Would eastern and western Ukraine be better off going their separate ways?

[Indy Texas]

I know Gully's question was rhetorical, but:



Red=Germany
Blue=Czechia
Brown=Slovakia
Purple=Poland
Yellow=Ukraine
Orange=Romania
Green=Hungary
Lime Green=Italy
Beige=Yugoslavia

I would also call the Czech state "Bohemia and Moravia" since Czechia sounds rather awkward and could be confused with Chechnya.

I'd also give all the orange area to Romania and create a little ethnic Hungarian state east of Romania and call it Carpathia.

That would be an enclave within Romania, not to the east of it. I'm not sure the people of Carpathia would be entirely comfortable with that.

Well would they rather just be part of Romania? It can't be worse than having all those Romanians in Hungary which is what that version of the map has happening.

[politicus]

No one really wants this to happen.

Very true.

And yet it still seems like the logical conclusion in the long run. Countries that are so clearly divided are difficult to hold together. Especially because the two parts are roughly equal in strength.

What do you see as the alternatives? Will the East and South become more Ukrainian in time?

They are quote Ukrainian as it is. They just have a somewhat distinc view of what it means.

Yeah, thats an important point. To clarify a bit: In a late 90s paper British Ukraine-expert Andrew Wilson predicted Ukrainian identity could move in three different directions.

1. A Canada-like state with its own Russophone or Ukrainophone Quebec. In this case either the Gallician version of ethnic anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism or the Donbass/South/Crimea russophones are marginalized, but left in control of their own province(s). At this point the marginalization of Gallicia is off the table.

2. Slow Ukrainization leading to a consolidation around Dnieper-nationalism i.e. an identity that recognizes the importance of shared East Slavic traditions and history, but considers the Ukrainian language to be central to Ukrainian identity.

3. A continuation and redefinition of the overlapping Ukrainian and Russian identities that currently make up the "other Ukraine." (his name for the panslavist (and/or more or less Russophile) Ukrainian identity where language isn't an important identity marker).

What I mean by Ukrainization is the spread of Dniepr nationalism to parts of the east and south diminishing the "Other Ukraine" and perhaps leading to "Quebec-status" for Crimea and Donbass in the end.

[ingemann]

For all those enjoying to draw new borders, here another case: Schleswig, the northern part of which was returned to Denmark after WW I. To enhance the fun, you get several maps:

That's easy, you just place the border at the Eider.

Joking aside OTL border while not perfect, was not a bad choice, yes I personal think that Denmark should have adopted an Eider border after WWII (without expelling the Germans and it should respect their right to their own language) where we could have gotten away with it. But with hindsight it was no disaster that it didn't happen.

[YL]

I know Gully's question was rhetorical, but:



Red=Germany
Blue=Czechia
Brown=Slovakia
Purple=Poland
Yellow=Ukraine
Orange=Romania
Green=Hungary
Lime Green=Italy
Beige=Yugoslavia

Compare http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_of_Greater_Austria (which I presume wouldn't have worked).

[Franknburger]

Sorry to have lead away the discussion towards other parts of Europe..

Going back to Ukraine, I think it is time for a few more maps:

The population density map above shows one of the roots of the problems: Ukraine is essentially a polycentric country, with a relevant, but not particularly strong centre. Kiew and its surrounding house some 3 million people, which is just 7% of Ukraine's total population (for reference - the Paris agglomeration accounts for close to 20% of France's population). Population concentrates in the East and the West, which are themselves each polycentric in nature. Further centres are Odessa and the Crimea (Sewastopol) in the South.


This observation needs to be put into context, though. First of all, note that Ukraine's population structure is less fractured than, e.g., Spain's (not even speaking of Norway or Sweden here). As such, while centrifugal forces make regionalism an issue, they don't necessarily imply that nation-building is impossible.
Secondly, it is not really SW Russia demographically pulling SE Ukraine, rather to the opposite. Russian Belgorod, 70 km NE of Kharkov, has some 400,000 inhabitants including suburbs. Not small, but less than a quarter of the population of the Kharkov agglomeration. Rostov-on-Don, some 100 km south of the Ukrainian border, isn't a small-town either, with more than 2 million inhabitants in the agglomeration. But the Donezk basin (including Luhansk and Mariupol) hosts more than 6 million people. As such, SE Ukraine forms an economic and population centre in its own right - with every reason to strive for the border with Russia being permeable to goods, services and people, but not depending on it for economic survival.


As the above map based on 2001 census results shows, Russian language (red) - or better the fact that Russian is not accepted as official language - is an issue not only on the Crimea, but also in the Donezk basin. But most of SE Ukraine, including Kharkov proper (not its surrounding), and even more so the Dnepropetrovsk area, is predominantly speaking Ukranian (dark blue). Reducing the political rift between East and West to a language issue is a gross over-simplification, and (as always), linguistics aren't much of a help when it comes to geographical delineation.
There are further linguistic minorities along the corresponding borders: Romanian/Moldavian (green), Hungarian (orange), judged by the map legend there should also be some predominantly Polish-speaking communities (light blue), though I have been unable to spot them. In any case, should Ukraine's borders start to being discussed in earnest, those minorities might want to also take their turn, and that could create various sorts of troubles for the EU. Note also Budjak (southern Bessarabia) with a classical post-Osman Empire mix of Bulgarians (purple), Albanians (light orange), Gagauz (olive) alongside Moldavians, Ukrainians and Russians. I don't know enough about the region to propose how can be dealt with this mix, but I am pretty sure that, whatever problems exist there, splitting up Ukraine is not going to solve them.


Finally, a map on post-independence population change, taken from this excellent Wikipedia article with many more great maps. It's first of all a map on low birth rates during the economic transition crisis, and elevated death rates. Because of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, northern Ukraine has been especially affected by both. Natural population decline is higher in the East than in the West (coal mining and steel working are neither particular healthy professions, nor conducive to air quality). However, it is also a map on (sub-)urbanisation and migration, and the latter is an indicator of long-term economic trends. So, where is the music playing? Obviously in Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, the Crimea (that one is exaggerated by the Tartar's remigration), and several areas close to the EU border, especially Lviw and Chernitsvy - but not in the Donezk basin and in Kharkow. The EU has put an offer on the table (as insufficient as that offer may be in some respects). Putin will need to provide more than cheap gas and protection of Russian-speakers, otherwise it is obvious which direction Ukraine will ultimately take.

[politicus]

Joking aside OTL border while not perfect, was not a bad choice, yes I personal think that Denmark should have adopted an Eider border after WWII (without expelling the Germans and it should respect their right to their own language) where we could have gotten away with it. But with hindsight it was no disaster that it didn't happen.

In fact, there was quite a movement after WW II to also have Holstein returning to Denmark, along the lines of "What has becoming part of Germany brought us - two World Wars and economic hardship afterwards". The movement was rather short-lived and died out with the German "Wirtschaftswunder", but as I have mentioned elsewhere, there were definitely worse places to live in than 18th century Schleswig-Holstein under Danish rule. Had Denmark not allied with Napoleon, and refrained from the stupid "Danisation policies" after 1848, the border would probably still be on the Elbe (and you speaking German as well as you speak Danish, or we both speaking some kind of "Platt"). Note also this:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altonaer_Freiheit

I remember us derailing another perfectly good thread (about Germans in America) on this subject, so I wont do it again, but you are wrong on at least two points in this post.
So I am making a post about Schleswig-Holstein on the history board and would suggest a mod moves yours and Ingemanns posts to there.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

There were no Ukraine before soviet time IIRC, and before 19th century it was  settled  by non Slavic people (Goths and Tatars).

Yeah, because Cossacks, for example, never existed

[Franknburger]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine. It only became part of Russia in 1944, and was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.
In Tsarist times, Crimea was part of the Taurida Governorate, which also included coastal parts on the opposite mainland. Until 1783, it was an independent Khanat.


Of the three possible claims (Independence, Ukrainian, Russian), the Russian one is historically clearly the weakest.

[muon2]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine. It only became part of Russia in 1944, and was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.
In Tsarist times, Crimea was part of the Taurida Governorate, which also included coastal parts on the opposite mainland. Until 1783, it was an independent Khanat.


Of the three possible claims (Independence, Ukrainian, Russian), the Russian one is historically clearly the weakest.

I don't follow this last statement of yours. Independence presumably refers to the Crimean Khanate from 1441 to 1783 and Russian from 1783 to 1992. Where is the Ukrainian claim other than since 1991? I wouldn't count the Kievan Rus from the Middle Ages since Russia can claim connection back to the Rus of the Middle ages as well.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Ok, but guvernement of Kiev was not that independent.

I agree Ukraine did not exist as a sovereign state till 1991 (except for a brief and very unstable period after the WWI), but to say there was no Ukraine was really inaccurate.

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine.

Not quite. It was an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the Russian SFRR. If not for the transfer, it would be part of the Russian Federation right now.

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I disagree. Crimea was part of Russia since the Khanate has been abolished. Compare that to mere 60 years as a part of first Ukrainian SSR, and then independent Ukraine.

I do not advocate Crimea to be annexed back, just saying.

[RodPresident]

In a Crimean Civil War, if Russia opts for a non-belligerant support to separatists (only weapons and logistical), would they be strong enough to keep Ukrainian army from Perekop?

[ag]

There were no Ukraine before soviet time IIRC, and before 19th century it was  settled  by non Slavic people (Goths and Tatars).

Yeah, because Cossacks, for example, never existed

I think, he meant Crimea - and there were no Cossacks in Crimea.

[ag]

In a Crimean Civil War, if Russia opts for a non-belligerant support to separatists (only weapons and logistical), would they be strong enough to keep Ukrainian army from Perekop?

Ukrainian army will not go to Perekop. They would just cut the canal, which is the main source of water for the peninsula. With rail and road traffic also closed, and an active Tartar insurgency scaring off the few tourists willing to fly in, Russia will get a pretty little social crisis on its hands. In fact, I think it is pretty safe to predict that within 10 years of the Russian takeover, the civilian population will drop by a factor of two - that is if Russians do not actually expel the Tartars for the second time.

[ag]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine. It only became part of Russia in 1944, and was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.
In Tsarist times, Crimea was part of the Taurida Governorate, which also included coastal parts on the opposite mainland. Until 1783, it was an independent Khanat.


Of the three possible claims (Independence, Ukrainian, Russian), the Russian one is historically clearly the weakest.

To clarify. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (which Crimea was before deportation) was an administrative category within a larger Soviet Socialist Republic. Crimean ASSR was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) even before the deportation of the native population, when it was replaced with the Crimean Region of RSFSR, later to become the Crimean Region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). It recovered the Autonomous status in 1991, when it again became the Crimean ASSR (within Ukraine). Currently its official name is the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It is, thus, the only part of Ukraine with the local executive responsible not to the president in Kiev, but to the local legislature (instead of the regional State Administration it has its own Council of Ministers, appointed by the local parliament).

[ag]

Re the Crimea situation it ought to be noted Crimea was never a part of Ukraine before the 1950s.

Soviets loved to play with the borders.

Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Republic before WW II, thus neither part of Russia nor of Ukraine. It only became part of Russia in 1944, and was transferred to Ukraine in 1954.
In Tsarist times, Crimea was part of the Taurida Governorate, which also included coastal parts on the opposite mainland. Until 1783, it was an independent Khanat.


Of the three possible claims (Independence, Ukrainian, Russian), the Russian one is historically clearly the weakest.

I don't follow this last statement of yours. Independence presumably refers to the Crimean Khanate from 1441 to 1783 and Russian from 1783 to 1992. Where is the Ukrainian claim other than since 1991? I wouldn't count the Kievan Rus from the Middle Ages since Russia can claim connection back to the Rus of the Middle ages as well.

His argument is that between 1802 and 1921 Crimean peninsula did not have a separate legal existence, but was part of the Tavrida governorate, most of which is, currently, part of Ukraine (between 1783 and 1802 it was part of the still larger New Russia governorate, centered in modern Dnipropetrovsk, which, along with a small bit of modern Russia, occupied most of the southern part of the modern Ukrainian state) . At the 1897 census around 63% of the governorate´s population lived in the three mainland districts. The ethnic composition of the population of the governorate as a whole was, overall, mostly Ukrainian: the same census showed that Lesser Russians (Ukrainians) were 42.2% of the population, (Greater) Russians were 27.9% and (Crimean) Tartars 13.6%, with the rest being made of other minorities (Germans, Jews, Bulgarians, Greeks), which would later be either killed of by the Germans (Jews) or deported by the Russians (Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks). Within Crimea proper (Greater) Russians were somewhat more numerous than the Ukrainians (except in the Yevpatoriya district), but only were a majority in the municipalities of Sevastopol and Kerch (in other parts of Crimea the Tartars were in plurality, being outright majority in the district of Yalta).

Of course, you could argue that the Tavrida governorate was part of the Russian Empire - but the same, of course, was true of the Kiev Governorate, which, clearly, is Ukrainian. As an administrative unit Crimea had no legal existence but, the bulk of the Tavrida governorate, to which Crimea belonged, is now, obviously, part of Ukraine. During the revolutionary years, of course, Crimea was the last outpost of the Russian "Whites". Notably, at the time Ukrainian governments seem not to have made the claim to the peninsula - unsurprising, given that the relatively small Ukrainian population there.

In any case, Ukrainian claim here would be the claim to being the successor to the Tavrida Governorate. Clearly, the claim based on belonging to Russian empire covers the bulk of modern Ukraine (and much of Poland, for that matter), so cannot be very relevant here.

[muon2]

In that case I think we would agree that some type of autonomous status has the highest claim. If Crimea as defined by the old ASSR were independent would that calm Russian concerns about an EU-leaning Kiev?

[ag]

In that case I think we would agree that some type of autonomous status has the highest claim. If Crimea as defined by the old ASSR were independent would that calm Russian concerns about an EU-leaning Kiev?

No, it wouldn´t. Many Russians (Putin included) are incapable of acknowledging that Ukrainians are not Russians. They might be willing to let Lviv and the rest of Galicia go - may be. I would not even count on that.

In any case, if you let them swallow Crimea today, they will ask for seconds. Crimea cannot survive economically without, at least, the adjoining part of Ukraine. There is banally no water to have 2 mln. people leaving there without the canal. And, of course, the bulk of tourists who come there, come by land - if you can pay the air fare, you fly to Turkey. Building the bridge from Kerch will be very costly - and, in any case, transportwise this would make Crimea a lot more remote from population centers than it is (nor would it resolve anything with respect to the water issue). It cannot be a stable solution: letting the Russians to take over is only postponing the next crisis by a year or two. That is even if you forget that the Tartar natives will fight - there is no way they are getting swallowed by the Russians without resistance (they have more reasons to hate the Russians than the Chechens do).  To the extent the Crimean Autonomy was always the Tartar Autonomy (it was originally abolished when Tartars were expelled), the Tartars would much rather exercise it within Ukraine. And, of course, Crimea is the one part of Ukraine, the autonomy of which is fully recognized by every Ukrainian government.

Anyways, what seems the most likely course of events now, is establishing a Yanukovich "Ukrainian" government in Simferopol (held up by Russian guns, of course). It will be very dangerous - and result in a major war within a couple of years, most likely.

BTW, in modern Russia there are, I believe, around 20 territories which used to be ASSR (Tatarstan, etc.). This was also the status of Abkhazia and Ajaria (but not South Osetia) in Georgia and Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. I am not sure the Russians would be very happy about raising THAT issue.

[Franknburger]

Thanks, ag, for having explained my line of thinking better than I did, possibly even better than I would have been able to do. Let me just make two additions:

During the revolutionary years, of course, Crimea was the last outpost of the Russian "Whites". Notably, at the time Ukrainian governments seem not to have made the claim to the peninsula - unsurprising, given that the relatively small Ukrainian population there.

1. The 1917-1921 period (revolution & civil war) was very fluent. After the February Revolution, an Ukrainian independence movement formed, leading to the declaration of the Ukrainian People's Republic on June 23, 1917, which proclaimed its full independence on 25 January, 1918. Crimea, meanwhile, declared independence as Crimean People's Republic on December 13, 1917, and became immediately recognised by the Ukrainian People's Republic. Crimean independence was short-lived. Already in January 1918, Bolsheviks took over and declared the Taurida SSR which, unlike the Crimean People's Republic, also claimed (though apparently never controlled) the mainland part of  the former Taurida Governorate. During the ensuing Russian-Ukranian War, it was overrun, with assistance from Germany, by the Ukranian People's Republic, and dissolved on April 30, 1918. Afterwards, a Crimean Regional Government was established, the formal status of which remained undefined. Germany protected it from Ukrainian claims and control, but promoted talks about a Ukrainian-Crimean federation. When WW I ended in November 1918, allied troops landed on Crimea but withdrew again in early 1919. That allowed for the advance of the Red Army which, on April 2, 1919, dissolved the Crimean Regional Government and established the Crimean SSR. White forces retook Crimea in June 1919 and held out there until November 1920.

In conclusion, between mid-1917 and mid-1919, Crimea's independence had been recognised by  Axis powers, Ukraine, Russia, possibly de-facto also by the Entente. At the 1919-1920 Paris Conference, however, the Ukrainian delegation presented the following map that includes Crimea as part of Ukraine. I haven't yet been able to figure out whether that map has been presented prior to the Red Army takeover, during the short-lived existence of the Crimean SSR, or after re-conquest by White troops.


2. Before WW II, the ASSR status tended to be stronger than afterwards. Point in case is the Moldavian ASSR within the Ukrainian SSR, which in 1940, after the USSR had re-gained control of Bessarabia from Romania, was elevated to the Moldavian SSR.
That is actually another reason why raising the ASSR issue won't become too popular. The original Moldavian ASSR was more or less covering the territory of break-away Transnistria, which is a de-facto independent part of Moldova that, however, isn't formally recognised by any UN member state. This is really Pandora's Box waiting to be opened....

[Franknburger]

After a bit more of research, I have to correct some of the statements in my previous posts:

1. The December 23, 1917 French-British accord on influence zones in the Near East among others designated Ukraine including Crimea as French influence zone. As such, at least in late 1917 / early 1918, France and Britain apparently still regarded Crimea as part of Ukraine.

2. German policy during 1917/18 was marked by substantial conflict between the German Foreign Office and Ludendorff as Commander of the eastern forces. The conflict became most apparent when Ludendorff continued military advancement (including occupation of Crimea) after Russia's signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litwosk, in breach of said treaty and against explicit German government orders. The Treaty of Brest-Litowsk excluded Crimea - it especially did not become part of Ukraine as recognised by Axis powers in that treaty.
A relevant part of German and Austro-Hungarian leadership was attempting to turn Crimea into a German protectorate. Among the first actions undertaken by the re-installed, Axis-backed governments was revoking land reform, in favour of especially German colonists, which in 1914 had controlled  60% or arable land on Crimea, and 38% of all land in Odessa county. As such, the status of Crimea appears to have deliberately been left undefined. Negotiations on a Ukrainian-Crimean federation only commenced in October 1918, when it already had become obvious to Ludendorff that the war was lost.

Having spoken of Pandora's boxes: The next worst thing, after regarding Ukraine in Cold War logics, is falling back on WW I lines of thinking to address the country's future. Let's hope Putin can withstand the temptation to evoke the various parties' WW I hegemonic aspirations (and let's also hope Islamists are not discovering the brave Crimean Tartars as brothers deserving support).  

[Хahar 🤔]

In any case, speaking of historical claims isn't terribly relevant to the actual situation today.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

[User157088589849]

Since the breakup of the austria-hungarian empire, this region has never stable and never will. They are small landlocked countries with giants next to them (russia and germany)

The uk is debating ww1 and its terrifying that from the moment franz ferdinand was murdered, we have yet to find a long term peaceful solution to this war.  Eastern Ukraine is not Russian, its central european. Asking the people of Lviv to be like Moscow is like asking prague, budapest and krakow if they feel Russian.

I have visited Kharkiv and Donetsk for footballing reasons and they are very Russian. They speak Russian, you don't hear Ukrainian. Shops serve you in Russian, the food/choice/religion is all similar. Ukraine as a state doesn't work because you have a mixture of different empires.

The european union will fail as a project because like austria-hungary, ottoman empire there was no common language. This is why ukraine will always be fragile and the long term it will split.

It is arrogant and foolish of the west to allow a nation with two different languages and cultures to become one nation. Look at Yugoslavia? It gained an empire from ww1 but took 70 years until it found its natural end.

Ukraine should be separated for long term peace of the region. This is exactly like yugoslavia.

[J. J.]

Ukraine should be separated for long term peace of the region. This is exactly like yugoslavia.

Ukraine may not have any choice.

[User157088589849]

Ukraine should be separated for long term peace of the region. This is exactly like yugoslavia.

Ukraine may not have any choice.

Free people have a choice. It/s a disgrace what is happening to ethnic russian speakers in former soviet republics. Constantly beaten with a stick to promote right wing nationalism.