Would eastern and western Ukraine be better off going their separate ways?

[ag]

Actually, it is precisely Ukrainian "diversity" that prevents it from becoming a Russia. The country simply has no unified elite, so the local elites are always competing between each other. And competition is a great force for the Good

Ukraine should, probably, become a much looser state. Since "federalization" seems to have nasty connotations there, I would propose to use the Spanish example and call it "autonomization". Clearly, a situation in which the President appoints local governors (who are not responsible to the local legislatures) is ridiculous under the circumstances. Such a governor cannot really be effective, if he is opposed to by most of his population. Yanukovich´s Western governors were humiliated and forced to resign in public when the trouble started. They were completely impotent in the face of an uprising (and, I suspect, long before that). Similarly, of course, a pro-Western governor in Donetsk would have little authority that would not collapse at the first sign of trouble (mercifully, at least Crimea has an elected government of its own, as it is already autonomous).

So, if anybody were to ask me (which nobody will), I would advise a major devolving of the authority to the regional level. But not anything like dissolution - it is precisely having to work together that keeps the bastards honest.

In any case, we should not kid ourselves. Eastern Ukraine will be quickly swallowed by its neighbor further East. It is not that people in Kharkiv or Donetsk have that much in common with those in Moscow (in fact, they do not). And they will be a lot unhappier under Russian domination than they are now, as part of Ukraine. But Russia will be forever interfering, until a pretext is found to annex.

[ag]

The defense of the current borders seems to ignore the much more important geopolitical reality. Russia conquered the Crimea to gain access to the Black Sea.

Things have changed a lot over the centuries. Even the Russian borders.

Black see is, effectively, an inland lake. The navy (whatever it is) is locked in it and would be quickly neutralized in any conceivable conflict in which it might be of use (to put it bluntly, if there is any major war, Montreux conventions will be the first ones to be broken - Russian navy is not getting past Istanbul, period). That is, as you say, a "geopolitical reality". And for anything minor there is always the Novorossiysk - good enough to attack Georgia, which is the only place that can be attacked by Russia´s Black Sea navy outside a major war.

[ag]

I'm going to assume western Ukraine is more fiscally conservative, and eastern Ukraine is more socially conservative?

Western Ukraine is fiscally conservative but socially liberal whereas eastern Ukraine is split between constitutional conservatives, bold progressive voices, and straight-talking mavericks with independent streaks a mile wide. Geopolitics 101, my friend.

Thanks,

Yanukovych was thought to be one of the straight-talking mavericks, but turned out to be more of a PORINO.

Yanukovich was always known to be a common thief. "Straight-talking" is a bit of an exaggeration - his capacity for human speech is rather limited (I mean, he is not Brezhnev, but it is hard to imagine him saying anything that anyone may find exciting).

[ag]

I'm going to assume western Ukraine is more fiscally conservative, and eastern Ukraine is more socially conservative?

Concepts that are completely meaningless in Ukrainian context.

The major fault lines are somewhat linguistic/ religious. But, really, they have to do with competition among local elites (which are, indeed, in part divided linguistically/religiously).

The West (especially Halicia and thereabouts), which had never been part of a Russian empire before WWII, is overwhelmingly Greek Catholic (i.e., they use a Byzantine  Rite and their priests are married, but they recognize the Pope), Ukrainian speaking, fairly rural (few major cities besides Lviv) and thinks of itself as part of Central Europe. It is not particularly socially liberal at all, though a pro-European orientation might force some movement in that direction. Nor is it very "fiscally conservative"- I am not sure anybody in Ukraine would even understand those words. One thing for sure: major Ukrainian business is not there.

There is, actually, quite a bit of variation there. Volyn has some Russian Orthodox enclaves (reflected in voting patterns). Transcarpathia is not really Ukrainian at all (many minorities, including Hungarians and the like; substantial late Russian migration; many indigenous Slavic locals tending to self-identify as Rusyn - a language of its own, and a separate Catholic rite from the Ukrainians).

The center (Kiev and vicinity) is quite another matter. Though this is the Ukrainian heartland, most urban dwellers tend to use more Russian than Ukrainian in their daily life. They, however, are generally fluent in Ukrainian and solidly identify as Ukrainians, not Russians.  Religiously the area is, mostly, Orthodox - but big chunk of that is Ukrainian Orthodox (mainly, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate).  Kiev, surprisingly for an ancient capital, does not at all dominate the country (it is simply not big enough), but it is a major symbol.

The  East is more industrial and urban and tends to think of itself as Russian-speaking (though, except in Crimea, not Russian). To the extent they are religious (much less so than in the West), they are Russian Orthodox (the so-called Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate). Donetsk/Luhansk are mining areas (mainly coal), with all that this implies (very blue-collar, populist, somewhat socially reactionary, very obscure in terms of financial flows (some major business barons are from there). Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk are more intellectual/industrial. Very important big business there. And that business has major links with Russia. But it does not want to be IN Russia.

The South... That is another story. Part of that story is a major population change in fairly recent history. You know, Odessa was mostly Jewish not that long ago...

Crimea, of course, is most obvious victim of population change. Stalin kicked out the native Tartars and replaced them with Russians. There are few Ukrainians there, it is true. But there is a non-Ukrainian group there that is vehemently pro-Ukrainian (and, actually, anti-Russian): the Tartars. Throughout the Soviet years they fought to be allowed back - though relatively few made it. As the Soviet Union was breaking up, they came under further pressure in Central Asia where they had been living in exile (there were some nasty pogroms there) - and Ukraine let them back. They may be under 15% of the population in Crimea - but they are the natives. And they will fight to keep their land Ukrainian.

[ag]

Another interesting point is the difference between the Cossack identity in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia Cossacks were regularized and militarized long back. Though originally free settlers, in later years these were armed farmers, on call to the regular army. In today´s Russia Cossack identity, if anything, correlates with high levels of pro-government "patriotism".

[ag]

The defense of the current borders seems to ignore the much more important geopolitical reality. Russia conquered the Crimea to gain access to the Black Sea. They built their southern naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea. Until the Russian Revolution no one would have thought of Crimea as part of Ukraine and even today there are few Ukrainians there. When the USSR collapsed Ukraine inherited Crimea through its USSR administrative borders, borders that had only existed for about 80 years.

This particular border is much younger than that; the Crimea was only transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.

Barely 10 years after the native population of Crimea had been expelled by Stalin.

[ag]

I really want to be mistaken. I would give A LOT to be mistaken. But...

Anyway, the Russian ambassador has been recalled from Kiev. There are certain (admittedly, unconfirmed) reports that the military is getting ready. I would not at all be surprised, if within the next week we are going to have Russian troops in Ukraine (at least, in Crimea - possibly, elsewhere as well).

God, I really want to be proven wrong on this one...

[ag]

I am afraid, you might be underestimating how serious it is. The troops seem to be on the move. Trusting Putin's words is not something I would ever do.

Lukin's role is a case in point. Personally, he is a decent man, but he is not somebody at all privy to any secrets or representative of anyone. He is not close to Putin or to anybody else with real power. Sending him was a statement of no commitment to anything: Putin's press secretary explicitly said that he was going in merely his own capacity. Lukin knew that: that is why he refused signing anything - he could not, really, as he was no envoy of anyone. I would easily believe, Lukin was trying to be reasonable and helpful. But the fact that it was him who was sent is very troubling, actually. It might mean that a decision not to talk but to act unilaterally has been taken already.

I am afraid, we may be on the eve of a Munich. Or worse.

[ag]

No one really wants this to happen.

I have no doubt, no decent person wants this to happen. I am less certain about the Russian government.

Hope to be very wrong on this one.

[ag]

The South... That is another story. Part of that story is a major population change in fairly recent history. You know, Odessa was mostly Jewish not that long ago...

Crimea, of course, is most obvious victim of population change. Stalin kicked out the native Tartars and replaced them with Russians. There are few Ukrainians there, it is true. But there is a non-Ukrainian group there that is vehemently pro-Ukrainian (and, actually, anti-Russian): the Tartars. Throughout the Soviet years they fought to be allowed back - though relatively few made it. As the Soviet Union was breaking up, they came under further pressure in Central Asia where they had been living in exile (there were some nasty pogroms there) - and Ukraine let them back. They may be under 15% of the population in Crimea - but they are the natives. And they will fight to keep their land Ukrainian.

So it sounds like Stalin expels the Tatars and replaces them with Russians. A decade later Khrushchev shifts this Russian population into the Ukrainian SSR. If this were US politics it would look like a classic gerrymander to move a block of favorable residents (Crimean Russians) into a district with less reliable residents (Ukrainians).

The real reason was that Russians, given their agricultural patterns, needed a lot more water. and the water was only to be had from Ukraine (there is no land connection to Russia). So, it was a purely engineering/ management decision, clothed as it was in some brotherly love verbiage.

[ag]

No one really wants this to happen.

Very true.

And yet it still seems like the logical conclusion in the long run. Countries that are so clearly divided are difficult to hold together. Especially because the two parts are roughly equal in strength.

What do you see as the alternatives? Will the East and South become more Ukrainian in time?

They are quote Ukrainian as it is. They just have a somewhat distinc view of what it means.

[ag]

Russia putting troops into Ukraine is very, very, very unlikely, unless the streets are in open revolt and they are 'invited' to enter. Which, with Yanukovich now out of office, is unlikely to happen (and was never likely in the first place).

Ukraine will sort itself out eventually.

They are beginning a mass issue of passports to Ukrainians, at least in Crimea - might be more broadly (today´s news reports from Crimea, where the statement to that effect has been made by some visiting Russian MP´s). There is that slight issue that Ukrainian law, if I recall it right, considers acquisition of another nationality as grounds for losing the Ukrainian (for the very obvious reason of expecting something exactly like that). So, we are soon going to have a territory with a lot of Russian citizens in residence. Anybody saying Osetia-Abkhazia?

They will be "invited". They even will have a president (Yanukovich) to do the inviting.

[ag]

There were no Ukraine before soviet time IIRC, and before 19th century it was  settled  by non Slavic people (Goths and Tatars).

Yeah, because Cossacks, for example, never existed

I think, he meant Crimea - and there were no Cossacks in Crimea.

[ag]

In a Crimean Civil War, if Russia opts for a non-belligerant support to separatists (only weapons and logistical), would they be strong enough to keep Ukrainian army from Perekop?

Ukrainian army will not go to Perekop. They would just cut the canal, which is the main source of water for the peninsula. With rail and road traffic also closed, and an active Tartar insurgency scaring off the few tourists willing to fly in, Russia will get a pretty little social crisis on its hands. In fact, I think it is pretty safe to predict that within 10 years of the Russian takeover, the civilian population will drop by a factor of two - that is if Russians do not actually expel the Tartars for the second time.

[ag]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine. It only became part of Russia in 1944, and was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.
In Tsarist times, Crimea was part of the Taurida Governorate, which also included coastal parts on the opposite mainland. Until 1783, it was an independent Khanat.


Of the three possible claims (Independence, Ukrainian, Russian), the Russian one is historically clearly the weakest.

To clarify. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (which Crimea was before deportation) was an administrative category within a larger Soviet Socialist Republic. Crimean ASSR was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) even before the deportation of the native population, when it was replaced with the Crimean Region of RSFSR, later to become the Crimean Region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). It recovered the Autonomous status in 1991, when it again became the Crimean ASSR (within Ukraine). Currently its official name is the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It is, thus, the only part of Ukraine with the local executive responsible not to the president in Kiev, but to the local legislature (instead of the regional State Administration it has its own Council of Ministers, appointed by the local parliament).

[ag]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine. It only became part of Russia in 1944, and was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.
In Tsarist times, Crimea was part of the Taurida Governorate, which also included coastal parts on the opposite mainland. Until 1783, it was an independent Khanat.


Of the three possible claims (Independence, Ukrainian, Russian), the Russian one is historically clearly the weakest.

I don't follow this last statement of yours. Independence presumably refers to the Crimean Khanate from 1441 to 1783 and Russian from 1783 to 1992. Where is the Ukrainian claim other than since 1991? I wouldn't count the Kievan Rus from the Middle Ages since Russia can claim connection back to the Rus of the Middle ages as well.

His argument is that between 1802 and 1921 Crimean peninsula did not have a separate legal existence, but was part of the Tavrida governorate, most of which is, currently, part of Ukraine (between 1783 and 1802 it was part of the still larger New Russia governorate, centered in modern Dnipropetrovsk, which, along with a small bit of modern Russia, occupied most of the southern part of the modern Ukrainian state) . At the 1897 census around 63% of the governorate´s population lived in the three mainland districts. The ethnic composition of the population of the governorate as a whole was, overall, mostly Ukrainian: the same census showed that Lesser Russians (Ukrainians) were 42.2% of the population, (Greater) Russians were 27.9% and (Crimean) Tartars 13.6%, with the rest being made of other minorities (Germans, Jews, Bulgarians, Greeks), which would later be either killed of by the Germans (Jews) or deported by the Russians (Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks). Within Crimea proper (Greater) Russians were somewhat more numerous than the Ukrainians (except in the Yevpatoriya district), but only were a majority in the municipalities of Sevastopol and Kerch (in other parts of Crimea the Tartars were in plurality, being outright majority in the district of Yalta).

Of course, you could argue that the Tavrida governorate was part of the Russian Empire - but the same, of course, was true of the Kiev Governorate, which, clearly, is Ukrainian. As an administrative unit Crimea had no legal existence but, the bulk of the Tavrida governorate, to which Crimea belonged, is now, obviously, part of Ukraine. During the revolutionary years, of course, Crimea was the last outpost of the Russian "Whites". Notably, at the time Ukrainian governments seem not to have made the claim to the peninsula - unsurprising, given that the relatively small Ukrainian population there.

In any case, Ukrainian claim here would be the claim to being the successor to the Tavrida Governorate. Clearly, the claim based on belonging to Russian empire covers the bulk of modern Ukraine (and much of Poland, for that matter), so cannot be very relevant here.

[ag]

In that case I think we would agree that some type of autonomous status has the highest claim. If Crimea as defined by the old ASSR were independent would that calm Russian concerns about an EU-leaning Kiev?

No, it wouldn´t. Many Russians (Putin included) are incapable of acknowledging that Ukrainians are not Russians. They might be willing to let Lviv and the rest of Galicia go - may be. I would not even count on that.

In any case, if you let them swallow Crimea today, they will ask for seconds. Crimea cannot survive economically without, at least, the adjoining part of Ukraine. There is banally no water to have 2 mln. people leaving there without the canal. And, of course, the bulk of tourists who come there, come by land - if you can pay the air fare, you fly to Turkey. Building the bridge from Kerch will be very costly - and, in any case, transportwise this would make Crimea a lot more remote from population centers than it is (nor would it resolve anything with respect to the water issue). It cannot be a stable solution: letting the Russians to take over is only postponing the next crisis by a year or two. That is even if you forget that the Tartar natives will fight - there is no way they are getting swallowed by the Russians without resistance (they have more reasons to hate the Russians than the Chechens do).  To the extent the Crimean Autonomy was always the Tartar Autonomy (it was originally abolished when Tartars were expelled), the Tartars would much rather exercise it within Ukraine. And, of course, Crimea is the one part of Ukraine, the autonomy of which is fully recognized by every Ukrainian government.

Anyways, what seems the most likely course of events now, is establishing a Yanukovich "Ukrainian" government in Simferopol (held up by Russian guns, of course). It will be very dangerous - and result in a major war within a couple of years, most likely.

BTW, in modern Russia there are, I believe, around 20 territories which used to be ASSR (Tatarstan, etc.). This was also the status of Abkhazia and Ajaria (but not South Osetia) in Georgia and Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. I am not sure the Russians would be very happy about raising THAT issue.

[ag]

I insist: where do we put the frontier?

According to ethnic Russians? According to Russian-speakers? According to political preferences?

I presume the idea would be to follow the fairly obvious line on the election maps, separating Crimea plus the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa.  But would that really be any sort of coherent state?  Even on election results it isn't as clean a divide as it looks at first glance.

Big chunks of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Cherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa would fight against it.  In fact, I am pretty sure in every one of these provinces, an overwhelming majority would vote against it in a referendum. Probably, also majorities in Donetsk and Luhansk would be against (though these would not be overwhelming).

[ag]

This discussion shows how impotent both the US and NATO, and the EU and affiliates are in all of this. The US has no leverage whatsoever; Non-US NATO and the EU have substantial leverage, but they won't use it because the results are unsavory and it costs too much. All we have left is to discuss fairytale contingencies.

The US has more leverage then anybody else. If it chooses to use it.