Misc Articles (Amendment, Supremacy, Officeholding, &c) LAST CALL for new topics

[Associate Justice PiT]

The Leinad Amendment Ratification Plan:

1. If an amendment has three-fifths of the vote overall, it will pass...

2. ...unless three-fifths of the voters in multiple regions oppose the amendment...

3. ...or four-fifths of a single region oppose the amendment.

This just might work. A suggestion to make it simpler: a three-fifths vote in a national referendum will ratify a proposed amendment, but 2 of the 3 Regional legislatures can veto it. That would increase the importance of the Regional governments and Regional elections (one of the goals of devolution), preserve the historical role of the Regions in the ratification process, and give the national electorate a voice in the matter.

A nifty compromise would be to let the regions decide how to "veto" it, would it not? So, either my plan or yours.

That would definitely be in keeping with the general policy of this Convention to give the Regions as much autonomy as is practicable. Personally, I can't think of any reason not to do it that way - it would give the Regions more leeway (and therefore more things to argue about) and make phrasing the Article much easier to boot.

I'm not a fan of the unilateral veto power, though: conceivably, you could have a scenario where 4/5 of Region X opposes an amendment but the other two Regions support it by similar margins. Allowing Region X to veto the amendment over the objections of the other two would undermine both the Regions and the popular will.

     What if we denied regions the ability to veto if the overall popular vote were above a certain threshold (say, 2/3rds)?

[Associate Justice PiT]

1. D
2. B
3. C
4. A

[Associate Justice PiT]

     When you say Game Engine, what specifically do you mean?