Japan Oct 22 2017

[Zuza]

To hazard a guess: I imagine that young Japanese are far less likely to be strict pacifists and, thus, are liable to be sympathetic to Abe's push for constitutional reforms, which can be framed as "modernizing" Japan, whereas elderly Japanese - at least, the left-inclined ones - who grew up in the shadow of WWII, are far more likely to be strict pacifists or to take issue with militarism. Further, Abenomics is rather radical in its thrust - constituting a break from ill-advised half-measures and the schizoid nature of post-90s crisis management in Japan - so I can see why young people in Japan would back the LDP, who are seeking to bring Japan out of its ~30 year period of malaise.

The LDP is a terrible party and Abe is a bit of a nutcase but they deserve credit for reviving the Japanese economy.

Hazarding to guess, I'd speculate that conservative Japanese have more children than liberal ones. Thus, each successive generation, reflecting the mores and values of their parents, is more conservative than the last.

Israel and Turkey is seeing that phenomena.

I highly doubt it. Conservative people tend to have more children in almost any society, but in almost all of these societies younger generations are less conservative than older. Israel and Turkey are very unusual in that regard: in Turkey there are huge regional and ethnic (Turks vs Kurds) differences, and in Israel Jews of different origin tend to form separate communities with very different birth rates. Japan is much more culturally homogeneous, and it's birth rate is so low that I can't believe it's hugely higher among conservative people (unless among non-conservatives it's close to 0).

Turnout explanation is much more believable.

[jaichind]

I think a better explanation is that turnout among the youngest age groups is utterly dire so those who do show up are unusually 'committed'.

Although the successes of the Abe government are undoubtedly factors as well.

Problem with that is that pre-election surveys (not just exit polls) also showed that the 20s age group was the strongest for LDP.  I do agree that apathy is a good reason why.  20s age group are not political at all and given the chaos in the non-JCP opposition the average 20s person would have only have heard of one political party, LDP.  So most would not bother voting and the rest votes LDP because that is the only party the have heard off, other than perhaps JCP.

[Cape Verde]

Tochigi Prefecture

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 46.9%
HP+CDP 43.3%
JCP+SDP 6.2%
JRP 3.1%
Others 0.5%

Constituency Vote Share

LDP 54.3%
HP+Pro-CDP independents 38.7%
JCP 6.8% (No candidate in 2nd district)
Others 0.2%

LDP won District 1,3,4,5. Pro-CDP independent won 2nd district, which JCP didn't field a candidate. Since Pro-CDP independent won by 6.8%, he could have lost his seat if JCP had run its candidate.
LDP candidates in District 1, 4, 5 are former or current ministers, so their personal appeal may have drawn votes from HP or CDP voters.

[jaichind]

December 26, you picked very good prefectures to start with. All of them have "consistent" competition structures to make comparison to PR vote easier.  Inconsistent competition structures would be if any districts in a prefecture does not have a non-JCP opposition party running or has JCP not running (to support CDP).  That makes comparison to PR vote very difficult.  I plan to post similar numbers (and also comparison with 2014) soon ..

[BigSkyBob]

To hazard a guess: I imagine that young Japanese are far less likely to be strict pacifists and, thus, are liable to be sympathetic to Abe's push for constitutional reforms, which can be framed as "modernizing" Japan, whereas elderly Japanese - at least, the left-inclined ones - who grew up in the shadow of WWII, are far more likely to be strict pacifists or to take issue with militarism. Further, Abenomics is rather radical in its thrust - constituting a break from ill-advised half-measures and the schizoid nature of post-90s crisis management in Japan - so I can see why young people in Japan would back the LDP, who are seeking to bring Japan out of its ~30 year period of malaise.

The LDP is a terrible party and Abe is a bit of a nutcase but they deserve credit for reviving the Japanese economy.

Hazarding to guess, I'd speculate that conservative Japanese have more children than liberal ones. Thus, each successive generation, reflecting the mores and values of their parents, is more conservative than the last.

Israel and Turkey is seeing that phenomena.

I highly doubt it. Conservative people tend to have more children in almost any society, but in almost all of these societies younger generations are less conservative than older. Israel and Turkey are very unusual in that regard: in Turkey there are huge regional and ethnic (Turks vs Kurds) differences, and in Israel Jews of different origin tend to form separate communities with very different birth rates. Japan is much more culturally homogeneous, and it's birth rate is so low that I can't believe it's hugely higher among conservative people (unless among non-conservatives it's close to 0).

Turnout explanation is much more believable.

Your understanding of the situation in Turkey and Israel simply misses the effect of religion on fertility. Conservative religious people have more children creating a more conservative electorate in the next generation.

[Zuza]

To hazard a guess: I imagine that young Japanese are far less likely to be strict pacifists and, thus, are liable to be sympathetic to Abe's push for constitutional reforms, which can be framed as "modernizing" Japan, whereas elderly Japanese - at least, the left-inclined ones - who grew up in the shadow of WWII, are far more likely to be strict pacifists or to take issue with militarism. Further, Abenomics is rather radical in its thrust - constituting a break from ill-advised half-measures and the schizoid nature of post-90s crisis management in Japan - so I can see why young people in Japan would back the LDP, who are seeking to bring Japan out of its ~30 year period of malaise.

The LDP is a terrible party and Abe is a bit of a nutcase but they deserve credit for reviving the Japanese economy.

Hazarding to guess, I'd speculate that conservative Japanese have more children than liberal ones. Thus, each successive generation, reflecting the mores and values of their parents, is more conservative than the last.

Israel and Turkey is seeing that phenomena.

I highly doubt it. Conservative people tend to have more children in almost any society, but in almost all of these societies younger generations are less conservative than older. Israel and Turkey are very unusual in that regard: in Turkey there are huge regional and ethnic (Turks vs Kurds) differences, and in Israel Jews of different origin tend to form separate communities with very different birth rates. Japan is much more culturally homogeneous, and it's birth rate is so low that I can't believe it's hugely higher among conservative people (unless among non-conservatives it's close to 0).

Turnout explanation is much more believable.

Your understanding of the situation in Turkey and Israel simply misses the effect of religion on fertility. Conservative religious people have more children creating a more conservative electorate in the next generation.

Of course, conservative people in most countries on average have more children. But in most of these countries younger generations do not become more conservative than older ones.

[Zioneer]

Any interesting new members of the Diet in general?

[jaichind]

HP PR vote distribution in Tokyo - HP stronger in less densely populated areas

 

CDP PR vote distributions in Tokyo - CDP stronger in more densely populated areas

[Lachi]

You posted the CDP map twice.

[jaichind]

You posted the CDP map twice.

Opps.  Fixed.

[jaichind]

Yamagata Prefecture

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 46.5%
HP+CDP 41.0%
JCP+SDP 8.4%
JRP 2.9%
Others 1.2%

Constituency Vote Share

LDP 53.5%
HP 39.7%
JCP 6.3%
Others 0.5%

A few of the HP or CDP voters clearly voted for the LDP candidate. Maybe one factor is that all LDP candidates in this prefecture are members of moderate-to-conservative LDP factions (Nukaga and Tanigaki).

The general trend of LDP-KP PR vote vs LDP-KP district vote seems bio-model.  In prefectures where
it seems the opposition is competitive (LDP-KP PR vote lower AND opposition has viable candidates) the LDP district vote premium seems low (0%-2% and sometimes negative) while in prefecture where the opposition is not competitive the LDP-KP district vote premium is high for the obvious reasons of weaker mainstream (CDP HP or ex-DP and JRP in Osaka) opposition candidates AND no mainstream opposition candidates (JCP only) since there is no hope of beating LDP anyway.

山形(Yamagata) is a good demonstration of this.   Overall for Lower House LDP has very strong local candidates so 2014 and 2017 Lower House LDP outperforms its PR vote but in 2016 Upper House the opposition came up with a ex-MP with great nation recognition and LDP-KP greatly under-performed  its PR vote.

2016 and 2014 data for 山形(Yamagata)

2016 PR
LDP+    54.27% (LDP KP)
HRP        0.79%
ORA+     6.16% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     29.56% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP        7.60%

2016 District
Opposition    59.05% (DP SDP PLP JCP united front)
LDP              38.34%
HRP               2.61%

Vast LDP over-performance on the PR section with vast under-performance in the district vote


2014 PR
LDP+       49.77% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.46%
PFG           1.47%
JIP           10.20%
DPJ+        29.72% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP            8.36%

2014 District
LDP          50.52%
LDP rebel  14.33%
DPJ          27.86%
JCP            7.03%

In 2014 SDP more aligned with DPJ so it makes more sense to group their PR vote shares together.  While in 2017 SDP tend to align more with JCP relative to CDP although on can also say that CDP is also loosely tied to JCP.   The 2014 LDP rebel joined HP so the 2014 district vote seems to map to 2017 district vote fairly well.  2014 DPJ+LDP rebel = 42.19% which maps to HP's 2017 39.7% fairly well once we take into account of LDP votes for LDP rebel in 2014 going back to LDP once the 2014 LDP rebel joined HP.  

In both 2014 and 2017 the JCP district vote under-performed its possible vote (2014 JCP PR vote of 8.36% and 2017 JCP-SDP PR vote of 8.4%.)  So in 山形(Yamagata) we can say that the 2017 CDP vote did not vote split and went HP overall with very little or no defections to JCP.  LDP's large victory in  山形(Yamagata) in 2017 is more of a function of strong local LDP candidates with strong local networks.

[Cape Verde]

Akita Prefecture

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 48.8%
HP+CDP 39.4%
JCP+SDP 7.8%
JRP 2.7%
Others 1.4%

District Vote Share

LDP 50.1%
HP 42.3%
JCP 7.6%

Compared to Yamagata, LDP+KP's PR vote share went up and District Vote Share went down.
All district races were 3-way competitions by LDP, HP, and JCP. LDP candidates won all.

1st: LDP candidate won by 17%. I don't understand why HP replaced the DP MP who lost the previous election by 6% (he faced a harder battle because both JCP and SDP fielded their candidates last time) with a weak former Upper House MP who lost last year's Upper House election when joint opposition candidates won all Tohoku seats. HP nominated the replaced DP MP for No. 1 of the Tohoku PR list, so he cruised to re-election.

2nd: Same candidates from last election. While LDP MP won by 17% last time, he barely won this year by 1%. HP candidate is now a newcomer to the lower house because he survived through the PR slate.

3rd: Same candidates from last election. LDP MP won by 3% last time, 6% this time.

[jaichind]

Tochigi Prefecture

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 46.9%
HP+CDP 43.3%
JCP+SDP 6.2%
JRP 3.1%
Others 0.5%

Constituency Vote Share

LDP 54.3%
HP+Pro-CDP independents 38.7%
JCP 6.8% (No candidate in 2nd district)
Others 0.2%

LDP won District 1,3,4,5. Pro-CDP independent won 2nd district, which JCP didn't field a candidate. Since Pro-CDP independent won by 6.8%, he could have lost his seat if JCP had run its candidate.
LDP candidates in District 1, 4, 5 are former or current ministers, so their personal appeal may have drawn votes from HP or CDP voters.

2014 and 2016 for 栃木(Tochigi)

2016 PR
LDP+    51.20% (LDP KP)
HRP        0.97%
ORA+   12.79% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     26.60% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP        7.00%

ORA over-performed on PR here since for 2016 old ex-YP leader Watanabe was in ORA.

2016 District
LDP              58.92%
Opposition    38.25% (DP SDP PLP JCP united front)
HRP               2.83%

Joint opposition candidate was not well known in politics and lacked grassroots support so LDP over-performed here relative to the LDP-KP PR vote.

2014 PR
LDP+       51.41% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.46%
PFG           2.34%
JIP           12.86%
DPJ+        24.81% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP            8.12%

2014 District
LDP          57.55%
ex-YP         6.89% (contested 1 out of 5)
DPJ          24.00% (contested 3 out of 5)
JCP           11.86%

In one of the districts only JCP competed with LDP so the LDP and JCP vote share outperformed their PR equivalents.

For 2017 the 2014 ex-YP candidate which is Watanabe himself joined HP and had his sister run in his team for HP.  Of course his sister cannot be interchanged for Watanabe himself and in 2017 LDP clearly over-performed its PR vote due to high candidate quality even though now all 5 seats in 2017 has a non-JCP mainstream opposition candidate.

Overall in 栃木(Tochigi) LDP generally over-performs LDP-KP PR vote due to high candidate quality and poor opposition candidate quality even though overall it is a LDP-KP +1 prefecture from a PR point of view.    Part of the reason is that during the post 2008 period YP which is a LDP Libertarian splinter pulled in a lot of the anti-LDP support at the local denying DPJ/DP and now HP of local quality candidates as a bench for national politics.

[jaichind]

Akita Prefecture

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 48.8%
HP+CDP 39.4%
JCP+SDP 7.8%
JRP 2.7%
Others 1.4%

District Vote Share

LDP 50.1%
HP 42.3%
JCP 7.6%

Compared to Yamagata, LDP+KP's PR vote share went up and District Vote Share went down.
All district races were 3-way competitions by LDP, HP, and JCP. LDP candidates won all.

1st: LDP candidate won by 17%. I don't understand why HP replaced the DP MP who lost the previous election by 6% (he faced a harder battle because both JCP and SDP fielded their candidates last time) with a weak former Upper House MP who lost last year's Upper House election when joint opposition candidates won all Tohoku seats. HP nominated the replaced DP MP for No. 1 of the Tohoku PR list, so he cruised to re-election.

2nd: Same candidates from last election. While LDP MP won by 17% last time, he barely won this year by 1%. HP candidate is now a newcomer to the lower house because he survived through the PR slate.

3rd: Same candidates from last election. LDP MP won by 3% last time, 6% this time.

2014 and 2016 for 秋田(Akita)

2016 PR
LDP+    54.65% (LDP KP)
HRP        0.61%
ORA+     6.68% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     29.62% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP        7.56%

 
2016 District
LDP              53.94%
Opposition    43.99% (DP SDP PLP JCP united front)
HRP               2.07%

District vote mostly matched PR vote with ORA+ voters mostly going to the opposition.


2014 PR
LDP+       46.53% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.38%
PFG           1.58%
JIP           17.48%
DPJ+        26,19% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP            7.85%

2014 District
LDP          49.69%
DPJ-JIP     41.58% (contested 3 out of 3)
JCP            7.61%

LDP seems to over-perform a bit in the district seat than the LDP-KP PR vote would imply.   This over-performance got greater in 2017 relative to 2014 since one of the DPJ candidates from 2014 with grassroots support did not run again in the same district leaving the HP with a less experienced candidate.   

[jaichind]

LDP factions change as a result of election

Hosoda faction 94 -> 91  (this is Abe's faction.  Abe as Prez of LDP had to resign from his faction)
Aso faction 58-> 58 (faction of deputy PM and former PM Aso)
Nukaga faction 55-> 50 (this is the old PM Tanaka faction)
Fumio faction 46 -> 45 (this is the old PM Suzuki faction)
Nikai faction 45 -> 44 ( this is the old PM Nakasone faction, the pro-PRC LDP faction)
Ishiba faction 20 -> 20 (Ishiba is Abe's main rival in LDP these days)
Ishihara faction 14 -> 12

Abe has Aso and Nikai as his main lieutenants as a way to keep your friends close and your potential enemies even closer. 

The Hosoda faction (also the old PM Fukuda faction) which is Abe's faction mainly came to power in LDP taking advantage of long time resentment toward Nukaga faction which is the old PM Tanaka faction that was able to dominate LDP from the 1970s to 2001.  The Nukaga faction is isolated within the LDP and the Hosoda faction dominate as it got the Aso faction and  Nikai faction to ally with it.  The Nikai faction used to be hostile to Abe but has been co-opted by Abe.  The Ishiba faction is the only faction that is hostile to Abe.

[Cape Verde]

Hokkaido

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 39.8%
CDP+HP 38.6%
JCP+SDP 9.9%
Pro-LDP regional party 8.4%
JRP 2.8%
Others 0.5%

District Vote Share

LDP+KP 47.8%
Opposition 52.2% (CDP 35.8%, HP 9.4%, JCP 5.9%, Others 1.1%)


LDP ran all candidates except 10th, where KP instead ran a candidate.
CDP ran as unified opposition candidate in District 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11.
JCP ran as unified opposition candidate in District 7.
Both CDP and HP ran candidate in District 4.
Both HP and JCP ran candidate in District 2, 9, 12.

LDP+KP won District 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12.
CDP won District 1, 3, 5, 8, 11.
HP placed a distant 3rd in District 4 and lost District 2, 9, 12.
HP's unpopularity in Hokkaido can be suggested by the fact that JCP candidates in District 2, 9, and 12's vote totals averaged 16.8% (20.8% in 2nd, 15.3% in 9th, 13.3% in 12th).
If joint opposition candidates ran in all districts, LDP could've lost 2nd, 4th, and 9th.

[jaichind]

Hokkaido

PR Vote Share

LDP+KP 39.8%
CDP+HP 38.6%
JCP+SDP 9.9%
Pro-LDP regional party 8.4%
JRP 2.8%
Others 0.5%

District Vote Share

LDP+KP 47.8%
Opposition 52.2% (CDP 35.8%, HP 9.4%, JCP 5.9%, Others 1.1%)


LDP ran all candidates except 10th, where KP instead ran a candidate.
CDP ran as unified opposition candidate in District 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11.
JCP ran as unified opposition candidate in District 7.
Both CDP and HP ran candidate in District 4.
Both HP and JCP ran candidate in District 2, 9, 12.

LDP+KP won District 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12.
CDP won District 1, 3, 5, 8, 11.
HP placed a distant 3rd in District 4 and lost District 2, 9, 12.
HP's unpopularity in Hokkaido can be suggested by the fact that JCP candidates in District 2, 9, and 12's vote totals averaged 16.8% (20.8% in 2nd, 15.3% in 9th, 13.3% in 12th).
If joint opposition candidates ran in all districts, LDP could've lost 2nd, 4th, and 9th.

2014 and 2016 for 北海道(Hokkaido)

2016 PR
LDP+    46.23% (LDP KP)
HRP        0.57%
ORA+     5.38% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     34.93% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP       11.44%
 
2016 District
LDP              44.43%
LDP rebel        1.05%
PJK                1.34%
DP               41.29%
DP rebel         0.51%
JCP                9.41%

District vote mostly mapped to PR vote with ORA and JCP tactical voting for DP to allow DP to win 2 seats out of 3 vs 1 for LDP.


2014 PR
LDP+       42.09% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.49%
PFG           1.53%
JIP             9.89%
DPJ+        29.70% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP          12.09%
NPB           4.19%  (anti-establishment protest party that pushes itself as a NOTA party)

2014 District
LDP          45.80%
LDP rebel   0.50%
DPJ-JIP     40.40% (contested 12 out of 12 with 13 candidates so 1 overlap )
DPJ rebel    1.88%
JCP           11.91%

Seat split was LDP 8 anti-LDP 4.

NPD was allied with DPJ ergo did not run on the PR slate.  LDP over-performed the LDP-KP PR vote most, I suspect from defections from JIP voters (some of whom might be anti-LDP NPD voters)


When looking at the PR sifts between 2014 2016 and 2017 we must remember to take into account of the role of NPD which did not run on PR slate in 2014 and 2016 but did in 2017.  NPD took votes from the LDP and the non-JCP opposition, lost likely equally.

In 2017 北海道(Hokkaido) it is hard to map PR vote to district vote.  ex-DPJ ally but now pro-LDP NPD running adds a variable on how that vote flow worked.  JCP did not run in a bunch of districts but was the sole opposition candidate in 7th district.  In the 7th district the 2014 DPJ candidate which was really the daughter of the NPD founder running as DPJ defected to LDP and ran on the LDP PR slate making the 7th district from a very competitive district into a easy LDP win with only JCP running.  Overall NPD PR voter voted LDP in the district vote and anti-JCP opposition votes in the 8th district voted LDP both of which had the effect of pushing up the LDP vote share relative to the LDP-KP PR vote.

[jaichind]

青森(Aomori)

2017 PR   
LDP+      49.89% (LDP KP)
CDP-HP   35.68%
JCP-SDP  10.31%
JRP           2.50%
HRP          0.74%
PJK           0.88%

2017 District
LDP        61.23%
HP          28.70%
JCP          9.38%

Number of seats went from 4 to 3 with LDP winning a 3 with ease.  HP had to run inexperienced candidates in 2 out of the 3 with the result of LDP easily exceeding the LDP-KP PR vote share to win crushing victory margins.  Candidate quality clearly helped LDP here.


2016 PR
LDP+    53.19% (LDP KP)
HRP        0.80%
ORA+     5.55% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     30.45% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP        8.92%
 
2016 District
Opposition    49.19% (DP SDP PLP JCP united front)
LDP              47.88%
HRP               2.93%

Opposition to TPP plus a quality DP candidate running as an united opposition candidate defeated LDP despite LDP-KP doing very well in the PR section.


2014 PR
LDP+       47.83% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.49%
PFG           1.53%
JIP           14.11%
DPJ+        25.73% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP           10.77%

2014 District
LDP          55.39%
DPJ-JIP     34.49% (contested 4 out of 4)
JCP           10.12%

LDP won all 4 seats with ease and over-performed its LDP-KP PR vote share with superior candidate quality.

Overall in 2017 LDP-KP gained PR vote share from 2014 and also expanded its district vote share lead on top of the PR vote share gain with an even greater candidate quality gap on top of an already large candidate quality gap in 2014.  Note that the candidate quality gap got worse BECAUSE of the DP victory in 2016 since one of its quality candidates in the Lower House won was the 2016 high quality candidate that beat the LDP.

A key takeaway is the critical nature of having quality candidates.  Here having a good farm league of prefecture level politicians is key.  This is something LDP and KP are very strong in across all prefectures.   

[jaichind]

Looking back one major turning point of the election was when there were speculation on if Koike should run for a MP position or not, Koike confidant and HP candidate for Koike's old seat in Tokyo 10th
 若狭 勝(Wakasa Masaru) say in an interview "Oh, HP's goal is not to win this election but to win the next one."  What he wanted to do is the set the stage for Koike not running this time around.  But by saying what he did he killed all the momentum from HP and did much more damage to HP than just the fact that Koike choose not to run. 

Wakasa who won the 2016 by-election for Tokyo 10th on the LDP ticket came in a weak 3rd place and failed to get a PR seat.  It was expected that if he won his seat that he will share in the leadership of HP with Koike staying on as Tokyo governor.  He pretty much said he will retire from politics. 

[jaichind]

岩手(Iwate)

2017 PR   
LDP+      40.11% (LDP KP)
CDP-HP   43.83%
JCP-SDP  12.07%
JRP           2.44%
HRP          0.66%
PJK           0.88%

2017 District
LDP        45.63%
HP-LP     50.91%
JCP          3.46%  (contested 1 out of 3 seats)

The seat split is 1 LDP 2 anti-LDP.   岩手(Iwate) due to the Ozawa factor has been fairly anti-LDP last few decades.  On the other hand Ozawa himself is fairly controversial and as a result LDP often punches above the LDP-KP PR vote here in district seats.


2016 PR
LDP+    43.51% (LDP KP)
HRP        1.42%
ORA+     6.73% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     35.79% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP       11.24%
 
2016 District
Opposition    53.34% (DP SDP PLP JCP united front)
LDP              41.04%
HRP               5.62% 

The high HRP vote shows that there is a large anti-LDP anti-Ozawa vote out there.


2014 PR
LDP+       36.74% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.56%
PFG           1.27%
JIP             8.16%
DPJ+        42.50% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP           10.78%

2014 District
LDP          37.72%
DPJ-PLP    49.57% (contested 4 out of 4)
SDP            1.52% (contested 1 seat)
JCP           11.18%

Seat split was 1 LDP 3 anti-LDP.  In 2014 it seems that the PR votes mapped well to district vote.

It seems that in 2017 there is a swing toward LDP-KP in terms of PR vote and on top of that anti-Ozawa feelings added to the LDP district vote.  This is a continuation of the trend in 2016.  Even though Ozawa won his seat easily he must be concerned that LDP is gaining ground in 岩手(Iwate) not because LDP is popular but because of growing anti-Ozawa feelings. 

[jaichind]

宮城(Miyagi)

2017 PR    
LDP+      46.64% (LDP KP)
CDP-HP   38.01%
JCP-SDP    9.32%
JRP           3.80%
HRP          0.45%
PJK           1.79%

2017 District
LDP        55.09%
JRP           1.00%
HP            9.89% (contested 3 seats)
CDP-JCP  33.63% (includes 1 DCP 3 JCP 2 Ind(OPPN))

Result was 5 LDP 1 anti-LDP.  In one of the seats JCP faced LDP alone which must have pushed up the LDP vote share relative to the LDP-KP PR vote share.  Also in one of the seats an experienced DPJ candidate did not run which also added to the LDP margin of victory.



2016 PR
LDP+    50.10% (LDP KP)
HRP        0.69%
ORA+     6.11% (ORA[now JRP], PJK, NPR[defunct])
DP+     42.05% (DP SDP PLP[now LP] VPA[defunct])
JCP        9.99%
 
2016 District
Opposition    51.10% (DP SDP PLP JCP united front)
LDP              46.98%
HRP               1.92%  

An experienced DP candidate (also an incumbent) backed by all opposition parties managed to defeat LDP.



2014 PR
LDP+       45.01% (LDP KP)
HRP           0.46%
PFG           3.07%
JIP            14.00%
DPJ+        26.79% (DPJ SDP PLP)
JCP           10.67%

2014 District
LDP          50.99%
FPG            1.67% (contested 1 seat)
DPJ-JIP     35.47% (contested 6 out of 6)
SDP            1.29% (contested 1 seat)
JCP           10.59%

It was LDP 5 anti-LDP 1.  Higher quality candidates relative to DPJ-JIP gave LDP a greater vote share than the LDP-KP PR vote.  

In 2017, just like 青森(Aomori) the LDP benefited from a positive swing in the PR vote as well as an even greater gap in candidate quality to create a greater vote share gap between the LDP district vote and LDP-KP PR vote.

[jaichind]

Asahi exit poll on PR by age. Similar to ANN exit poll with LDP stronger in the 20s age group and weakest in the 60s age group

Red - LDP
Light Blue - CDP
Dark Blue - HP
Pink - KP
Very light blue - JCP
Blue - JRP

[jaichind]

It would be interesting to see the LDP-KP PR vote share by PR zone in 2014 2016 2017.

                                                  2014        2016        2017  
Total                                        46.82%    49.44%     45.79%            
北海道 (Hokkaido)                     42.09%    46.23%     39.84%
東北(Tohoku)                            44.16%    49.59%     45.62%    
北関東 (North Kanto)                 49.30%    51.25%     46.25%
南関東 (South Kanto)                 46.77%    49.00%     45.74%
東京 (Tokyo)                             44.21%    45.81%     41.28%      
北陸信越 (Hokurikushinetsu)       45.57%    51.88%     45.97%        
東海 (Tokai)                              45.77%    47.97%     44.80%
近畿 (Kinki)                              43.55%    43.60%     44.41%    
中国(Chugoku)                         54.82%     57.68%     54.12%      
四国 (Shikoku)                         50.63%     57.10%     50.61%      
九州 (Kyūshū)                          52.05%     55.42%     49.63%      

Overall urban areas in 北関東 (North Kanto), 東京 (Tokyo), and 九州 (Kyūshū)  are moving away from LDP-KP due to the DCP surge while rural areas in 東北(Tohoku), 北陸信越 (Hokurikushinetsu),  中国(Chugoku), and 四国 (Shikoku)  are moving toward LDP-KP.  近畿 (Kinki)  is more urban as well but is moving toward LDP-KP due to the decline of JRP.  北海道 (Hokkaido) should also count as a shift toward LDP-KP once we take into account that NPD which did not run in 2014 nor 2016 but got 8.37% in 2017 half of which I would say came from otherwise LDP-KP voters.



Now, another way to look at the fortunes of LDP-KP is also to add in PFG/PJK.  PFG/PJK PR voters are mostly hawk Right voters and normally would vote LDP (or perhaps HRP or JRP)  As PFG/PJK PR vote declined from 2014 to 2017 most of that vote should have drifted to LDP.  Not to include PFG/PJK understates the relative decline of LDP-KP from 2014 to 2017.  So a chart of LDP-KP-PFG/PJK PR vote share for 2014 to 2017 gives us a better picture in my view.

                                                  2014        2016        2017  
Total                                        49.47%    50.75%     45.94%            
北海道 (Hokkaido)                     43.62%    47.40%     39.84%
東北(Tohoku)                            46.01%    50.55%     46.69%
北関東 (North Kanto)                 52.15%    52.83%     46.25%
南関東 (South Kanto)                 50.23%    50.69%     45.74%
東京 (Tokyo)                             48.60%    47.46%     41.96%
北陸信越 (Hokurikushinetsu)       47.45%    52.88%     45.97%        
東海 (Tokai)                              48.05%    49.14%     44.80%
近畿 (Kinki)                              45.63%    44.73%     44.41%    
中国(Chugoku)                         58.33%     58.74%     54.12%    
四国 (Shikoku)                         53.47%     58.08%     50.61%      
九州 (Kyūshū)                          54.00%     56.80%     49.63%      

Looking at it this way the trends are still the same but even stronger with 北関東 (North Kanto), 東京 (Tokyo), and 九州 (Kyūshū) moving away from LDP-KP while 東北(Tohoku), 北陸信越 (Hokurikushinetsu) and 北海道 (Hokkaido) moving toward LDP-KP.  Urban 南関東 (South Kanto) is now also moving slight away from LDP-KP.  近畿 (Kinki) also moving toward LDP due to fall of JRP which this chart understates since some of the 2014 FPG vote in Osaka would have gone to JRP instead of LDP.  中国(Chugoku), and 四国 (Shikoku) now looks more neutral as the relative growth of LDP-KP in the last few years seems more like FPG votes coming back to LDP.



So the overall trends are rural areas that historically have an anti-LDP lean are moving toward LDP-KP while urban areas are moving away from LDP-KP with the exception of   近畿 (Kinki) where JRP voters coming back to LDP is making up for loss LDP-KP is losing in urban population centers.


The Abe coalition is increaseing made up of rural votes which is the opposite of the Koizumi coalition.  The LDP-KP PR vote in the Koizumi 2005 landslide was mostly based on urban areas such as 北関東 (North Kanto), 南関東 (South Kanto), and 東京 (Tokyo) which is exactly where Abe is now losing ground.  LDP-KP also over-performed in urban 近畿 (Kinki).   Koizumi under-performed in rural areas such as  北海道 (Hokkaido), 東北(Tohoku), and 北陸信越 (Hokurikushinetsu) where it is exactly where Abe is gaining ground.   Note that just like in 2017 the 2005 北海道 (Hokkaido) LDP-KP vote is underestimated since NPD won 13.44% of the 北海道 (Hokkaido) vote but even taking that into account LDP under-performed there.    


                                               2005
                                        LDP-KP PR vote
Total                                        51.43%
北海道 (Hokkaido)                     40.56%
東北(Tohoku)                            48.48%
北関東 (North Kanto)                 53.29%
南関東 (South Kanto)                 54.57%
東京 (Tokyo)                             52.62%
北陸信越 (Hokurikushinetsu)       47.57%      
東海 (Tokai)                              50.98%
近畿 (Kinki)                              51.74%
中国(Chugoku)                          52.46%
四国 (Shikoku)                          53.08%    
九州 (Kyūshū)                           53.02%

[jaichind]

The shifts in the 19 seats in 大阪(Osaka) is quit dramatic last few election cycles where it went from a DPJ-LDP battle ground to one of LDP-KP upper hand over JRP and CDP with a LDP near sweep in 2005 and DPJ total sweep in 2009.  They were

2003: 6 LDP, 4 KP, 9 DPJ
2005: 13 LDP, 4 KP, 2 DPJ
2009: 1 LDP, 17 DPJ, 1 SDP
2012; 3 LDP, 4 KP, 12 JRP
2014: 9 LDP, 4 KP, 5 JIP, 1 DPJ
2017: 10 LDP, 4 KP, 3 JRP, 2 CDP (1 CDP 1 pro-CDP Ind)


The same is true for the 12 seats neighboring 兵庫(Hyōgo) in its shift from a strong LDP prefecture toward total LDP domination after a LDP complete sweep in 2005 and DPJ complete sweep in 2009

2003: 6 LDP, 1 NCP (LDP ally), 2 KP, 3 DPJ
2005: 10 LDP, 2 KP
2009: 11 DPJ 1 NPN (DPJ ally)
2012: 8 LDP, 2 KP, 2 DPJ
2014: 8 LDP, 2 KP, 1 JIP, 1 DPJ
2017: 10 LDP, 2 KP


Similar pattern in Tokyo 25 seats but with a revival of of the center-left in 2017 under CDP

2003: 12 LDP, 1 KP, 12 DPJ
2005: 23 LDP, 1 KP, 1 DPJ
2009: 4 LDP, 21 DPJ
2012: 21 LDP, 1 KP, 1 YP, 2 DPJ
2014: 22 LDP, 1 KP, 1 JIP, 1 DPJ
2017: 19 LDP, 1 KP, 1 HP, 4 CDP


In the 15 seats of historically anti-LDP 愛知(Aichi) where even the 2005 LDP landslide get DPJ getting a respectable number of seats there has been an opposition revival in 2014 to fight LDP to parity

2003: 3 LDP, 2 NCP (LDP ally), 10 DPJ
2005: 9 LDP, 6 DPJ
2009: 15 DPJ
2012: 13 LDP, 2 DPJ
2014: 8 LDP, 1 JIP, 6 DPJ
2017: 8 LDP, 3 HP, 2 ex-DP Ind, 2 CDP


In the 12 seats of historically anti-LDP 北海道(Hokkaido) one sees a similar pattern as  愛知(Aichi)

2003: 5 LDP, 7 DPJ
2005: 4 LDP, 8 DPJ
2009: 1 LDP, 11 DPJ
2012: 11 LDP, 1 KP
2014: 8 LDP, 1 KP, 3 DPJ
2017: 6 LDP, 1 KP, 1 ex-DP Ind, 4 CDP

[🦀🎂🦀🎂]

I see that Naoto Kan took his district seat back.

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legend

random phrases from Democratic Party leader wikipedia pages:

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(this is the entirety of the "Other Interests" section btw)

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