Would eastern and western Ukraine be better off going their separate ways?

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

Yugoslavia's separation certainly was not conducive to the long-term peace of its region.

[Peeperkorn]

I insist: where do we put the frontier?

According to ethnic Russians? According to Russian-speakers? According to political preferences?

[YL]

I insist: where do we put the frontier?

According to ethnic Russians? According to Russian-speakers? According to political preferences?

I presume the idea would be to follow the fairly obvious line on the election maps, separating Crimea plus the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa.  But would that really be any sort of coherent state?  Even on election results it isn't as clean a divide as it looks at first glance.

[Hatman 🍁]

I would follow the political divide. It might be the best idea for peace is to keep like-minded people together. I feel this might be hopelessly naive though. 

[Zanas]

I'm sorry but :

The answer is no. And the good answer is obviously : electoral or linguistics maps don't make all, you know. There really isn't much of an Eastern or a Western Ukraine, in reality. As in solid nations that would make for solid states.

[ag]

I insist: where do we put the frontier?

According to ethnic Russians? According to Russian-speakers? According to political preferences?

I presume the idea would be to follow the fairly obvious line on the election maps, separating Crimea plus the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa.  But would that really be any sort of coherent state?  Even on election results it isn't as clean a divide as it looks at first glance.

Big chunks of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Cherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa would fight against it.  In fact, I am pretty sure in every one of these provinces, an overwhelming majority would vote against it in a referendum. Probably, also majorities in Donetsk and Luhansk would be against (though these would not be overwhelming).

[Famous Mortimer]

Honestly, I think anyone who voted for the Party of Regions would vote to become part of Russia. The Overton window has changed.

[MaxQue]

Honestly, I think anyone who voted for the Party of Regions would vote to become part of Russia. The Overton window has changed.

I doubt PR voters in Transcarpathia are interested.

[Famous Mortimer]

Russian speaking Party of Regions voters then.

[Franknburger]

Russian speaking Party of Regions voters then.

Which are to be identified how (given the fact that, e.g., Budjak-Bulgarians also use Russian)?

In times of unemployment and economic crisis, it doesn't cost a lot of money to get somebody joining a demonstration, and I have seen quite some reports about Putin's party in Russia having paid people there to participate in demonstrations. At the moment, I would refrain from any speculation about popular mood in certain places.

What I am quite sure about, however, is that the mood in Crimea will quickly turn more pro-Ukrainian, once people realise that the 2014 tourism season will be a disaster. Even the most pro-Russian coal miner in Donezk will give more than just a second thought to whether, as usual, load kids and mother-in-law into his Lada to drive to Crimea this summer..,

[Storebought]

This discussion shows how impotent both the US and NATO, and the EU and affiliates are in all of this. The US has no leverage whatsoever; Non-US NATO and the EU have substantial leverage, but they won't use it because the results are unsavory and it costs too much. All we have left is to discuss fairytale contingencies.

[ag]

This discussion shows how impotent both the US and NATO, and the EU and affiliates are in all of this. The US has no leverage whatsoever; Non-US NATO and the EU have substantial leverage, but they won't use it because the results are unsavory and it costs too much. All we have left is to discuss fairytale contingencies.

The US has more leverage then anybody else. If it chooses to use it.

[muon2]

This discussion shows how impotent both the US and NATO, and the EU and affiliates are in all of this. The US has no leverage whatsoever; Non-US NATO and the EU have substantial leverage, but they won't use it because the results are unsavory and it costs too much. All we have left is to discuss fairytale contingencies.

The US has more leverage then anybody else. If it chooses to use it.

I feel like we lost a lot of that leverage by not recognizing the geopolitical reality a week ago. By waiting until Russia acted, our reaction puts us in overt opposition with a weaker diplomatic hand. The stronger position would have been to use the leverage (economic and diplomatic) when Russia's primary goal and outcome were clear, but events on the ground still provided space for dialog.

[Franknburger]

Time for another map: These are the "yes" votes on the 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum, which obviously implied separation from Russia:


Even Crimea voted 54% "yes" vs. 42% "no" (and that was at a time when most of the Tartars hadn't returned yet).
Can we please once and for all stop with the myth of Crimea just having become part of Ukraine, and against their will being separated from Russia, by some historical accident back in 1954.

[Hatman 🍁]

That was 23 years ago. It's possible that even with the Tatars that Crimea would want to separate.

[Franknburger]

That was 23 years ago. It's possible that even with the Tatars that Crimea would want to separate.

Yes, I agree. The current will of the people on Crimea (to the extent circumstances allow for a representative assessment of their will, which I have some doubts about) needs to be respected. But a lot of the discussion is about historical claims, and in this respect, a referendum 23 years ago is more significant that political decisions taken in Moscow between 1921 and 1954.

[Californiadreaming]

That way, the west can comfortably join the EU, and the east can become the Democratic Republic of Putinistan or whatever.

Would Russia actually have enough money to modernize East Ukraine, though? After all, both East Ukraine and West Ukraine currently (and unfortunately) appear to be dirt-poor!

[Californiadreaming]

Ukraine, like many of the former Soviet republics, was an artificial construct of the USSR. The Crimea and Black Sea coast was not historically Ukrainian, but instead shifted from Tatar to Russian in the late 18th century. Note that much of modern Ukraine was for a long time under Polish rule, and only became whole to the west after WWII.



The coast was attached to Ukraine for administrative purposes when Ukraine became part of the USSR. When the USSR collapsed the existing pieces of the union became independent countries, even when there was no historical basis for many of those states with those borders. The language map below shows the percent native Ukrainian speakers and is indicative of the historical Ukraine.

I would like to point out that present-day southern Ukraine's population was Ukrainian-majority even back in 1897, though:



Thus, it's certainly not like Ukraine had no legitimate claim to southern Ukraine.

[Californiadreaming]

The idea that more borders could solve problems has already too often proven fatal in European history. Ireland, former Yugoslavia (especially Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), also Czechoslovakia with the Sudeten Germans, are only a few points in case to demonstrate that each new border tends to bring forward the next minority-majority issue, just on a reduced geographical scale. You can then continue territorial split-ups ad infinite, or solve the issue once and for all through ethnic cleansing. Neither is a particular good solution to me.

So, do you think that the Soviet Union should have remained intact but reformed itself? After all, there would have been less national borders in Europe in such a scenario.

[Californiadreaming]

The defense of the current borders seems to ignore the much more important geopolitical reality. Russia conquered the Crimea to gain access to the Black Sea. They built their southern naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea. Until the Russian Revolution no one would have thought of Crimea as part of Ukraine and even today there are few Ukrainians there. When the USSR collapsed Ukraine inherited Crimea through its USSR administrative borders, borders that had only existed for about 80 years.

Actually, the Ukrainian SSR only acquired Crimea in 1954.

[Californiadreaming]

Russia will lease the base indefinitely. Every Ukrainian government, regardless of orientation, will allow them to do it. Why wouldn't they? They're all White Christians. Half of Ukraine speaks the same language. There is no reason for these countries to be locked in enmity. Sure, they might shake their fists at each other once in a while but anyone with the political savvy to make it to the top of Ukrainian politics knows they have to live and let live.

For the record, many Ukrainians appear to be hostile to Russian encroachment and domination. Indeed, even under the ostensibly pro-Russian Yanukovych, Ukraine's parliament (Rada) only renewed Russia's lease on Sevastopol by 10 votes.

[Californiadreaming]

The defense of the current borders seems to ignore the much more important geopolitical reality. Russia conquered the Crimea to gain access to the Black Sea. They built their southern naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea. Until the Russian Revolution no one would have thought of Crimea as part of Ukraine and even today there are few Ukrainians there. When the USSR collapsed Ukraine inherited Crimea through its USSR administrative borders, borders that had only existed for about 80 years.

This particular border is much younger than that; the Crimea was only transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.

Barely 10 years after the native population of Crimea had been expelled by Stalin.

Crimea's population was already almost half ethnic Russian back in 1939, though. Indeed, the Crimean Tatars were only deported in 1944--five years after the 1939 Soviet Census was conducted.

[Californiadreaming]

The neoliberals will win out - Ukraine will join the EU and NATO within the next few years.

Actually, it will certainly take much more than several years for either of these two things to actually occur. Indeed, it would probably be a huge burden for the E.U. to incorporate Ukraine within the next few years.

[GMantis]

I would like to point out that present-day southern Ukraine's population was Ukrainian-majority even back in 1897, though:



Thus, it's certainly not like Ukraine had no legitimate claim to southern Ukraine.

The census was by language (and Little Russian language at that). This doesn't necessarily translate into an Ukrainian identity, which was in any case pretty weak in Eastern Ukraine before the Soviets started to support it.

Actually, it will certainly take much more than several years for either of these two things to actually occur. Indeed, it would probably be a huge burden for the E.U. to incorporate Ukraine within the next few years.

There is no plan for immediate EU expansion after all Western Balkan states are admitted and even that will probably take more than ten years. Ukraine will be very lucky to enter the EU in twenty years.
NATO is of course not going to happen, because most Western European countries are not that insane.

[Californiadreaming]

Time for another map: These are the "yes" votes on the 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum, which obviously implied separation from Russia:


Even Crimea voted 54% "yes" vs. 42% "no" (and that was at a time when most of the Tartars hadn't returned yet).
Can we please once and for all stop with the myth of Crimea just having become part of Ukraine, and against their will being separated from Russia, by some historical accident back in 1954.

I would like to point out that a rump USSR could have theoretically survived even without Ukraine, though. Thus, this referendum should be viewed as being a Ukrainian separation from the USSR rather than as a Ukrainian separation from Russia.

Plus, the situation in what is now Russia was still perceived as being very unpredictable in late 1991. Indeed, my own parents left the Soviet Union several days before it collapsed in 1991 and told me on numerous occasions that, when they left, they were very concerned that there would eventually be another coup in what is now Russia. In contrast to this, the current political situation in Russia appears to be very stable.