Colombia: FARC peace agreement plebiscite (October 2, 2016) (user search)
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  Colombia: FARC peace agreement plebiscite (October 2, 2016) (search mode)
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Author Topic: Colombia: FARC peace agreement plebiscite (October 2, 2016)  (Read 9733 times)
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« Reply #25 on: September 30, 2016, 09:40:03 AM »

  • Barranquilla (Atlántico): Expect a YUGE victory for the Yes here, anything short of that would be pretty bad. The city's unbelievably popular mayor, Alex Char, who rules hegemonic over local politics, is from CR and is close to VP Vargas Lleras, but he's been far more enthusiastic and active in his campaign for the Yes than the VP has (but Vargas Lleras finally seems to be getting off his ass now, and incidentally showed up at a big campaign event organized by Char here in Barranquilla). Uribismo has no base here - their vote is no higher than 50,000, if that. Santos got 268,000 votes in the 2014 runoff (74%); Char won 355,800 in 2015, or 73%.
  • Cartagena (Bolívar): The city where peace was signed, proclaimed by Santos to be the "city of peace", will be interesting to watch. The governor, Dumek Turbay (Liberal), is actively campaigning for the Yes, but the mayor, populist radio host Manolo Duque's position is "yeah sure whatever, don't bother me". Uribismo isn't dominant here, far from it, but is stronger than in other regions of the Caribbean - Zuluaga did won 30% in the first round, but the core seems to be about 9-12%. Uribe (and his new sidekick Ordóñez, who got a taste of his own medicine by being deposed from his job as Procurador General) campaigned here on Monday, although apparently they only attracted a pathetically small crowd.

Other major regions or cities to watch out for

  • Antioquia: The biggest department, if you don't count Bogotá, is the cradle of uribismo, where it has the strongest and deepest roots and is the largest political force in the arena - 58% for Zuluaga in the runoff (1.14 million votes), 25% for Senate in 2014 (436,000), 38% for Zuluaga in the first round (665,000), 20% for Chamber in 2014 and Assembly in 2015 (351,000/373,000). At the same time, there are internal squabbles between various clans in the local party which hurt it in 2015, and it certainly isn't invincible, as I noted for Medellín (which is also one of the strongest regions for the CD in the department). The Yes supporters, besides Fajardo, also have a presence, but 2014 (and even 2015) showed that Uribe's star power is enough to defeat rival machines here, to a certain extent. It's also an interesting department because it has been a battleground in the entire conflict, particularly geographically peripheral regions like Urabá, the Nordeste Antioqueño, the Bajo Cauca and Magdalena Medio - uribismo is weaker in these regions, particularly Urabá (perhaps because of its leftist history, or, more likely, because of its large Afro-Colombian population). So, there are many things to look out for here: does the No win in Uribe's homeland? if so, by how much? how do regions which suffered most from the conflict and paramilitarism, like Urabá, vote? if the Yes wins, by how much and on what geographical basis? 4,539,316 voters registered here. Over 2 million votes could come from Antioquia, if turnout is decent.
  • Bucaramanga (Santander): I'm always somewhat surprised this city isn't larger than it is (still #9) since it gets more press and media attention than larger cities (Cúcuta, Ibagué and Soledad), perhaps because it's one of the wealthiest and most educated cities in the country. Its politics oscillate between boringly generic and very interesting; the main national political movements were closely matched here in 2014, with uribismo a strong but not dominant force (and lacks well-known local leaders, the CD has only a single representative, who isn't a real uribista anyway) - 23.5% (48,700) for Zuluaga R1, 16% for Senate (33,700), 12% for Assembly (31,000) and 39.5% (92,600) for Zuluaga R2. The Liberal Party is strong here, but lost the mayoralty in 2015 to Rodolfo Hernández, a very idiosyncratic anti-establishment businessman (his movement's name is Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics is its logo is the pi sign), who is the only major city mayor to remain explicitly neutral and tell the government to  off (although he was in Cartagena for the signing). Besides the Liberals, the nasty Aguilar clan is somewhat strong, though less than in the rest of the department. Bucaramanga also produced the oh so great departmental assemblywoman Ángela Hernández (U), who became famous last month or so for alleging 'homosexual colonization' by the education ministry (the education minister, the pretty awesome Gina Parody, is a lesbian, and has riled up all the Christian right against her, officially because some generic 'don't be a bully'/'don't be a bigot' curriculum stuff is anti-family/muh traditional values); Hernández has since become famous and developed a following, and now seems to have taken it upon herself to lead the charge against the gay conspiracy, perhaps soon to be joined by "straight outta 1200 a.d." Lefebvrist/Falangist Ordóñez, who is also from Bucaramanga. More than one poll suggests that Santander/Norte de Santander/Boyacá are the strongest departments for the No, but whether that's true (I'd be a bit surprised myself) or just sampling issues remains to be seen.
  • Manizales (Caldas): Admittedly I have a personal interest here, since I know this city really well, but I feel as if it's still interesting. Caldas is Zuluaga's native department, and it gave him 40.5% and 61.3% in the two rounds, although in Manizales that was lesser (31% and 54%). The CD also has prominent politicians besides Zuluaga - Luis Alfonso Hoyos (who is, however, inactive now after scandals in Zuluaga's 2014 campaign) and former senator Adriana Gutiérrez (who got 25% in last year's mayoral race in Manizales, but she was a favourite and ended up third); the CD also effectively has former Conservative senator Omar Yepes, the old political boss of Caldas, even if his younger brother, Conservative representative Arturo Yepes is with the government (and the Yes). However, uribismo hasn't proven itself to be the main political movement in Manizales or much of Caldas in either 2014 and 2015. Manizales' mayor is the populist (and presumably corrupt) Liberal Octavio Cardona, who is campaigning for the Yes. The current president of the Senate, Mauricio Lizcano (U), is from Caldas and received a lot of his votes in Manizales and Caldas (with some in Antioquia), he is probably going to be looking for a Yes win in his territories for prestige reasons (at any rate he's actively campaigning for it). The departmental government, both suspended governor Guido Echeverri and the caretaker governor, are actively campaigning for the Yes as well. Conservative senator Luis Emilio Sierra is also for the Yes.
  • Buenaventura (Valle): The largest city on the Pacific coast, and one of Colombia's poorest and most violent cities (not coincidentally, it is also the biggest city with an Afro-Colombian majority - by majority I mean 90% black). Politically, its governments are extremely corrupt (can't be bothered to double check, but we're well on track for 100% of its past 3 or 4 mayors ending up in jail), and its national leanings are outright anti-uribista (Uribe never won here, even in 2006, and Santos lost in 2010; Zuluaga got all of 12% in the first round and 18% in the runoff, against 55% and then 79% for Santos). The city has suffered a lot from the armed conflict, and will continue to suffer from conflict because of the strategic importance on the city in drug export routes and the consequent active presence of drug cartels and other criminal gangs. Mostly anecdotal evidence, and the political leanings of the municipality, suggest that it should return a massive Yes vote. It featured in the campaign when a young Afro-Colombian man had an awesome high-energy take down (#rekt) of Uribe at a No campaign event (which was, imo, a better end-all argument against the No than any of the government's "we luv peace!!11" stuff).
  • Valle del Cauca: Besides Cali and Buenaventura, the Valle has 3 million registered voters (third behind Bogotá and Antioquia), and has the potential to provide a lot of votes for the Yes. As aforementioned, the department's governor, Dilian Francisca Toro (U), isn't popular with the voto de opinión but she is one of the most powerful politicians in Colombia and is actively campaigning for the Yes. Dilian's people also control Palmira, the third largest city in the Valle, and maybe Tuluá, the fourth; Palmira is the most violent city in Colombia (by homicide rate, 70.88) and the eighth most violent in the world, if you go by the Mexican Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal's yearly rankings; Buenaventura and Tumaco would rank higher if the ranking included them), mostly because it's a gang hot spot (Cali is the second most violent by that list). The north of the Valle, whose largest city is Cartago, has a Conservative tradition and paisa (Antioquian) influence, and uribismo (and non-santista Conservatives) is quite strong there, although that really didn't show up in 2015.
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« Reply #26 on: September 30, 2016, 09:40:22 AM »

Of particular interest...

  • Tumaco (Nariño): Tumaco, the second largest city on the Pacific coast, suffered the most from the FARC's final spate of violence in the summer of 2015; it remains a poor (and 98% Afro-Colombian) city, one of the most violent in the country and where the FARC were still the main public safety concern. It is also the municipality with the most coca cultivation in the country. Its politics, shockingly enough, are rotten to the core - the main political group in control is that of Liberal representative Neftalí Correa, who holds the city hall and won the most votes in the city in 2014 (he is allied to Conservative senator Samy Merheg, who got an [abnormally] strong vote in Nariño/Tumaco in 2010 and 2014, and is the brother of former senator Habib Merheg, investigated for parapolitics). I would expect Tumaco to deliver a resounding victory for the Yes. The wider department is interesting as well - it's one of the most left-wing departments, having voted for Carlos Gaviria (Polo) in 2006 against Uribe, and it has now had three left-wing governors in a row (the current one is former Polo/Green senator Camilo Romero); the left also controls the city halls in Pasto (the capital) and Ipiales (the third largest city, and main border crossing with Ecuador). Uribismo is very weak; Santos won two-thirds of the vote in the 2014 runoff, and 43% in the first round. In Tumaco, Santos won 65% in the second round.
  • Chocó: Colombia's only majority Afro-Colombian department, the most remote one besides the Amazonian ones (fun fact: it's also the rainiest region in the world), has, by number of victims proportional to its population, suffered the most from the armed conflict since the 1980s. All armed groups are active. Long forgotten by the authorities and rotten by corruption, it is the symbol of the Colombian State's quasi-criminal abandon of millions of its own citizens to their own fate. Politically, uribismo is very weak here - Uribe lost Chocó in 2002 and won it only by a hair in 2006, in 2014, Santos won 52% and then 63% of its votes. The CD won just 4% of the vote for Senate in Chocó in 2014. Afro-Colombian advocacy groups and civic movements have long been active in the peace movement (interestingly, Afro-Colombian women often seem to feature prominently in pacifist causes), and I would expect a massive vote for the Yes. One place, however, to look at with special attention will be Bojayá, tragically infamous for the 2002 massacre, in which the FARC killed nearly 80 civilians, an event which became one of the more emblematic massacres of the conflict (the FARC travelled to Bojayá in 2015 to ask for victims' forgiveness, their first public apology directly to a community). Corrupt caciques retain dominance of local politics.
  • Putumayo: The southwestern department, on the border with Ecuador and at the western extremity of the Colombian Amazon, has been one of the hotbeds of the conflict, primarily the guerrilla, and also one of the main coca cultivating departments in the country (and consistently so, through all of Plan Colombia). It is famous (presumably to me only) for being the only department not to vote for Santos in 2010, and then being one of his best in 2014 (66.9% in the runoff, 39% in the first round). Its politics are interesting - the left has real strength here, although it shows up only intermittently, perhaps because some of those votes went to Guillermo Rivera (Liberal), representative between 2002 and 2014 (one of the main figures behind the victims law) and unsuccessful candidate for Senate in 2014. The current governor, Sorrel Aroca (Green), has been very supportive of the peace process and is active for the Yes.
  • Barrancabermeja (Santander): The city of oil refineries has been at the centre of the conflict in the Magdalena Medio for years, disputed between guerrillas (and the political left and unions, always strong here) and the paramilitaries, with the latter basically seizing control of the city around 2002. Now, it is back to being something of a left-wing stronghold, at least as far as the 2014 presidential election can be used to make such claims - Clara López placed first with 32% in 2014, and her voters allowed Santos to triumph with 74% in the runoff. It will be interesting to see how the final agreement was received by voters here, and how effective the left and the unions were in mobilizing support for the Yes outside of Bogotá.
  • Catatumbo region / Tibú (Norte de Santander): Another of the main regions of conflict, with an active presence of all armed groups (FARC, ELN, EPL remnants, Bacrim) because of its resource wealth (oil, historically, and now coca) and the border with Venezuela, one of Latin America's "hottest" borders (and not because of Colombian paramilitaries commanded by Uribe plotting to destroy the glorious Bolivarian socialist motherland, like Maduro claimed). The Polo was strong in a select number of municipalities in 2014, in both elections, because of its ability to catch some of the remnants of the 2013 agrarian protests (Polo senator Jesus Alberto Castilla was one of the agrarian leaders then); there have been claims that, in these municipalities, the guerrillas, including the ELN and EPL, coerced voters. Santos was very strong in the Catatumbo, including Tibú (the capital), where the left wasn't. Norte de Santander as a whole seems interesting - I don't know much about it (except that its politics are a fest, and that the mayor of Cúcuta is the ally of a convicted murderer/former mayor)
  • San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá): The infamous and stigmatized centre of the FARC's old zona de despeje (1998-2002), which, interestingly, elected a CD mayor in 2015, who initially signalled that he'd remain neutral but is now backing the No openly. Zuluaga won the municipality in 2014.
  • Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá): One of the few original UP strongholds where the left remains strong to this day.
  • Florencia (Caquetá) and Leticia (Amazonas): I won't pretend to know much about politics in these places, especially the boonies (Amazonas), but they're the only two departmental capitals which elected a CD mayor in 2015, although only one (Leticia) is openly for the No.
  • Casanare: Zuluaga won 77.8% of the vote in the runoff in 2014 in this oil-rich, old paramilitary stomping ground (= its politicians are all scum, basically) in the Llanos (it had also been Santos' best department, ironically but unsurprisingly, in 2010). It is also the only department with a CD governor, who is remaining neutral. What may be interesting is Yopal, the capital: in 2015, it famously elected Jhon Jairo Torres, better known as Jhon 'Calzones' (underwear), who was in jail at the time (and is now back in jail, for the third term). He is the owner of a store selling women's panties, who got rich overnight (and spends his money on eccentricities, like army jeeps) and illegally began a housing development for 10,000 poor families (on land seized from drug traffickers, no less) sold at discount (in exchange for a vote). Jhon 'Calzones' was behind Zuluaga in 2014, but apparently peeved at how uribismo treated him in return, he is supporting the Yes from his prison cell in Bogotá.

Concentration zones - where the FARC's demobilization will take place

  • Anorí, Antioquia
  • Dabeiba, Antioquia
  • Ituango, Antioquia
  • Remedios, Antioquia
  • Vigía del Fuerte, Antioquia
  • Arauquita, Arauca
  • Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá
  • La Montañita, Caquetá
  • San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá
  • Buenos Aires, Cauca
  • Caldono, Cauca
  • Corinto, Cauca
  • La Paz, Cesar
  • Riosucio, Chocó
  • Tierralta, Córdoba
  • Fonseca, La Guajira
  • San José del Guaviare, Guaviare
  • La Macarena, Meta
  • Mesetas, Meta
  • Vistahermosa, Meta
  • Policarpa, Nariño
  • Tumaco, Nariño
  • Tibú, Norte de Santander
  • Puerto Asis, Putumayo
  • Planadas, Tolima (also the 'birthplace' of the FARC)
  • Villarrica, Tolima (1955 battle of Villarrica, the government's assault on communist rebels)
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« Reply #27 on: September 30, 2016, 06:42:19 PM »

If I may go full #AMA - What would be the immediate (political, not legal) consequences of a Sí and No victory, respectively? And how would you expect the FARC to react to a No result in the longer term?

Sí victory: It would allow for the implementation of the final agreement to begin, using the special legislative mechanism adopted for speedy congressional approval of all necessary laws to implement it. The first will be expediting the amnesty law, which the FARC say is necessary before they can disarm, and is expected to come very quickly after the plebiscite (the text was included as part of the final agreement). Afterwards will be the constitutional amendments for transitional justice (JEP), the approval law for the final agreement, the incorporation of the final agreement into the constitution (i.e. SURRENDERING TO CASTRO-CHAVISMO!) and so on down the list (the other important things: creation of the land fun, political/electoral reform etc.) - it's all laid out neatly in the text of the final agreement. Simultaneously, the concentration and disarmament of the FARC will begin, under international (UN) supervision, and must be completed within 180 days - but it's not quite sure if the clock has started (the agreement talks 180 days from 'd-day', but nobody has defined 'd-day'). Hopefully they pass the law making homosexuality mandatory soon Smiley

Politically, the FARC will tell us more about what political strategy they intend to follow. A Sí victory would be a big win for Santos and the government, but, for now, Santos' disapproval is still over 60%, and time will tell if that changes (I really don't foresee his approvals improving much, since implementation will bring up a lot of unintended/unannounced consequences which won't go over well). Although, since he has no electoral incentives, Santos will likely spend the second half of his term trying to be the 'president of peace' or whatever. Now, those who do have electoral things to think about (i.e. 2018), will need to make their plans clearly fairly soon - those holding office (i.e. Vice President) will need to resign it a year before the election, so as soon as next spring we will have Vargas Lleras out of the vice presidency and officially campaigning (ha! as if he isn't already!). Vargas Lleras is a slimy opportunist, who will be closely watching how the final agreement goes over to decide which position to adopt (if it goes well: "vote for me, i was with it all along and peace is so cool! btw remember all the nice highways and free houses i built personally?"/if it goes poorly: "i always had my doubts here folks, Santos didn't listen to me but here we are! Not good! btw remember all the nice highways and free houses i built personally?"/if FARC-bashing becomes popular: "mano firme corazón grande's back baby (btw remember all the nice highways and free houses i built personally?)").

But Vargas Lleras won't be allowed to run away with it - the Liberals and the U, will fight one another to be the 'party of peace', but may come together to find a way to sabotage Vargas Lleras (so far, the Liberals - esp. César Gaviria - really like the idea of chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle running in 2018, but I have my doubts - there's a difference, obviously, between being respected as a non-partisan negotiator and active partisan politics; he'd also be a mighty throwback to the '90s in political terms).

The reorganization of the left, prompted by the FARC's entrance into politics, will be very interesting - especially since everything indicates that the FARC won't participate alone, but rather seek a 'broad coalition', a possibility which is already dividing the Polo a lot and will divide it even further once the FARC actually become a political movement. I have a feeling the Polo won't be around much longer. Then you have people like Gustavo Petro and Sergio Fajardo who will figure out the best way to run for president. TLDR: lots of interesting things will come from it.

No victory: Nobody knows. Uribe claims that the agreement will be renegotiated so that we can get a bunch of stuff which sounds nice (peace without impunity!1 no war criminals in Congress!2 jail for the guerrilla commanders!3) but is really a pipe dream, and the constitution/law makes it clear that only Santos has the power to handle such matters. The government claims that the FARC will go back to blowing you up and killing people, but that's fairly unlikely because things have changed a whole lot from 2012 (and you also have stuff like the military now has a lot of information about the FARC's locations, or that the UN is already in Colombia). The FARC suggest that they won't do that, but also make clear that they won't renegotiate. If they do agree to renegotiate, everybody feels that the FARC would enter in a position of strength, and demand that the agreements be changed to accommodate their demands as well, and the most likely modification to come about would be a constituent assembly, where both the FARC and Uribe have common ground (guess what: Uribe wants one so he can become the Colombian Ortega/Maduro - who is castro-chavista now?).

What is certain is that the government would be weakened, to the point where Santos may become so weak and stripped of all legitimacy that resignation will be on the table. The coalition would collapse, with CR (and the Conservatives) bolting in a second and the Liberals/U gaining bargaining power v. Santos and/or finding a way to implement the agreement, in part or in full, through Congress, since the plebiscite's result is only binding on the President (whether this is legal is another issue), although this will be difficult since I don't foresee CR or the Conservatives being overly enthusiastic at this kind of stuff.

Uribe will be strengthened, and the CD's strategy for 2018 will become very important - you may see Vargas Lleras ally with Uribe, but that depends to what extent Uribe still holds a grudge against Vargas Lleras (he probably still does - he's not a forgiving person). Ordóñez's presidential candidacy may be boosted, though there are lots of question marks here. My best guess here is that Uribe, deep down, has no idea what would happen but is just going for the No because of his intense, personal hatred for 'Santos the dirty traitor' (and Uribe is basically a 5 year old kid who wants to punch you in the face because you stole his toy)

1 This isn't how peace agreements actually work (and Colombia's agreement has way less impunity than (a) most peace agreements in the world and (b) more than any previous peace agreement in Colombian history).
2 As if there aren't already criminals in Congress!
3 Definitely realistic to have a peace agreement starting with the invitation "haha you'll still go to jail for 30 years at the end of it suckers!"
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« Reply #28 on: October 02, 2016, 10:35:40 AM »

Finally - to what extent is the government serious about implementing the parts of the agreement I get the impression will be unpopular among (certain parts of) the establishment (land reform springs to mind in particular)?

That may be the million dollar question. It will certainly be difficult to implement the entirety of the agreement or, at best, it will take lots of time. Land reform carries certain benefits for the more progressive/enlightened parts of the establishment: formalizing property titles will permit a real market for land and investments, for example. The land reform agreement may also help increase the productivity and efficiency of agriculture, currently shackled by problems such as widespread rural poverty, the absence of technology of any kind in much smaller farm properties and so much land being used for cattle grazing. One would also guess that the government has promised its people in the regions that they will be able to get in all those anti-poverty infrastructure programs. In a way, the land reform agreement is also a natural progression from the 2011 victims law. Which isn't to say that there won't be resistance here - Fedegán, the main cattle ranchers' association and reactionary outpost, has been hard at work trying to sabotage the 2011 law and isn't happy about this.

On illicit drugs, the current government has shifted away from the traditional failed 'drug war' approach (whose most visible expression was aerial spraying) and has refocused, at least on paper, to see drugs as a public health issue. The agreement continues in that direction, with the hope that with the cooperation of the FARC, crop substitution programs will be successful nationally. It's a tall order. There's some pushback from parts of the 'establishment' here too - the new attorney general, a lawyer for rich people, has come out in favour of aerial spraying, which was stopped in 2015.

Political participation has controversial points as well, but may be one of the less difficult things as far as the main aspects are concerned - a 'statute of the opposition', which is required by the Constitution (i.e. since 1991 Roll Eyes), electoral reform, facilitating the creation of new parties and guarantees for social movements. The devil, here, will be in the details - I'm particularly curious as to what the government has in mind for electoral reform and new political parties.
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« Reply #29 on: October 02, 2016, 04:54:47 PM »

94.6% reporting

NO 50.16% 6.107.565
YES 49.83% 6.067.957

Words can't express how terrible and enraged I feel now.
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« Reply #30 on: October 02, 2016, 05:05:18 PM »

It's over, the NO has won. Seems like the paramilitaries will have their last laugh.

97.88% reporting
NO 50.22% - 6.328.501
SÍ 49.77% - 6.270.730

Wow!!! What could the political consequences of these results? Could FARC start making terrorists attacks again?

Nobody knows. I feel as if the uncertainty here is bigger than Brexit.
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« Reply #31 on: October 02, 2016, 05:11:32 PM »

98.45% reporting. NO victory irreversible.

NO 50.22% 6.362.549
YES 49.77% 6.304.720

37.02% turnout

+1 fascist victory! God bless this great world we live in.
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« Reply #32 on: October 02, 2016, 07:22:53 PM »

Maps.



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« Reply #33 on: October 03, 2016, 12:17:25 PM »

Colombia on Twitter, less than 24hrs after voting in favour of 10,000 more dead people:
Kim Kardashian 483,000 tweets
#HAPPY MONDAY 64,300 tweet
Humberto de la Calle (peace negotiator) 17,500 tweets

"meh the No won, at least our kids won't learn about gender in school but BTW WHAT ABOUT KIM KARDASHIAN'S TITS?Huh!!!! IS THAT SOMETHING OR WHAT?Huh!!!!". Ignorance is Strength.

Here's a municipal map of this travesty. More substantive analysis if anybody cares (probably not because KIM KARDASHIAN HAPPY MONDAY!!!)



Larger link here.
Kim Kardashian was held at gunpoint: Here's what we know about this terrifying situation
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« Reply #34 on: October 04, 2016, 01:43:43 PM »

From a vague scan, would it be fair to say that the areas hit hardest by the FARC over the course of the conflict did indeed overwhelmingly vote Sí?

I would say those regions which suffered the most in the recent years of the conflict (as in, during and post-"Democratic Security") overwhelmingly voted Sí, although almost always with turnout below the (low) national average of 37%, which can either be seen as a general disconnect from politics in those regions abandoned by the State for decades or skepticism of some locals towards the peace agreement.

Bojayá (Chocó) is the most commonly cited example, as it was the site of a 2002 massacre in which 79 civilians were killed when the FARC accidentally fired a cylinder bomb into the church where the locals were taking refuge, and because the FARC apologized on repeated occasions in 2015 and 2016 for the massacre, in events organized with the community. It voted 95.78% for the Sí, although with only 30.1% turnout - but this is in line with its low turnout in national elections (31.3% in the 2014 runoff).

Tumaco (Nariño) suffered the brunt of the FARC's last (?/thanks a lot Uribe you degenerate scumbag) spate of violence in the summer of 2015, and has generally been screwed over by everybody for its entire history (they are blacks, you see). It voted 71.2% Sí with just 28.1% turnout, which in this case is lower than usual. The even more remote, inaccessible and severely impoverished Afro municipalities of the Pacific coast in Nariño and Cauca voted 90%+ Sí, although with low turnouts. Buenaventura (Valle), another case of "generally been screwed over by everybody for its entire history (they are blacks, you see)", voted 70.7% Sí with just 28.5% turnout, low compared to 2014 runoff and slightly lower even than 2014 first round.

San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá) was the centre of the infamous 1998-2002 FARC DMZ (thanks a lot Pastrana you demented brain-dead half-senile waste of oxygen), and, unlike the other municipalities mentioned above, does have a significant Uribista presence (and a CD mayor, who supported the No after being a tease about it). It voted 62.9% Sí with 31% turnout, roughly in line with its turnout in 2014. The other four municipalities in the DMZ - La Uribe, La Macarena, Vista Hermosa and Mesetas (Meta) - all voted Sí, with decent turnout (over 40%), up to 93.6% Sí in La Uribe, which remains a left-wing stronghold after having been a FARC/UP bastion in the 1980s.

Urabá in Antioquia voted Sí, fairly decisively, albeit with disastrously low turnout. On the other hand, the Magdalena Medio region as a whole, where the paramilitaries pushed the FARC out in the 1980s/1990s ('pushed', of course, meaning, "murdered thousands of innocent civilians using different sorts of Nazi/WW2 Japanese-level barbarities, and forcibly expelled millions to steal their land, but that's OK because Our Lord and Saviour Uribe PBUH said it was OK!"), voted pretty overwhelmingly No. Places like Segovia (Antioquia), Puerto Boyacá (Boyacá), southern Bolívar, Puerto Berrío, one-time leftist strongholds, voted solidly No.

As a final tidbit, Mitú (Vaupés), the only departmental capital ever captured (for 48 hours) by the FARC, in November 1998, voted 75.6% Sí with just 23.3% turnout, low although not much lower than 2014 first round (28.9%). Mitú is absurdly tiny (15,576 registered voters) and is only reachable by boat (from even more middle of nowhere places) or plane (and not on the cheap).

In unrelated, oh so fantastic news, Our Lord and Saviour Uribe PBUH has proposed "amnesty for all rank-and-file guerrillas of the FARC who haven't committed crimes against humanity" - which is exactly what was in the fucking final agreement, for fuck's sake. Somebody please put some lead in his diet.
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Hashemite
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« Reply #35 on: October 04, 2016, 02:36:10 PM »

So basically less than one percent effectively decided the country should remain plunged into a bloody conflict.

F**king great.

53,895 people. 257,189 people actually showed up, casting an unmarked vote (86,243 people) [wow rebels so kewl! hopefully they're proud of their courageous rebellion] or invalid vote (170,946 people). If just 21% of these people had still showed up but cast a valid vote for the Yes, it would have won and everybody would be in a better place. But because of a few hundred thousand idiots who decided to take a figurative sh*it in the ballot box with their valiant acts of defiance, now a war criminal whose former sister in law was a drug trafficker and money launderer for the Sinaloa Cartel is holding the country hostage and condemning such a beautiful country to more suffering and crises. Referendums need to be banned and declared to be crimes against humanity by the ICC asap.

So basically less than one percent effectively decided the country should remain plunged into a bloody conflict.

F**king great.

No. 51%.

It would be great if you at least made a minimal effort not to say nonsense.
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« Reply #36 on: October 04, 2016, 07:10:49 PM »

OK, some early turnout #analysis:

Turnout (37.43%) was 2.5% lower than in the first round of the 2014 presidential election (39.93%), which was very low because, like this time, the pro-government machinery only did the bare minimum to move their people to the polls. The correlation, at the departmental level, between these two election is 0.95 and the RSQ value is 0.90, so about as perfect a positive correlation as you're gonna get in polisci.

4 departments + the vote abroad (LOL) had higher turnout, with the biggest gains in the foreign vote (+3.3%), Norte de Santander (+3%) and Guaviare (+4.4%). Seven departments had turnout 5% lower than in 2014 - the three eje cafetero departments, Cundinamarca, very remote jungleland Guainía and Amazonas and Magdalena. Magdalena (-7.3%) is probably Hurricane Matthew, as turnout was just 5.8% in Aracataca, the town hardest hit by flooding on Sunday. Interestingly, turnout in La Guajira, also hit by Matthew, dropped 4.1%, so its low turnout is more 'structural' - basically, the indigenous Wayuu people of the Guajira Peninsula/Desert do not vote outside local elections (and, to a much lesser extent, congressional elections, when some congressman comes over and bribes a few thousand people) - 3.4% turnout in Uribia, 6.2% in Manaure, compared to 8% and 9.3% in the 2014 first round. And who'd blame them? The government is basically letting them starve to death so criminal mining companies can loot their land.



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« Reply #37 on: October 07, 2016, 10:19:11 PM »







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