charles N. Pray (R-MT): Republican Gain, 48%
Chester H. Aldrich (P-NE): Progressive Gain, 49%
George S. Nixon (R-NV): Republican Hold, 49%
Mahlon R. Pitney (P-NJ): Progressive Gain, 48%
Thomas B. Caltron (R-NM): Republican Gain, 50%
George B. McClellan, Jr. (D-NY): Democratic Hold, 46%
Porter J. McCumber (R-ND): Republican Hold, 46%
James R. Garfield (P-OH): Progressive Gain, 43%
Philander C. Knox (R-PA): Republican Hold, 59%
Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI): Republican Hold, 64%
Luke Lea (D-TN): Democratic Hold, 52%
Charles Allen Culberson (D-TX): Democratic Hold, 80%
George Sutherland (R-UT): Republican Hold, 70%
Carroll S. Page (R-VT): Republican Hold, 68%
John W. Daniel (D-VA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Miles Poindexter (P-WA): Progressive Gain, 53%
Nathan B. Scott (R-WV): Republican Gain, 53%
*Dave Elkins (R-WV): Republican Hold, 50%
Robert M. La Follette (P-WI): Progressive Hold, 59%
Clarence D. Clark (R-WY): Republican Hold, 55%

*Special Election

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A Consumer Dreams of Trusts Being Imprisoned, March 8th, 1910 - Source: Wiki Commons

The results of the 1910 elections quite clearly demonstrated a desire from the American voting public to place a check on the Hearst Administration and more thoroughly explore the finer details of the Manhattan Scandal. Given the go-ahead in a spree of sweeping victories, the more stridently anti-Hearst Congress prepared to delve head-first into the investigatory stage and tackle the affair on all fronts. Thomas Butler, now returned to his role as Speaker of the House, released a statement regarding his legislative priorities in the next session. As he wrote, "We will take immediate action in uncovering the precise chain of events which transpired, and the identity of all parties involved."

Congress met on April 4th, 1911. True to his word, Speaker Butler called for a resolution that constructed a supporting House committee in conjunction with the ongoing counterpart in the Senate. This basically allowed for an expanded team of investigators whilst granting the Senate additional time to call for hearings. That resolution passed on a partisan basis, with only one-third of House Democrats voting in the affirmative. Every Progressive, Republican, and Socialist representative voted for passage. Some Democrats implored the legislature to wait for the results of the Justice Department's evaluation, yet faithlessness in the administration's ability to provide an impartial view killed that plea in its crib.

Meanwhile, the Senate reconvened and its special committee returned to a normal schedule. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Augustus Bacon of Georgia led the investigation, coupled with the ranking minority member, Senator Clarence D. Clark (R-WY). Bacon and Clark had yet to learn of any specific instances of wrongdoing in the final months of the last congressional session, but they held firm that a continued, lengthy inquiry would inevitably result in new evidence. The committee privately called forth witnesses related to the allegations on a regular basis. These testimonies were recorded and the names of those interviewed were eventually made public, but that did not occur during the investigatory procedure itself. Still, it was rather obvious who would be called to testify: Louis Haffen, Patrick McCarren, and Charles Murphy.

During this time, the nation reached an eerie turning point where Hearst made very few public appearances and cancelled the bulk of his regular engagements with the press. The president no longer maintained his larger-than-life populist persona out of a creeping fear of ineffectiveness and uselessness. He reportedly met with his Cabinet only once in the period between the midterm elections in November of 1910 and the first public announcements from the U.S. Senate committee over one year later. Furthermore, he scantly penned any personal diary entries, aside from the infrequent note of irritation with Congress and his feeling of betrayal by the Democratic Party.

His policy objectives dried up and turned to dust, Hearst totally withdrew from the presidency altogether. He allowed (Secretaries) Lentz and Garner to settle state matters without personal consultation, and A.G. Holcomb was treated as a traitor in his midst. In this time, the Justice Department notably failed to address a novel crop of trusts forming under its nose. Through the utilization of loopholes in contemporaneous statute, these companies evaded prosecution and came to supplant their more blatantly monopolistic predecessors. Those like Eastern American Steel Corp. and Dallas Steel Corp. avoided federal searchlights by joining in a legal partnership without outright consolidating. Both of the above were managed by men working for J.P. Morgan.

         John S. Gardner, The Exiled President, 1996

Insofar as congressional progress unrelated to the investigations was concerned, the single measure which managed to pass through both legislative houses was a benign expansion to the 1904 trade deal with the German Empire. Nothing passed to fight the ghoulish threat of trust-owning robber barons, to improve the conditions of industrial workers in American cities, nor to reform voting interstate trade practices whatsoever. Each of these issues played second fiddle to the overarching narrative of a scandal at Tammany Hall. "Borrowing Marx's term, noted Ackerman, "the spectacle shrouded a genuine push for reform at the federal level. Historians now include Hearst's presidency in the Progressive Era of the United States, but it was far more regressive in practice than many of the Gilded Age administrations."

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Attorney General Silas Holcomb (Gubernatorial Portrait Pictured) Faced Accusations of Mismanagement in his Term - Source: FindAGrave

Advancing full steam ahead, the Senate Judiciary Committee pressed on with its investigatory mission. Supplemented with their partner council in the House, the officials in charge of the truth-finding objective remained resolute. All eyes were centered on this story: a controversy some journalists christened the most captivating political scandal in modern American history.

Much of the country waited on pins and needles at the precipice of a theoretical revelation. Some voters in New York fretted over the future of electoral security in their home districts while others simply hoped the findings would shed light on the corruptible nature of Tammany Hall. "Shut it down, one Times opinion piece on the topic read, referring to Tammany Hall. "Us Republicans in New York pray for federal observation to definitively remove fraud as a potential threat to the integrity of our elections." Another proclaimed, "The Tammany-Hearst machine has soiled Democracy for a generation. The president ought to resign and leave governing to men of respectability." Such editorials found an eager audience as Americans (chiefly those in the middle and upper classes) looked to find the latest political gossip. Ironically enough, it seemed the yellow journalism that Hearst perfected and utilized to grasp the presidency would play a role in his downfall.

At last, the senatorial committee released a notice declaring its work accomplished. Senator Bacon unveiled the team's findings on December 3rd, 1911, in a widely circulated address. He explained that the Senate's investigatory procedure was confined to very narrow parameters based on the testimonial evidence supplied by several witnesses. They did not explore any "superfluous" allegations concerning activities unrelated to the "electoral scheme" in New York City on Election Day and in the preceding weeks. Per their findings, Bacon announced that a handful of individuals were found to have engaged in a broad voter intimidation effort aimed at reducing votes for the non-Democratic candidates. The committee was unable to link this criminal exercise to Charles Murphy, nor to a coordinated effort orchestrated by Tammany Hall.

The final report named and indicted four precinct workers for falsifying their identities to state election authorities and for criminal conduct involving tampering with voter registries. It recommended New York State explore the matter further and requested the state judicial system issue a summons for the four perpetrators. These men were not found guilty of violating federal law. The only other persons named as possible guilty parties were Hearst's attorney, Clarence J. Shearn, for failing to disclose certain documents during testimony and former Treasury Secretary Haffen for a potential perjury charge on an unrelated matter. Other than that, according to the committee summary, none of the individuals previously cited as likely suspects in a presumed vast criminal conspiracy were cited.

It was also revealed through the report that the author of the original Times piece was none other than Joseph Willicombe, Hearst's former secretary. That alone provided to the Judiciary Committee adequate grounds to proceed with its investigation throughout most of 1911. However, Willicombe's claims concerning his former boss' political dealings with Tammany to commit criminal atrocities could not be backed up with hard evidence. To be clear, the scope of the investigation did not allow for federal authorities to ransack East 14th Street nor could the investigators demand documentation from Charles Murphy that may or may not have existed. The Senate record seemed to have considered the mystery solved and the conspiracy theory debunked, and it left no indication that further investigation was necessary.

Even with these results seemingly placing Hearst in the clear, the president's reputation was not suddenly and inexplicably restored. His opponents remained just as fierce as ever, criticizing Hearst for failing to lead when the nation was embroiled in the controversy, and furthermore pondering why he fought against opening an investigation if his campaign had nothing to hide. Hearst lost many allies in the sparring over how best to handle the federal response to the scandal, and he fumbled away the Democratic House majority in the process. Even with the perception of vindication, Hearst was just as unpopular and politically paralyzed as ever. All that had changed was Hearst himself, who no longer spent his nights pacing around the White House in a state of agony. The president, curiously enough, did not give any sort of rebuttal to the release of the Manhattan Report, instead spending that night locked inside the White House with an unscheduled meeting of the Cabinet.

A somewhat relieved President Hearst called an emergency meeting of his Cabinet on the evening of December 3rd. In the words of John Gardner, "Tracing back the actions of the administration in the ensuing weeks, we have a decent idea of what took place in that meeting. We know that Holcomb dissolved the Justice Department's investigation the following morning, and through a 'clerical mishap' all files on the case were shredded or burned. That was indisputably a presidential order. We can also determine that lines of communication between Governor Chanler and President Hearst reopened as a result of a conscious decision reached by the Cabinet, and the same could be said of correspondence with Hearst and Boss Murphy."

The Senate's inability to prove Willicombe's accusations amounted to a serious blow to the legislative anti-Hearst coalition. Speaker Butler, sensing a misstep, began moving toward dismantling the House investigatory team. He greatly feared the political repercussions of insisting Hearst and Tammany's guilt, and planned to turn the congressional conversation back to policy. Yet, when the time arrived to make the call, Butler silently backed off from doing so. For this, he faced discernible resistance among some of his lukewarm supporters in the Progressive camp, but Butler no longer felt satisfied that the game had ended. Attorney General Holcomb's brash move to end the Justice Department's examination period did not sit well with the House Speaker, and news that judicial authorities in New York had begun a separate investigation lessened his fears. The House committee thereby lingered, though the full epilogue to that story would go unresolved for several years.

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The Grand Hall at Cooper Union, November 22nd, 1909 - Source: Labor Arts

Chapter XVII: Experiments in Solidarity: New Strategies for a New America

During his successful bout for the presidential title, William R. Hearst keenly employed labor agitation as a tool to secure electoral victory, but, as noted, he was unable to pass any meaningful legislation to qualm the woes of working people in the United States. That is not to say, however, that workers were content to remain in squalor while men in Washington waited idly by. It was truly quite the opposite, with industrial workers proving more than capable of enforcing their own demands down the gullet of an unsuspecting owner class. Unskilled laborers, sometimes known or referred to as a the "machine proletariat," became the unlikely vanguard for a new chapter in the American labor movement.

In the summer of 1909, a railcar manufacturing business based out of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, mandated to its workforce a novel method of distributing wages. To their 6,000-strong cache of employees, owners of the McKees Rocks Pressed Steel Car Company introduced a primitive system of scientific management designed to increase worker output by lowering its base wage according to the least productive plant worker. This allowed for the company to establish artificially raised rates and bonus incentives for the most efficient workers. In such a system, particularly in conjunction with an industry rife with managerial corruption and a hushed network of kickbacks, the owners could retain a psychological advantage over its workforce.

Finding the above methodology inhumane and their lousy pay wholly unacceptable, some hundred workers walked out from their factories. They were soon joined by the remaining McKees plant laborers, and thereafter workers in neighboring plants. IWW organizers Bill Haywood and Wiliam Trautmann swiftly arrived to assist in the developing work stoppage and worked to convince the strikers to join in their cause for industrial unionism. The AFL's continued refusal to adjust its traditional doctrine of forbidding unskilled workers to join in their ranks allowed for complete displacement by the IWW in this instance, and dozens more. Once violent skirmishes began to break out between the scores of mounted members of the Pennsylvanian constabulary and the thousands of strikers of whom were chiefly first and second generation immigrants, one AFL delegate famously blamed the fighting on, "ignorant, foreign labor."

The strike held throughout the month of July and lasted all through August. Not until September, when thirteen in all had died from the bloody affair, did the Pressed Steel Car Company call for a settlement. Company owners bent to the will of the strikers, shockingly redacting the reward system and granting an increase in wages. The entire ordeal, thereby dubbed the McKees Rocks Strike, proved the power of organizing unskilled workers as well as the ignorance of the old AFL policies. The IWW, which dunked itself into the Pittsburgh brouhaha with a spirit of inclusivity and solidarity (exemplified through its deployment of bilingual speakers and publications), won their first significant victory since the enlistment of the United Mine Workers in 1907. Mirrored strikes at steel factories in McKeesport and South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, also led to wins for the laborers as the IWW sowed class-wide unity among all stripes of workingmen.

Additional hot spots for the growing American Labor Movement emerged in New York City and Philadelphia, when the young female workforce of the novel shirtwaist-manufacturing industry rallied against brutal working conditions. They were expected to work 12-hour days with no time off and with zero union representation. Their pay was a meager $4-6 per week, with deductions for needles, thread, and the electricity used by their sewing machines. Employees of the Leiserson Shirtwiast Company walked out from their jobs in September of 1909, joined shortly thereafter by the all-women workforce of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company. Both groups aspired for coordination with a strong industrial union to ally themselves with. They turned to a local chapter of the recently established Workingwomen's Craft and Industrial Union League: An IWW-affiliate organization built to advance the interests of women within the union movement. As an unapologetic ally of skilled and unskilled women workers, it contrasted itself with its more conservative, AFL "business unionist" counterpart: The Women's Trade Organization.

The WTO was underfunded (it relied heavily on upper-class philanthropist donations) and underappreciated  by AFL President Samuel Gompers, while the WCIUL, by comparison, was prominently endorsed by IWW leaders as a tool to be used to contest with the open-shop system, ameliorate the conditions for working women, and secure women's suffrage. Led by activists including famed settlement house organizer Mary Kenney O'Sullivan, Polish-born social feminist Rose Schneiderman, and rent strike leader Pauline Newman, the small and inexperienced union organized a picket line. Allies to the cause gleefully joined extended picket lines in New York as word of the strike spread, including members of the WTO. Police officers commonly harassed the striking women, oftentimes culminating in violent beatings and arrests. City officials refused to comment.

An absolute turning-point for the Triangle Workers' Strike came about on a brisk day in late November, when these inspired women paraded to New York's Cooper Union to call for a general strike. They arrived in such astounding numbers that the crowds spilled out into the street. Representatives of the local unions, including workers-rights advocate Frances Perkins, spoke their peace to the sea of agitated workingwomen. Then, a young Jewish immigrant and WCIUL-affiliated garment laborer named Clara Lemlich rose. In her familial Yiddish, she told of her experience on the picket line, the beatings, arrests, and sexist shouts from the officers.

She said to them, "I am a working girl, one of those who are on strike against intolerable conditions. I am tired of listening to speakers who talk in general terms. What we are here for is to decide whether we shall or shall not strike. I offer a resolution that a general strike be declared - now." The audience roared in approval and were galvanized to demand the general strike be called. Two thousand women swore to honor the strike. Their righteous course set, tens of thousands of shirtwaist makers answered the call. The strike would spread to Pennsylvania, and it would receive prompt assistance from dozens of labor organizations, women's groups, and the local and national Socialist parties. [...] This became known as the Uprising of the 20,000.

         Benjamin McIntyre, The Workers' Struggle: The Birth of a Columbian International, 2018

Left with no other option but to concede, the company owners acquiesced to the demands of the strikers. After three and a half months of brutal picketing in the freezing city streets, the women won. The WCIUL negotiated contracts for over two-thirds of the total 337 shirtwaist companies in NYC and Philadelphia, with the WTO only holding representation among five. As recalled by Helen Marot of the WCIUL, "The unyielding and uncompromising temper of the strikers showed that women make the best strikers." The WCIUL became one of the most powerful union organizations in New York City, with newcomers like Clara Lemlich rising to the forefront. Humbled company owners like Triangle's "Shirtwaist Kings" Max Blanck and Isaac Harris begrudgingly agreed to recognize the women's union, and, within the year, followed-up with slightly reduced hours, heightened pay, and more sanitary conditions and safety precautions in the shops.

Due to the victories of the shirtwaist workers, as well as a second strike involving 50,000 cloakmakers in 1910, the newly elected Progressive Mayor of New York City, John Purroy Mitchel, implemented building safety standards as a mandate for all industrial operations located in the metropolitan area. Two years following the Shirtwaist Strike, when a fire had broken out in the Triangle-occupied Asch Building, these safety standards were celebrated as a chief reason for the efficient and orderly evacuation of the burning building. Not one worker was harmed from the building fire, and to this the IWW, the WCIUL, and a receptive progressive city government was granted kudos.

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The Chicago Daily Socialist's Depiction of Milwaukee Mayor Emil Seidel, April 1910 - Source: Wiki Commons

American Socialists were left disappointed in the wake of Bill Haywood's somewhat lacking performance in the 1908 presidential election. After an exceptional boost in raw vote totals between Debs' 1900 and 1904 campaigns, the meager 0.39% improvement delivered by the Western labor organizer did not deliver to the party's expectations. Some pointed to the rise of reformist factions in competing political parties as a chief cause of this development. Hearst's populist brand of Democracy had been cited by the socialist press as one which severely undercut Haywood's messaging.

There had been a slim contingent of Socialist Party members who halfheartedly supported Hearst upon his inauguration, hoping beyond hope that the media magnate's promises to enact labor reform could serve to benefit the immediate needs of the working class. Should he have been true to his word and concentrated on, for instance, workplace protections instead of engaging in all-out war with the party bosses, it is certainly plausible that radical union activists would have been split over the issue of engaging in the Democratic Party. However, Hearst's quick abandonment of labor as president cost the leader what little support he had by the American Left, and all incumbent Socialist congressmen in the House of Representative would go on to join in the demand for an investigation into the Manhattan Scandal. Hearst's move to disrupt the status quo failed miserably, and with this setback to the Democratic Party came a notable burst of energy for the SP.

Congress-wise, the party had yet to lose a single elected representative, and continuously gained seats to the point that their delegation reached six members in the 62nd Congress. All throughout the nation, card-carrying members of the SP began winning hotly contested races for city council and town council positions. Even in the unlikeliest of regions like the American Southwest, an interest in Socialism and a recognition of class antagonisms began to stir. Due to a combination of plump landowners possessing an imbalanced hold on the agrarian economic system as compared with tenant farmers, and active agitation and organization by the United Mine Workers rallying coal miners to their cause, the Socialist Party of Oklahoma captured a greater share of the vote in 1910 than in almost any other state. Clearly, within the ever-expanding "blue-collar belt" in the American heartland, industrial unionism had birthed a degree of class consciousness that had not existed prior.

From small towns to tightly packed urban centers, an awareness pertaining to class relations and a distinct lack of workplace democracy resulted in a sporadic spree of electoral successes for the left-wing political party. Socialists succeeded in sweeping in a new class of elected officials in 1911 on the municipal level. They won hearty minorities on city councils throughout the Industrial Midwest, including in Findlay, Ohio, where the SP managed to defeat an incumbent Democratic mayor. Likewise, Socialist mayors won elected office in the diverse, metropolitan venues of Reading, Pennsylvania, and Schenectady, New York. In each of these cities, victory only came about as a natural result of intensified working-class support. The Machinist Union in Schenectady and the Federated Trades Council in Reading strongly endorsed the leftmost candidates in 1911, practically guaranteeing support by the union workers.

Just as in the above examples, the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, elected a member of the Socialist Party to the mayorship. In 1910, German-American trade unionist Emil Seidel easily defeated opponents in the other three major parties to be elected the first Socialist mayor of a major American city. Seidel, upon taking office, administered a staunch, pro-labor administration, organizing a public works department and expunging casinos and brothels from the city. He also oversaw the exponential growth of the Milwaukee branch of the SP, which quadrupled in membership from 1911 to 1913. It is also crucial to note that the city chapter of the Socialist Labor Party, in an unprecedented vote, chose to endorse Seidel in his 1912 re-election campaign. This had been the first time that the SLP and the SP united on a single candidate, and in doing so acted against the sparring of the national organizations.

Especially in the aftermath of the McKees Rocks and Shirtwaist strikes, the Socialist rank-and-file understood the necessity of forging solidarity and formulating unity-in-action to combat the oppression of the owner class. That being said, the SP leadership remained feverishly divided as a big-tent political group. The Left and Right wings sharply disagreed on the matter of labor policy as well as whether to cooperate with other political associations. Haywood's lackluster showing demonstrated to the conservative faction fruitlessness of appealing to disruptive unions like the Industrial Workers of the World. This sect instead demanded the party focus its mission solely on the election of representatives to municipal and state offices. Victor Berger, who in 1910 succeeded in capturing Wisconsin's 5th congressional district, readied to face a strong, pro-IWW faction in the upcoming Socialist convention. He would, of course, be facing off against an empowered, increasingly antagonistic Eugene Debs.

The large increase in the socialist vote in the late national and state elections is quite naturally hailed with elation and rejoicing by party members, but I feel prompted to remark, in the light of some personal observations during the campaign, that it is not entirely a matter for jubilation. [...] The danger I see ahead is that the Socialist party at this stage, and under existing conditions, is apt to attract elements which it cannot assimilate, and that it may be either weighted down, or torn asunder with internal strife, or that it may become permeated and corrupted with the spirit of bourgeois reform to an extent that will practically destroy its virility and efficiency as a revolutionary organization.

Of far greater importance than increasing the vote of the Socialist party is the economic organization of the working class. To the extent, and only to the extent, that the workers are organized and disciplined in their respective industries can the socialist movement advance and the Socialist party hold what is registered by the ballot. [...] We have just so much socialism that is stable and dependable, because securely grounded in economics, in discipline, and all else that expresses class-conscious solidarity, and this must be augmented steadily through economic and political organization, but no amount of mere votes can accomplish this in even the slightest degree. Voting for socialism is not socialism any more than a menu is a meal.

        Eugene Debs, "Danger Ahead", International Socialist Review, January 1911

Debs' concern that the party had relied too heavily on electoral goals lied together with his commitment for industrial unionism. Since cementing ties with Bill Haywood and the IWW, the radical leader led the charge to ingrain the relationship betwixt the IWW and the SP. He knew that doing so jeopardized any shred of hope of reforming the far more influential AFL, but Debs became determined on furthering this line as the party convention drew closer. Only through an industrial unionist policy could any left-wing organization sufficiently build solidarity for all workers regardless of language, color, or skill. The IWW was well on their way to doing just that, while the AFL blindly marched in the wrong direction. Achieving simple victories on the municipal and (occasional) congressional scale without tying in a concise labor policy was akin to fighting a war with one's arms tied behind one's back. For Debs, rebutting the conservatively oriented direction of the party was essential in building a socialist future.

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Lawrence Textile Workers in a Picket Line, March 1912- Source: Wiki Commons

After a brief slowdown of labor activity in the winter of 1911, 1912 started off with a thunderous bang. Trouble had been brewing for some time in the industrialized city of Lawrence, Massachusetts, where tens of thousands of men, women, and children worked grueling shifts in unregulated textile mills. The American Woolen Company, a corporation that employed about half of all city residents, ignored the pleas of its workers for some semblance of workplace safety or a regular wage scale. Well-meaning reformist Massachusetts lawmakers passed a law mandating shortened working hours for women and children, and it went into full effect on January 1st. The mills, in response, slashed its workers' wages.

Sparked initially by a walkout of a small group of Polish textile workers, a work stoppage escalated with crowds of dozens swiftly turning into hundreds. Some damaged manufacturing machines on their way out of the factories while others persuaded friends and neighbors to join with them. This event accelerated into an industry-wide strike of over 20,000 who picketed and protested detestable working conditions and intolerable pay. Many of the Lawrence workers in the woolen and cotton mills were already somewhat organized by the IWW by 1912, familiar with their recent victories, accessibility for non-English speakers, representation of second-wave European immigrants. Mimicking their effective strategy from the McKees Rocks Strike, multilingual IWW speakers rallied together workers of all stripes in a united condemnation of the owners' brutality.

Italian-American New Yorker Joseph James "Smiling Joe" Ettor arrived to Lawrence that January. Ettor, a 27-year old IWW organizer capable of speaking five languages, rallied the outraged strikers and encouraged expanding the strike to every mill. As an unskilled worker himself, Ettor could empathize with the plight of the textile workers and speak to their frustrations with the bosses and fear of being unheard. Alongside fellow union agitators Arturo Giovannitti, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Bill Haywood, Ettor emphasized the philosophy of the IWW and its primary aim to restructure American life based on industrial unionism. The IWW strike fund, a crucial component to any earnest work stoppage, was vigorously supported by the Massachusetts Socialist Party in a key act of cross-organizational solidarity.

Mill owners possessed two elemental allies in the Lawrence Strike. First, the United Textile Workers of America, a powerful union affiliate of the AFL, decidedly refused to intervene. UTW managers upheld Gompers' line in regard to excluding immigrants and unskilled workers from their ranks. Gompers himself dismissively and insultingly described the strike as a "passing event," and allowed for the UTW to attempt to break the strike on behalf of the workers themselves (although this tactic ultimately failed). Secondly, at the start of the strike, the American Woolen Company retained near-total support by the city government and the middle-class population of Lawrence and nearby towns. Owners frequently accused the IWW of fermenting anarchy, and too attributed labor unrest to the immigrant workforce. They alleged that the Central and Eastern European migrants brought with them to the United States Old World-style class discrepancies. Those opposed to the strike embraced this sense of Nativism, and to this they often professed immigration restriction as a viable solution.

By the hundreds and thousands, strikers picketed the factories and peacefully marched from mill to mill. State militia and police forces responded with fire hoses, blasting young women and children to the cold pavement. IWW leaders actively pushed the strikers to remain peaceful rather than unleashing a broken retaliation. The strikers listened, and did indeed follow this guideline. Eugene Debs gave full-throttled support to the strikers, as did Socialist House Minority Leader John Chase. The Socialist Party's candidate for the upcoming Massachusetts gubernatorial election, organizer Roland D. Sawyer, also expressed solidarity with textile-manufacturing workers. Together, members of the SP and the IWW helped orchestrate massive parades in the city, complete with sprawling banners demanding what soon became the affixed slogan of the strike: "We Want Bread and Roses Too."

Towing the picket line, a wise tactic purposefully developed to evade loitering charges, the striking workers marched, they chanted, and they sang. In the words of Ray Baker in "The American Magazine", "Always there was singing. Lawrence is the first string I ever saw which sang. And not only at the meetings did they sing, but in the soup houses and in the streets." Marchers sang the French Marseillaise and L'Internationale, belting out choruses with the rhythmic voice of solidarity.

Parents fearful of successive, appealing police beatings and winter starvation somberly began transporting their children off to relatives' homes in New York and Philadelphia. Socialist Party members similarly offered shelter, lending their assistance in totality to the now-nationally renowned Lawrence mill workers. The conscious choice to highlight the plight of the Lawrence Strike Children gained the strikers widespread sympathy and did far more to benefit the their cause than anarchist-proposed 'direct action' could ever bring. Historians estimate consultations between Debs and Haywood during this period led to the latter forever disavowing outright sabotage and similar alienating methods in place of bilateral movement with the Socialists.

         Benjamin McIntyre, The Workers' Struggle: The Birth of a Columbian International, 2018

After a tumultuous eight-week work stoppage, the 'Bread and Roses Strike' finally came to an end on March 12th. The American Woolen Company resentfully acceded to the demands of the strikers, including an adjustment of the wage system and a recognition of the union. The IWW initially intended on spurning the signing of a contract, believing doing so legitimized the superiority of the owners, but at the urging of Debs and the Socialist Party, they went ahead with negotiating a permanent union organization. It appeared after growing tension by sections of each major socialist tendency, the two seemingly disparate forces of the IWW and the Socialist Party discovered a path to cooperation.

More so than any prior strike, the events of Lawrence, Massachusetts appeared to embody what was possible with the synchronization of a union organization with a political organization. "One most gratifying feature of this struggle," one article in the April edition of the International Socialist Review read, "is that in the presence of a common enemy, we Socialists forgot our factional fights. While the Industrial Workers of the World were in direct charge of the struggle at Lawrence, the Socialist party contributed the greater part of the funds needed to keep the workers from being starved into submission. [...] The battle that has been won is only a beginning. Its importance lies in the fact that winning tactics have been discovered and have received the virtual endorsement of the Socialist Party of America. The two-headed dragon of socialist agitation is no longer an untried theory, nor is that of industrial unionism. Henceforth its progress will be swift and sure."

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The Socialist Party National Convention, May 12th, 1912 - Source: EHistory/ISR

Bill Haywood, Joe Ettor, and Arturo Giovannitti jubilantly returned from the Lawrence struggle determined to enact further progress on the political level. Haywood had recently been elected to the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party, and for this he faced endless scrutiny from the party's conservative wing. Traditional socialists, hoping to expand electoral victories by retaining an honorable image, intensely disliked Haywood and his ilk for muddling SP respectability with flashes of revolutionary rhetoric. Even though the process to elect him to the board was democratic in nature, the IWW founder was treated by some in the party as if he conspired to gain that position. In reality, Haywood's ideas were certainly more in line with the direction of the labor movement and its trend toward industrial unionism.

The Lawrence Strike sufficiently validated the effectiveness of industrial unionism as well as how proper cooperation betwixt the IWW and the SP could satisfy the goals of each organization. This seemingly proved Haywood and Debs correct, as opposed to Berger who remained firmly on the side of reforming the AFL. Uniting American industries into one big union did not necessarily bring about socialism in and of itself, but in the course of fermenting class consciousness and building solidarity throughout the entire working class, anti-capitalist sentiment was bound to arise. That, perhaps, would lead workers to prefer the politics of a socialist society versus the status quo. Accomplishing such a task required a political organization capable of coordinating with the unions and pushing systematic change. Therefore, enthusiasm emanating from the success of Lawrence funneled directly into the Socialist National Convention.

The SNC took place in May of 1912 at an Indianapolis venue, bringing together quarreling factions to sort out their differences and set the future direction of the party. This was its largest convention yet, encompassing several hundred delegates and thousands of supporters. Conservatives and radicals encompassed the two halves of the party, each about equally represented by its fair share of delegates. Berger stood statically with the sect most virulently opposed to associating with the IWW and its predominantly immigrant union workers. He, in fact, endorsed restricting immigration, considering the influx of European migrants a threat to the native-born American working class. Haywood and the radicals positioning themselves opposite to the conservatives on the national committee gave the impression that a bitter fight was on the horizon, one that could potentially shred the big tent of the Socialist Party to ribbons. Even as the party reached 200,000 members and held office in 42 states, not all was well.

Party Chairman Morris Hillquit, now a dyed-in-the-wool conservative stiffly opposed to the strike-oriented tactics liberally employed by the IWW, struck an unexpectedly mild, compromising tone during his opening remarks. He stated, "We need not close our eyes to the fact that we come here from different parts of the country, with different and sometimes conflicting views on various questions of policy and tactics. It is well it should be so. No live popular movement can exist without like differences between adherents of that movement. Let us carry on our deliberations with all the differences, legitimate differences of opinion that we have and should have, in the realization that, after all, we are here for one joint common cause, the emancipation of the working class, and let us act accordingly." Regardless of his wish that the party concentrate on disavowing violence (the type some publications accused the IWW of perpetuating), Hillquit notably did not lead with that perspective.

Soon enough, Congressman Berger took command and spoke out in favor of association with the AFL. The party labor plank was always destined to be a point of contention by the delegates, as it no longer seemed appropriate to leave the subject vague as in conventions past. Berger believed that the growth of the AFL as a pragmatic and non-controversial vehicle for unionization stayed the best bet to achieve nationwide unionization. Determining the matter of pivotal importance, he demanded the platform settle on this issue once and for all. Judging by the profuse applause to his statement in favor of the pro-AFL motion, as well as similar acclamation for Ohio delegate Max Hayes for the same, it looked as if Berger would prevail. Yet, when Haywood spoke on behalf of the IWW, coining victories by "garment workers in New York, steel workers in Pittsburgh, and textile workers in Lawrence," as both economic and political progress (citing a specific enfranchisement effort by the IWW), the audience gave a twenty-minute standing ovation accompanied by deafening cheers. 178-132, above the ravenous objections of the conservatives, Berger's motion failed, and the party formally adopted ties with the Industrial Workers of the World.

Their startling downfall was playing out in slow motion. Never before did Berger directly challenge an opponent and lose. True, the Milwaukee Socialists were a big movement within the Socialist Party of the early twentieth century, but the powerful and tightly organized radical faction dominated the self-important congressman. He tried to strike back, expressing support for an anti-IWW amendment laced with hauteur and fear. It was Hillquit's writing, allegedly, though the man himself smelt the sulfur in the air and rightly distanced from it.

Carl Thompson, a Berger protege, voiced approval for expelling Socialist members who advocated some ethereal notion of violence. He plead to the moral high ground, using "IWW" and "Anarchism" interchangeably. (Germer) seconded the motion, referring to Haywood and the IWW's tactics as "idiotic." They were anxious to disassociate themselves from perceived lawlessness to better attract the American Federation of Labor and middle-class voters. It failed, of course, by resounding margins. Haywood had already disavowed the sort of techniques he was accused of promoting, and neither he nor the IWW engaged in violent agitation. Lawrence made the difference. If Debs hadn't been in Massachusetts to witness the strike himself, he might not have convinced Haywood to stay the course.

        Harry Braverman, 6th President of the New York Assembly, The Early Socialists: A Prelude to the Revolution, 1969

The call to build permanent ties with the AFL failed, the demand to expel suspected anarchists failed, and a last-ditch recall vote to remove Haywood from the Executive Committee would fail as well. The IWW and their legions were in the Socialist Party to stay, and in spite of the dramatic theatrics performed by the conservatives, the party was not accused of harboring lawbreakers or criminals. Berger's limited view of Socialist Party conduct did not win over any new SNC delegates, and, by all accounts, it was outright alien to the party rank-and-file. Milwaukee's own labor unions supported coordination with the IWW, and they did not appreciate Berger reneging on his promise to abide by their views.

Despite the odds, the Socialist Party in 1912 presented an indivisible image. Not all was resolved, not every dispute was removed from play, but the party consciously allied itself with the direction of the American Labor Movement. Eugene Debs, albeit not a material presence at the convention, was named by a four-fifths of the delegates to once more don the nomination crown. No other individual could better exemplify a sense of party unity and of 'being above the fray' than the two-time candidate and enormously popular public speaker and working class champion. Minnesota Congressman Thomas Van Lear (S-MN), a Spanish-American War veteran and Minneapolis machinist, was selected as vice president. As a side note, this ticket is notable for winning the endorsement of the Socialist Labor Party of America by a hair-thin margin at their separate nominating convention, something that had not yet occurred on the national level.

FIFTH SOCIALIST NATIONAL CONVENTION*

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		310 DELEGATES
Eugene V. Debs ☑		276		310
Emil Seidel		29
Charles E. Russell		5
OTHERS/BLANK		0

FIFTH SOCIALIST NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		310 DELEGATES
Thomas Van Lear ☑		189		310
Joseph Ettor		90
August Gillhaus		23
Emil Seidel		8
OTHERS/BLANK		0

*The fourth official convention was a National Congress held in Chicago in 1910. 1912's event is described in the stenographic report of convention proceedings as the Fifth National Convention of the Socialist Party.

[We Live in Black and White]

Now that's a ticket.

[Pyro]

Rebels During the Mexican Revolution, 1911 - Source: Wiki Commons

The Hearst Administration had effectively been consigned to the dustbin of United States history by 1912. Once a robust and efficacious populist, Hearst devolved into a textbook lame duck president, paralyzed by Congress and endlessly scrutinized by an increasingly antagonistic press corp. He failed to satisfy his pledge to back the plight of workers' rights and distinctly opted against voicing support or offering federal arbitration in any of the major labor disputes in the span of his tenure. His estimated national approval plummeted since the opening of the Manhattan Scandal investigation, and its irresolute conclusion did not assist in rebounding Hearst to his former glory. On the domestic front, Hearst's chief legacy would be the appointment of four Supreme Court justices in the span of three years, although this too would be limited by Congress and the virtuousness of his appointees would prove incontrovertible.

Hearst's undisputed disapprobation allowed for a sharp resurgence of the Republican and Progressive parties, as first illustrated in the 1910 midterm elections. Both oppositional groups capitalized on the Tammany affair for their own gains to the extreme detriment of the president and the Democratic Party. Each soon looked to utilize their newfound approval to catapult themselves into the White House. The Republican nomination contest appeared to epitomize a serious horserace as numerous candidates came forward, but Progressives did not fancy a strenuous convention fight. An overwhelming majority of Columbians prayed for the return of their beloved champion: Former President Roosevelt.

From the time of his return to the United States partway through 1910, Roosevelt proved an unmistakable voice of sensibility in contrast with the arbitrary president. He decried Hearst when necessary, but otherwise allowed incumbent officeholders to take the lead. Now, with November on the horizon, not even the Rough Rider's closest friends and allies could speculate as to his future. Some days it seemed Roosevelt was itching to return to the realm of politics, while on others he waved away the notion of throwing his hat into the ring. It was not until the autumn of 1910, when Roosevelt visited the small city of Osawatomie, Kansas, that the press placed their bets. The former president delivered a monumental speech that September that roared with progressive fervor. He called for an invigorated federal government capable of eliminating social disparities, worker exploitation, and corporate domination of the economy. "The betterment which we seek," he boomed, "must be accomplished, I believe, mainly through the National Government. The American people are right in demanding that New Nationalism, without which we cannot hope to deal with new problems."

As for the Democratic Party, its leadership dreaded the Hearst albatross tied tight around its neck and longed to be rid of it as soon as possible. Much of the party turned away from Hearst at the height of the scandal, especially doing so in the aftermath of the abysmal midterms. Even Democratic National Committee Chair William Osborn, Tom Johnson's successor, refused to comment to the party's commitment to the Hearst program nor its prospective choice of a nominee in 1912. Their options were plentiful as there was no shortage of aspiring 'rising stars' within the Democratic ranks, but all understood the importance of disallowing Hearst from a second nomination. Distancing from the incumbent was their only chance of survival.

Hearst, like Chairman Osborn, did not respond to inquiries concerning his electoral plans. It was clear that a re-election bid would end in utter humiliation, far more so than the congressional investigations. An uncooperative Congress and legislative bickering could stain any presidency, but an electoral loss equaled nothing apart from complete dismissal by the American people. Several officials in Hearst's Cabinet planned their own career paths moving forward, most often involving a return to the private sector. We could also determine, judging by Vice President Champ Clark's meeting with Osborn and House Majority Leader Henry Clayton early in the year, that the second-in-command was considering a return to the House of Representatives and a potential run for the speakership. Any sane man would have viewed the writing on the wall, but Hearst did not meet those qualifications.

The United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century and at the start of the twentieth owned an economic arrangement with the government of Mexico that allowed unlimited foreign investment. [...] President Porfirio Díaz, an oligarchical ruler governing Mexico since 1876, kept tidy relations with the U.S. He welcomed with open arms the plundering of his country by foreign entities, specifically oil drilling and coal mining by British and American enterprises. Like in the case of China, a mass sentiment of indignation against foreign domination and state repression arose among the Mexican people and propelled them to revolt against the government. Revolutionaries called for, "Land for the landless and Mexico for the Mexicans." [...] When Díaz finally resigned in 1911, the reality of the situation set in (for the Hearst Administration).

         Daniel Tanner, "Mexico and the Second Independence War", Anti-Imperialism in the 20th Century, 2002​

Hearst paid close attention to the affairs in Mexico as the rebellion ensued, observing the revolution as closely as he observed the unfolding of the congressional investigation. He understood that the rise of an anti-American government in Mexico could threaten U.S. development in the region, possibly shuttering the American-owned oil fields, rubber plantations, and silver and copper mines. Between an escalating trend of raids on U.S. holdings and the resignation of Díaz, Hearst knew that the preservation of American interests (partially owned by the Hearst estate, mind you) counted on presidential action. Still, other than placing soldiers on the border with Mexico, the climate had not yet worsened to the extent that an order for military intervention could be deemed suitable. Therefore, in February of 1912, reasoning that he alone could prepare the nation for the eventuality of war against an intolerable Mexican government, President Hearst announced that he would seek a second term.

[Pyro]

An Overflowing Crowd at the Republican National Convention, June 18th, 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XVIII: The Election of 1912: United Let Us Be, Rallying Round Our Liberty

Long before President's Hearst's fateful announcement concerning his interest in attaining a second term, Republicans and Progressives each treated the coetaneous political climate as if it was a referendum on the incumbent. It was no secret that the GOP suffered immeasurably in the prior decade, sliding from an unquestioning position of authority down to congressional minorities and low electoral ceilings. They managed to avert total disaster in the recent midterm elections as a logical byproduct of staunch hostility to the unpopular president, but none were certain whether this development was the beginning of a grandiose return to prominence or a final gasp of air. Some party officials dared to whisper their greatest fear in the lead-up to the election: President Chauncey Depew may have been the last Republican president.

Regretful over their downward trend yet optimistic for a turnaround, the Republican Party gathered at the Chicago Coliseum on June 18th to finalize and commemorate their latest platform and presidential contender. Since their last defeat, the party had already undergone somewhat of a political facelift. Most of the nineteenth century Old Guard either faded into obscurity or had died by 1912, leaving a new class solidly in the driver's seat. House Speaker Thomas Butler was, by far, the most powerful Republican presently occupying office, and yet he had only served as a congressman for 15 years. His direction of congressional procedures garnered him public adoration by the growing anti-Hearst electorate and his ability to coalesce with House Progressives made it an arduous task for the reformers to unleash the same degree of criticism that met his more conservative counterparts. Still, Butler had not indicated an explicit interest in the party's presidential nomination despite these clear advantages.

Other potential candidates for the upcoming race, like Senators Knox and Fairbanks, began emitting signals that they possessed a desire for higher office. Fairbanks essentially started from the ground-up, gathering likely allies as well as recollecting his senatorial campaign staff to explore the field. Meanwhile, Knox, having run a presidential campaign four years prior, already prepared a national organization and started utilizing his resources to sway potential state delegates. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the exceptionally well-known power broker in the upper house of the legislature (and, like Butler, had widespread appeal beyond the traditional Republican base), was speculated to have begun a silent campaign for the presidency as well. Unwilling to contend a presidential contest with Roosevelt, a close friend of the senator, he did not actively campaign. Lodge's name was nonetheless entered into the running in various states.

A series of state-run primaries and caucuses were featured in the prelude to the national conventions. Several states passed initiatives in 1910 through 1912 that mandated primary elections, or caucuses, be held to determine how delegates should be selected. As state Republican chairs disliked the prospect of public primaries, very few allowed for these elections to 'bind' delegates to the outcome of the vote. Therefore, these results proved inconsequential on the Republican side save the right to declare oneself chosen by the voters. Perhaps at first these contests were eyed curiously by the party as a legitimate signal for which direction they ought to proceed, but these presidential primaries chiefly award victories to favorite son candidates (Fairbanks in Indiana, Lodge in Massachusetts, etc.) and largely failed to demonstrate much else. The only exception to this rule was in Illinois, where Butler won a surprising 60% win. According to historical sources on the subject, that landslide outcome promptly tempted the House leader to seek the nomination more actively outright.

At the convention site, an astonishing crowd of thousands arrived to witness the political festivities. The halls of the coliseum grew so packed with attendees on the first day that the Chicago police were forced to blockade the doors to prevent an unbearable influx of guests. It had been years since the Republican National Convention was met with such interest by the general population, and, as some publications pondered, this phenomenon confirmed just how detrimental Hearst's presidency had been to the Democratic Party and to the cause of progressivism. If the Republicans generated this extent of tremendous enthusiasm before the campaigns lifted off the ground, perchance hope remained for the once-insurmountable political force. Convention

Settling the arena and quelling the impatient audience, Chairman John Weeks pounded his gavel as the convention came to order. Republican congressmen, governors, and local and state officials commenced with a chain of long-winded speeches in the aftermath of an opening prayer, and in doing so set a unique tone for the event. In speech after speech, the guests harshly reprimanded the Hearst administration and the Democratic Party for "four years of utter chaos, scandal, and what may be a permanent loss of public faith in our institutions." They concentrated on the character of the president, his shady business and political associations, and the "flagrant lawlessness of Tammany Hall" much more so than their policy proposals. Albeit steering clear of simple name-calling, Republican speakers named Hearst one of the worst presidents in United States history, far surpassing their old punching bag, former President Bryan. Some cited the president's potential involvement in intimidation tactics, "a crime worthy of impeachment," while others derided Hearst's dangerous ties to the yellow press. All in all, to the unbeknownst onlooker, it was as if the Senate committee found Hearst guilty of every accusation.

Following the unanimous approval of an uncontroversial party platform, one which contained proposals for a raised tariff, called for an enforced Federal Trade Commission, and frequently contrasted conservative righteousness with the Democrats' "lack of constructive statesmanship," the delegates went on to call the rolls for president.

FIFTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		2nd Call		3rd Call		1078 DELEGATES
Thomas S. Butler ☑		295		498		570
Charles W. Fairbanks		256		244		223
Philander C. Knox		299		200		175
Herbert S. Hadley		31		38		30
Jay Bowerman		29		33		26
Emanuel L. Philipp		31		29		24
Charles Edward Merriam		18		11		13
Jacob Burkett		8		8		8
Henry Cabot Lodge		93		4		2
C.A. Johnson		6		7		2
Joseph B. Foraker		4		3		2
OTHERS/BLANK		8		3		3

It took three calls to settle the shifting seas, but Speaker Butler received the necessary number of delegates to win the nomination. Senator Lodge and Senate Conference Chairman Shelby Cullom endorsed the temperate legislative leader just prior to the second ballot, stirring the pot just right to award sufficient momentum for Butler to sail to victory in the third count. Knox, to his frank embarrassment, lost control of the Pennsylvania delegation to Butler on the second ballot as well, likely crushing his spirit to pursue the nomination and thereby allowing Butler's team to vacuum up his supporters. Like the party platform, Butler's telegraphed acceptance speech condemned President Hearst and the compliant Democratic Party to the nth degree. "We must return to respectability, and thenceforth rid ourselves of the weed of demagoguery in all of its forms. This is the newest challenge faced by our republic, but the obstacle is nothing new. General Cleon rose to power in Ancient Athens by manipulating and bullying his contemporaries. He professed a false love for democracy, showering praise on his allies and raining insults on his enemies. He spoke of a brilliant future won through battle, but this lie led the Athenians to certain catastrophe. My fellow Americans, I charge that the present occupant of the White House, Mr. Hearst, is our Modern Cleon."

FIFTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		1078 DELEGATES
Robert Todd Lincoln ☑		949
Warren G. Harding		129
OTHERS/BLANK		0

Empathizing with the desperate need to surge the party forward, former Secretary of War and President of the Pullman Company Robert Todd Lincoln solemnly accepted the nomination as vice president. Per the recommendation of Butler, a united front of Republicanism effectively persuaded the typically disinterested Lincoln to accept the role. His name alone, Butler and the Republican National Committee believed, would tempt plenty of otherwise apathetic voters to voice preference to the Republican Party and assist the ticket in carrying the Midwestern swing states. Butler and Lincoln thus started down the treacherous path to the election, hoping to renew their brand of politics and remove Hearst from power at all costs.

[Pyro]

William J. Bryan Speaking to Supporters, c. 1912  - Source: Wiki Commons

In the wake of the Manhattan Scandal investigations and coinciding accusations that the president acted in an unlawful manner, Democratic Party leaders fretted over their future. As previously indicated, the bulk of the leadership discarded the notion of renominating Hearst once the midterm elections straightforwardly exhibited public disfavor with the administration. His brand was immeasurably toxic, and the only remote shot of retaining Democratic control over the Executive Branch as well as the U.S. Senate necessitated distancing the party from the president. A notable portion of the national committee alternatively preferred redirecting the public narrative in order to exonerate Hearst, likely calculating the pure strategic advantage of a re-election campaign, but they were an extreme minority.

Before Hearst's February announcement, a quiet civil war brewed within the Democratic ranks as its destiny appeared up for grabs. Without a doubt, the largest and most influential faction had been the Bryan Democrats. Pre-dating Hearst and his far more exaggerated and dubious form of populist agitation, the Bryanites were the first in the country to have run a successful, anti-corporate national campaign. They viewed Hearst with a skeptical eye from the start, and had no qualms with launching a challenge to the incumbent. Once stories began to break regarding the Hearst Campaign intimidating delegates at the 1908 Democratic National Convention, Bryan Democrats forever broke with the president. "We, the true enemies of private monopoly and the sinners on Wall Street," pro-Bryan Representative Cyrus Cline (D-IN) remarked in November of 1911, "know of only one man, honest and true, who can restore faith and promise to this land. William Jennings Bryan is the man this country needs."

Former President Bryan continuously prevailed as the nation's single most beloved and requested public speaker in the United States. Always a thorn in the side of corporate America, Bryan spoke out against the new crop of trusts emerging in the period between 1909 and 1912, and implored the people themselves demand federal intervention. He usually avoided criticizing Hearst, even amid the scandal, instead preserving his fiercest remarks for financial interests for sinking the anti-plutocratic Keliher Bill. More so, Bryan commended the Hearst Administration once it passed a reduction of the tariff in 1909, but in no other instance did the orator provide his two cents on the elected leader.

In a move that may have cost him more than originally intended, Bryan emerged in favor of temperance in 1909. He rallied against what he flavored, "the conscious-less, merciless liquor trust," and the immoral essence of alcohol consumption. Few Democrats had thus far dared to risk their political fates on affiliating with the overly righteous, prickly Prohibitionists, but Bryan found the issue essential to "purifying [an America] rife with violence and treachery." He evangelized it, joining with groups like the Christian socialists, champions of the Social Gospel, and remnants of the defunct Populist Party. Prohibition laws even began winning passage on the state level with players in the Anti-Saloon League gaining significant steam, especially in the South. Yet, Bryan's support of alcohol prohibition tarnished his reputation among industrial workers and immigrant populations which wholly opposed the proposed ban. As was true with his other policy stances, Bryan was never one to adopt politically expedient positions.

If he intended on seeking the presidential nomination, Bryan also faced one other monumental test, namely that progressivism was no longer limited to he alone. Democratic progressives effectively ran the national organization by 1912. The reorganizers of yore were long since removed from power, and even Southern Democratic conservatism had lost its edge to a company of Southern populists in the vein of Senators James Vardaman and Ben Tillman. Most prospective presidential candidates were indeed far more like William J. Bryan than Grover Cleveland. As described by historian John S. Gardner, "Internal strife over the direction of the post-Hearst Democratic Party threatened to drag them into the wilderness. Scuttling an unpopular incumbent was difficult enough on its own, but the rise of six separate popular candidacies over that year's course meant traversing an intersection with all roads possibly leading to dead-ends."

The above quote highlights the unique shape of the pre-convention turmoil endured by the Democrats. In the case of a typical contested nomination, one or two prominent officials declare an interest in the presidency and, thereafter, fight for the title while a group of minor and/or favorite son candidates fall to the wayside. In 1912, the brawl proved far more intense and was accompanied (just as in the case of the Republicans) by a string of hard-fought presidential primary elections. First, Representative Oscar Underwood, the notorious anti-Hearst House official, displayed the tell-tale signs of a national campaign. He began more publicly, virulently scrutinizing the president for consistent policy failures and blaming his shortcomings for spoiling what could have been a masterful reign by the party. Underwood quickly won over scores of Southern delegates and gained various pledges of support in that time.

Former Governor Judson Harmon did as Underwood had, organizing an apparent presidential campaign and setting up state-wide operations for the clear purpose of wooing party delegates. He did eventually formally declare his intention to succeed Hearst, the first Democrat to do so, but had some trouble cultivating a base for his Cleveland-esque stances and sensibilities. Additionally, recently elected Governor Woodrow Wilson, who from his election was instantly considered as a plausible contender, followed the will of his supporters and announced a campaign for the White House in mid-February. Wilson acted the part of a trustworthy progressive in office, spurning state bosses and enacting anti-trust laws. Albeit a textbook dark horse candidate, the governor looked to emulate Cleveland's support in the northeast with social moderation and Hearst's on the West Coast with economic reformism. Wilson went on to carry several states, including Pennsylvania and New Jersey, in the primaries.

Hearst declared his candidacy on February 28th, dramatically shuffling the race and sending all the active and prospective candidates' plans up into smoke. Quiet unrest in the upper echelon of the party rose to a frenzy. Hearst, likely amused by the disarray of the Democratic Party, unveiled an extraordinarily well-funded campaign operation, and confirmed the hiring of his entire 1908 staff. He promptly received the endorsements of Minority Leader William Sulzer, State Secretary and former Speaker John J. Lentz, Governor Lewis Chanler, Boss Charles Murphy, and promising New York State Assemblyman Alfred E. Smith. That aforementioned pro-Hearst minority in the national committee reawakened, feverishly calling upon the other active candidates to suspend their campaigns to better assist the president's re-election. The following morning, in what served as the next chain in a link of perceptively panicked events, Vice President Champ Clark furiously resigned from the administration and declared his wish to challenge Hearst. "Out of pure manic, or perhaps brilliance," wrote Gardner, "Clark undercuts the president along with any upward momentum. Whether by plan or coincidence, Bill Bryan publishes an announcement of his own the very same day. [...] The primaries are split, and no one walks away a clear favorite going into the convention."

[Pyro]

Democratic National Convention of 1912 in Session - Source: Wiki Commons

On June 25th, a mere week after the Republican Party formally nominated Thomas Butler for president, leagues of Democratic delegates, officeholders, and supporters gathered at the Fifth Regiment Armory in Baltimore, Maryland. The time had finally arrived to let loose the steam that bubbled beneath the surface, and thereby allow for the party to designate its standard bearer. A dramatic airing of grievances was all but inevitable, and the divided national committee braced for the worst. The 21st Democratic National Convention had begun, and the fight was on.

President Hearst explicitly broke a long-standing tradition and opted to personally attend the convention. Incumbent presidents customarily permitted campaign managers to appear on their behalf, as party traditionalists found the presence of any active candidate during the convention inappropriate and unseemly. Hearst, never one to abide by political customs, balked at that notion and chose to visit the festivities regardless. Just as he accomplished four years earlier, the president knew that this action would award him prolific press coverage and a featured spot above the competition. Unlike in 1908, however, he was not alone in seeking this objective. Bryan and Clark also appeared in-person. Harmon, Underwood, and Wilson preferred to take the established route.

Each camp arrived to Baltimore set on accomplishing their specific agenda, not limited exclusively to nominating their favored candidate. For instance, Bryan contrived of a bigger picture beyond his potential presidential assignment. One of the Nebraskan's greatest struggles as president was constant negotiation with fellow Democrats. The Democratic Party of 1896 did not have a progressive majority, and as a result many of Bryan's proposals, like strict anti-trust regulation and federal assistance for farmers, remained unfulfilled. In 1912, his ideas were, in theory, wholly accepted by the party proper minus unpersuadable Southern conservatives and Northeastern Bourbons. Victory for Bryan involved not simply re-election but completing the transformation of the Democratic Party to unhesitatingly adopt a progressive program ready to pass through a (conjectural) Democratic-majority Congress.

On the opposing end of the spectrum, Hearst failed to outline any novel policy goals for a potential second term and merely upheld the crushed Civic Liability plan. As explored by biographers like John Gardner and Thomas Cohen, Hearst waged the war for re-election for the sheer purpose of embarrassing his foes and verifying his own political philosophy. "[Hearst] on the top of the ticket," Cohen wrote, "absolutely guaranteed an uphill battle in November. The controversies could not be easily scrubbed away. Empirically, this was a permanent stain. [...] Policy was not his purpose for leaping into the fray. Though his committed supporters relentlessly and passionately defended the cause of re-electing the president, Hearst was in it for Hearst." Despite the incumbency advantage, Hearst was unable seat his ally, Representative George Lindsay (D-NY), as convention chairman and keynote speaker. The winner of that vote was anti-corruption advocate Governor John Burke of North Dakota.

Yes, it was certainly a contentious affair, but the Baltimore convention contained all the regular pomp and circumstance. Brass marching bands played Dixie down the aisle. Auditorium walls were plastered in Democratic symbolism and its ceiling adorned with the stars and stripes. Convention staff, fascinatingly enough, nailed down state standards to the floorboards to prevent them from being raised and paraded about. Hearst and Bryan being present did not disturb the atmosphere of the convention, it only served to excite the crowds further. John Burke delivered a rather inconsequential speech that did not take sides, but actually promoted harmony. Burke didn't disrupt the peace, that honor belonged to Bryan with his famous Sermon on the Mount moment.

         Prof. Dominic Stratton, "Interview: Party Conventions Throughout History," The Cambridge Historical Journal, 1995

During the third day of the convention, just before the first ballot was cast, Bryan rushed to the podium and requested of Chairman Burke to introduce a resolution to the floor. Burke agreed to the request. As the erstwhile president relayed, the convention ought to declare, unmistakably, its "opposition to any candidate for president who is a representative of, or under any obligation to, John Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hinting and favor-seeking class." Over shouts of disapproval he continued, "Be it further resolved, that we demand the withdrawal from this convention of any delegate or delegates constituting or representing the above-named interests. [...] If thy right hand offends thee, cut it off! The party needs to cut off those corrupting influences to save itself." This proclamation, that was met with antipathy by the non-Bryan delegations and loud jeers by the New York delegates, was a thinly veiled assault on Wall Street and its ties to Tammany Hall. Transportation industrialist Thomas Ryan had been accused of bribing New York City officials for years, and such a bribing network could only have existed with the apt assistance of Boss Murphy. Hearst, knowing this was Bryan's method of enacting revenge, reportedly scowled all the while.

TWENTY-FIRST DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:PRES		1st Call		1088 DELEGATES
William J. Bryan		339
William R. Hearst		338
Champ Clark		149
Oscar Underwood		107
Woodrow Wilson		77
Judson Harmon		36
Thomas R. Marshall		32
Simeon E. Baldwin		3
Ollie M. James		3
Charles A. Culberson		2
OTHERS/BLANK		2

At the conclusion of the initial ballot, Bryan just narrowly excelled over Hearst, 339-338. Clark rang in in third, with Underwood and Wilson sputtering behind. Bryan's figure was hardly enough to win out the fight, but in commanding a higher number of delegates in the first official roll call, he exemplified that Hearst, regardless of his stature as the incumbent president, did not hold the full allegiance of the Democratic Party. Observers accredited this count to Bryan's resolution, which served to remind the convention-goers of the calamity of Hearst's reign and the murky mysteries of the Manhattan Scandal. In the immediate aftermath of the call, the respective candidates' camps scrambled to win over the now uncommitted blocs of delegates. Boss Murphy, the leader of the New York delegates, worked meticulously behind the scenes to stop Bryan and promote Hearst. Simultaneously, Western Democrats condemned Hearst as an unelectable toxin and demanded Bryan be granted a shot at re-election.

The incongruent array of forces could not arrive at a reasonable accommodation as the day went on. A second ballot came and went, with similar results displaying six immovable delegations. Then, a third, and a fourth. By this point, nearly all minor candidates had dropped out and released their delegates, but the count again failed to change. President Hearst, according to Cohen, conveyed to Bryan a mediated settlement on the eve of June 27th. Via telegram, the incumbent "offered Bryan his choice of Secretary of State or Vice President. Knowing he would not be able to swing the stick, Hearst hoped to tempt Bryan with the carrot. Recall, he pulled a comparable stunt four years prior. It worked then, why should he expect any different now?"

[Pyro]

Former President Bryan at the 1912 DNC - Source: Wiki Commons

Vice President Champ Clark entered the Democratic National Convention intent on bringing Hearst down. Once cordial associates, Hearst and Clark drifted apart as the former's presidency dragged on. Their disagreements on policy and strategy were profuse, and the two no longer seemed to get along person-to-person. As incompatible as the arrangement was, Champ acceded to the president out of respect for the office and recognition of his place as second-in-command. He eventually consigned himself to wait out the remainder of his term, planning afterward to support Hearst's eventual successor and run for a position of leadership in the House of Representatives. When Hearst did the unthinkable, however, and declared his ambition for a new term, Clark forcefully switched gears.

The Missourian's record was not quite spotless in terms of political connections and reported dealings, but he had no love for Hearst's ties with Tammany, his eye-rolling demagoguery, and oblivious disdain for Congress. A Hearst ‘Part Two’ epitomized an expansion of everything Clark despised in contemporary politics. It was in this mindset that the vice president formally handed in his resignation and departed Washington. He wished not to collaborate with Bryan out of fear that the former president would end up as paralyzed in office as he was in 1897. More so, Bryan was none too fond of Clark, privately coining the bureaucrat a servant of Wall Street and the Democratic Old Guard. All that remained was to declare a separate candidacy, and Clark did just that.

By mid-June, Clark won his fair share of presidential primaries and managed to cobble together a unyielding coalition of moderate Democrats, veteran party officials, and Midwestern leaders. He won the support of about half of the Californian delegation as well, appealing to them with folksy mannerisms and a guise of anti-corporate reformism. Still, a large swathe of the voting population not only perceived the Missourian as a stale career politician (1912 was Clark's 17th year in Washington), but viewed him as a tainted Hearst Cabinet official. If one was opposed to Hearst's re-election, in all likelihood one would too oppose this ill-suited substitute. Therefore, Clark understood the hurdles of his long-shot candidacy and planned for numerous potential outcomes.

TWENTY-FIRST DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:PRES		1st Call		3rd Call		5th Call		7th Call		9th Call		1088 DELEGATES
William R. Hearst		338		332		329		345		328
William J. Bryan		339		331		336		314		314
Champ Clark		149		155		161		160		172
Woodrow Wilson		77		90		88		94		100
Oscar Underwood		107		93		88		85.5		85.5
Thomas R. Marshall		32		45		43		63		69
Judson Harmon		36		33		34		13		9
Coleman L. Blease		0		0		3		7.5		7.5
Simeon E. Baldwin		3		3		0		0		0
Ollie M. James		3		2		0		0		0
Charles A. Culberson		2		0		0		0		0
OTHERS/BLANK		2		4		6		6		3

Chairman Burke had just completed the 9th roll call, one that again failed to appoint a nominee. Harmon had conceded by the 7th and released his delegates to "vote as they will," resulting in an equal spread. Now, another candidate announced their concession. Discovering lackluster support and a convention leaning to the top three candidates, Governor Woodrow Wilson dropped out of the race. Wilson's phoned-in memo was read aloud by his campaign manager, Democratic committee member and railroad engineer William Gibbs McAdoo. It stated that the governor's removal from the divided count would move the deadlocked convention closer toward a salvageable conclusion. It begged for peace, exclaiming that a united front was a prerequisite to defeat the Progressive and Republican nominees. He did not go as far as to endorse any one candidate, but, considering Wilson's delegates were all adverse to Hearst, this move strongly benefited Clark, Underwood, Bryan, and, the final candidate in the running, Indiana Governor Thomas Marshall.

When the next call pushed Clark closer to the top while Hearst and Bryan remained hopelessly stunted, the time had arrived for a choice to be made. Two members of the Hearst Camp, most feasibly Representatives Sulzer and Lindsay, visibly approached Bryan and implored he act on the aforementioned negotiation. Bryan was seen thoughtfully listening to the men's words whilst uncharacteristically keeping his mouth shut when he had his attention split. An individual from the Clark camp scrambled to Bryan's side and breathlessly handed him a sealed letter. The former president opened the note, read it, turned to nod at the Clark associate, and slipped the letter deep into his suit-jacket pocket. The above occurred in the span of about ninety seconds.

Burke, after briefly consulting with a Bryan campaign worker, announced that a candidate would be speaking to the delegation prior to the next roll call. The anti-Bryan component of the crowd understandably groaned at the prospect of another bomb-throwing charade by the Great Commoner, but, alas, Burke had not referred at all to Bryan. Champ Clark was the individual who then rose and approached the podium. Up to this moment, Clark had yet to directly speak to the delegates, but as a top-3 competitor, none anticipated what would next take place.

My friends and colleagues, and all good Democrats. *He clears his throat. The stage creaks as the crowd observes in silence.* In this occasion we confidently offer a promise to the American people as an earnest to what we will do if sworn into power. Our promise is to judge wisely, act for progress, and stand tall as American patriots. In the days of Thomas Jefferson, the work of the Democratic Party accomplished a great deal to bind the nation. We did it by good teamwork. The Democratic Congress did its duty, the Democratic president did his duty. Today we will do the same. We will work together. Therefore, I will no longer allow myself to be considered as a candidate for President of the United States. *Audience reacts in shock. Some gasp, others leap to their feet. * Speaking for myself, and for any of the delegation who may decide to join me, I shall support the nomination of Governor Thomas Marshall for President.

*The crowd erupts in a frenzy. A tide of men dart toward the stage frantically yelling over one another. Pan to close-up on Hearst. Music swells as Hearst furrows his brow.*

         Dir. Walter Hill, W.R.H., Cannon Films, 1998

For Clark, endorsing Marshall was the final option available. First elected in 1908, the witty and mustachioed Hoosier generally identified with the progressive faction of the party, albeit shying away from associating with the Bryan or Hearst sects. He supported a pro-labor, anti-corruption agenda as governor, matter-of-factly opposing the more moderate Indiana Democratic Party leadership and its calls to govern conservatively. Marshall championed the core of Civic Liability on the state level and fought incessantly for the ratification of the 16th and 17th Amendments in addition to the legalization of state-wide primary system. Having been a popular executive, the Indiana delegation placed Marshall's name in consideration for president despite the governor's absence at the convention and his absent campaign.

In order to secure the future of the party and finally rid it of its Hearst-shaped albatross, Clark made the decision to bow out and endorse the sole candidate left undirtied by intra-party bickering, factionalism, and the rottenness of D.C. One look at Hearst's slack-jawed face explained exactly how unforeseen this event had truly been. He was not especially angered by the ordeal, but more so slumped in disbelief. With their plan set in motion, Bryan took the cue from Clark. He too announced a stunning concession one ballot later, petitioning the delegates cast their votes for Marshall. The momentum catapulted the Hoosier forward, outright collapsing Hearst's strategy for a terminally deadlocked convention and awarding the dark horse candidate the nomination. 

TWENTY-FIRST DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:PRES		10th Call		11th Call		12th Call		13th Call		Unanimous		1088 DELEGATES
Thomas R. Marshall ☑		91		299		639		756		887
William R. Hearst		329		321		299		283		0
Oscar Underwood		95.5		96		88		47		0
William J. Bryan		351		364		60		0		0
Champ Clark		208		0		0		0		0
Woodrow Wilson		4		0		0		0		0
Coleman L. Blease		7.5		6		0		0		0
Judson Harmon		0		0		0		0		0
Simeon E. Baldwin		0		0		0		0		0
Ollie M. James		0		0		0		0		0
Charles A. Culberson		0		0		0		0		0
OTHERS/BLANK		2		2		2		2		201

Chaos very briefly ensued in the latter part of the 13th ballot. Having been bested by the apparent scheme unleashed by Bryan and Clark working in tandem, a festering President Hearst stood amongst the noise and rabble of the venue, accompanied by roughly two-hundred of his minority delegation, and waltzed out of the Fifth Regiment Army. The incumbent did precisely as he had warned and, in most melodramatic fashion, permanently severed ties with the Democratic Party. The anti-Hearst section of the party cheered as the president strolled down the aisle. When the delegates followed, apart from a recorded fistfight and a notable incident with a thrown chair, far less of an uproar was raised then initially expected. Once the arena settled down, Chairman Burke announced that the final call was unanimous (by the remaining delegates), and Governor Marshall was the choice of the convention.

Somewhat surprised over the effectiveness of the plot, Marshall sent over his hastily written acceptance speech to the national committee and had it read to a mostly relieved audience.  He went on to deliver the remarks personally to a crowd in Indianapolis. It swore to uphold a progressive program, deliver to the promises of the Democratic platform, and wipe clean the slate leftover by President Hearst. The speech itself was nothing particularly special, but the sheer fact that it encompassed the core of the Democratic message without being held back by the ingrained drawbacks of Hearst or Bryan led to the speech's reprinting in most mainstream publications. The nominee advised the convention to settle on a more conservative option to balance out the perceived progressive nature of the selection, and to this the convention designated the nemesis of the New York City leadership: Senator George B. McClellan, Jr.

TWENTY-FIRST DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:VICE PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		1088 DELEGATES
George B. McClellan, Jr. ☑		799		887
William E. Chilton		80		0
William Sulzer		8		0
OTHERS/BLANK		201		201

[Pyro]

Former President Roosevelt Speaking in Chicago Convention Hall - Source: Wiki Commons

With the Democratic and Republican conventions formally wrapped up and their nominees ceremoniously decided, all that remained was for the Progressives to make their pick. The RNC and DNC each captured the attention of the country, especially the latter considering it revolved around President Hearst and his fight for the nomination, but neither event expressly appreciated the mood of the country in 1912. The Republicans latched squarely onto the Manhattan Scandal and chiefly focused on deriding the administration rather than offering an alternative vision for the United States. Democrats, largely distracted by factionalism and a deadlocked convention, chose neither Hearst's nor Bryan's interpretation of Democratic progressivism. It selected a wild-card and opted to begin from square-one as opposed to settling on either of the available former presidents with their respective bases. According to contemporaneous reporting and the slant of 1912-era editorials, much of America desired a return to stable familiarity whilst maintaining a progressive course. To this, just one candidate held all the cards.

Former President Theodore Roosevelt finally declared his decision in early March, and indeed chose to run once more for the presidency. Supporters clamored for the return of the Progressive standard bearer and wrote scores of letters addressed to the Rough Rider articulating that perspective. They considered his work unfinished and found Hearst's alleged corruption to blame for the lackluster election results four years ago. Furthermore, very few believed any of the alternative options could defeat the two predominant nominees. Butler had lined up a sea of high-dollar donations behind his campaign while Marshall gained swift support by powerful Democratic city managers and the Bryan machine. As rumors swirled of Hearst preparing to launch an independent bid for the White House, the Progressives knew that this fractured contest was their greatest shot at repeating their 1904 triumph.

Their Progressive leader concurred, and thereby treated his return to the political scene as a grandiose comeback much in the style of the late Grover Cleveland. Like Cleveland, Roosevelt was tossed from power in exchange for a divisive and economically untested replacement. Both retained an air of the presidency even in exile, and constantly absorbed the attention of the press. Coverage of ex-President Roosevelt was just as excessive, if not more so, than when he resided in Washington. As was not the case for Marshall and Butler, everyone knew of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and therefore he did not need to expend any energy defining himself on the national stage. As such, when the Progressive National Convention opened its doors in the Chicago Coliseum, it felt just as if the party was on the course of re-nominating an incumbent president rather than a former one.

On August 5th, thousands of delegates as well as political celebrities like Jane Addams and Samuel Gompers arrived to Chicago ready to begin the next chapter in American history. A defining feature of the Chicago PNC, one made apparent early on, was just how united this organization truly was. It was jarring, some reporters claimed, to witness a committee and a delegation completely undivided. This was the sole convention in 1912 that gave such an impression, and that benefited the Progressives immensely when it came to satisfying a stability-craved population. Walls were adorned with patriotic memorabilia and symbols, including American flags and picturesque depictions of Columbia (referencing their nickname), in addition to enormous portraits of Beveridge and Roosevelt overlooking the convention hall. It was quite clear who the nominee would be.

The finalized list of principles combined aspects of Roosevelt's New Nationalism, the Square Deal, and unaccomplished goals as listed in prior platforms. It applauded the eight-hour working day, emphasized the need for women's suffrage, and condemned the resurgence of industrial trusts. The Progressive platform also emphasized the achievements of the Roosevelt Administration as compared with the Democratic legacy, demonstrating the party's ability to provide significant results regardless of the status and makeup of Congress. Regarding foreign policy, the Progressives doubled-down on the need to expand the American sphere of influence abroad, grow overseas markets in developing nations and territories, aggressively stave off British interference in Cuba and French involvement in Latin America, and continue to foster amiable trade relations with Germany. That platform, the most left leaning of its three thus far, was unanimously supported by every last delegate.

THIRD PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		2105 DELEGATES
Theodore Roosevelt ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

The first and only roll call was unanimous. Theodore Roosevelt would be it. He appeared in-person at the arena and delivered a forceful and compelling speech which won a thirty-minute standing ovation and a romping iteration of "Hail, Columbia."

In every wise struggle for human betterment one of the main objects, and often the only object, has been to achieve in large measure equality of opportunity. In the struggle for this great end, nations rise from barbarism to civilization, and through its people press forward from one stage of enlightenment to the next. One of the chief factors in progress is the destruction of special privilege. The essence of any struggle for healthy liberty has always been, and must always be, to take from some one man or class of men the right to enjoy power, or wealth, or position, or immunity, which has not been earned by service to his or their fellows. That is what you fought for in the Civil War, and that is what we strive for now.

Now to you men, who, in your turn, have come together to spend and be spent in the endless crusade against wrong, to you who face the future resolute and confident, to you who strive in a spirit of brotherhood for the betterment of our nation, to you who gird yourselves for this great new fight in the never-ending warfare for the good of humankind, I say in closing what in that speech I said in closing: We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord.

         Theodore Roosevelt, Progressive Convention Acceptance Speech, Excerpt, 1912

The two-day affair concluded with the nomination of the vice president. There were several contenders, including the potential re-nomination of former Vice President Taft, but a strong recommendation by the national committee to end unsuccessful appeals to Republican voters eventually persuaded Roosevelt to prompt the delegation into its eventual direction. After some deliberation, they chose staunch progressive, railroad regulator Governor Hiram Johnson of California in unanimity. A committee majority found that Taft's probable enticing of Republicans equally deterred otherwise eager Progressive voters. Therefore, choosing a popular incumbent member of their own party was a no-brainer.

THIRD PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		2105 DELEGATES
Hiram Johnson ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

[Pyro]

Governor Thomas Marshall and First Lady Lois Marshall of Indiana - Source: Wiki Commons

Public opinion had grown less charitable to the idea of continuing half-hearted progress by 1912, and leaned into the idea of more serious, systemic reform to achieve economic equity. Reinforced with the reality of faux reform in Washington under Hearst, a more substantial fragment of the population now questioned the issues associated with a system based on exploiting labor. It was becoming increasingly common for one to belong to a labor union, and the stigma of joining a "radical" IWW local lessened considerably in the period between 1909 and 1912. Socialist editorials stayed prevalent in the public eye with subscriptions to newsletters like Appeal to Reason and Max Eastman's The Masses far surpassing figures in previous years. Enclaves of left-wing communities began sprouting forth in coastal and Midwestern regions, such as in the famously progressive Greenwich Village in New York.

Theodore Debs, the Socialist nominee's younger brother, managed the candidate's campaign and geared it to take advantage of recent developments. He ensured that the presidential effort appealed to young Village rebels just as fervently as it did so among union activists and traditional party members. Rallies numbered in the tens of thousands in support of the Socialist Party as the Red Express of 1912 traveled from town to town. Eugene Debs appeared alongside IWW leaders like Joseph Ettor, spoke in Denver with Bill Haywood, and enthralled crowds with Meyer London and Charles Russell at Madison Square Garden. He urged his listeners organize for industrial unionism and not be carried away with electoral reform as the be-all and end-all. "Revolution cannot be achieved in a day," he repeatedly stressed. "Never for a moment confuse reform for revolution and never abandon sight of the ultimate goal."

Not every unionized worker and social activist sided with the aging Socialist star, however. Although the SP's nominee captivated gargantuan audiences and obtained far more notoriety than in any prior election, the number of voters willing to offer their vote to that party was a distinct minority. All major presidential candidates voraciously professed some degree or another of pro-reform sentiment. Case in point, Governor Marshall looked to win over many of the same voters of Debs: Industrial workers, urbanites, and young and diverse communities. He reiterated his progressive record at every opportunity and tastefully pledged to accomplish similar goals if elected. Marshall named specific measures including expanding the primary system and instituting stringent guidelines on public officials to combat corruption (introduced during a critique of Hearst).

Marshall did not go as far as to support the eight-hour working day nor promote fundraising transparency out of a conscious effort to retain Southern Democrats in the coalition. Applauding expansive federalism would be impossible for the Democrat. With so many options available on the ballot to choose from, the last development he desired would be for Southerners to splinter the party. As thus, even though Marshall favored anti-trust action and economic opportunity for outmaneuvered small businesses, he could not offer the reform-hungry populations in the North and West much beyond that. Apart from proudly embracing prohibition, Marshall ducked any and all risky or controversial topics. His fellow Democrat in the White House, on the opposing end, was not held down by such strings.

August closed with four candidates in the ring. September began with five. President Hearst formally announced his plan to run for president as an independent on September 1st. Viewing himself as a sword-wielding hero atop a white horse, the incumbent declared that the political system was despairingly corrupt and necessitated a liberator. He began his campaign by voicing virulent fury toward Congress for knee-capping his presidency with a foolhardy, retaliatory investigation. He exclaimed that, "progress perished in the Legislature," and that the only way forward would be to elect self-reliant congressional candidates unaided by political parties and associations. This intense antagonism hardly helped Hearst's image, and, of anything, buttressed memories of the Manhattan Scandal to otherwise persuadable voters. He also no longer rallied against the state boss apparatus (ie, Boss Murphy) in the same tone that he had four years earlier. This likely propped up the perception of Hearst as a corrupt politician beholden to certain interests.

Still, not all was bleak for the incumbent. Hearst's status as a 'President without a Party' granted him incessant media coverage, and his base of dedicated proponents were not so quick to abandon their leader. As written by John Gardner, "Incumbency comes with certain advantages and disadvantages. One supremely essential plus in a presidential re-election campaign is brand loyalty, and Hearst had it. Regardless of the events of the Democratic National Convention and Marshall's presence on the campaign circuit, Hearst, as the sitting president, had friends in both high places and low places. [...] His managers took on more intensive roles in the autumn of 1912 as the campaign heated up, and they sought out to win support from a pool of responsive municipal groups and businesses. When unable to fulfill their task of achieving an endorsement, they would erect spurious counterparts - see Women's League for Hearst vs. National American Woman Suffrage Association."

Having invested enormous sums of private capital into the campaign thus far, Hearst was flat broke by early October. He spent an estimated $75,000 per week on the re-election effort, and when his own supplies ran dry, he took on immense loan debt. The president sporadically incorporated his fundraising difficulties into his campaign speeches, professing that the oil and steel trusts feared his reign and opted to sink his personal investments. Over the span of the first month of campaigning it gradually appeared as if he was losing his grip on the situation. His lifesaver market connections notwithstanding, Hearst was at severe risk of bankruptcy on a financial level and finishing dead last on the political front. Despite pushing endless campaign advertisements and editorials through his media enterprises, the president's figures in public polling were abysmal. In order to remain afloat, Hearst needed a new tactic.
    

The Des Moines Register
Presidential Preference Polling, October 1912

Theodore Roosevelt		35%
Thomas S. Butler		27%
Thomas R. Marshall		25%
William R. Hearst		09%
Eugene V. Debs		03%
Other		01%

[Pyro]

Bitter Rivals Theodore Roosevelt and William R. Hearst - Sources: Boston Public Library & Wiki Commons

The decisive campaigning period in late September through October was principally characterized by extensive stump speechmaking and celebratory rallies from each of the presidential candidates and their respective endorsers. Normalized as a standard feature of electioneering, all parties contesting the race now adopted the whistle-stop/regional touring approach once pioneered by President Bryan. The various teams, traveling by rail and the occasional buggy, dotted the map in search of excitable crowds and untapped electorates. This five-way race was completely unpredictable from start to finish, and with parties divided and ideologies splintered, even veteran analysts had profound difficulty predicting its outcome.

Speaker Butler and former Secretary Lincoln looked to build inroads among communities in swing states like Illinois and Pennsylvania, utilizing a similar campaign strategy to that of Senator Knox in 1908. The Republican nominee opted to run predominantly negative messaging in these areas, thereby mimicking the RNC in its stinging criticisms of President Hearst. Butler never hesitated in demeaning his electoral competitors as subpar, untrustworthy, and potentially dangerous, but it was undoubtedly Hearst who absorbed the lion's share of the assaults. More so than anyone, Butler hammered Hearst's do-nothing tenure and referred to his theoretical second-term as a wellspring of economic calamity and cultural ruination. He exclaimed that the, "integrity of the republic," was dependent upon the outcome of the race, and only through a sharp rebuke of Hearst and Democratic corruption could the nation endure. Butler took on some flak from his contemporaries for stopping short of grouping Roosevelt in with Hearst, and indeed the House speaker did not frequently condemn the Progressives nor its presidential ticket - especially not with the same fire with which he condemned Hearst, but the overall strategy was working. The Pennsylvanian's October poll numbers and forecasted percentage of the vote had already exceeded expectations.

The Republican presidential campaign in 1912 was, by far, the most sophisticated and well-funded of the bunch. Progressives relied on small businesses for financial endorsements and Democrats looked to city organizations and Southern investors, but the Republicans retained an unmoving lock on corporate support. The giant trusts all sided with Butler and dedicated huge sums to his cause, as had the Pullman and Vanderbilt families. The Butler Campaign also did wonders in terms of printed advertisements along the eastern seaboard with election ads appearing in most mainstream publications (outside of the Hearst papers, of course). The congressman's greatest strengths, a proven bipartisan ability to negotiate legislatively and a knack for attaining mild cross-over appeal with moderate Progressives, made Butler a far weightier presence in the race than other GOP contenders in recent memory. His strategic dispatching of Lincoln in the Midwest helped immensely to the party's prospective fortune as well.

Even with Butler doing well in the East and Marshall garnering support in the South, the splintered field benefited no one quite as well as it had Theodore Roosevelt. The former president comfortably led every national poll, attracted the largest audiences, kept a healthy relationship with small financiers, and played to the desire of an America looking for familiarity. Roosevelt echoed the bullet points of his New Nationalism at each speaking venue and drove home the need for an active federal government that preserved economic growth and shielded average Americans from corporate leeches. He promoted an increased tariff to benefit American factorial production, promised a "living wage" for workers, and even adopted Democratic positions concerning electoral reform (national primaries, the recall, and the initiative). He spoke in unmistakably positive terms, skillfully latching onto and directing the emotions of the crowds. "What we Progressives are trying to do," he roared with his distinctive ebullience, "is to enroll rich or poor, whatever their social or industrial position, to stand together for the most elementary rights of good citizenship, those elementary rights which are the foundation of good citizenship in this great Republic of ours."

Nevertheless, trouble brewed for the Progressive standard bearer. As the frontrunner in the race, a bright red target was painted squarely on his back. Just as Butler often refused to chide the former president, Roosevelt conspicuously declined to speak to the ills of the Republican Party. It appeared to be an unspoken gentlemen's agreement betwixt the two men, likely to focus all fire at the incumbent in a joint effort. This tactic was somewhat effective in that moderates were seemingly split as opposed to tuning out in favor of the Democratic candidate, but it allowed for President Hearst to launch a rather unexpected barrage of attacks against the two leading figures. In a chain of advertisements, press interviews, and speeches, the Napoleon of the American Press charged that Butler and Roosevelt were disreputably conspiring to rob the voters of a fair election. More specifically, he decreed that the Rough Rider was merely donning a progressive persona for the purposes of winning the election. Afterward, Hearst purported, Roosevelt would inevitably regress to his 1908-era conciliatory tone with the GOP.

My fight has always been for the interests of the people. That, I expect, has been made clear these past four years. The scheming and conniving of certain characters and anti-democratic societies has made progress stagnant. They have intimidated us, they have rejected our calls for compromise, and now they have converged to permanently forestall our movement for honest governance. Mr. Roosevelt recently, and proudly, admitted to sawing the edges from his program to appeal to the enemies of progress. Mr. Roosevelt can boast of a belated honesty, so why not be completely frank with the public and tell the whole truth? To labor, to women, to the jobless, to the sick, he will not spare one crumb. It is the standpat program for which Mr. Roosevelt fights. You may vote for a Progressive, but you shall receive a Republican.

         William R. Hearst, "Campaign Speech in St. Louis", October 19th, 1912

This move revived Hearst's faltering operation in an unprecedented fashion and reinvigorated his most fervent supporters. The unrelenting assault onto Roosevelt's character and prolific accusations of under-the-table shuffling reminded Hearst's fans why they fancied the charismatic businessman to begin with. For them, Hearst spoke the gospel truth, and nothing offered by the other candidates could match that. Suspecting collusion by the old parties against the new age of reform was Hearst's bread and butter, and in making this charge a centerpiece in his campaign, the business magnate rose refreshed.  A letter in the New York Herald summarized the shape of the late autumn election. "The American people, like all people, are interested in personality. If they are asked to vote they want to know whom and what they are voting for. If any man casts a vote for Hearst for President, he will know that Hearst is answerable only to him. [...] He appeals to the people, not to a boss or corporation. Not even the most venal of newspapers has suggested that anybody owns Hearst, or that he would be influenced by anything save the will of the people in the event of his election."

In the terms of the Hearst Campaign, only with a continuance of the current policies could the country embark toward true "patriotic progressivism" and genuine reform. They drilled it in as a life-or-death choice. Hearst's professed policies of protecting the virtue of government from insidious influences went together with keeping American property and American lives safe along the border with Mexico. Of all five candidates, the incumbent alone brought up intervention in Mexico as a realistic endeavor. While Roosevelt, Butler, and Marshall mostly put a spotlight on keeping relations with Germany tidy and fending off European influence in the Caribbean, none but Hearst consistently exploited local foreign policy to their advantage. "The Others May Bring Us to the Grave, I Know Hearst Will Keep Us Safe!" one pro-Hearst pamphlet read. After a lengthy interval, it seemed Hearst had returned to his old self, and that was what the other candidates feared most of all.

    

Literary Digest Poll
November 1912

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.		27% Pop., 157 Electoral Votes, 18 States
Thomas R. Marshall		24% Pop., 152 Electoral Votes, 14 States
Thomas S. Butler		24% Pop., 127 Electoral Votes, 12 States
William R. Hearst		19% Pop., 095 Electoral Votes, 04 States
Eugene V. Debs		05% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States
Other		01% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States

[Pyro]

House Speaker Thomas Butler on the Campaign Trail, October 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

Following a tumultuous set of nominating conventions and a bitter campaign season, Election Day 1912 finally arrived. The disparate candidacies completed their final events and their complex campaigns officially closed shop. Roosevelt and Hearst operations concluded in New York City at separate venues, Butler appeared for the final time as an active candidate from the front porch of his West Chester home in Southeastern Pennsylvania, Marshall settled in at a St. Louis hotel, and Debs wrapped up his last campaign showing in Sacramento. National polls proved the malleability of this race as Roosevelt's lead diminished slightly since early October, yet it could hardly be denied that the Progressive preserved the greatest degree of enthusiasm out of the presidential field. Some press contributors still estimated a landslide in favor of the Rough Rider despite the polls reflecting otherwise. In any metric, this election was Roosevelt's to lose, and coming up short would likely spell the end of the former president's career.

President Hearst, meanwhile, was met with a last-ditch effort by the Democratic Party to blockade the now-independent from interrupting the vote. Some two-dozen state governments announced, roughly six days before the scheduled election, that the president would not be included on their official ballots. These election authorities referred to various procedural missteps and errors in the Hearst Campaign's haphazard filing. As such, these powers exclaimed that the president's name would be removed from the final printing. This phenomenon was not an official policy of any political party, but the states enacting such decision making were predominantly in or along the border of the South. State election officials deliberately handed down this development at the final hour, knowing full well Hearst would not have an adequate window to fight it. Southern Democrats were not about to allow for a split Democratic electorate if it could be prevented, as even a single Republican victory would speculatively amount to utter embarrassment. Not one state overruled its ruling. This left the business magnate at a major strategic disadvantage.

The above fear among Democrats that a split vote could harm their notoriety just as the 1904 Progressive schism damaged the GOP was prevalent going into November 5th. Very few publications predicted a victory for Governor Marshall, and even fewer for President Hearst. "Frankly, neither had the numbers," wrote election historian George Alexander in The Four Elections That Shaped America. "Discounting their inherent Southern advantage, the Democratic Party was unable to withstand even a 10% loss. Even for William Jennings Bryan, the Champion of the West, victory in the Great Plains and in spotty Mountain districts counted on carrying every possible vote. [...] Roosevelt once robbed a mere portion of Bryan's sums and that was enough to carry him to the White House with an Electoral majority." As previously inferred, the potentiality of a rift in the Democratic vote benefited Roosevelt immeasurably, and he presumptively prayed that split would be enough to sidestep an underperformance.

On the evening of the election, as the vote count progressed and states began reporting their figures, early signs appeared promising for the Progressive Party. Roosevelt had a promising Popular Vote advantage in the bulk of Northeastern and Midwestern swing states, perhaps due to his middle-class precincts reporting sooner than in poorer and more diverse communities, but it slowly, steadily dissipated as the night went on. Fortunately for their standard-bearer, Maine was called for the Progressive column far sooner than in previous cycles. It seemed Hearst only won a meager 8% out of Augusta, but that 8% derived exclusively from the Democratic vote. Democratic division drove their nominee far into third place, and boosted Butler to a distant second. As for the remainder of New England, the Republican nominee performed roughly as well in that region as Knox and Depew. Massachusetts was a bit closer, and Roosevelt hoped to replicate his stunning 1904 Boston win via a superbly constructed media blitz, but Butler successfully grabbed the Bay State, 32% to 27%.

Theodore Roosevelt was, however, able to assert dominance in New Jersey. A state politically fissured between its popular Democratic governor and its two Progressive senators, New Jersey became a textbook visualization of Democratic splintering costing that party any remote chance of success. This practically assured Roosevelt an easy win with little effort required. Some analysts and Democratic operatives within the Marshall Campaign hoped that the presence of Governor Wilson would push its electorate toward their side of the ballot, but the "Hearst Factor" dividing ballots allowed the Progressive firebrand to outpace his previous attempts in the Garden State. Roosevelt won New Jersey's 14 Electoral Votes with 38% of the vote, in conjunction with Butler's 29%, Marshall's 23% and Hearst's 9%. For comparison's sake, the latter managed 33% in 1908.

Always politically capricious, New York state remained a fickle beast. State government officials as directed by Governor Chanler meticulously monitored some of the busiest polling places as a means to assuage fears of repeated corruption. In the aftermath of the endlessly discussed Manhattan Scandal, many New Yorkers residing in the five boroughs fretted that their votes may not be counted or counted incorrectly due to Tammany shenanigans. Chanler privately believed the measure was unnecessary, but he acquiesced to the demands of the population and planted 'watchdogs' in those precincts marked for high risk of malpractice. As a direct result, the 1912 election in New York may indeed have been one of the safest up to that point with few irregularities to note.

New York, in a unified voice, resoundingly rejected the prospect of re-electing President Hearst. The incumbent and former governor received a humiliating 4% of the tally in his apparent home state. Even in the event of rampant voter fraud and a recreation of the very worst practices in electoral history, the scandal-ridden businessman was always doomed to lose in the Empire State. The State Democratic Party refused to comment on the entrance of Hearst as an independent candidate, and fully endorsed Governor Marshall at the closing of the Democratic Convention. Hearst's state-wide allies, once instrumental in swaying New York to the Democratic column, were totally disinterested in the renewed candidacy. Democrats may have been dejected from the election, considering Marshall finished in a distant third nearing fourth-place Eugene Debs. Butler ran extraordinarily close to Roosevelt, but it was the latter who emerged victorious in that bout. By a margin of 3%, the Progressive leader finally won his coveted New York.

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Cartoon Depicting Eugene Debs Rising Above the Hearst-Roosevelt Fray - Source: LoC

Four years earlier, Senator Philander Knox narrowly lost his home state by a margin of about 2%. Roosevelt, in that previous election, succeeded in harvesting Pennsylvania's vote after triumphantly locking in support from municipal workers in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. It was Debs who managed to pull of this stunt in 1912. Debs captured a decent portion of the Keystone State's significant urban and left-leaning vote, albeit falling to bits in the more conservative countryside. This fortuitous rise of the Socialist candidate was a one of two sure-fire blows to the dismayed Progressive. The other was a stellar performance by the Republican nominee. Apparently a far more beloved public official than Knox, Butler conquered the home field advantage accompanied by a wide majority of middle-class voters. Therefore, Butler snagged the state out from Roosevelt's nose.

President Hearst retained some sense of adoration among former Populists in Mississippi and Arkansas, and was initially anticipated to perform fairly well in the Southern states, but on the whole his results in this region were negligible. When listed as the 1908 Democratic nominee, Hearst swept the South. In 1912, he did not exceed 3% in any one state. Indeed, Governor Marshall sailed to successive wins in the Deep South and carried Texas with ease. Beyond the Southernmost part of the nation, however, Marshall encountered pronounced difficulties the likes of which no Democrat in recent history was forced to reckon with. In states along the border of the American South, Hearst received noteworthy totals through tremendous write-in campaigns. In Kentucky, for example, the incumbent managed to pull out 8% of the total vote even though his name did not appear on the state ballot. This sharply pained the Democratic effort and produced a rather unexpected outcropping.

Marshall held on in Kentucky after a shockingly tight vote, finishing about seven points ahead of the competition. Likewise, the contender won out in Missouri by about 10% despite early reports indicating a Republican lean. The trouble came with Democratic division in the remaining three states. In West Virginia, a state traditionally won by Democrats (apart from the 1900 election), a combination of Progressive collapse and Hearst segmenting the Democratic electorate resulted in a Butler victory with about 31% of the total count. The same stunning scenario played out, scene-for-scene, in Maryland and Delaware. Marshall, of course, was furious.

As for the American West, it reconfirmed its unambiguous preference for the Progressive Party. Although many rural farmers admitted some interest in the Hearst candidacy while others leaned into the left-wing messaging offered by Debs, few seemed fascinated by the Eastern-centric Marshall/McClellan ticket. Burgeoning cities in Colorado and the Dakotas expressed clear-cut support for Roosevelt, while Butler struggled to keep up his second place standing. His wins remained stuck in the mid-30s percentile, but the former president successfully carried nearly every Western state that pledged support for the Columbians in 1904. Even Bryan's Nebraska and Hearst's California narrowly chose Roosevelt out of the five-man field. Utah alone stayed a staunch beacon of Republicanism in a sea of Progressivism.

President Hearst made a serious play at the newer Southwestern states deep into the election season. He believed that these former territories would be more receptive to antagonizing Mexican revolutionaries considering their experiences along the Mexican border. For the president, concentrating on American security potentially outshined the more positive campaign themes utilized by Marshall and Roosevelt. To some degree, he was correct in determining their infatuation with such language. Hearst did secure some his strongest showings in the Southwest, surpassing 10% in both states. This was hardly enough to set oneself apart from the field, however, and all it truly accomplished was setting back the official Democratic nominee. At the end of the day, Butler took New Mexico and Roosevelt eked ahead in Arizona - each by some thousand votes.

At last, in the central boiling pot of swing states and sheer unpredictability of the Midwest, some of the closest matches reached their end. Roosevelt maintained his natural advantages among small business owners, city workers, and tenant farmers throughout the entire region with a distinctive asterisk regarding Debs' base of unskilled industrial workers. Marshall fell far behind in this pivotal arena and could only surpass the pack in his gubernatorial base of Indiana. In any other electoral contest, Roosevelt would have attained checkmate, but the involvement of the Butler Campaign in Midwestern cities was dramatically underestimated. Possessing a near-unlimited war chest, a constant stream of favorable editorials, and endorsements by several city governments, Speaker Butler managed to do exceptionally well in Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan. The simple inclusion of Robert Todd Lincoln also seemed to profoundly help the Republican cause.  

The final results of the race did not trickle in for some time, and that aspect kept everyone on edge. Wednesday, November 6th went on with no one candidate named the winner. Michigan went to Roosevelt, then Illinois did the same. Both counts were intense, and indeed kept the attention of the prospective presidents, but at that point it no longer mattered. Due to the arrangement of the Electoral Votes as is, and upon confirmation from Governor John Tener (R-PA) that the margins in Pennsylvania were not close enough to merit a recount, it was impossible for any candidate to meet the require 266 count needed to assume the presidency. Roosevelt held an ascertained plurality in both the Electoral and Popular Vote, but the division of the electorate had finally unleashed the ultimate consequence. The Presidential Election of 1912 would not be determined by the voters, but by the United States Congress in a contingent election.

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The Election of 1912: Final Results

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1912 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Democratic: 36 (-7)
Republican: 32 (-2)
Progressive: 28 (+9)

House **
Progressive: 148 (+47)
Republican: 139 (-9)
Democratic: 121 (-15)
Socialist: 16 (+10)
Independent: 11 (+9)

  Senate Leadership

Senate President Not Yet Determined
President pro tempore Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA)
Caucus Chairman Robert L. Owen (D-OK)
Conference Chairman Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN)
Conference Chairman Robert La Follette (P-WI)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader James R. Mann (R-IL)
Minority Leader Oscar Underwood (D-AL)
Minority Leader Victor L. Berger (S-WI)
Minority Leader Daniel A. Driscoll (I-NY)

Coinciding with the presidential race was the similarly heated elections for Congress. Voters not only had to fend with a monster of a ballot concerning the five-man contest for the White House, but they too cast their preference for congressional identification. Leaving aside the Progressive slant of the national Popular Vote, the odds that the incoming president would line-up ideologically with the incoming Congress were exceptionally slim. Nevertheless, the Columbian torch shone bright as the insurgent faction captured enough House seats to outnumber either of their rival parties. Furthermore, the Socialists more than doubled their congressional representation. The elder two political organizations did not far quite so well in 1912.

The splinter within the ranks of the Democratic Party immeasurably affected the contentious election on the presidential stage, but that aspect also played a role on congressional, state, and local levels. Democratic voters were, overall, less likely to turn out to vote in 1912 than in any prior contest in the past decade. Some historians attribute that facet to Hearst rallying his supporters against the whole of the party establishment and its national committee (in addition to its sitting legislators). It is also speculated that Democratic turnout was generally depressed due to the presence of the unpopular incumbent with a lackluster record. Governor Marshall hoped to persuade voters to back a Congress receptive to their agenda, but his team performed about as poorly in 1912 as they had in 1904. This was nowhere near a 1894-esque disaster, but it did the Jeffersonian branch no favors.

A small assortment of pro-administration Democrats joined with the president's break from the party system and likewise ran as independents. Fewer than ten managed to retain congressional office after partaking in this stunt, and zero independent challengers found success. Like with Hearst, nonaffiliated candidates were largely unable to find a coherent base in the already-divided field. Only fellow Democrats seemed fascinated at all by the so-called "Civic League" (a la Hearst's Civic Liability Program) class of representatives, meaning their sole legacy had been segmenting the Democratic portion of the national electorate. This group would eventually create its own House caucus led by avid Hearst Democrat Daniel Driscoll (I-NY).

Vote-splitting and Hearst-like resentment toward the Democratic Party for allegedly conspiring to rob the incumbent of the nomination dramatically changed the outcome of the Senate races. Deeply entrenched senators like Ben Tillman (D-SC) and Furnifold Simmons (D-NC) encountered huge drop-offs in their respective vote totals. Simmons, who in 1906 was unopposed for re-election, defeated Republican and Independent Democratic challengers with a mere 14% margin to spare. For incumbents in the Solid South, this problem was a curious footnote. Yet, to those in swing states, this development proved an utter nightmare. Senator Ebe Tunnell, for example, (D-DE) lost his race by an astonishing 14% to Butler-backed Republican opponent Harry Richardson. Even in Kentucky, a state that had elected almost entirely Democrats since the Civil War, the Democratic incumbent fell to a member of the typically maligned GOP. In total, 40% of the Democratic-held Class 2 Senate seats were vanquished in the 1912 elections.

Republican candidates, on the whole, failed to capitalize on the political atmosphere in the same vein as Speaker Butler. The GOP nominee's ability to tie federal stagnation and corruption with Hearst whilst avoiding pledges to abide by popular, progressive policies turned out to be particularly pivotal. Very few could, or desired to, replicate Butler's strategy. Conservative Republicans ran as conservatives, and for this they paid a heavy price, electorally. Appointed replacements for retiring or deceased senators unanimously fell to more Progressive challengers. Former Lieutenant Governor Lawrence Sherman of Illinois, the designated successor to Senate titan and a self-proclaimed economic moderate Shelby Cullom, crumbled to avid pro-regulatory Representative Frank Hamilton Funk (P-IL) when the former opted to run his campaign on the principles of strict conservatism and opposition to Theodore Roosevelt. More so demonstrating that Butler represented an aberration of the norm, liberally minded Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN) formally ran his re-election campaign as a member of the Progressives. Of this decision, Nelson only remarked that Minnesotans stood to benefit more from the Progressive platform than that of the GOP.

Once the outcome became clear, that of a mass influx of Progressives asserting genuine power in the legislature, those newly elected congressmen gleefully awaited the assumed anointment of their influential standard-bearer on the presidential level. It was thought by Progressive politicians that Roosevelt would carry a discernable mandate, if not in a surefire landslide. New York's call for the former president rallied this crowd toward the belief that their prediction would soon be validated. When Pennsylvania and Ohio slipped through the cracks, however, Roosevelt's congressional champions faced a completely new and unanticipated reality. Regardless of their promising moves to prevail in these congressional elections, the duty of selecting a president and vice president in a contingent election fell to the outgoing class. Barring any further surprises, the Republican-majority House and Democratic-majority Senate of the seemingly expired 62nd Congress would be tasked with deciding the race. In the kindest possible terms, the Progressives were supremely outraged at that discovery and braced for the fight of their lives.

Senators Elected in 1912 (Class 2)

John H. Bankhead (D-AL): Democratic Hold, 93%
John N. Heiskell (D-AR): Democratic Hold, 69%
Frank Catlin (P-CO): Progressive Gain, 48%
Henry A. Richardson (R-DE): Republican Gain, 48%
Augustus Bacon (D-GA): Democratic Hold, 91%
William E. Borah (P-ID): Progressive Hold, 51%
Frank H. Funk (P-IL): Progressive Gain, 44%
William P. Hepburn (P-IA): Progressive Hold, 49%
Charles Curtis (P-KS): Progressive Hold, 46%
Edwin T. Morrow (R-KY): Republican Gain, 42%
Murphy J. Foster (D-LA): Democratic Hold, 90%
E.M. Thompson (P-ME): Progressive Gain, 42%
John W. Weeks (R-MA): Republican Hold, 53%
William A. Smith (R-MI): Republican Hold, 42%
Knute Nelson (P-MN): Progressive Gain, 53%
LeRoy Percy (D-MS): Democratic Hold, 81%
Joseph M. Dixon (P-MT): Progressive Gain, 47%
George W. Norris (P-NE): Progressive Gain, 44%
*Samuel Summerfield (P-NV): Progressive Gain, 41%
John H. Bartlett (R-NH): Republican Hold, 46%
Franklin Murphy (P-NJ): Progressive Hold, 48%
Albert B. Fall (P-MN): Progressive Gain, 40%
Furnifold Simmons (D-NC): Democratic Hold, 58%
Robert L. Owen (D-OK): Democratic Hold, 44%
Jonathan Bourne Jr. (P-OR): Progressive Hold, 41%
LeBaron B. Colt (R-RI): Republican Hold, 49%
Benjamin Tillman (D-SC): Democratic Hold, 82%
Thomas Sterling (P-SD): Progressive Gain, 44%
John K. Shields (D-TN): Democratic Hold, 53%
John Morris Sheppard (D-TX): Democratic Hold, 70%
Thomas S. Martin (D-VA): Democratic Hold, 71%
Nathan Goff, Jr. (R-WV): Republican Hold, 53%
Frank W. Mondell (P-WY): Progressive Gain, 47%

*Special Election
**House of Representatives expanded to 435 seats per 1910 census reapportionment.

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New York Tribune Front Page, November 6th, 1912 - Source: LoC

Following an extraneous election season ripe with drama, party splitting, and mudslinging, the country was now forced to endure an elongated period of uncertainty. None of the candidates were able to surpass the necessary number of votes in the Electoral College. That meant that the election remained contested. This predicament had not come to pass since 1824, when a multi-pronged field resulted in a corresponding split electorate. Andrew Jackson received a greater portion of the votes than any of his competitors in that race, yet Congress eventually designated John Quincy Adams the victor in the subsequent contingent election. Controversy plagued that result, with Jackson supporters proclaiming the existence of an Adams-led "corrupt bargain" involving fourth place finisher Henry Clay. Four years later, Jackson was swept into office with an outright majority.

"Election to Be Decided in Congress," read a New York Times headline on November 7th. At first, none were certain that a contingent election was necessary. It was not out of the realm of possibility for the closest states to issue a recount or otherwise further explore the vote totals, yet, once these state governments fully verified their respective votes as previously outlined, there was no longer avoiding a congressional face-off. The dreaded thought of a contingent contest was now a guaranteed reality.

Governor Thomas Marshall held onto a meager 25% of the Popular Vote and an Electoral tally of 182. Through no true fault of his own, the Hoosier did rather horribly in the presidential election and ended with fewer net votes than even Richard Olney in 1904. Marshall and his campaign staff squarely blamed President Hearst's independent run for their misfortune and took no responsibility for the failure to contain Democratic strongholds like Maryland and Delaware. The governor counted his blessings, however, when news of Ohio and Pennsylvania reached his team. Not all was lost, it seemed. In theory, Marshall could still win it out.

Theodore Roosevelt, like Marshall, unceasingly watched the election play out. He understood the severity of the situation when the lower Midwest tilted away from the Progressive line and leaned into Republican territory. Roosevelt knew the importance of making the first move instead of allowing Butler or Marshall to grasp the initiative. If left to its own devices, Congress could be unpredictable, but if properly persuaded, the chance of victory was tenable. Fiery as ever, the former president appeared before a collection of newsmen and publicists to deliver a post-election address.

In the days when all governmental power existed exclusively in the king or in the baronage and when the people had no shred of that power in their own hands, then it undoubtedly was true that the people themselves had no voice in political affairs. But today, the people have, actually or potentially, the right to voice their political will onto the government. It is theirs to use and exercise if they choose to use and exercise it. The American people by a great plurality have decided in favor of the Progressive program. Like all good citizens, I implore Congress speak to the political will of the people and cast their judgement selflessly.

         Theodore Roosevelt, Post-Election Speech, November 7th, 1912

Roosevelt expected a win and fell short. For that he intended to fight to the last vote. Butler never anticipated an outright win, but he was granted, perhaps, his single best chance at reaching it. The Republican went to bed on November 5th confident that either Marshall or Roosevelt would have won by morning, disregarding newspaper predictions and national polling in that process. He hoped to outperform Knox and Depew, and thereby secure the continued presence of the national Republican Party as a viable force in contemporary politics. When he awoke the next day and learned that he achieved about one quarter of the vote, that end-goal changed drastically. Pushing the race to Congress was the best possible result for the GOP. The 62nd House of Representatives was controlled by a Republican-led coalition, and to top it all off, Butler himself was the commander of that coalition. In the right circumstances, Butler could nab the White House and effectively mimic the John Quincy Adams strategy.

As the public eagerly awaited the upcoming session of Congress and the above three presidential campaigns erratically reconfigured their organizations, President Hearst could only stew in misery. He lost every ounce of political capital on a failed piece of legislation, confronted nation-wide humiliation, was outwitted, and outmaneuvered at the Democratic National Convention, and now met with a defeat of historic proportions. Never in American history had an incumbent president lose in such a colossal fashion, with less than 10% of the vote and zero pledged electors. Furthermore, as the fourth-place finisher, his name would not be considered for president in the House contingent election. Although, that is not to say that he would play no role in that contest.

Each of the major campaigns, Hearst's included, frantically worked to schedule meetings with members of Congress in advance of its call to order. All available congresspersons (exempting Butler) were reportedly approached by the campaign officers in one manner or another. The situation was extraordinarily fluid, regardless of party affiliations. The varying House coalitions over the past decade seemed to precisely establish the plausibility for shifting allegiances. Per the 12th Amendment to the Constitution, "the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote [...] and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice." Voting would not take place on an individual basis, but by blocs of state delegations. If one campaign had the capability to entice a majority of one state's delegation, that counted as a single vote. In order to win, 25 states, or one over half, was required. In the words of George Alexander, "1801, 1825, and 1913. None (of the contingent elections) took place smoothly as intended. Plagues of dirty politics and allegations of corruption hovered over all three processes. 1913 perchance the worst of all.