Italian Election Series - Master Thread

[Antonio the Sixth]

Figured out we'd need one, to compile the results of all past elections instead of bumping old election threads.


1946 Referendum:



Republic: 52.8%
Monarchy: 47.2%


1946 Constituent Assembly Election:



Pd'Az: 22.9%, 130 seats
PCI: 18.2%, 106 seats
DC: 15.6%, 90 seats
PSIUP: 13%, 73 seats
UDN: 10.1%, 55 seats
BNL: 9.8%, 53 seats
FUQ: 5.1%, 28 seats
PRI: 2.4%, 13 seats
Others: 2.9%, 8 seats


1948 General Elections:



Pd'Az: 20.5% (-2.4), 122 seats (-21)
FDP: 18.5% (-12.7), 114 seats (-44)
MSI: 13.3% (new), 76 seats (+76)
DC: 11.8% (-3.8), 64 seats (-26)
US: 11.4% (new), 63 seats (+42)
BN: 11.2% (+1.1), 64 seats (+9)
PNM: 11.1% (+1.3), 66 seats (+16)
Others: 2.2%, 5 seats


1952 General Elections:



PSDI: 20.7% (+9.3), 163 seats (+100)
PLI: 15.4% (+4.2), 116 seats (+52)
PNM: 12.7% (+1.6), 59 seats (-7)
PCI: 10.6%, 49 seats (-32)
PSI: 10.5%, 42 seats (+9)
MSI: 10.1% (-3.2), 43 seats (-32)
DC: 9.9% (-1.9), 68 seats (+4)
Pd'Az: 7.4% (-13.1), 47 seats (-75)
Others: 2.7%, 3 seats


1956 General Elections:



PLI: 23.6% (+8.2), 169 seats (+53)
PSDI: 21% (+0.3), 145 seats (-18)
PSI: 10.4% (-0.1), 56 seats (+14)
MSI: 10.1% (=), 48 seats (+5)
PNM: 9.8% (-2.9), 47 seats (-12)
DC: 7.8% (-2.1), 42 seats (-26)
Pd'Az: 6.9% (-0.5), 40 seats (-7)
PCI: 5.8% (-4.8), 32 seats (-17)
PMP: 2.5 (new), 10 seats
Others: 2.1%, 5 seats


1961 General Elections:



PSI: 31.9% (+21.5), 218 seats (+162)
PLI: 22.5% (-1.1), 148 seats (-21)
PCI: 14.4% (+8.6), 85 seats (+53)
PDIUM: 9.1% (-3.2), 61 seats (+4)
Pd'Az: 7.3% (+0.4), 37 seats (-3)
PSDI: 5.4% (-15.6), 39 seats (-106)
MSI: 5.2% (-4.9), 25 seats (-23)
DC: 2.8% (-5), 13 seats (-29)
Others: 1.4%, 4 seats


1964 General Elections:



PLI: 32.3% (+9.8), 221 seats (+73)
PSI: 28.2% (-3.7), 193 seats (+32)
PDIUM: 9.4% (+0.3), 55 seats (-6)
PSIUP: 8.5% (new), 46 seats (-11)
PCI: 7.7% (-6.7), 48 seats (-37)
PDP: 7.4% (-5.3), 43 seats (-33)
MSI: 4.3% (-0.9), 20 seats (-5)
DC: 0.9% (-1.9), 0 seats (-13)
Others: 1.3%, 4 seats


1968 General Elections:



PSI: 25.6% (-2.6), 170 seats (-23)
PLI: 22.8% (-9.5), 153 seats (-68)
PCI: 20.2% (+12.5), 132 seats (+84)
PDIUM: 11.9% (+2.5), 76 seats (+21)
PDP: 10.8% (+3.4), 62 seats (+19)
PSIUP: 4.5% (-4), 23 seats (-23)
MSI: 2.7% (-1.6), 11 seats (-9)
Others: 1.5%, 3 seats


1974 General Elections:



PLI: 35.4% (+12.6), 236 seats (+139)
PSI: 31.1% (+5.5), 203 seats (+26)
PCI: 21% (+0.8), 134 seats (+10)
PDP: 9.7% (-1.1), 54 seats (+5)
Others: 2.8%, 3 seats


1974 Constitutional Referendums:

	Yes	No
#1	74.3%	25.7%
#2	32.2%	67.8%
#3	19.5%	80.5%
#4	63.9%	36.1%
#5	87.7%	12.3%
#6	46.9%	53.1%

1977 General Elections:



PCI: 27.4% (+6.4), 185 seats (+51)
PSI: 15.8% (-15.3), 104 seats (-99)
PLI: 15.6% (-19.8), 108 seats (-128)
PR: 13.9% (new), 79 seats
PDP: 12.5% (+2.8), 76 seats (+22)
DN: 11.8% (new), 66 seats
DP: 2.1% (new), 9 seats
Others: 0.9%, 3 seats


1982 General Elections:



PCI: 29.4% (+2), 212 seats (+27)
DN: 16.6% (+4.8), 109 seats (+43)
PLI: 14.5% (-1.1), 94 seats (-14)
PR: 11.3% (-2.6), 61 seats (-18)
PSI: 10.4% (-5.4), 63 seats (-41)
PDP: 10.1% (-2.4), 57 seats (-19)
DP: 6% (+3.9), 29 seats (+20)
Others: 1.7%, 5 seats


1982 Abrogative Referendums:

	Yes	No
#1	49.6%	50.4%
#2	32.6%	67.4%
#3	44.9%	55.1%
#4	34.3%	65.7%
#5	53%	47%

May 1984 General Elections:



PCI: 35.2% (+5.8), 247 seats (+35)
PLI: 20.8% (+6.3), 136 seats (+42)
PSI: 14.1% (+3.7), 91 seats (+28)
DN: 13.6% (-3), 82 seats (-27)
PR: 9.5% (-1.8), 50 seats (-11)
PDP: 3.5% (-6.6), 16 seats (-41)
DP: 1.1% (-4.9), 3 seats (-26)
Others: 2.2%, 5 seats


1984 Abrogative Referendum:



Yes: 52.2%
No: 47.8%


Sept. 1984 General Elections:



PCI: 35.8% (+0.6), 256 seats (+9)
DN: 20.5% (+6.9), 135 seats (+53)
PSI: 18.6% (+4.5), 122 seats (+31)
PLI: 10.2% (-10.6), 51 seats (-85)
PR: 7.2% (-2.3), 37 seats (-13)
PDP: 5.1% (+1.6), 24 seats (+8)
DP: 0.4% (-0.7), 0 seats (-3)
Others: 2.2%, 5 seats


1988 General Elections:



PCI: 28.2% (-7.6), 197 seats (-59)
DN: 18.1% (-2.4), 128 seats (-7)
PSI: 17.2% (-1.4), 124 seats (+2)
PLI: 14% (+3.8), 82 seats (+31)
FV: 10.6% (new), 53 seats
PR: 6.3% (-0.9), 30 seats (-7)
PDP: 1.9% (-3.2), 9 seats (-15)
Others: 3.7%, 7 seats


1988 Constitutional Referendum:



Yes: 73.1%
No: 26.9%


1988 Abrogative Referendums:

[Antonio the Sixth]

	Yes	No
#1	36.8%	63.2%
#2	54.6%	45.4%
#3	93.4%	6.6%
#4	38.3%	61.7%

1990 General Elections:



PCI: 29.1% (+0.9), 207 seats (+10)
PDP: 14.3% (+12.4), 100 seats (+91)
DN: 10.4% (-7.7), 74 seats (-54)
PSI: 10.4% (-6.8), 63 seats (-61)
PLI: 10% (-4), 63 seats (-19)
LN: 8.7% (new), 56 seats
FV: 8.5% (-2.1), 43 seats (-10)
Pan: 3.8% (-2.5), 18 seats (-12)
Others: 4.8%, 6 seats


1995 General Elections:



PDS: 33.6% (+4.5), 220 seats (+37)
FI: 21.7% (new), 142 seats (+117)
AN: 10.9% (+0.5), 72 seats (-2)
PRC: 9.7% (new), 64 seats (+22)
Pan: 8.5% (+4.7), 56 seats (+38)
PPI: 6% (new), 39 seats (-23)
FV: 5.1% (-3.4), 33 seats (-10)
LN: 1.5% (-7.2), 0 seats (-56)
Others: 3%, 4 seats


1995 Abrogative Referendums:

	Yes	No
#1	69.7%	30.3%
#2	46.5%	53.5%
#3	79.2%	20.8%
#4	31.7%	68.3%
#5	44.8%	55.2%
#6	63%	37%
#7	57.1%	42.9%
#8	76.4%	23.6%

Presidents of the Council of Ministers since 1946:
June 1946-Nov 1948: Ferruccio Parri (Pd'Az)
Nov 1948-Aug 1949: Ugo La Malfa (Pd'Az)
Aug 1949-Jan 1951: Amintore Fanfani (DC)
Jan 1951-Mar 1951: Riccardo Lombardi (Pd'Az)
Mar 1951-Apr 1951: Giuseppe Pella (DC)
Apr 1951-July 1951: Amintore Fanfani (DC)
July 1951-Sept 1951: Giuseppe Saragat (PSLI)
Sept 1951-Feb 1952: Antonio Segni
Feb 1952-Apr 1954: Giuseppe Saragat (PSDI)
Apr 1954-Dec 1954: Gaetano Martino (PLI)
Dec 1954-Mar 1955: Ugo La Malfa (Pd'Az)
Mar 1955-May 1955: Antonio Segni (DC)
May 1955-Jan 1956: Bruno Villabruna (PLI)
Jan 1956-Aug 1956: Adone Zoli (DC)
Aug 1956-Feb 1959: Giovanni Malagodi (PLI)
Feb 1959-Oct 1961: Giuseppe Saragat (PSDI)
Oct 1961-Nov 1963: Pietro Nenni (PSI)
Nov 1963-Sept 1964: Giacomo Mancini (PSI)
Sept 1964-June 1965: Ugo La Malfa (PDP)
June 1965-Jan 1967: Giovanni Malagodi (PLI)
Jan 1967-May 1967: Ugo La Malfa (PDP)
May 1967-Jan 1969: Mario Tanassi (PDP)
Jan 1969-Dec 1970: Francesco De Martino (PSI)
Dec 1970-Feb 1971: Junio Valerio Borghese (President of the Council for National Salvation)
Feb 1971-Mar 1973: Alfredo Covelli (President of the Council for National Salvation)
Mar 1973-Apr 1977: Francesco De Martino (PSI)
Apr 1977-Mar 1982: Aldo Moro (PDP)
Mar 1982-Jul 1982: Giovanni Spadolini (PDP)
Jul 1982-Jul 1984: Bettino Craxi (PSI)
Jul 1984-Feb 1985: Giovanni Spadolini (PDP)
Feb 1985-Jan 1989: Luciano Lama (Ind)
Jan 1989-May 1992: Claudio Martelli (PSI)
May 1992-Oct 1995: Leoluca Orlando (PDP, PPI)
Oct 1995-Nov 1999: Achille Ochetto (PDS)
Nov 1999-Jul 2004: Massimo D'Alema (PDS, DS)
Jul 2004-June 2009: Walter Veltroni (DS)
June 2009- : Nichi Vendola (SEL)

Presidents of the Republic since 1948:
1948-1955: Luigi Einaudi (PLI)
1955-1962: Ferruccio Parri (Pd'Az)
1962-1969: Giuseppe Saragat (PSDI, PDP)
1969-1970: Pietro Nenni (PSI)
1970-1971: Office vacant
1971-1973: Umberto II (King of Italy)
1973-1976 : Pietro Nenni (PSI)
1976-1983: Amintore Fanfani (PDP)
1983-1990: Sandro Pertini (PSI)
1990-1997: Nilde Iotti (PCI, PDS)
1997-2004: Mario Segni (PPI)
2004-2011: Emma Bonino (Rad)
2011- : Stefano Rodotà (DS)

[DC Al Fine]

So much awesome.

[Antonio the Sixth]

So much awesome.

Thanks! Here comes the electoral analysis.

The polarization process continued during the 1964 election. More than ever before, Italian voters concentrated their votes on two parties, PLI and PSI, which together won more than 60% of the total vote and monopolized the electoral map (regionalist SVP narrowly beat PLI in TAA). PLI, in particular, gained nearly 10 points from its 1961 results, beating PSI by about 4 points. Right-wing voters proved sensitive to the PLI's calls to give it the strength to defend Italy's free market against the PSI's bold reformist agenda. With more than 32% of the vote, the party even beat the PSI's 1961 record. PLI topped the polls in roughly half of the constituencies. It got its strongest percentages came in the Northwest (especially Piedmont, where it broke 40%), as well as Molise and Sicily. It also did well in the rest of the North, in Latium and in Campania, but lagged behind its national results in the Deep South and the Red Regions.

Turnout was notably high, almost returning to its 1948 peak. Indeed, the PLI's gains mostly came from new voters, and only marginally hurt the rest of the right. The Monarchists actually regained a bit of the ground they had lost in the previous elections. However, due to the PLI's rise, it was distanced even in its bastions of Campania, Sicily and Apulia, and did not win a single constituency. MSI lost almost a percentage point, but remained strong in its bastions in Latium, Southern Apulia and the Trieste region. On the other hand, DC's collapse was more brutal than ever before. The party's losing streak continued for the fifth election in a row, leaving it with less than 1% of the vote. Failing to qualify in any constituency, DC thus lost all its representation in parliament. By the end of the evening, it was obvious to everyone that the party of De Gasperi and Fanfani was effectively dead.

On the other side of the aisle, the outcome was disappointing but still decent. PSI attempted to make of these elections a referendum on the sweeping reforms it had fought for in the government, so as to win a strong mandate among working class voters. While the PSI remained very strong, over 28%, the PSIUP's splinter cost it a few votes and prevented it from repeating its 1961 exploit. Once again, the party was strong in the red core and Southern Lombardy, and also did well in the rest of the Northwest, but lagged behind in the South and South-centre, and in the Northeast. It actually won two constituencies in the South, where the PLI's performance was disappointing (in relative terms). PSI actually gained seats compared to the past legislature, because many deputies had chosen to follow PSIUP instead. Thus, it could legitimately be considered as one of the winners of this election.

As previously mentioned, PSIUP did not take many votes away from PSI. Instead, it owed its good result - over 8% - to former PCI voters, who expressed their disapproval of the party's dogmatism and its continued support for USSR. While PSIUP did not exactly have a clear line on these issues, hard-left voters sent a clear message by giving PSIUP more votes than PCI. With less than 8%, the communists lost nearly half of their votes, continuing a chaotic electoral streak made of ebbs and flows. PCI and PSIUP had similar electoral geographies, with most of their support coming from the red regions of the centre. Finally, for the first election it disputed as a single party, the PDP fell flat, winning barely more than Pd'Az had won alone three years earlier. It was likely hurt by climate of political polarization, with its most centrist voters flowing to the PLI in an effort to counter PSI's power. Still, it retained a significant parliamentary representation and could play a key role in the upcoming negotiations.

The relative decline of the left opened the door to different possibilities for government formation. PDP, PLI and PDIUM now had a narrow 8-seat majority, and PLI was particularly enticed by the possibility of excluding PSI from government. However, making PDP and PDIUM agree on a common platform would certainly prove extremely difficult (especially when just 4 defectors would suffice to make the government fall). The only other alternative would be a continuation of the alliance of the past legislature. While PSI, PDP and PLI together held more than 70% of the seats, the experience had proven chaotic and frustrating for both sides. No one could know which of the two options would eventually be privileged (though most would have given the PSI-PLI option an edge), and the upcoming months would no doubt be marked by tough negotiations.

[Peter the Lefty]

This is awesome Tony!  What do you use to make Italian maps?

[Antonio the Sixth]

This is awesome Tony!  What do you use to make Italian maps?

Good ol' MS paint. I use the standard color key of the Atlas, with a couple slightly modified shades in order to have better contrasts. In retrospect, I think I should change the PCI shade in order to avoid confusion with PSI (Atlas Red has the defect of tending toward pink in shades under 40%).

[Antonio the Sixth]

I'm also moving the leaders list in this thread so as leave more room from events summaries in the election threads.

[Leftbehind]

Voting landscape, so far:

[Antonio the Sixth]

Voting landscape, so far:

Great job! It's very interesting to see the evolution.

BTW, I slightly modified the PCI color key (but not the FDP's) to better mark the difference with PSI.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The 1968 election saw a new spike in support for the left. Surpassing their 1961 record height, PCI, PSI and PSIUP together reached the absolute majority of valid votes cast. Undoubtedly, the left-wing effervescence of the 1968 protest movements had massively translated in the polls. However, with PSI and PLI both losing significant ground, the elections highlighted a much less bipolarized electorate than that of the two previous elections. Meanwhile, the upward trend observed in turnout since the beginning of the 1960s continued, evidencing the strong level of political involvement on both sides.

PSI had been the party most vocally spurring the protesters to continue their fight through electoral means. However, far from reaping the benefits of the left-wing mobilization, the socialists actually lost further ground, winning barely over a quarter of the vote. Many working-class voters had felt betrayed by years of coalition agreements between PSI and PLI which had not yielded the expected improvement in their living conditions. They thus shunned the party in favor of more radical alternatives. However, the even more brutal collapse of the PLI allowed the Socialists to still come in first. PSI did best in Southern Lombardy and in the hard-left regions of the center - where it was nonetheless outpolled by PCI. It proved surprisingly resilient in the South, beating PLI in almost all its constituencies (the first time that a left-wing party carried the South while the national vote was close). It also did reasonably well in the North, but not as much as PLI.

PCI was undoubtedly the main beneficiary of the left-wing wave. With over 20% of the vote, the party indeed reached its highest level of support ever, even surpassing its postwar levels. The PCI's ebb-and-flow dynamic was more stunning than ever: after seeing its support nearly halved in 1964, PCI saw it rise almost threefold, gaining 12.5 percentage points. Communist lists broke 30% in the leftist strongholds of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria, managing (as well as in the Marche) to come ahead of the PSI. PCI also did fairly well in Piedmont, Liguria and some parts of the South, though it lagged behind in the Northeast and the Upper South. While it certainly took votes from PSI, PCI took even more votes away from PSIUP, which lost nearly half of its 1964 support. The party had struggled to find its raison d'être aside from left-wing unity, and its most radical voters easily fell for the PCI after the party started to distance from its doctrinaire pro-Soviet stance.

On the other side, PLI took a brutal hit, losing almost 10 percentage points and receding to its late 50s-early 60s levels. If the PLI-PSI deals had caused frustration among left-wing PSI voters, they apparently had caused far more furstration among right-wing PLI voters. This was particularly the case for many socially conservative and devoutly Catholic voters who had supported DC or the Monarchists in the past, but had recently rallied around PLI in order to defend Italy's free enterprise. These voters were particularly outraged about the coalition's projects for secularization, and thus massively abandoned the party in favor of PDP or PDIUM. The Liberals held their ground relatively well in the North, where they largely remained the first party. On the other hand, the party took a beating of epic proportions in the South, which had once been its strongest area.

Taking many voters away from the PLI, the Monarchists experienced a significant rebound. With a gain of 2.5 percentage points, the PDIUM returned to the levels of the PNM's heyday. As usual, the party's vote was concentrated in the South, where it managed to retake its old bastion of Campania. However, its votes weren't as well-distributed as the PNM's, and due to the PSI's decent showing in the South, the party was unable to prevail even in the very conservative Apulia. More surprisingly, PDP also took a significant number of the votes away from PLI, allowing it to break the highly symbolic 10% threshold. The moderate stance taken by some of the party's leaders regarding secularism provided the party with a new voting base among the former members of the DC's left-wing. The party's geography was largely Northern, though it also enjoyed some support in the South-Central regions. Finally, MSI took a new hit, falling below 3% and remaining significant only in Latium and Trieste.

History was made on Election Night, when it was established PSI, PCI and PSIUP together would hold 325 of the 630 seats in the House of Deputies, and a similar share of the seats in the Senate. The existence of a "Popular Front" majority opened the way to entirely new and previously unthinkable scenarios. The Sixth Legislature of the Italian Republic began in November of 1968 with more uncertainty than ever before...

[Antonio the Sixth]

Check out the OP: I have posted the map and party results/seats for the 1968 elections, and updated the leaders list.

Also, here is what the VIth Legislature looked like in March 1973, after the return to democracy:

PSI: 177 seats (16 former PSIUP)
PCI: 124 seats (4 former PSIUP)
PLI: 97 seats
PDP: 49 seats
Others: 19 seats (2 former MSI, 14 former PDIUM)
Vacant: 164

[Antonio the Sixth]

With the political landscape still shaken by the years of civil war, only four parties were able to seriously compete for the 1974 election. The incumbent government was represented by PSI and PCI, while PDP and PLI were also largely campaigning together. The outcome was unambiguous: the socialist-communist bloc reached 52%, surpassing its 1968 result and beating the PDP-PLI alliance by 7 points. Turnout remained at its high levels. With 337 seats in the House and a slightly lower share of the Senate, the De Martino government had all the means to implement its policies.

Winning 31%, PSI almost returned to its historical peak of 1961. The party did more than retake the votes that the PSIUP splinter had momentarily taken away, and surpassed the parties' combined total of 1968. A few former PDP voters had seemingly rejected the party's new centrist orientation and, in the wake of the liberation, found some legitimacy in supporting a more radical alternative. The party's geography was the same as usual: strong in the centre and in Southern Lombardy, average in the North, and weaker in the South, South-Centre and islands. Despite its excellent performance, PSI was beaten for first by PLI, which meant that it only managed to come ahead in its strongest regions. PCI also improved marginally over its 1968 level, winning 21%. This continued high level of support showed the solidification of a working-class electorate around a party under whose banner many of these voters had recently taken the arms. The communist vote was once again concentrated in the "red core", with also good results in the Northwest and around big cities. It remained very weak in the Northeast, in Campania and in Sicily.

PLI heavily benefited from its status as the only right-wing party still in competition. Winning over 35% of the vote, the party set the new record for the best result ever in the history of the Republic. Its impressive 13-points gain compared to the 1968 election could largely be explained by former monarchists (and to some extent, neofascists) turning to the liberals for lack of a better alternative. However, the PLI also undeniably did well among centrist voters, who sought to provide a staunch opposition to the radical policies of the PSI-PCI government. Compared to 1968, the PLI made impressive gains in the traditionally conservative Northeast, and in the South where it clearly benefited from monarchist transfers. It remained very strong in Piedmont, its old bastion. However, its gains were generally lower than average in the Northwest, as well as in Latium. As always, it remained weak in the central regions (often finishing third to PSI and PCI). Finally, PDP had a very disappointing result, being the only party to actually lose ground from 1968. It was likely hurt by the increasingly polarized political climate, with some voters instead going for either PSI or PLI.

If the parliamentary elections were a triumph for the left, the outcome of the Constitutional Referendums was more mixed, since only half of the 6 proposed amendments were approved by the people. The outcome was overall positive for PSI, whose instructions were followed in 4 of the 6 ballots - but it was even better for PDP, which got what it wanted in 5 of them. Five of the six questions were resolved by a margin superior to 25 points, leaving no room for ambiguity. The only competitive referendum proved to be the one about the Sixth Amendment.

Three of the six ballots saw the Yes or No option prevail everywhere on the map. The most lopsided result regarded the 18-year voting age (A#5), which was approved by 7 out of 8 voters. Support for that measure was relatively uniform throughout the country, except in the most conservative regions of the South where it lagged behind. Voters also supported the  public administration oversight system (A#1) by a whopping 3-to-1 margin. Opposition to that measure strongly correlated with past monarchist/fascist support (whereas even right-wing regions of the North came strongly in support of it). Equally impressive was the voters' opposition to the ban on anti-democratic political groups (A#3), rejected by 4 out of 5 voters. Many left-wing voters had seemingly taken a principled stand, refusing to support an Amendment which, though well-intentioned, may infringe on fundamental liberties. The Yes could not break 40% even in the most left-wing constituencies, and was under 20% everywhere South of Rome as well as in the most conservative parts of the north.

Considering that it only had the support of PCI, the ban on stationing troops (A#2) did surprisingly well. Nearly a third of Italians voted yes, outperforming by more than 10 points the party's showing. As expected with a predominantly communist electorate, the Yes vote was particularly strong in Tuscany, Emilia and Umbria (and actually prevailed in the former). However, the No's margin was surprisingly weak in Latium and in Napoli's region, hinting that a significant share of Yes voters might actually be right-wing nationalists (fairly ironically). However, both the North and the Deep South came solidly against the Amendment. By a similar margin, the voters chose to make Italy a secular nation (A#4). The pattern of the vote was a fairly unusual one, with strong support coming from the Red Core but also from large urban centers. Opposition to secularization came equally strongly from the conservative South than from the Northeast, in what once were the DC's bastions. Finally, in the only competitive ballot,  voters rejected 53-47 the amendment attempting to set guidelines in potential coup-like situations (A#6). In an otherwise classic left-right divide, the South's overwhelming hostility proved key to the victory of the No.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The 1977 election saw extremely wild swings, within a context of increased electoral competition. The two parties that had dominated the past 15 years both brutally collapsed, while brand new political forces saw a breakthrough. The result was an extremely fragmented parliament, with no less than five parties polling between 11% and 16%. These elections were the first where 18-year-olds could vote - for both the House and the Senate - following the passage of the constitutional amendment. This expansion of the electoral body largely explain the significant drop in turnout.

PCI came clearly ahead of the election, receiving support of over a quarter of the voters. Its 6-points gain largely came form disgruntled working class voters who abandoned PSI following its austerity, and saw in Berlinguer's PCI an appealing alternative. Due to the extreme fragmentation of the political landscape, this results allowed PCI to sweep the electoral map, winning nearly everywhere. The party was particularly strong (obviously) in Italy's "red core", but also in the industrial Northwest. It also did pretty well around other big cities (Milan, Rome, Naples), in some parts of the South, and in Berlinguer's home Sardinia. It lagged behind in most of the South, in Lombardy and in the Northeast.

PSI lost nearly half of its 1974 support, shrinking from over 30% to barely above 15% after having consistently polled over 15% since the 1960s. The tough austerity measure that the De Martino government was (grudgingly) forced to enact proved catastrophic for the party's electoral fortunes. But the party didn't only bleed its voters to the PCI: it also clearly was hurt by the Radicals' breakthrough, which took away many of its younger voters/potential voters, and probably lost some moderate voters to PDP as well. PSI still managed to come second, narrowly beating PLI. However, since the geography of its vote was similar to PCI's, it didn't come ahead in any constituency except the single-member Valle d'Aosta (it came very close in the FVG+Belluno one).

PLI's collapse was even more brutal than PSI's. In these 3 years, the liberals lost nearly 20 points, and were reduced to their lowest level since 1952. The reason for this shellacking were partly common with PSI, and partly different. The most obvious one is that in 1974 PLI had received the support of many voters whose traditional allegiance went to the monarchists or the MSI, and had only voted PLI as a "lesser evil". With the foundation of DN, these voters could return to their natural political area. On the other hand, many in the PLI's young and progressive wing were seduced by the novelty and energy of the Radicals. The party still managed to retain a few of its Northern strongholds and Molise, but even there its performances were anemic.

PR had a major electoral breakthrough, going from a minor party to Italy's fourth political force with nearly 14% of the vote. This success was certainly aided by the extension of the electoral body to younger citizens, who were the party's most natural constituency. However, it is also undeniable that many Radical voters were former supporters of other "establishment" parties (PSI and PLI in particular) who were eager for change and novelty. The party's electoral geography was largely Northern and skewed toward big cities. It actually managed to pull ahead in one constituency, Trieste, with 25%.

DN's strong performance, nearly 12%, proved that the dictatorship and civil war had not eradicated conservative/monarchist/nationalist support in Italy. In fact, the new party's results clearly mirrored the past PDIUM and MSI electorate. Thus, unsurprisingly, DN had its best performances in Latium, Campania, Apulia and Sicily (where it won one of the two constituencies). However, the party's votes were somewhat more evenly distributed than the old monarchists'.

DP attracted a significant amount of support, slightly over 2%, coming from the PCI's most radical wing which disapproved the party's new turn. The party's base was mostly northern.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The 1977 map and results are also posted.

BTW, is anyone reading these? I don't really feel like writing so much if it's just for myself.

[Dereich]

I read them all. The amount of effort you put into these makes this the best election series on Atlas.

[Supersonic]

I am! I love this election series.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Thanks guys! It's always good to know the work is appreciated.

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

I'm reading these, and eagerly awaiting the 1982 maps and numbers.

[Antonio the Sixth]

To everybody's surprise, the real winners of the 1982 elections were the extremist forces on both sides of the political spectrum. All the parties that had taken part in the incumbent government (even the Radicals, who only provided external support) lost ground, while all the parties that had stayed out of it (and the PCI which only provided a temporary support) made major gains. This created a legislature even more unstable and uncertain than the previous one, since the support of either PCI or DN (DP is obviously off the table) would be indispensable for any new government. Turnout ticked up somewhat, showing that political participation remained strong.

PCI once again easily distanced all its competitors, gaining further ground from its already excellent 1977 performance and approaching the 30% line. Its gains were uniform throughout the country, allowing it to break 30% in southern Lombardy and Latium and 40% in all the red core. They came mostly from new PSI voters flocking to the PCI.

The second spot went to DN, which had come sixth back in 1977. The party gained nearly 5 points and gathered roughly one sixth of the electorate, the best performance in the history of the conservative right since the 1950s. The virulent debate over abortion, and the government's attempt to compromise on it, apparently radicalized many right-wing voters, who chose to send a clear message to the governing party that this issue was non-negotiable. The party made major gains in the South, allowing it to regain pole position in its old Campania strongholds (while keeping eastern Sicily), and also come close in Apulia, Molise and Calabria.

PLI saw a new - though small - drop in support, slipping below 15%. It bled a significant amount of votes to DN in the South, where it lost even its old Molise stronghold. It only managed to hold on two constituencies of the North, in Southern Piedmont and Western Veneto.

The Radicals also saw a decline in support, going from 14% to slightly above 11%. Their support to a "traditional" government, even if only external, proved a difficult exercise for a party that had heavily campaigned against the establishment. But they remained strong enough to have a significant impact on the political stage.

The sharpest decline hit the PSI, which lost over a third of its support and barely held over 10%. The general climate of radicalization on the left hurt the socialists, which had just started engaging a moderate turn. The party kept its popular deputy in Valle d'Aosta, but did not come close anywhere else.

PDP also lost some ground, despite the praises that Moro received in his five years leading the government. The party returned to its traditional base of roughly 10% of the electorate, probably losing some ground to PLI and PR (which however lost ground as well to more extremist parties).

The most surprising breakthrough came from the far-left of the political landscape, with DP nearly tripling its 1977 results and reaching 6% of the vote. This surge in far-left support was explained by the most radical electorate of the PCI disapproving the government's brutal reaction to terrorism, and showing at least some level of solidarity with the Red Brigades.

The Radicals also experienced a setback with the abrogative referendums, since 3 out of the 4 repeals they had proposed failed. Over two thirds of the electorate rejected the idea of abolishing the life imprisonment sentence (#2), in a rather geographically uniform vote. By an extremely narrow margin, the voters also chose to preserve the public funding of political parties (#1)*. Strong mobilization against it in the regions where PCI was strong proved decisive to allow the No side to prevail. The Radical's proposal to liberalize abortion (#3) also failed by a clear 10-points margin. Support for the measure was a blend of central progressivism and northwestern liberalism, but the conservative South and the christian Northeast fully weighed in fully to kill the proposal. While this further liberalization failed, the conservative proposal to outlaw abortion again (#4) was even more soundly defeated. The No won almost a third of the vote, proving extremely strong even in the ol' conservative South. Status quo thus prevailed on abortion legislation. The only success of this year was the proposal to repeal the police powers laws enacted by the Moro government to crush terrorism (#5). This came at the great surprise (and dismay) of the political class, which thought that the vivid memories of terrorism would be sufficient to scare the populace into upholding the laws. Instead, support for the proposal reached 53%, coming from left-wing central Italy, but even more strongly from the North, where authoritarianism was extremely criticized. However, strong opposition to it came from the South.

*The actual vote was a perfect tie. I thought it would make sense to decide in favor of the No in such cases.

[Wake Me Up When The Hard Border Ends]

Keep up the good work, I'm loving this series!

[Antonio the Sixth]

The May 1984 elections did not produce a parliament any more governable than the one that had just been dissolved. With PCI stronger than ever and reduced support for the "establishment" area, it was obvious to everyone that the political crisis would only intensify - the only potential solution lying in an agreement between Craxi's PSI and Berlinguer's PCI. These results also showed the growing hegemony of the left, which, since the 1970s, had the support of a strong majority of the Italian electorate. Turnout again remained stable at a reasonably high level.

Gaining ground for the fifth time in a row, the PCI won a historical result with over 35% of the vote (nearly beating the 1974 PLI for best result ever). It gained nearly 6 points, coming from traditionally moderate left-wing voters who disapproved of Craxi's decision to gut the price-wage linking scheme. This historical result also showed Berlinguer's talent as a political leader and the support that his charisma had drawn - with the party having gained nearly 15 point during his decade of leadership. The PCI's gains were particularly strong in the left's central bastion (allowing it to win an unprecedented absolute majority along the Bologna-Firenze-Siena strip) and in the South (where it finally broke the 30% line). Otherwise, the party's geography was mostly unchanged.

Coming second was the PLI, which, in a reversal from the recent trend, gained about 6 points and returned above 20%. In a time of economic difficulties, right-wing voters generally chose to follow the path of fiscal responsibility and anti-inflation policies that the Liberals offered. The party thus managed to stay ahead in its northern strongholds despite the PCI's mounting tide.

PSI also regained some ground compared with the previous electoral round, though its 14% performance remained poor in light of the party's history. Still, Craxi's bold and assertive style  of leadership proved to seduce a new electorate, which lamented political instability and was in search for strong leadership.

DN's performance declined a bit, losing 3 points (most of which to PLI) and returning to a level more in line with the party's traditional standing. Still, its nearly 14% remained a fairly decent result and showed that the party retained a strong base. Nonetheless, the PCI's major gains in the South meant that the party was wiped off the map.

In similar decline was the Radical Party, which for the first time slipped below the 10% line. The novelty factor which had propelled the party in its early days had since started to wear off, and  the increased focus on economic issues hurt a party whose main campaign themes were societal.

Having lost its charismatic leader Aldo Moro, PDP suffered from a brutal collapse, losing nearly two thirds of its support and being reduced to a marginal level. It was clearly hurt by the rebound in support for PSI and PLI, which took away its old centrist electorate.

Finally, DP also went from 6% of the vote and a substantial parliamentary delegation, to barely over 1% and only 3 seats. Almost all its 1982 electorate returned to the PCI (in the wake of the party's breakup with the government), leaving DP with only its most radical core.

The abrogative referendum propounded by the Radicals proved successful despite the party's electoral decline. To the surprise of all, 52% of Italians voted to liberalize the country's gun regulations. Low turnout (lagging significantly behind the general elections' turnout) might partly explain this result, as enthusiasm was greater on the "yes" side. There was little geographic polarization, but the patterns were clear: the "yes" vote was strong in the libertarian-leaning North, but also, more surprisingly, in the old conservative South, even breaking 60% in the Naples constituency and in Sicily (it was hypothesized that the local mafia, currently at the peak of its power and having obvious interests in laxer gun laws, threw all its support behind the measure). The no votes prevailed in the left-wing regions of the centre, in Latium, and in places of the South where conservatism prevailed over criminality.

[Leftbehind]

Providing nothing changes on the Sept elections, an update:

[Antonio the Sixth]

The day after the vote, it was clear to everyone that the September 1984 elections had not resolved any of the problems that had triggered their calling - instead possibly making them worse. Overall, the traditional area of government (PSI, PDP and PLI) experienced a new decline, totaling barely more than a third of the electorate. Craxi's bet on the Italians' aspiration for stability proved unsuccessful, as instead extremist forces were the main beneficiaries of this electoral round. The fundamental balance of power wasn't modified: the key to the resolution of the political crisis remained in the hands of PSI and PCI. Turnout remained the same.

In the wake of Berlinguer's unexpected death, PCI once again improved its performance (albeit marginally) and received the best electoral result ever for any party post-World War II. With nearly 36% of the vote, the party established itself as the powerhouse of Italian politics, spectacularly bucking the trend of communist decline experienced everywhere in Europe. Emotion over the beloved leader's death energized the communist base more than ever before, spurring them to go to the polls and show the enduring of his legacy - but also drawing a few voters from other parties, in a display of solidarity. The party's electoral geography was roughly unchanged from four months earlier.

In a reversal from the previous vote, DN gained 7 points and recovered the second place it had held in 1982. Its performance was even more astounding than it was then, winning over 20% of the vote, a level the conservative right had never reached after 1956. This sharp rise, in only four months, was obviously correlated with the decline of the PLI. Many liberal voters expressed their frustration over the party's powerlessness in the new political arrangement. These right-wing voters were attracted by DN's unambiguously conservative message. For the first time in the party's history, DN broke 30% in in two constituencies, Napoli and Eastern Sicily, which it carried. It also too the Southern Campania constituency and came close in Molise, Apulia, Calabria and Western Sicily.

PSI remained third, but significantly improved its showing, gaining 4.5 points to 18.6%. This result, higher than any PSI showing since its brutal collapse of 1977, highlighted the party's newly found appeal under Craxi's leadership. Many center-left voters were attracted by Craxi's calls for a strong and decisive governance and his promise to reconcile left-wing policies with good economic management. Due to the nature of PSI's vote, it did not come ahead in any constituency except the uninominal Valle d'Aosta one.

PLI's decline was even sharper than DN's rise. The party lost half of its support, going from over 20% to barely over 10% - the party's worst result ever. Apart from the numerous voters who switched to DN, PLI's losses can also be explained (somewhat surprisingly) by the growth of Craxi's PSI, which rallied a large share of the old establishment parties' electorate, even from the right. With such a paltry result, the PLI was for the first time entirely wiped off the map, even losing its Cuneo stronghold.

The Radicals pursued the steady decline that followed their initial breakthrough, losing two more points to establish themselves slightly above 7%. Political polarization, the dominance of economic themes and fatigue over the party's anti-establishment antics remained the main explanation for this continued loss of support.

PDP regained a bit of lost ground, establishing itself at 5%. The party probably benefited from a modest spike in centrist support in reaction to political instability, as well as from Spadolini's image as a consensual caretaker PM. Still, its electoral prospects remained dire compared to where the party stood at the beginning of the decade.

DP further fell into irrelevancy, polling less than half a percentage point and losing any parliamentary representation. The party's brand of far-leftism appeared increasingly out of touch with reality, and the wave of sympathy following Berlinguer's death brought their remaining voters back to PCI. Soon after this electoral setback, the party decided to abandon electoral activity and dedicate itself exclusively to grassroots militancy.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The 1988 elections returned a more fragmented parliament, with a weakened PCI and the emergence of the Greens. The fundamental balance had not been altered, although for the first time since 1982 a majority without either PCI or DN was technically possible. The Italian electorate once again expressed a strong preference toward the left, which, depending on definitions, weighed from 56% to 64% of the electorate. Turnout increased somewhat, demonstrating that political instability had stimulated, rather than depressed the Italians' political involvement.

Losing 7-8 points, PCI returned to the level of support it enjoyed at the turn of the decade, that is slightly under 30%. The party clearly paid the price for the loss of its charismatic leader, whose successors (Natta, then Ochetto) proved unable to match. The PCI was also hurt by the structural trends of Italian society, as the working class had since a decade experienced a sharp demographic decline in favor of middle classes. Many former communist voters (especially the middle-class ones) were attracted by the Greens, which they saw as a novel left-wing alternative. The party's decline was uniform throughout the country, though losses were more limited in the party's traditional core of Central Italy.

DN retained its second place, despite eroding 2 to 3 points (likely a few of the former PLI voters who had switched in 1984 and now returned home). Its 18% score was still the second best in the party's history, and its 10-point gap with PCI was the closest any political force had come since the beginning of the party's hegemony in 1977. This allowed DN to come ahead in two more constituencies (Southern Apulia and Western Sicily), making the Italian South bluer than ever.

Even PSI, despite Craxi's efforts, could not avoid losses, eroding one point and half to slightly over 17%. While the party continued its progress among moderate voters in search for strong leadership and for a lasting solution to political instability, these gains were offset by a loss of left-wing voters to the Greens. Thanks to the PCI's decline, the party was able to come ahead in two constituencies of Northeastern Italy.

PLI was the only previously existing party that did not lose ground compared to four years earlier, regaining 4 points to 14%. This bounce had probably originated from former voters of both DN and PDP. Still, its performance remained fairly low by historical standards, and the party was only able to come ahead in its Cuneo stronghold.

The Greens achieved a breakthrough similar to that of the Radicals a decade earlier, taking almost 11% of the vote. The newly founded ecologist movement drew support from other left-wing forces, PCI, PSI, and to a lesser extent Radicals. Its electorate was northern, urban, young and fairly middle-class, but the party's results were too low for it to prevail anywhere. [note: Green on the map stands for local regionalist parties, not for the FV]

The Radicals bled one more percentage point and ended up slightly over 6%. The party was still faced with the same problems as always, and lost its spot as Italy's "young" party with the rise of the Greens.

Finally, PDP suffered from a new collapse and lost over three fifths of the electorate, ending up slightly below 2%. Under the new balance of power, the party had been entirely marginalized and had become largely out of touch with the issues of the day. It lost voters both on the left to PSI and on the right to PLI.

The constitutional referendum, meanwhile, was an clear success for Craxi and those who, like him, had advocated for a reinforcement of the executive branch. The constitutional reforms inspired by the PSI leader were massively approved by voters, with almost 3/4 of the vote. Support for the amendment was strong all over the peninsula, with little polarization except in "red" Central Italy, where the No vote managed to break 30%.

As for the abrogative referendums, the voters approved of the two measures put on ballot by the radicals, by rejecting those that had originated from the PCI and the Greens. The emblematic communist proposal to revoke Craxi's 1984 decree and reestablish the Escalator (#1) was soundly rejected by voters. With only 37% of the vote, the measure failed to attract beyond the hard-left electorate, to the surprise of many. This defeat was another massive blow to the PCI, further indicating that the tide had started to turn. By roughly 55%, the voters approved of the Radicals' initiative to make judges responsible before civil courts (#2). Left-wing regions once again successfully allied with the libertarian north to make this victory possible. The other Radical proposal, eliminating the special system for the investigation of ministers (#3) drew near-unanimous support, winning over 93% of the vote. Finally, the Greens' initiative to effectively end nuclear power (#4) also failed, with over 60% of Italians instead choosing to preserve this source of energy. There was some left-right divide in the vote, with support for the initiative being the strongest in the "red regions" but also in the urban Northwest.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The last election of the First Republic was held in 1990. They were marked by PCI's continued electoral prevalence, while the rest of the political spectrum was more fragmented than ever. With the exception of PCI and PDP, all the parties that had contested the 1988 election lost ground, showing the voters' widespread fatigue toward the old political establishment. Of the eight parties that contested these elections, five would either disband or significantly reform themselves within the next three years.

To the surprise of all, PCI's internal divisions did not hurt it in the polls. Instead, the party gained a percentage point from three year earlier, establishing itself at a solid 29%. The communist electorate turned out massively to express its adhesion to the party in a troubled time. The party made major gains in its traditional core of central Italy, and also held its ground in the South. In the North however, it fell victim of the Lega's surge and dropped a few points.

In a surprising twist from previous round, the second place went to PDP, which saw its electoral success rise sevenfold from 2% to 14%. The party achieved what can only be called a resurrection, going from its worst to its best electoral result in less than 3 years. Leoluca Orlando's efforts to reenergize a moribund party succeeded beyond anyone's expectances. Undoubtedly, the new leader managed to appeal to the voters' increasing fatigue with old establishment parties and their wish for "clean" politics. The party even came ahead in Orlando's native Sicily, almost reaching 40% in the Palermo constituency.

DN lost nearly 8 points, stabilizing itself at 10%. In a sharp reversal from the last few elections, this marked the party's lowest result ever. What hurt the party so badly is unclear, but the old conservative electorate apparently proved sensitive to the general climate of hostility toward the old party. With such a weak result, DN was wiped off the map.

Tied with DN and having lost almost 7 points, PSI was also entirely wiped off the map. Craxi, more than any other politician, embodied the political establishment of the 1980s, and as such fell victim of the voters at this establishment. His continuous shenanigans to increase his political influence heavily backfired, and the party was reduced to its early 1980s lows. Its losses were particularly heavy in the North, where it bled votes to LN.

PLI also lost ground, though only 4 points since it started from a lower level, and also ended up at 10%. Like the other parties, it fell victim of the anti-incumbent mood, and bled many votes to the Lega in the North.

The major breakthrough of this year came from the populist-regionalist Northern League, which won over 17% of the votes in the North (thus about 9% nationally). The party's radical style attracted many working class voters who used to vote PCI, as well as small entrepreneurs who traditionally supported the conservative parties. It distanced PCI in three constituencies of Northern Lombardy and Veneto.

The Greens to a minor hit, bleeding 2 points to 8.5%. The main explanation for this loss is the lack of the novelty factor they enjoyed in 1988, as well as possibly the disappointment of the most radical voters for the party's compromises with other political forces.

The Pannella List's success did not equal that of the Radical Party 3 years ago, losing 2.5 more points and ending up at only 4%. Clearly, the Radicals moment' of glory was over and their support was reduced to the most enthusiastic core (though the party was still able to achieve political victories through the referendums it propounded).