Are some cultures incapable of democratization?

[Samof94]

Yeah our modern representative system was designed by 18th century elites in order to be explicitly counter-democratic, the American framers and French revolutionaries taking inspiration from the oligarchic British parliament. That's not to say that over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries it did not evolve to take in greater democratic content, but the form of representative government as it was created in order to maintain legislators' independence from the popular will endures.

It is why Israel even lets Arabs exist as citizens at all.

[Vosem]

No, there is absolutely no evidence for this; democracies have been set up in such a wide variety of cultures around the world that it seems literally anywhere could democratize. However, this doesn't mean that everywhere actually is democratizing, or that democratization can be accomplished by force.

Trying to build a liberal democracy in Afghanistan by force was incredibly weird and naive, but this doesn't mean that there could never be a liberal democracy in Afghanistan.

Yeah our modern representative system was designed by 18th century elites in order to be explicitly counter-democratic, the American framers and French revolutionaries taking inspiration from the oligarchic British parliament. That's not to say that over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries it did not evolve to take in greater democratic content, but the form of representative government as it was created in order to maintain legislators' independence from the popular will endures.

It is why Israel even lets Arabs exist as citizens at all.

...what?

[Samof94]

No, there is absolutely no evidence for this; democracies have been set up in such a wide variety of cultures around the world that it seems literally anywhere could democratize. However, this doesn't mean that everywhere actually is democratizing, or that democratization can be accomplished by force.

Trying to build a liberal democracy in Afghanistan by force was incredibly weird and naive, but this doesn't mean that there could never be a liberal democracy in Afghanistan.

Yeah our modern representative system was designed by 18th century elites in order to be explicitly counter-democratic, the American framers and French revolutionaries taking inspiration from the oligarchic British parliament. That's not to say that over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries it did not evolve to take in greater democratic content, but the form of representative government as it was created in order to maintain legislators' independence from the popular will endures.

It is why Israel even lets Arabs exist as citizens at all.

...what?

What I mean is that an actually autocratic Israel would have done much worse things to the Palestinians.  Look at what Guatemala’s military did to Mayan peasants.

[Hnv1]

Yes of course, democracy is not a universal optimal decision-making procedure and there is nothing over and above it being derived from Western tradition.
Some form of majoritarian decision-making procedure is possible but really democratic culture is untenable without an incredible amount of westernisation.

[Benjamin Frank]

The United States isn't exactly showing it's capable of democracy right now either.

[Tintrlvr]

The United States isn't exactly showing it's capable of democracy right now either.

Things would frankly be a lot better and less tense if we had more democratic institutional structures instead of the by modern standards anti-democratic system we were saddled with by the Founders and are too pig-headed to change.

[Samof94]

The United States isn't exactly showing it's capable of democracy right now either.

Things would frankly be a lot better and less tense if we had more democratic institutional structures instead of the by modern standards anti-democratic system we were saddled with by the Founders and are too pig-headed to change.

I strongly agree. Back on topic. What can make the Muslim world secularize?

[ingemann]

The United States isn't exactly showing it's capable of democracy right now either.

Things would frankly be a lot better and less tense if we had more democratic institutional structures instead of the by modern standards anti-democratic system we were saddled with by the Founders and are too pig-headed to change.

I strongly agree. Back on topic. What can make the Muslim world secularize?

Fewer money to radical Islamists and a backlash against Islam in some of more successful Muslim states. As example Erdogan is in his incompetence doing more to weaken Islam in Turkey than 80 years of radical secularism have done.

[All Along The Watchtower]

What can make the Muslim world secularize?

Why should it?

[Statilius the Epicurean]

The United States isn't exactly showing it's capable of democracy right now either.

Things would frankly be a lot better and less tense if we had more democratic institutional structures instead of the by modern standards anti-democratic system we were saddled with by the Founders and are too pig-headed to change.

I strongly agree. Back on topic. What can make the Muslim world secularize?

Fewer money to radical Islamists and a backlash against Islam in some of more successful Muslim states. As example Erdogan is in his incompetence doing more to weaken Islam in Turkey than 80 years of radical secularism have done.

There is some evidence that this may already be happening. The failures of political Islam over the past decade on a broad spectrum from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahda, ISIS, sectarianism in Lebanon etc. may be leading to an uptick in secularism - from a small minority as of yet.

https://twitter.com/_alice_evans/status/1470099915678392321?s=21

[Хahar 🤔]

It is worth noting that surveys of Islamic religiosity can rely on overly Christianized views of religion; here, for example, we see the unwieldy term "attend mosque" as a direct analogue to "attend church" as if attendance at Friday congregational prayers is equivalent to attendance at Sunday church services (it is not). Failure to understand that attendance at congregational prayers is a communal obligation incumbent upon men and not women can lead to the conclusion that Muslim men are far more religious than Muslim women, which would be unlike just about every non-Muslim society on earth and is also not true.

The trouble with "Islamism" as an ideology is that Sunni Islam is rooted in quietism; acceptance of the status quo is fundamentally what defines Sunnis. This makes it an awkward fit as a causative agent of political change. Even as the scholars who created Sunnism framed their ideal republican society, they accepted the absolute monarchy under which they lived, since that was the only coherent model of large-scale administration in pre-modern society.

The prevailing ideologies of the Cold War created a situation unusual in the Sunni world where Islam was actively countercultural. With that sort of Soviet-inspired socialism being dead and gone now, it is possible to imagine a world in which Islam returns to a role as provider of social cohesion but not social change. That said, the Maghreb has always been peripheral to Islamic society, and one can make a reasonable case that the Arab world in general is the Islamic periphery.

There are more Muslims in the Indian world than in the Arab world, and there (with the exception of politically settled Bangladesh) religious politics and politically-motivated religiosity seem to be increasing, not decreasing. That part of the world (and even more so Indonesia to its east), of course, is generally inconvenient to narratives about Islam and politics, and so it tends to be ignored.

[Statilius the Epicurean]

It is worth noting that surveys of Islamic religiosity can rely on overly Christianized views of religion; here, for example, we see the unwieldy term "attend mosque" as a direct analogue to "attend church" as if attendance at Friday congregational prayers is equivalent to attendance at Sunday church services (it is not). Failure to understand that attendance at congregational prayers is a communal obligation incumbent upon men and not women can lead to the conclusion that Muslim men are far more religious than Muslim women, which would be unlike just about every non-Muslim society on earth and is also not true.

What's interesting is the evidence that self-reported religiosity has no gender gap in Muslim countries, versus Christian countries where women self-report as more religious than men. But either way the point is not really relevant to the chart that measures a relative shift.

The trouble with "Islamism" as an ideology is that Sunni Islam is rooted in quietism; acceptance of the status quo is fundamentally what defines Sunnis. This makes it an awkward fit as a causative agent of political change. Even as the scholars who created Sunnism framed their ideal republican society, they accepted the absolute monarchy under which they lived, since that was the only coherent model of large-scale administration in pre-modern society.

The prevailing ideologies of the Cold War created a situation unusual in the Sunni world where Islam was actively countercultural. With that sort of Soviet-inspired socialism being dead and gone now, it is possible to imagine a world in which Islam returns to a role as provider of social cohesion but not social change. That said, the Maghreb has always been peripheral to Islamic society, and one can make a reasonable case that the Arab world in general is the Islamic periphery.

I don't think it was about Cold War ideology. You're of course right that the quietism of Sunni political theory is absolutely central, but the other half of that bargain between the Sunni ulema and the state was that the ruler would leave law (sharia) to the scholars. So the ruler who doesn't transgress sharia gains religious legitimacy, and the scholar who doesn't threaten the ruler's power gains social authority. What happened in the 19th and 20th century is that under the assault of European colonialism and modernity the bargain came apart: secular law codes were introduced that disenfranchised the traditionalist madhhab jurists educated in in schools like al-Azhar. (Political) Salafism and a Leninist party like the Muslim Brotherhood (among other modernist movements) are reactions to the traditionalists' loss of institutional hegemony and the power vacuum it created in Islam. In that sense political Islam is one attempt to make sense of (the ideal of?) sharia under the modern secular state and why Salafis tend to bifurcate so violently into ultra-activists and ultra-quietists. I can only guess that given the central place law occupies in Islam that the genie won't be put back in the bottle, unless there's a social bargain found where the state can accommodate sharia again, or sharia loses its political significance.

There are more Muslims in the Indian world than in the Arab world, and there (with the exception of politically settled Bangladesh) religious politics and politically-motivated religiosity seem to be increasing, not decreasing. That part of the world (and even more so Indonesia to its east), of course, is generally inconvenient to narratives about Islam and politics, and so it tends to be ignored.

Yes, I should have qualified that I'm mainly talking about the Arab world here.

[Samof94]

It is worth noting that surveys of Islamic religiosity can rely on overly Christianized views of religion; here, for example, we see the unwieldy term "attend mosque" as a direct analogue to "attend church" as if attendance at Friday congregational prayers is equivalent to attendance at Sunday church services (it is not). Failure to understand that attendance at congregational prayers is a communal obligation incumbent upon men and not women can lead to the conclusion that Muslim men are far more religious than Muslim women, which would be unlike just about every non-Muslim society on earth and is also not true.

The trouble with "Islamism" as an ideology is that Sunni Islam is rooted in quietism; acceptance of the status quo is fundamentally what defines Sunnis. This makes it an awkward fit as a causative agent of political change. Even as the scholars who created Sunnism framed their ideal republican society, they accepted the absolute monarchy under which they lived, since that was the only coherent model of large-scale administration in pre-modern society.

The prevailing ideologies of the Cold War created a situation unusual in the Sunni world where Islam was actively countercultural. With that sort of Soviet-inspired socialism being dead and gone now, it is possible to imagine a world in which Islam returns to a role as provider of social cohesion but not social change. That said, the Maghreb has always been peripheral to Islamic society, and one can make a reasonable case that the Arab world in general is the Islamic periphery.

There are more Muslims in the Indian world than in the Arab world, and there (with the exception of politically settled Bangladesh) religious politics and politically-motivated religiosity seem to be increasing, not decreasing. That part of the world (and even more so Indonesia to its east), of course, is generally inconvenient to narratives about Islam and politics, and so it tends to be ignored.

I was taking less about individual Muslims and more about the fact Salafi Jihadism is a thing.

[All Along The Watchtower]

It is worth noting that surveys of Islamic religiosity can rely on overly Christianized views of religion; here, for example, we see the unwieldy term "attend mosque" as a direct analogue to "attend church" as if attendance at Friday congregational prayers is equivalent to attendance at Sunday church services (it is not). Failure to understand that attendance at congregational prayers is a communal obligation incumbent upon men and not women can lead to the conclusion that Muslim men are far more religious than Muslim women, which would be unlike just about every non-Muslim society on earth and is also not true.

The trouble with "Islamism" as an ideology is that Sunni Islam is rooted in quietism; acceptance of the status quo is fundamentally what defines Sunnis. This makes it an awkward fit as a causative agent of political change. Even as the scholars who created Sunnism framed their ideal republican society, they accepted the absolute monarchy under which they lived, since that was the only coherent model of large-scale administration in pre-modern society.

The prevailing ideologies of the Cold War created a situation unusual in the Sunni world where Islam was actively countercultural. With that sort of Soviet-inspired socialism being dead and gone now, it is possible to imagine a world in which Islam returns to a role as provider of social cohesion but not social change. That said, the Maghreb has always been peripheral to Islamic society, and one can make a reasonable case that the Arab world in general is the Islamic periphery.

There are more Muslims in the Indian world than in the Arab world, and there (with the exception of politically settled Bangladesh) religious politics and politically-motivated religiosity seem to be increasing, not decreasing. That part of the world (and even more so Indonesia to its east), of course, is generally inconvenient to narratives about Islam and politics, and so it tends to be ignored.

I was taking less about individual Muslims and more about the fact Salafi Jihadism is a thing.

What does Salafi jihadism have to do with any of this?

[Samof94]

It is worth noting that surveys of Islamic religiosity can rely on overly Christianized views of religion; here, for example, we see the unwieldy term "attend mosque" as a direct analogue to "attend church" as if attendance at Friday congregational prayers is equivalent to attendance at Sunday church services (it is not). Failure to understand that attendance at congregational prayers is a communal obligation incumbent upon men and not women can lead to the conclusion that Muslim men are far more religious than Muslim women, which would be unlike just about every non-Muslim society on earth and is also not true.

The trouble with "Islamism" as an ideology is that Sunni Islam is rooted in quietism; acceptance of the status quo is fundamentally what defines Sunnis. This makes it an awkward fit as a causative agent of political change. Even as the scholars who created Sunnism framed their ideal republican society, they accepted the absolute monarchy under which they lived, since that was the only coherent model of large-scale administration in pre-modern society.

The prevailing ideologies of the Cold War created a situation unusual in the Sunni world where Islam was actively countercultural. With that sort of Soviet-inspired socialism being dead and gone now, it is possible to imagine a world in which Islam returns to a role as provider of social cohesion but not social change. That said, the Maghreb has always been peripheral to Islamic society, and one can make a reasonable case that the Arab world in general is the Islamic periphery.

There are more Muslims in the Indian world than in the Arab world, and there (with the exception of politically settled Bangladesh) religious politics and politically-motivated religiosity seem to be increasing, not decreasing. That part of the world (and even more so Indonesia to its east), of course, is generally inconvenient to narratives about Islam and politics, and so it tends to be ignored.

I was taking less about individual Muslims and more about the fact Salafi Jihadism is a thing.

What does Salafi jihadism have to do with any of this?

A somewhat more secular Muslim world would be less prone to this.

[StateBoiler]

Xi and the CCP don't argue that Chinese culture is incapable of democratization. They'd probably claim the PRC under their rule is already a form of non-electoral democracy, as the CCP supposedly closely monitors public opinion and takes that into account when making decisions. In their view, elections are one way to attain democracy but not the only way; what is important is that public opinion has weight in governance.

In most of the Arab world the issue is that the sociopolitical identity of the majority is based on Islam, so minorities and secular elites mobilise to block majoritarian rule that they fear would be illiberal.

There's arguably a similar dynamic in China, or at least was in late 2019. It has been argued that electoral democracy in China would just be the Maoist and national-liberal "wings" of the current CCP breaking off and forming their own parties, and Beijing pursuing a more militaristic foreign policy than present.

What would a democratic China look like?

The most potent forces in the public consciousness today are Maoism and Nationalism. The "mainstream" CCP today is a compromise between these two lines of thought, which has produced a capitalist middle ground that people "consent" to because it's working so far. A Chinese democracy would be the same thing, just polarized. There would be a Maoist Party, appealing to people who feel left behind in the New China, and a Nationalist Party, appealing to the elite, who would trade majorities with each other. They would broadly agree on a much more aggressive foreign policy than what the CCP, motivated mainly by economic interests, is pursuing now.

Because everyone with any kind of government experience is or was a CCP member, the parties would be led by largely the same people who are running the CCP today. Just, instead of using the "collective decision making process" I described in the section about CCP plasticity, they'd form 2 distinct factions - leftist and rightist - and fight their battles in public.

You can see that with Utah before it became a state. The party that ran Utah politics was a Mormon-based party that consistently ruled save for one brief period of time. When they became a state the party chose to disband and told its members to join either the Democrats or Republicans, whichever one they agreed with, thereby for the foreseeable future both parties in the state would be pro-positions of the forerunner Mormon party.

The CCP is maybe not possible of democratization, but I would argue most political parties even in democratic countries are hardly democratic because the concern of the party is not hearing all voices, it's to gain and hold power. The modern-day Democratic and Republican national conventions are very very far away from being democratic. Contrast to the Libertarian Party where they in contrast are very democratic, but that's sometimes detrimental to party goals and they are not near power. The RNC resolution on Cheney and Kinzinger: that's party democracy in action. Most public Republican politicians told the RNC to shutup. There's Villaraigosa ignoring Democrats at a national convention that seemed to be against a pro-Israel plank. He said the ayes have it when they clearly did not. (Neither main party would ever do it, but voice votes in national conventions should be banned.)

Canadian Liberals this week had a couple members come out saying the government positions on a couple things did not make sense and the government needs to explain and defend their position. The reaction was "wow, there's internal dissent to Trudeau". It's not like Canada is China where speak out against government you're locked in a jail and never heard from again. One minister said the "rebels" were entitled to their view, but it should have been handled in imternal party caucus. That is a Chinese Communist Party-level argument.