Something to keep in mind regarding Trump's gains with Latinos

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https://twitter.com/HotlineJosh/status/1385257426358874117

[ملكة كرينجيتوك]

"In 2020, Trump carried Latinos who identify as conservative by nearly 40 points—roughly five times his advantage with them in 2016. By contrast, he made only a small gain among Latinos who identify as liberal, and he lost ground among moderates"

Trump still gained with self-identified "liberal" Latinos, whether due to reduced turnout among liberals/progressives, persuasion due to lockdown conditions, or dislike of the D establishment status quo.

Shor offered two other theories that provoked substantial debate, but there’s disagreement among Democrats about their accuracy.

The first: Shor believes that large numbers of Latinos who voted for Clinton in 2016 switched to Trump four years later. Although they agree that some switching occurred, Valencia and Odio (among other Democratic analysts) believe that most of Trump’s improvement came from turning out Latinos who didn’t vote at all last time, just as he did with non-college-educated and rural white voters. (Still, that’s hardly reassuring for Democrats. Valencia and Odio’s research has found that those new Latino voters are predominantly young, male, and less assimilated into mainstream American culture; if Democrats can’t reach them, they say, this group could become a lasting headache for the party—blunting the advantage it expects from the current of young Latinos steadily entering the electorate.)

Second: Shor (along with many Republicans) says that Trump was helped by Latino backlash against last year’s racial-justice protests and calls to defund the police.

[TML]

As I've said elsewhere, most of Trump's gains among Latinos came not from converting previously Democratic voters, but rather from turning out people who didn't vote before. This is especially evident if you compare raw vote totals in southern FL & TX in the 2016 and 2020 elections, where Trump's 2020 raw vote totals far exceeded his 2016 raw vote totals but Biden's 2020 raw vote totals didn't change by that much from Clinton's 2016 raw vote totals. For example, in Miami-Dade County, Trump gained nearly 199K votes from 2016 to 2020, while Biden lost only about 6K votes compared to Clinton - it's clear that most of this difference came from new voters rather than converting previously Democratic voters.

[Tartarus Sauce]

As I've said elsewhere, most of Trump's gains among Latinos came not from converting previously Democratic voters, but rather from turning out people who didn't vote before. This is especially evident if you compare raw vote totals in southern FL & TX in the 2016 and 2020 elections, where Trump's 2020 raw vote totals far exceeded his 2016 raw vote totals but Biden's 2020 raw vote totals didn't change by that much from Clinton's 2016 raw vote totals. For example, in Miami-Dade County, Trump gained nearly 199K votes from 2016 to 2020, while Biden lost only about 6K votes compared to Clinton - it's clear that most of this difference came from new voters rather than converting previously Democratic voters.

True, but considering how high turnout these elections were and the fact that Biden also probably brought out some new voters yet his totals largely remained the same in a lot of these locations, there almost certainly had to be some level of conversion happening as well. The question is how much of Trump's gains among Latinos and other minorities consisted of new voters and how much consisted of converting former Democratic votes. The majority of his gains were obviously previous non-voters, but how much of a majority? 90%? 75%? 66%? 55%?

Another thing to keep in mind though is that Trump's performance with Hispanics improved the most with Protestants, he made significantly less inroads with Catholics and Unaffiliateds. Conservative Hispanic Protestants either coming out to vote for the first time or switching away from voting Democratic are, in my opinion, probably going to be part of a more long-term alignment towards the Republicans, so I wouldn't be surprised if the GOP has a higher floor than the '08-'16 elections from now on in Hispanic areas.

But at the same time, we have no idea how reliable these new voters are, or if some of them could still swing towards the Democrats under certain circumstances, so it's also possible that Republicans could go several elections cycles performing well below the 2020 numbers. Time will tell what exactly is going on.

[Xing]

In addition to what others have mentioned, Trump’s gains were much stronger among rural Latinos. What’s unclear, in addition to whether the 2016-2020 trend will continue, stop, or revert somewhat, is how much room for growth is left. In Texas, the huge swing in the Rio Grande wasn’t enough to offset Democratic gains in the cities and suburbs, including Bexar, which has a very large Latino population. Since I doubt Starr county is going to swing another 55 points to the right in 2024, Republicans should still be concerned about Texas. Florida is a different story, but the voting patterns of Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans are not even that comparable.

[Bootes Void]

"In 2020, Trump carried Latinos who identify as conservative by nearly 40 points—roughly five times his advantage with them in 2016. By contrast, he made only a small gain among Latinos who identify as liberal, and he lost ground among moderates"

Trump still gained with self-identified "liberal" Latinos, whether due to reduced turnout among liberals/progressives, persuasion due to lockdown conditions, or dislike of the D establishment status quo.

Shor offered two other theories that provoked substantial debate, but there’s disagreement among Democrats about their accuracy.

The first: Shor believes that large numbers of Latinos who voted for Clinton in 2016 switched to Trump four years later. Although they agree that some switching occurred, Valencia and Odio (among other Democratic analysts) believe that most of Trump’s improvement came from turning out Latinos who didn’t vote at all last time, just as he did with non-college-educated and rural white voters. (Still, that’s hardly reassuring for Democrats. Valencia and Odio’s research has found that those new Latino voters are predominantly young, male, and less assimilated into mainstream American culture; if Democrats can’t reach them, they say, this group could become a lasting headache for the party—blunting the advantage it expects from the current of young Latinos steadily entering the electorate.)

Second: Shor (along with many Republicans) says that Trump was helped by Latino backlash against last year’s racial-justice protests and calls to defund the police.

A small gain could be 1 or 2 pts which would be irrelevant or 5-6 points which would be a little significant. The article doesn't mention that anywhere