🇩🇪 German elections (federal & EU level)

[palandio]

The following points have been made quite often during the last few years and often used at the same time:
- Immigrants are refugees fleeing from war, persecution and terrible circumstances.
- Immigrants can help us cope with demographic change as skilled workers and professionals.
- Immigrants are ready and willing to adapt to our society and accept the rules.

While all of this is true for many immigrants, for some immigrants none of it is true. In my opinion it is exactly the continuous denial of problems by some parts(!) of media and politics that has contributed to poisoning the debate. (The AfD and their friends of course have a major interest in a poisoned debate, but calling them out for it is like calling the kettle black.)

The highest number in the poll is 60% saying that Roma and related groups are prone to crime. It is not enough to say that they're all engineers and doctors. And yes, it is true that the public image of (immigrated) Roma is affected by some of the most visible groups among them who don't represent all of the rest of the Roma.

Maybe it would be good to also speak about some of those 50,000-100,000 Roma who came to Germany in the 70s as guest workers from Yugoslavia, many of whom were very happy to work and integrate themselves into society. Maybe it would be good to shed some more light on the situation in construction, where hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans do hard work, a sizeable number of them Roma, the working conditions differing quite a lot from case to case. Maybe it would be good to report about Roma from Romania, Bulgaria or Hungary who come to Germany to work and live just like many of their fellow citizens.

But that doesn't make the problems go away. Thousands of Roma or Turkized Roma are moving from the poorest ghettos of Bulgaria to the de-industrialized central strip of the Ruhr area, in the hope to find work, via other Roma or Turks that are already living there. But there is no work and many of them struggle to adapt to the civilized livestyle that their German, Turkish and Italian neighbors expect. Other Roma are brought to Germany by organized clans as beggars and thiefs. I think that it is possible to solve these problems in a way that is fair to the involved "simple" Roma. But the problems need to be solved and for that need to be acknowledged.

[palandio]

Rates of employment in jobs with obligatory social insurance by citizenship in August 2018:
Germany 68.6%
not Germany 49.9%
Pakistan 43.6%
Nigeria 39.1%
Eritrea 38.2%
Iran 37.9%
Afghanistan 32.5%
Somalia 28.7%
Iraq 27.7%
Syria 26.0%

Numbers are not comparable with Omega21's EU statistics. It should be noted that the employment rates of citizens from the states mentioned above have risen a lot during the last year.

Source: https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statischer-Content/Statistische-Analysen/Statistische-Sonderberichte/Generische-Publikationen/Fluchtmigration.pdf

[palandio]

There are new allegations of hidden financing of the AfD by Swiss-based German multi-billionaire August von Finck Jr. who in the past has already given money to the short lived anti-Euro League of Free Citizens (BFB) and later CSU and then FDP (the hotel tax scandal).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_von_Finck_Jr.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-unterstuetzung-die-spur-zu-milliardaer-august-von-finck-a-1240069.html

[palandio]

Is Merz considered to be favored? Virtually all the discourse that I've seen just assumes that Merz would be the next leader, even though it seems to me like an internal election in a deeply establishmentarian party like the CDU (as opposed to an Anglophone type of primary) should give a victory to the establishment candidate, who would be AKK.

No, AKK is clearly favored.
I compiled a list of all latest polls about the CDU chairmanship election in the respective thread:

Ok, I'll let you respond to yourself:

[...] Therefore polls of the general popoulation or the CDU-members do not really give any prediction about who is going to win in the end, [...]

Hm, I thought that has long been clarified.
[...]

Do you understand what some of us consider the problem? A list of all the latest polls is only meaningful to a certain degree when they're polling CDU voters and not delegates. Comprende?

[palandio]

seems more like the Social Democratic Parties are victims of their own success - the social democratic policies they pushed for more or less have survived in the policies of other parties. After all, it's not like any of the other parties are pushing for the abolition of public healthcare or co-determination in the workplace.

I would tend to agree...but in Germany this does not really apply. The current surging party of the left is the Greens, who happily carried through all the Agenda 2010 neoliberal reforms while in Government with the SPD. If this were really a rebellion against Leftists doing neoliberal politics, then the Left party should be surging? They arent, quite the contrary. Why is the AFD so successful among working-class voters despite their even more hardline neoliberal position? Why did the SPD retain their Vote with Schröder in 2005 even after having pushed through Agenda 2010, and why did the SPD only really tank while in Grand Coalition, where they actually did get quite leftist policies through, such as the minimum wage, and rent control?

I agree with the "Blair screwed Labour narrative" in the UK, but here in Germany it does not really add up.

That's not what CrabCake meant at all. By "their own success" he meant enabling millions of working class people and their children to become middle class and thus radically transforming their own classical voter base. Not during the last 30 years, but more like during the last 70 years.

Regarding your post:
- The Greens gain only partially from former SPD voters. Plus exactly what CrabCake said applies: Many former working class members or their children are now economically and culturally not working class anymore.
- The Left gives lower middle class voters the impression that it wants to take away things from them and give it to others.
- The AfD is profitting from a climate of de-solidarization established over the last 15-20 years. Why show solidarity to outsiders if the welfare state shows much less solidarity towards you than in the past when push comes to shove?
- Schröder was an extraordinarily gifted campaigner. He almost let the hardcore-neoliberal full-of-itself 2005 CDU take itself out from the race. In 2009 the CDU seemed much more harmless.
- Even after 2005 the SPD was co-responsible for politics like raising the pension age to 67 and raising the VAT.
- About twice the minimum wage (before taxes) is still an average wage at best. So how would the minimum wage affect most voters directly?
- Rent control doesn't help you when you have difficulties to find a house or appartment in the first place. Plus it can easily be painted as ineffective or even counterproductive.
- I might ad the recently introduced early retirement scemes at 63. They are for a small privileged group of mostly men who started earning money at a very early age and then were lucky enough to be employed all the time, probably at a stable medium-to-large well-paying company.

[palandio]

That's not what CrabCake meant at all. By "their own success" he meant enabling millions of working class people and their children to become middle class and thus radically transforming their own classical voter base. Not during the last 30 years, but more like during the last 70 years.

But then her Assertion makes little sense. During the same time as Social Democracy has been in decline, i.e. since the 1990s, the German (like the American) Middle Class has shrunk. Similarly those in Germany with the lowest incomes have increased since the mid-90s from some 17% of the Population to 22%, yet Social Democratic fortunes have not. Of course there has been a change in the traditional "working class", such as a change from low-paid manufacturing to low-paid service jobs, but that is not down to "social democrats success". If anything Social Democrats tried to slow down this inevitable trend of globalization, such as through helping industries in Germany, that would have been closed long ago if it were only for their profitability and preventing the full-scale change to a service based economy like in the UK.

That's neither what I meant nor what I wrote (and imho not what CrabCake meant). I'm not talking about "since the 90s" but about a much longer time horizon.
After WWII a majority of people was working class in one way or the other. The descendants of this working class are now culturally, socially and economically very diverse. A part is now in low-paid service jobs, but these people are electorally much less relevant than the mentioned 22% suggests, because many are foreigners and the rest has low turnout. A part has profitted from the opened education system and is now part of the academic middle class, with a different lifestyle and cultural attitudes. And a part is now "lower middle class", people in skilled jobs who earn clearly more than the minimum wage and who have something to lose. The last group can be seen as a (much smaller) functional successor to the old working class, which has profitted from strong unions (traditionally linked to social democracy in Germany) in the past and is still quite well-off, but has reasons to worry.

- Even after 2005 the SPD was co-responsible for politics like raising the pension age to 67 and raising the VAT.
- About twice the minimum wage (before taxes) is still an average wage at best. So how would the minimum wage affect most voters directly?
- Rent control doesn't help you when you have difficulties to find a house or appartment in the first place. Plus it can easily be painted as ineffective or even counterproductive.
- I might ad the recently introduced early retirement scemes at 63. They are for a small privileged group of mostly men who started earning money at a very early age and then were lucky enough to be employed all the time, probably at a stable medium-to-large well-paying company.

Well you may criticize the policies of the Grand coalitions of being not left-wing enough, but the SPD has in the Grand Coalitions from 2005 presided over decreases in inequality and still the SPD only really went down after 2005.
(Citation here) Inequality went up massively between 2000-2005, only to go down again from 2005-2009 (first Grand Coalition), went up again until 2014 (CDU-FDP) and since has gone down again (2., 3. Grand Coalition). It can hardly be argued that Government economic policy, especially that of the CDU, did not shift leftwards during the Grand coalitions with the SPD.

From a purely economic perspective, why should most average lower middle class voters care? The most advertised and remembered measures are not for them, the small measures are nice to have but fast-forgotten, and they have to work until 67 or otherwise worry about having to use their savings and work in pizza-delivery after 15 months of unemployment.
I must admit that I am not informed about the exact development of the average middle class pay-check over the last 15 years, but when it goes up, I would think that most people would attribute it to the general economic development and not to politics against inequality.

- The AfD is profitting from a climate of de-solidarization established over the last 15-20 years. Why show solidarity to outsiders if the welfare state shows much less solidarity towards you than in the past when push comes to shove?

Oh come on. The idea that Working class voters would be suddenly totally fine with mass immigration, if only they got higher welfare benefits, is naive at best and highly condescending at worst. I suggest you actually ask some working-class AFD voters. Ignoring the opposition to the cultural impact of immigration has led the left into the abyss.

No, it's not about giving handouts to everyone and I never said this. Many lower middle class voters are happy to live without benefits as long as things go well. But the German welfare state was a lot about preserving once reached social status of the middle class and about providing immaterial goods like public education and security. A common mistake on both the left and right has been that economically motivated protest vote has been equated to present economic deprivation. People have something to lose, they feel that they would not be cared for when things get serious, and therefore they are less ready to care for other people.

Apart from that, you are right that opposition to immigration comes from opposition against all kinds of impacts of immigration. But the economic motivation is often neglected, and it shouldn't be in my opinion.

[palandio]

[...]
In my opinion, it would also certainly be a matter of debate whether Wagenknecht's stance was in fact a pretty dumb one from a purely strategic point of view. On one hand, it alienated supporters of more liberal immigration policies, while on the other hand it's unclear whether it motivated people to vote for the Left Party in larger numbers since it was obvious that Wagenknecht's views were only a minority position within the party and caused a lot of discord there. I mean, if we come back to Boris Palmer for a minute: I doubt that anyone votes Green because of him, but I met a number of people who refuse to vote Green because of Palmer. The thumb rule is: Whichever position a political party holds, you better make sure that it is a uncontroversial one within that party, because people usually don't vote for parties who don't even seem to agree on what they want.

Exactly.

It is very difficult to go against your activist base. As soon as it becomes clear that the majority of your party holds completely different views from you on a certain issue, most voters will not vote for you because of that issue anymore. On the contrary: If you don't shut up, you become a drag for your party , because 1. you alienate voters that hold the majority view, 2. the discussion serves to highlight the majority view to your own supporters, who will be alienated as well. The Left lost me when it became clear what views the majority of it holds on immigration, i.e. already before the 2017 federal elections. (And no, I didn't go to the AfD.)

[palandio]

I am wondering if the "moderate" and "far-left" labels are still useful for understanding the Left's inner-party and inner-caucus dynamics.

From an ideological point of view it was always dubious. Lafo for example was radical in the sense that he was against compromises with the SPD, but ideologically he always was a social democrat. People like Gesine Lötzsch on the other hand are pragmatic in everyday politics, but in speeches on sundays they speak about how to reach their communist utopia. So far some time the main cleavage within the Left was "uncompromising" vs. "pragmatic" rather than "far-left" vs. "moderate".

The first rupture came when the "uncompromising" wing managed to elect the party chair(wo)men Riexinger/Kipping over Bartsch/Heyenn in 2012. Bartsch was the most visible representative of the Eastern ex-PDS "pragmatics". Kipping was an Eastern ex-PDS "pragmatic" as well, but head of her own faction Emancipatory Left. Some other Eastern ex-PDS "pragmatics" saw her as a traitor, worse than their "uncompromising" open enemies.

In 2015 Wagenknecht ("uncompromising", "communist platform") and Bartsch (the ex-PDS "pragmatic") were elected caucus leaders, which was then seen as another compromise between the key exponents of the two wings of the party. But surprisingly the two caucus leaders got along quite well and began to develop a constructive working relationship between them.

Since then the conflict involving Wagenknecht and her supporters on the one side and Kipping and large parts of the party on the other side has complicated things further.

Regarding the three candidates I would say:
- Bartsch was probably supported by the Eastern traditionalist pragmatics and also by Wagenknecht's core group of supporters because of their strategic alliance. The defectors probably came form Kippings's core supporters and from some Western "umcompromisers" like Riexinger who didn't like "pragmatics" like him in the past and now don't like him because of his strategic alliance with Wagenknecht.
- Lay is a key ally of Kipping.
- Mohamed Ali managed to keep many Western anti-Wagenknecht lefties in the boat while at the same time Wagenknecht's and Bartsch's supporters absolutely couldn't swallow Lay.

[palandio]

[...]
I would even say that there are three (if not more) cleavages within the LINKE:

1. East vs. West (or: ex-PDS vs. all others)
[...]

2. Radical vs. Reformist (or: willing vs. unwilling to govern)
[...]

3. Economic vs. Cultural focus:
[...]

Of course, the reality is always much more complicated, especially since the LINKE has quite a number of intra-party structures (Marx21, Communist Platform, Emancipatory Left…) and, just like any other party, also a lot of people who forge alliances that are based on opportunism rather than ideology. But I would say that these three cleavages are more or less at the center.

You put many aspects better than I could ever have. But I would like to put additional emphasis on how the weighting of these cleavages has shifted over time and how this leads some commentators to speak of some of the divides within the Left in outdated terms that in this regard explain little and confuse a lot. E.g. the party's "Left" (Wagenknecht, Dagdelen,...) and the party's "Right" (Bartsch,...) allying against the party's "Center" (Kipping, Riexinger,...). The third cleavage you mention seems much more useful in this regard.

[palandio]

Scholz' nomination is not a big surprise since the SPD's leaders Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans are by many seen as lacking the right profile to win over many voters. Additionally after last year's heavily contended leadership election (which Esken/Walter-Borjans won and Scholz lost) the party leadership, caucus leadership, ministers (including Scholz) and other important figures seem to have developed a functioning cooperation.

Still, there are many reasons to remain sceptic. Scholz is bland and uncharismatic (nickname "Scholzomat") and like e.g. Steinmeier before him he's tied to policies and reforms in the welfare sector that at the time were very unpopular with a part of the electorate. And then it is almost a given that the party will struggle hard to find a consistent message regarding policies but also for example future coalitions. (As you put it: "bipolar")

[palandio]

Talking about R₂G (or GR₂) right now makes sense if you actually want it. Because if it becomes an option only after the election it's not going to happen (see 2005, 2009, 2013).

At the same time agreement and harmony are not enough by far. To form a government SPD, Greens and Left need an actual majority. In 2017 they got a meager 38.6% which means that they have to win over many voters that voted for neither of these three parties in 2017 (from other parties or abstention). While the Greens have been successful at this to some degree, the Left and SPD so far have been complete failures. In this regard Scholz might have a better chance than e.g. Esken. Going by electoral arithmetics it is probably wise to go for the slightly-left-of-center electoral mainstream (but without too much neoliberal Agenda vibes) and to leave parts of the non-Green progressive vote to the Left. This would both increase the chances for R₂G and weaken the CDU/CSU resulting in a better bargaining position for the case R₂G fails.

[palandio]

Worth mentioning that the Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz has classified the AfD as suspected right-wing extremists, surely?

Generally there are three levels of observation:
1. Prüffall (examination case): If there seem to be first signs of anti-constitutional aspirations, observation is limited to the evaluation of publicly accessible material.
2. Verdachtsfall (suspect case): Under the condition of judicial permission the Verfassungsschutz ("Constitution protection", i.e. domestic intelligence organization) can be allowed to check the suspect organization's finances or put certain members under observation.
3. Gesichert extremistische Bestrebung (confirmed extremist aspiration): If suspicions have been confirmed, a variety of intelligence measures can be applied to keep the anti-constitutional organization under surveillance.

Examples:
2. AfD, Young Alternative (Afd youth organization, already when AfD was still in category 1)
3. Der Flügel ("The Wing", formally dissolved far-right group inside AfD), Identitary Movement

So the AfD is working its way through the levels. Maybe it is only a matter of time until it reaches level 3.

[palandio]

CDU/CSU with a big mask scandal.

https://www.dw.com/en/german-lawmaker-resigns-over-face-mask-scandal/a-56798497

At least both Susanne Eisenmann and Christian Baldauf now have someone to blame for leading their respective state party into the worst electoral defeat in the party's history. That's clearly the #Arminmentum.

Wouldn't be too surprised if the FDP scored a double digit result in both state elections and the Free Voters enter the Landtag of RLP.

I think that at least subconsciously some leading CDU politicians are glad about the mask scandal. The Baden-Württemberg CDU was at 25% and 24% in two polls done immediately before the mask scandal became public, which is already an absolute electoral desaster. I think that 20% after a corruption scandal is easier to explain than 25% without a scandal. Now they can say "Our politics was good and popular, but then came the mask scandal" and use the two random backbenchers whose names will be forgotten tomorrow as scapegoats.

[palandio]

Thing is, at pretty much this time 4 years ago, the SPD had just named Schulz as Kanzlerkandidat and everyone was going "what if? this time? maybe". And, well, we know how that ended.

If things still look tight in July, then maybe - but for now, assume this is just a bump relating to the mask scandal and exacerbated by the two landtag elections and the stumbling Covid management; and come the summer these will be forgotten, the Union will have named Söder and things will be running as normal.

It's probably a question of perspective and what you regard as 'normal'.

2017 polling saw first the Schulz hype (starting with his nomination on January 24 and ending somewhere in April) and then a superficial CDU/CSU rebounce to almost 40% which was by many erroneously interpreted as a return to normalcy. It turned out that the real normalcy was closer to the polling in 2016 prior to the Schulz hype, with CDU/CSU in the low 30s.

At the moment it can be argued that the CDU/CSU polling in the high 30s over the last year was the anomaly and that we're now returning to pre-COVID normalcy. If you look at the CDU/CSU's polling numbers over time you see that they began to drop before the mask scandals and the landtag elections. The leadership and direction issues that the CDU had until March 2020 are still unsolved for the most part, although it is possible that Söder can be a part of the solution. A lot will depend on COVID. If politics and its communication is kept the same as during the past months, then there will be no way back to the high 30s. Relegating COVID to second tier during the election campaign will not work, particularly when you don't have real alternative campaign themes and run an idiotically ignorant campaign like in 2017 ("For a country in which we live well and happily"). The CDU/CSU in 2017 thought that the difficulties from 2015/16 were forgotten, too, but during a content-free campaign, voters began to remember. Only a real success in fighting the pandemic and restoring societal normalcy can save the CDU/CSU. Because of his hardline stance, Söder's political fate will be particularly tied to the success of Germany's COVID policy.

Of course the CDU/CSU is only one of the parties involved, so your point about the SPD and the Schulz hype in 2017 is valid.

[palandio]

Is Tino Chrupalla perceived as the AfD leader?  I'm just interested that he is polled and Meuthen isn't.

Chrupalla has been elected lead candidate for the 2021 federal elections (together with Alice Weidel).

Not that Chrupalla is a particularly interesting figure; he's the archetypical compromise candidate. So, few people would actually consider him the AfD leader. But neither Meuthen (still in Brussels) nor Wundrak (too 'liberal') or any other prominent contender had a majority to become lead candidate.

AfD's leadership has always interested me somewhat as they've never really seemed to have one obvious, well-known leader.  This makes them quite different to other rightwing populist outfits who often coalesce around one leader.  For example Lega has Salvini, RN has Le Pen, UKIP had Farage, Chega has Ventura, Fidesz has Orban, PVV has Wilders, FPO had Haider, SD has Akesson and so on.  I know in the past AfD had Lucke and Petry but they weren't as well known as Salvini or Le Pen.  I wonder if it is in order to avoid comparison with you-know-who.

I don't think that it is in order to avoid comparison with you-know-who. At least not directly. German party law generally impedes coalescennce around one leader and this has of course partially something to do with you-know-who. The CDU tends to coalesce around the chancellor (when the chancellor is from the CDU) as long as he/she is strong. But even then the party structures can do their own thing against the explicit will of the leader when they deem it necessary (i.e. Kauder's deselection as caucus leader). The AfD is a party grounded in opposition towards what they deem to be "establishmentarian" and the German party law puts the party base in a strong enough position to impede any establishment of strong leadership. Petry in particular was not able to see this and tried to reform the party with herself in a Le Pen-like position. This was her demise. (Don't believe that she was more moderate than Meuthen or even Weidel...)

[palandio]

Why is die Linke polling so bad?

I know that Sahra Wagenknecht has some views somehow similar to the far-right regarding immigration, private automobiles and the pandemic. Of course these views are not equal to the far-right, but she tries to appeal to people who could be AfD voters. But she is not the leader of the party anymore.
What is the problem of die Linke? Do the voters dislike Wagenknecht's views? Or is the problem the opposite: if her views were the views of the whole party, die Linke would poll better?
Or the problem is the conflict between the members who like and the members who dislike Wagenknecht's views?

Yeahsayyeah's answer is very good.

To answer your Wagenknecht-related questions directly: Some voters dislike Wagenknecht's views, some dislike that the party is moving against Wagenknecht, and some dislike the conflict.

But as Yeahsayyeah said, it's not this alone. The Left has severe structural problems. And as it has often been the case Wagenknecht (and Lafontaine) can detect that there is a problem but they have never been very good at solving problems.

[palandio]

Socialism is maybe not the right word, but educated young people who vote for the Linke usually have clearly left-wing/progressive views on economic issues. The group that you describe wouldn't make a lot of sense in Germany for exactly the reasons that you mentioned.

[palandio]

There is a chart of the average of the polls in the last 4 years
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2021_German_federal_election

What did I observe:

The peak of May 2021 was not the first peak of the Greens. They had already a peak in July 2019 and also a fast decline after that (I don't know why it happened)

During the last years the Greens' voter potential has been quite high mostly due to the political salience of the climate change issue. Many of the new potential Green voters are quite fast to switch towards the Greens (e.g. the bandwaggon effect after their strong showing at the regional elections in Hesse and Bavaria in October 2018, the European elections in May 2019 and Baerbock's nomination some weeks ago) but also quite fast to turn away again. The steep decline of the Greens in March/April 2020 was due to a rally-around-the-flag effect in favor of CDU/CSU during the first COVID-19 wave.

The CDU increases (decreases) when the Greens decrease (increase)

Which implies that there are a lot of CDU/Green swing voters.

The SPD is doing bad, but it is stable at the 15% since mid 2020. The Linke is doing bad, but it is stable at the 7% since mid 2020

Yes, I don't say they can't do worse in the future, but for the moment they seem to have come near a structural minimum.

The FDP increased a lot in 2021

I would attribute this to two factors: 1. The FDP's consistent messaging for a less restrictive COVID-19 policy (without denying the threat). 2. The CDU's and Laschet's difficulties during the last months.

The AfD was stable since April 2020, but I don't know if they will increase after the knife attack in Wurzburg

I feel like public attention has moved away from that issue and that it probably won't help the AfD as much as it would have done in 2016, but I could be wrong. Many have failed at predicting potential AfD voters in the past, in every direction.

[palandio]

I have been following this more closely recent weeks, so I ask myself what happens if SPD+Greens+FDP have a majority, but CDU/CSU is the strongest party? Does that mean there's a CDU/CSU-Greens govt? Usually the party that finishes 1st gets the 1st chance to form a cabinet, but that's not a binding rule.

There is no rule that the largest party must lead the government. They probably will be tasked first with forming a government, but if the other three parties have other ideas, then nothing the CDU does will stop a Traffic Light coalition. If Black-Green happens, it will be because both the CDU and the Greens chose to negotiate a government.

Yes, "Who comes first?" is a question that is very important in German election psychology, but in the end it doesn't really matter. There have been many examples on the state level and even during the SPD-FDP coalitions between 1969 and 1982 the CDU/CSU was the strongest party except for 1972-1976.

[palandio]

FDP leaving the government formation process in 2017 put party survival ahead of government stability, why would it be different in 2021?

Because it really wasn't a popular move. Most people found it kind of weird.
The FDP is in a better position now, yes. But these are different times. I get the feeling that most people believe that the FDP has outgrown the 2017-version of itself--that the mishap of 2017 will not occur again because the FDP has learned. Lindner is very keen on conveying this exact message. The high polling numbers for the FDP are kind of a new phenomenon. In fact, the party was not well until early 2021.
Also, the general sentiment of the public is different, and supporting a government that would get rid of the Union could be a very popular move.

That's a take that I hear quite often but I think that it's slightly besides the point.

The FDP is the only "major" German party whose structural floor is below 5%. (For the CSU the 5% threshold doesn't matter because of the FPTP seats and the Left's reliable base is eroding, but still at slightly above 5%.) Since Westerwelle's times the FDP has been in opposition for all but four years and has drawn a lot of its electoral success from catering to people from center-left to right-wing who think that the other parties tend not to emphasize individual freedom enough when governing. The four years in government where not a success at all for the FDP. In 2017 the FDP got the impression that its intended role was just to prop up the long-desired Black-Green coalition without getting the chance to significantly influence government policy. On a personal level the problems seem to have occurred less with the Greens (differently from what one might have expected), but with the CSU. The FDP's decision was then to not take the risk and remain in its opposition role.

That's the FDP's problem. Now I think that we agree that the FDP should at some time break out of its current role and find a way to become an active, successful partner in federal governing coalitions. But I equally think that the FDP would be ill-advised to care too much about what is popular among people that would never consider voting for the FDP. I admit that a sizeable number of FDP sympathizers would have preferred to enter a Jamaica coalition in 2017, but there is a good argument that this would have been politically and electorally very risky. Staying in opposition at ca. 8-9% until COVID-19 came was the safer option, although on the long run maybe not.

[palandio]

INSA is doing a ton of polls, there's another one from today showing little move. We need more to see the effects of recent events and the debate. If the numbers roughly remain unchanged over the course of this week, Laschet is in severe trouble. I mean, he already is, but time is running out now.

https://twitter.com/Wahlen_DE/status/1437421172535267340

Note that the survey period could be characterized as the worst time for Scholz so far. That the SPD's numbers remained unchanged is a great relief for the SPD, even if we are talking about just one poll. Time is running out for Laschet. It's only 13 days until the election, and people are already voting.

Is there any chance of FW entering or another party by passing threesold or winning a direct seat?

The South Schleswig Voters' Federation (SSW), minority party of Danes and Frisians, is exempted from the threshold and will likely just need about 50.000 votes to enter Parliament. Not guaranteed, but quite possible.

Beyond that? Meh. The only question will be which parties can cross the 0.5 % mark to receive federal campaign fundings.

Is it that the Danish and Frisian minority communities in Germany are constitutionally allowed to "endorse" a party to represent them,* and then that party is exempt from the threshold? Or rather, is it that the SSW, the party itself, is recognized in the Constitution as being by definition the party for Frisians and Danes--and thus exempted?

Sorry if it seems like splitting hairs! But I'm curious


*Perhaps through their ethnic organizations or whatever

The electoral commission makes the decision to recognize a particular party as representative of a national minority (although they are limited to the four officially recognized minorities: Sorbs, Danes, Frisians, and Roma). Prior to this election, the electoral commission officially recognized the SSW as the party of Danes and Frisians in Schleswig-Holstein. It appears that this was a determination of the electoral commission itself rather than of any representative organizations (although presumably the opinions of such organizations could be considered). No other party was recognized as a minority party.

I don't speak German and I've gleaned all of this through Google Translate, but a brief explanation is here: https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/16_21_parteien-nationaler-minderheiten.html

If I understand correctly in theory more than one party can represent a national minority.

In case of the SSW the electoral commission argued that it was representing the Danish and Frisian minority, relevant criteria were:
- The origin of the party (i.e. it was founded by Danes and Frisians)
- The personell of the party (i.e. its current functionaries are usually Danes and Frisians)
- The program of the party (i.e. the representation of Danish and Frisian minority interests is at the core of its political program).

If there were a second party fulfilling these points in the same way then I can't see why it wouldn't be granted the same privileges.

[palandio]

Wasn't the FDP historically seen as the "sister party" to the FPO in Austria? The FPO has always been the repository of ex-Nazis

Until the 1980s the FPÖ was an odd mixture of liberals, 'reformed' former Nazis, and assorted other small groupings of cranks. It basically functioned as an umbrella organisation that gave people not associated with the two big monopoly parties (as they were at the time) a small degree of access to the political system and the social benefits that were directly tied to it at the time. It polled about 5% of the vote in election after election. An attempt to turn it into a normal liberal party aligned with the SPÖ backfired catastrophically, resulting in Haider (who had been the leader of the party's youth wing) taking it over and turning into the far right monster that we know and do not love.

Also pre-1933 the FDP's and the FPÖ's predecessor parties were different.

The FDP's pre-1933 predecessors were the DDP (since 1930 DStP) and to some degree the DVP. The predecessors of these parties in the Kaiserreich were various "left-liberal" parties and the National Liberals. And while it would be a long discussion what liberalism (and "left-liberalism") meant then and what it means now, I think that we can recognize that all in all these parties had ideas that can be called liberal in the wider sense on many issues.

The FPÖ traces its roots to the "Third Camp" (the other two camps being Christian Socials/Austrofascists and Socialists/Austromarxists). The Third Camp in the Habsburg monarchy never managed to establish a unified party between liberals, conservatives and ultra-nationalists (including antisemites), peasants and bourgeois voters, but they all had their names begin with "Deutsch-" and nationalism and unification with Germany was a central pillar of all of their programs. (It's true that some of these parties stood in the tradition of the failed 1848/49 liberal/bourgeois revolution [which of course was also quite nationalist], but over time the liberal part lost importance.) After 1918 they lost most of their strongholds in the Sudetenland and consolidated into the Greater German People's Party (GDVP) and the Rural League which in some elections ran on joint lists. If you compare the GDVP's program and political actions to DDP and even DVP, the GDVP was a party of the nationalist (and often antisemitic) Right that even denounced liberalism.

[palandio]

Yes, many Eastern races will be fun to watch, with up to five candidates having a realistic chance in certain districts in Leipzig and Dresden.

Regarding Bavaria, one interesting race will be
217 München-Nord
Incumbent: Bernhard Loos (CSU) since 2017, +6.4 over SPD in 2017, +19.3 over Greens.
The SPD candidate is MP Florian Post, a close ally of former party chairman Sigmar Gabriel, who lost his spot on the state list and has been at odds with most of his party on several occasions.
München-Nord was the only remaining SPD district in Bavaria in 2002 and 2005 and can therefore be considered a relative SPD stronghold. If the SPD manages to win seats in Bavaria then it is likely that München-Nord will be one of them and that Post, who was safe to lose his seat, will remain an MP.
Socio-geographically the district can be divided into an outer part (roughly speaking everything north of Scheidplatz) and an inner part (south of Scheidplatz). The outer part is socially mixed and contains some of the poorest areas of Munich, (still this is Munich we are speaking about). The inner part is very densely populated and was the first quarter of Munich that has seen extensive gentrification since the 1960s. There is fertile SPD territory in the outer part, but (unusual for Munich) also in some wealthy areas of the inner part.

[palandio]

TV networks live coverage:

ARD

ZDF

They interviewed people in a beergarden in Maxlrain, that's almost where I grew up.

[palandio]

Who is classed as a ‘worker’?

It's basically to be used synonymous with building laborers, craftsmen and low-income jobs you don't need an apprenticeship for (e.g. road sweeper), who get a wage instead of a salary.

It‘s more or less similar to „blue-collar“ really, including a lot of industrial workers with three-year apprenticeships and often decent wages. The difference between Arbeiter (~blue-collar) and Angestellte (~white-collar) was relevant for social insurance and the calculation of wages (hourly vs. monthly) but laws have changed that and generally there are probably more useful indicators of class today.