Roe v. Attorney General ZuWo

[ZuWo]

It's definitely going to take a while for me to formulate a response to the petitioner's brief but I expect to be able to meet the deadline set by the Court.

[ZuWo]

To the Justices of the Supreme Court,


1. General remarks

Before I respond to the specific arguments made by the petitioner in his brief I would like to remark the following: Firstly, the background story told by Foucaulf, which involves a client named Janet Roe and her alleged legal dispute with Atlasian prosecution authorities, is entirely fictional. The petitioner is, of course, free to embellish his narration in a manner he finds desirable but as he lacks the authority to establish facts concerning events which may or may have not occurred in the context of Atlasia there is no reason to take the Janet Roe storyline at face value.

However, and this is my second point, I thank the petitioner for directing the Court’s attention to an issue which, for a considerable amount of time, has more or less openly dominated a great deal of the political discourse in Atlasia, namely the fundamental question of what the Senate can and cannot do and how the powers of the Senate limit the law-making responsibilities of the Atlasian regions. It is no secret that this was always an issue dear to my heart when I served as a regional officeholder so I await the Court’s ruling on this matter with great interest.


2. The scope of the Senate’s powers

The petitioner’s brief focuses on Article I, Section 5 of the Atlasian constitution and the 32 clauses which enumerate certain powers of the Senate. The petitioner also cites previous rulings by the Supreme Court which suggest that the Senate derives its law-making powers exclusively from the plain meaning of the clauses appearing in Article I, Section 5. 

It can be argued that this interpretation of the scope of the Senate’s powers is too restrictive. For one, the mere existence of Article I, VI contradicts the notion that the constitutional powers of the Senate are limited to the rights explicitly enumerated in the previous section. Indeed, Article I, VI lists seven powers that are denied to the Senate but the entire section would appear completely redundant if the Senate’s powers were restricted to Article I, V in its plain meaning. Following the argument made by the petitioner it does not make sense, for instance, to explicitly deny the Senate the right to lay a tax or duty on “articles exported from any region” as stated in Article I, VI, 3, because none of the 32 clauses grant such a power to the Senate in the first place. Why, then, is Article I, VI, part of the Atlasian constitution at all? Indeed, the presence of said article seems logically sound only under the assumption that the powers of the Senate are to be interpreted much more liberally than the petitioner suggests but there is a need of a few specifically defined constitutional safeguards against a potential overreach by the Senate.

[ZuWo]

Furthermore, the petitioner’s understanding of senatorial responsibilities is fundamentally at odds with the way the Senate has operated for several years. In fact, a high number of bills which have been passed by the Senate lack a firm legal basis according to the narrow reading of the constitution the petitioner employs. Indeed, there seems to have been an implicit consensus among Senators of all stripes that the Senate’s ability to pass laws for the entirety of the Republic of Atlasia are based on a loose (or, as the petitioner puts it, “wild”) interpretation of Article I, V. Were the “Late-Term Abortion Restriction Act” to be ruled invalid for the reasons given by Foucaulf, a few dozen if not more other bills ought to be repealed as well, which would result in a paradigm shift in Atlasian politics of unprecedented proportions.

Finally, there may be a way to reconcile both the petitioner’s point of view and the “Late-Term Abortion Restriction Act”. Foucaulf argues that none of the clauses in Article I, V are a sufficient justification for restricting a medical procedure. We can claim, however, that Article VI, III offers a possible constitutional way out of the dilemma. Article VI, III states that the “Atlasian government shall not deprive any citizen of life, liberty, or property, without due process, nor shall it deny any citizen the equal protection of the laws.” Indeed, by outlawing abortions in the 28th week of gestation the Senate may have implicitly defined personhood as beginning at that moment. Therefore, the protection of a citizen’s life, liberty and property as established by Article VI, II might extend to the point of fetal viability.


3. Summary

To sum up, three arguments can be put forward against invalidating the federal act in question. Firstly, the constitution is unclear on the exact nature of the scope of the Senate’s competences. If, as stated by the petitioner, the Senate must be granted affirmative power in order to make laws as defined by the plain meaning of the words that the drafters of the constitution utilized, Article I, VI, which states certain powers the Senate does not have, appears entirely superfluous; clearly, the constitution does not need to bar the Senate from doing something which the Senate is not allowed to do in the first place.

Secondly, if the “Late-Term Abortion Restriction Act” were struck down numerous Senate bills would suddenly be on very shaky legal ground. While this is not a legal argument per se, it highlights that the petitioner’s narrow reading of the constitution fundamentally contradicts the manner in which the Senate has conducted its affairs in recent years. Undoubtedly, this would have significant political consequences.

Thirdly, the “Late-Term Abortion Restriction Act” can be regarded as a tacit legislative definition of a fetus’ personhood at the 28th week of gestation. Consequently, even if the Court finds that the petitioner’s reading of the constitution is accurate, Article VI, III of the constitution could then be construed as pertaining to the law at hand and would assert its constitutional validity.

Respectfully, Attorney General ZuWo

[ZuWo]

Thank you for the question, Justice TJ.

My wording regarding laws that should be repealed if the “Late-Term Abortion Restriction Act” were to be ruled invalid was deliberately unspecific as I did not want to make my answer to the petitioner’s brief unreadable by citing too many examples in a single post. I am glad I have the opportunity to present a few examples now.

Following the premise of Focaulf’s brief and excerpts of past rulings handed down by the Supreme Court, the Senate “must be granted affirmative power in order to make laws”, and these powers must derive from the plain meaning of words and phrases used in the constitution. Indeed, this affects the below-mentioned laws passed by the Senate - and probably many more since I have only been able to focus on a few due to time constraints.

-   The Senate has dedicated a lot of time debating and passing bills dealing with drug use and possession. I do not see, however, which of the clauses enumerated in the article that defines the powers of the Senate grants the Senate the affirmative power to pass such legislation for the entire Republic of Atlasia. Therefore, laws such as the “Cannabinoid Legalization Act”, “Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 2013”, “Consistency in Drug Enforcement Bill” or “Cheech and Chong Act”, which have set federal standards that the Atlasian regions are obliged to respect, cannot be upheld if we employ a narrow reading of the constitution.

-   Similarly, a plain reading of the clauses in Article I, V does not empower the Senate to pass laws which, as the petitioner puts it, transform the Republic of Atlasia into a “fully socialist economy”. While Article I, V, 30 grants the Senate the power to make regulations to protect those in employment, it is a stretch to argue that this clause means the Senate can pass detailed regulations on the management structure of privately owned companies, such as in the recently passed “Co-Determination Act of 2014”.
Likewise, it is tenable only under a very wide interpretation of clause 30 to assume that the Senate is actually empowered to make it illegal for 14-year olds to work in a summer job or businesses owned by their own families in the entire Republic of Atlasia, as was recently reaffirmed by the “Youth Employment Act”.

If the Court wishes to see additional examples, I will present more. However, I believe that the above-mentioned cases are valid examples of my general point that out that the petitioner’s reading of the constitution affects the fate of not only the “Late-Term Abortion Restriction Act”, but of many other bills passed by the Senate as well.

[ZuWo]

I thank the Court for its very detailed ruling and kind remarks directed at me. I, too, have appreciated working with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who at all times have shown their impartiality.