Misc Articles (Amendment, Supremacy, Officeholding, &c) LAST CALL for new topics

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Hear ye! Hear ye! Having seen the adoption of a Bill of Rights, this Convention will now turn its attention to such additional and miscellaneous provisions as should be fitting and proper for inclusion in the federal Constitution. Through discussion with the Deputy Presiding Officer and other delegates to the Convention, I have compiled the following list of the questions that remain to be settled before we proceed with a final vote on this document:

                    • Process for amending the Constitution
                    • Federal "Supremacy Clause"
                    • Relations between the Regions
                    • Rules for simultaneous officeholding
                    • Legislative process, relationship between the Senate and the House

Sometime tomorrow, I will present an amendment addressing most of these topics that will form the basis for our discussion; in the meantime, feel free to offer any ideas, thoughts, or concerns you may have in regards to these Articles.

I now open the floor for debate.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

However, we should institute a 3/4 vote on secession.

This has already been done.

Anyways, I offer the following amendment:

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Delegates have 24 hours to object to Truman's amendment; HOWEVER, because it will be much easier to adopt this and then make changes as necessary than it would be to scrap this proposal and start from scratch, I respectfully ask that delegates refrain from objecting to this amendment. Think of this as a foundation rather than a final product: the idea is to erect a basic framework, after which we can consider changes or additions as necessary.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Shouldn't it be "a majority/three-fifths of voters in two thirds of the regions"?

Such is the status quo; however, I believe that amendments to the national Constitution should be ratified by the national electorate. Under the current system, it is not inconceivable that a widely popular amendment could fail because of an uneven distribution of the population. For example:

Region A:   50 Yes, 10 No
Region B:   19 Yes, 21 No
Region C:   18 Yes, 22 No

Under the "Ratification by Region" System, this hypothetical amendment would have failed despite over 60% of voters having supported it at the polls. That strikes me as enormously undemocratic. Under my proposal, the right to amend the Constitution would lay with the body it was created to represent: the national people.

Of course, others will disagree with me, so a vote will be in order once this amendment is adopted; however, I strongly believe that my proposal is the correct one, and I urge my fellow delegates - when the time comes - to vote to sustain it.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

This constitution establishes their powers, and protect's their rights. We have fought so hard to get devolution and other things into this constitution. Removing the regions from this process denies them a say in any future changes to those provisions, including their removal or even abolition of the regions. Such attempts have occured every two years or so since I joined in 2008. 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015.

I see your point, and I don't discount the danger of eroding Regional authority too greatly (hence my steady support for devolution at this Convention). At the same time, however, I'm wary of denying the national electorate a voice in shaping the national Constitution. The only circumstance in which a vote of the Regions would turn out differently than a vote of the nation as a whole is when the Regions are out of step with public opinion. In that sense, the "Ratification by Region" system is a bit like the RL electoral college: it's perfectly rational and democratic... until it isn't.

I'm cautiously intrigued by your earlier proposal. To clarify: your idea was that the national electorate could overturn the result of the Regional referendum(s) by a 2/3 vote, yes?

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

On the flip side, couldn't that entail that a change is being made that is especially harmful to agriculture for instance and thus harmful to the West and South but is loved by the less agricultural North? Also your example implies a lower turnout in both the other regions but not in the supportive one. Indicating the supportive one has an overwhelming vested interest in it, that those other two don't share.

Actually, my model assumed unanimous turnout in every Region: the difference is one of population, with Region A having roughly 20 more citizens than B and C. As for your main point:

1. While the existence of competing Regional Interests (to use your example, the agrarian West versus the industrial North) are real and significant in the world outside Atlas, within Atlasia they have almost no effect on the game. The Regions - if I may break character for a moment - are imaginary constructs of an internet community. People do not stand to loose their homes or jobs if, for example, a particular farm subsidy is reduced, and so those kinds of issues rarely drive how people vote in elections and referendums. In real life, someone living in Wyoming is much more likely to support a pro-agriculture program than someone living in, say, New York City; in Atlasia, however, whether one is registered in the Northeast or the Midwest makes almost no difference as to what policies one supports (quite often, the poster in question does not even live in that state IRL). In short, the idea that policy differences are based on Regional divisions doesn't match up with how the game operates: ideology, not geography, is the deciding factor in most Amendment votes, and therefore it will be quite rare to find someone who supports or opposes an Amendment because of where they are registered.

2. Forgive me, but you seem to be confusing Rights with Interests - that is, you are arguing that a hypothetical Amendment could conceivably turn out better for some parts of the country than others, and that this alone is reason enough to block the National Ratification system. I must respectfully disagree. There are really two reasons that a Region might object to a proposed amendment: either because it infringes upon their Rights, or because it infringes upon their sectional Interests. The former is obviously deplorable and must be avoided; the latter is sometimes unfortunate, but can be appropriate. Consider an amendment that truly violates the Rights of the people of the Regions: say, the right to vote. An attempt to eliminate this right would affect all people equally: in the absence of the cultural or economic differences debunked in (1), support or opposition to this measure is likely to have little to do with Regional boundaries. There is no reason that someone in the Northeast would be more or less inclined to support the proposal than someone in the South, except for arbitrary registration patterns that have little to do with any inherent quality of the Regions themselves. In short, any attempt to infringe upon the rights of the Regions would be debated on the same premises and preconceptions in every Region; geography, in effect, is moot.

Now consider an equally hypothetical amendment that is contrary to one particular Region's Interests. (As I explained in (1), these kinds of considerations rarely play a role in Atlasia, but for the sake of the argument let us set that aside for a moment.) Interests are not like Rights: there is nothing universal or unchangeable about them, nor is one Interest inherently more important or 'correct' than the other. There are millions of examples of conflicts of interest in our politics: trade policy pits the interests of consumers against the interests of producers; mass transit projects benefit urban communities more than rural ones; green energy subsidies are good for solar panel producers but not oil companies. While most of us are likely to find one of these interests more compelling than the other, none is inherently superior or more important to the others. When possible, it is best to balance these interests (after all, government exists to serve the whole people, and not just a fraction), but sometimes we are forced to make a choice. By tradition, Atlasia bases its choices in these cases on the principle of majority rule: that is, whichever policy benefits the greatest number of people is adopted.

When the interests of one Region are pitted against the interests of another (such as in your example of agricultural policy), the will of the majority of citizens must prevail. As such, when a proposed Amendment is supported by a majority of the populace, it is only right that said Amendment should be adopted. The only exception to this rule is when the proposal violates the Rights of the minority- a state of affairs that, as I have just demonstrated, effects all citizens equally regardless of Regional boundaries.


I realize that I've been talking for a while here, so to summarize:

   1. Sectional rivalries (i.e. rural vs. urban, farm vs. industry) don't really play a role in Atlasia. This is because the Regions are (like Atlasia itself) imaginary and many people aren't RL residents of their Region, so ideology - not geography or the local economy - forms the basis for what policies people support or oppose.
   2. Rights are universal - when a Right is taken away, it affects everyone equally. Thus, support or opposition to an Amendment that legitimately violates the rights of the people does not depend on one's Region of residence.
   3. One Region's Interests are not inherently superior to another Region's Interests; in other words, the North is not more important that the South or West (and vice versa). Therefore, when two interests come into conflict, the will of the majority must prevail. Therefore, a system that obstructs the principle of majority rule is illogical and unproductive.

Especially now that there is a secession mechanism, because if the other two are always outvoted, it runs the risk of the country breaking apart.

This is why I voted against secession: what you're describing is a scenario where the Regions are blackmailing the Union into adopting minority rule. In any case, I don't think that this is at all likely: remember that there is a very high threshold for secession votes. As such, in the scenario I described, Regions B and C could not secede unless a sizable portion of "Yes" voters supported doing so.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

The Regions - if I may break character for a moment - are imaginary constructs of an internet community. People do not stand to loose their homes or jobs if, for example, a particular farm subsidy is reduced, and so those kinds of issues rarely drive how people vote in elections and referendums. In real life, someone living in Wyoming is much more likely to support a pro-agriculture program than someone living in, say, New York City; in Atlasia, however, whether one is registered in the Northeast or the Midwest makes almost no difference as to what policies one supports (quite often, the poster in question does not even live in that state IRL).

Truman, this is precisely the argument you do not want to be making. Your first sentence, alone, was the basis for every attempt at reducing Regional power for the last eight years. Be it removing the regional Senate seats and replacing it with an at-large Senate, replacing the ratification process with a referendum or abolishing the region's outright.

Pardon me, I chose my words poorly. The point I was making was not, "The Regions are imaginary, so their Rights don't matter," but rather "The Regions aren't organic communities bonded by geography and a common upbringing, so sectional tensions are less prevalent in Atlasia." Obviously, the latter ought have no bearing on discussions of Regional Rights, which is the main question here. I agree that we need to protect the Regions against assaults on their liberty, but it's also important for the national electorate to have a vote too (lest the Regions themselves become the abusers).

The Leinad Amendment Ratification Plan:

1. If an amendment has three-fifths of the vote overall, it will pass...

2. ...unless three-fifths of the voters in multiple regions oppose the amendment...

3. ...or four-fifths of a single region oppose the amendment.

This just might work. A suggestion to make it simpler: a three-fifths vote in a national referendum will ratify a proposed amendment, but 2 of the 3 Regional legislatures can veto it. That would increase the importance of the Regional governments and Regional elections (one of the goals of devolution), preserve the historical role of the Regions in the ratification process, and give the national electorate a voice in the matter.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Anyways, seeing no objection, the Amendment has been adopted.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

The Leinad Amendment Ratification Plan:

1. If an amendment has three-fifths of the vote overall, it will pass...

2. ...unless three-fifths of the voters in multiple regions oppose the amendment...

3. ...or four-fifths of a single region oppose the amendment.

This just might work. A suggestion to make it simpler: a three-fifths vote in a national referendum will ratify a proposed amendment, but 2 of the 3 Regional legislatures can veto it. That would increase the importance of the Regional governments and Regional elections (one of the goals of devolution), preserve the historical role of the Regions in the ratification process, and give the national electorate a voice in the matter.

A nifty compromise would be to let the regions decide how to "veto" it, would it not? So, either my plan or yours.

That would definitely be in keeping with the general policy of this Convention to give the Regions as much autonomy as is practicable. Personally, I can't think of any reason not to do it that way - it would give the Regions more leeway (and therefore more things to argue about) and make phrasing the Article much easier to boot.

I'm not a fan of the unilateral veto power, though: conceivably, you could have a scenario where 4/5 of Region X opposes an amendment but the other two Regions support it by similar margins. Allowing Region X to veto the amendment over the objections of the other two would undermine both the Regions and the popular will.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Leinad, forgive me for being blunt, but what exactly is your argument? Is the unilateral veto a purely decorative ornament that will never be used, or a highly necessary safeguard of the Union? It's not clear to me why the former would be a reason to support this provision, or why the latter makes any sense at all.

If 3/5ths of the overall population supports something, I highly doubt 80% in one region would oppose it. Unless it was something that would hurt that one region.

These two sentences nicely sum up the contradiction at the core of your argument: the idea that the majority cannot be trusted to never abuse its power, but the minority (if given power over the majority) can. If we assume it is likely that the national people will vote to strip a single Region of its rights, we must also assume that that Region would vote to strip the national people of their rights.

Do you really believe that 2/3 of both houses of Congress and 3/5 of the national people would ratify an amendment that is openly hostile to one Region? (That's not a theoretical question - do you really believe there is a chance that this will happen?) If not, why have this provision at all? If so, why should we trust the Regions but not Congress? Again, if it is likely that majorities in two Regions would gang up to sabotage the third, it must be equally likely that the third Region will use its power to sabotage the other two. Human nature does not change at the state line: either people are all backstabbing, untrustworthy tyrants or they are not.

This was the point my previous post was making: maybe the Regions can be trusted not to abuse this power, but if so, why can't the national people be trusted not to abuse their power?

Also, as I believe Yankee mentioned earlier, the secession risk is a real factor. If 80% of one region opposes something, this reduces the chances they leave over it.

This is the sort of argument that John C. Calhoun made to rationalize his support for Nullification: according to Calhoun, the states must be given the power to destroy the Union, and then - to make sure they never use it - the majority must never do anything that the minority does not like. I'm not by any means putting you in the same class as Calhoun (the South Carolinian was a horrible, racist b*stard; you are very much otherwise), but the logic of your argument is worryingly similar to that of Calhoun's Fort Hill Address. This does not surprise me: I predicted that this would happen when the right to secede was first proposed:

Sooner or later, the national legislature is going to pass a law that a majority of citizens in one Region do not like: if that majority can declare itself out of the Union on a dime, we have a situation where the national government will be paralyzed by threats of separation.

Replace "law" with "Constitutional Amendment" and you basically have the argument for the unilateral veto, only with national paralysis re-imagined as a positive good.

Preserving the the historical method of ratification is one thing; taking the unprecedented, anti-democratic step of allowing a minority of both the Regions and the national population to veto a decision of the majority is another. This goes beyond the mere likelihood that such will ever occur: if this provision is adopted, we will have enshrined in our Constitution that the majority is subservient to the minority. That accomplished, why stop with Constitutional Amendments? Why not allow 4/5 of one Region to veto the results of presidential elections, acts of Congress, or Supreme Court rulings? You have not proposed any of these changes, but is the argument in favor of them really any different from that in favor of your proposal?

A Union that is controlled by a minority of its members is not worth preserving. I am willing to accept the status quo, but the unilateral veto is unacceptable.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

We will now proceed with a principle vote on the question of Constitutional Amendments

PRINCIPLE VOTE on CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Please rank the following Plans in order of preference.
[   ] PLAN A: The Constitution may be amended by a 3/5 vote of the national electorate.
[   ] PLAN B: The Constitution may be amended by a 3/5 vote of the national electorate, BUT amendments may be Vetoed by a 2/3 vote of the Regions.
[   ] PLAN C: The Constitution may be amended by a 3/5 vote of the national electorate, BUT amendments may be Vetoed by 3/5 of the voters in two (2) Regions or 4/5 of the voters in one (1) Region.
[   ] PLAN D: The Constitution may be amended by a 2/3 vote of the Regions.
[   ] Abstain

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

PRINCIPLE VOTE on CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Please rank the following Plans in order of preference.
[ 1 ] PLAN A: The Constitution may be amended by a 3/5 vote of the national electorate.
[ 3 ] PLAN B: The Constitution may be amended by a 3/5 vote of the national electorate, BUT amendments may be Vetoed by a 2/3 vote of the Regions.
[ 4 ] PLAN C: The Constitution may be amended by a 3/5 vote of the national electorate, BUT amendments may be Vetoed by 3/5 of the voters in two (2) Regions or 4/5 of the voters in one (1) Region.
[ 2 ] PLAN D: The Constitution may be amended by a 2/3 vote of the Regions.
[   ] Abstain

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

False equivalency. The ability to veto constitutional amendments gives a region no power other than that. A region couldn't unilaterally do anything to alter the Constitution in it's form prior to the vote in question, or impose anything on the other two regions.

I disagree. Basically, I hold that there are two types of amendments where this power might be invoked: those that legitimately infringe upon the rights of the Regions (for example, abolishing Regional representation in the Senate), and those that do not BUT that are objectionable to one Region for political or ideological reasons (for example, a pro-life amendment to the Bill of Rights would fall under this category). The first would be a threat to every Region's rights: they would therefore likely be opposed by multiple Regions (if not rejected outright by the national electorate), and thus the unilateral veto power would be unnecessary. The second kind is another matter. Because they are not actually threats to Regional sovereignty - opposition to these kinds of proposals is purely ideological - they should by right be submitted to the principle of majority rule. It is not out of the question, however, that one Region might use the unilateral veto to strike down the amendment anyways. This, in my view, would be an abuse of power: while technically legal, it contorts the Constitution and uses it as a partisan weapon to win fights that could not be won at the ballot box. If I were convinced that 2/3 of the Regions would willingly vote to strip themselves of their liberty, I would support this provision, but I do not; therefore, I come to the conclusion that this provision would serve only as a tool to obstruct the will of the majority.

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This argument, however much you disagree with it, is not a "strawman." When you use a "strawman" in debate, you create an extreme and ludicrous opinion out of thin air and attempt to tie it to the view you are contesting. For example, if I had wanted to use a strawman against your position, I could have argued "Leinad wants to bring back the Articles of Confederation! A vote for Plan C is a vote for dissolving the Union!" That is not what I did. It so happens that I recently read the entirety of Calhoun's Fort Hill Address for a paper I was writing IRL on the American System, and his argument against the tariff reminded me of one argument in favor of the unilateral veto. Essentially, Calhoun argued that the American System - specifically the Tariff of Abominations - had divided the country and alienated his home state. Having previously argued for each state's right to secede, Calhoun then posited his thesis: if the Tariff were not repealed, South Carolina would withdraw from the Union, which would irreparably harm American democracy. Therefore, certain concessions had to be made "for the sake of the Union": among them, granting individual states the right to "nullify" federal laws. This progression (1. We must protect the right to secede; 2. If State X doesn't get its way, it will secede; 3. We must allow State X to nullify the law when it does not get its way) seemed to echo your own. This is a relevant historical reference: you are free to refute it and explain how your argument differs, but it is not a strawman.

I will admit, Leinad, that I feel I am being blackmailed (not by you, but by Janus). I can accept defeat on the Secession Clause (indeed, I had made my peace with it until this came to the fore), but it seems that the threat of disunion is being used to extract further concessions. I don't think you mean it that way, but that's the message the Fates are sending me, and it's very discouraging. It reminds me of the RL Sequester crisis: the argument is that if we don't accept Plan C as the lesser evil, the country is in trouble, but that choice of pot or kettle only exists because we knowingly embraced it earlier. It's a moot point now, of course, but I can't help feeling trapped: I warned that adopting secession would create a choice between minority rule and disunion, and it seems now that I was right.

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I know you meant this as tongue-in-cheek, but this is actual a fair argument to make, so I will address it. Based on my (admittedly limited) knowledge of Atlasian history and my (much more complete) knowledge of the opinions of our current population, I do not believe that the adoption of Plan A will lead to an erosion of Regional liberty, for three reasons. First, as I said earlier, an attack on the Regions effects all voters equally, so it seems to be doubtful that a national vote would turn out differently than a Region-by-Region vote. Second, the historical attempts to alter the Constitutional standing of the Regions that I am aware of have all failed to gain popularity with the national electorate. Whether we're talking about Fix the Regions (a positive reform) or Operation Rimjob (a negative example), it remains that throughout our history, most attempts to change the relationship between the Regions and the people have failed miserably. Third, the current population of Atlasia is remarkably pro-Region: I doubt if an effort to abolish the Regional governments would get even 15% in a national referendum. These facts lead me to believe that there is no reason to assume Plan A is bad for the Regions, especially considering that - as you said - the threat of secession should forestall any serious attempt to dismantle the federal system.

Now, obviously, some people are not convinced by this argument, and that's okay - there's a reason we have a Constitutional Convention, as opposed to a giant rubber stamp shaped like my wildest dreams. If people decide that a national referendum is too risky and we want to keep the old system, I'm fine with that (that's why I second preferenced Plan D) - I just don't want us to adopt a plan that, in my view, is logically unsound.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

RESULTS of the PRINCIPLE VOTE on CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

First Count
Plan A   6
Plan B   3
Plan C   1
Plan D   8

Second Count
Plan A   6
Plan B   4
Plan D   8

Third Count
Plan A   8
Plan D   10

By a majority of two votes, PLAN D has been ADOPTED.

In retrospect, it's probably for the best that Plan D won out. This way we have a process for amending the Constitution that is time-tested and absolved of the controversy that would have dogged the other three plans.

Alright, moving along! I'll propose an amendment to incorporate the results of this vote shortly; after that, we'll proceed to the legislative process and then (hopefully) a final vote.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I offer the following amendment:

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As should be evident, this amendment affirms the results of the latest principle vote. Delegates have 24 hours to object.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Seeing no objection, the amendment has been adopted.

Alright, the last item on the table is the relationship between the Senate and the House. Several delegates raised this as an issue they would like to see debated, so I'm sure we'll have lot's of input.

There are three questions to be answered here:
          1. Who can introduce legislation? The Senate? The House? Both?
          2. Who can amend legislation? The house that introduced the bill? The other? Both?
          3. If a bill is amended by a house other than the one that introduced the bill, does it go
          straight to the president or to a second vote in the original house?

The simplest way to do this is to allow both the Senate and the House to answer 1. Any other plan might lead to one house becoming irrelevant or, worse, kindling animosity between the Regionally-elected Senate and the generally-elected House. On 2, I have a more open mind, but generally think "both" is the right answer here as well. On 3, I think that bills should go straight to the president after they have been passed by both houses, as opposed to heading to a second vote in the original house: otherwise, the legislative process - which is already going to take longer than it does currently - will be much more complicated and thus less transparent.

If we're in broad agreement, I can draw up an amendment detailing how this will work post haste. If you have an opinion on this issue (and you all should), please SAY SO - even if you're just empty quoting what someone else said, it will be much easier to proceed if I can gauge public opinion, and I can't do that if nobody says anything.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I'd be interested in seeing seeing some differences between the two houses- have we already covered the issue of who approves nominees etc?

Yes - that would be the Senate.

I'd also lean towards the traditional role of having budgets voted on in the house only

I'm fine with this.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I offer the following amendment:

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Basically, this amendment fills the remaining blanks in the legislative process. If anyone sees any other flaws, say so and I will fix them. Clause ii has already been approved during the debate on Congress.

Delegates have 24 hours to object.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Seeing no objection, the amendment has been adopted.


On the question of amendment, I basically agree with what Yankee said. I therefore offer the following amendment:

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Delegates have 24 hours to object. Thoughts?

EDIT: Deleted duplicate "otherwise" (grammatical fix)

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Seeing no objection, the amendment has been adopted.

What about conference committees in the event of house/senate difference on a bill? That would be within our efforts to keep it largely like the American System.

Not a bad idea by any means, but I don't think it belongs in the Constitution. Perhaps we could address this when the new Congress sets about adopting its Rules of Order.


Ladies and Gentlemen: THE TIME HAS COME for you to make any last-minute queries before we move to a final vote. Every topic hitherto proposed has been debated, voted on, and incorporated into the Constitution. If anyone has a last-minute proposal, you have 24 hours to make it known; otherwise, we will move ahead with a grammar-check of the adopted text and then a FINAL final vote.

For reference, here is the text adopted in this thread:

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[/quote]

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Delegates have 24 hours to object.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Seeing no objection, Griffin's Amendment has been adopted.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I offer the following amendment:

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Delegates have 24 hours to object.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

     When you say Game Engine, what specifically do you mean?

The Game Moderator plus any deputy GMs/other officers subservient to the Game Moderator.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

Seeing no objection, Truman's amendment has been adopted.

[Unconditional Surrender Truman]

I offer the following amendment:

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Delegates have 24 hours to object.