Notice of lawsuit

[Sam Spade]

You are free to argue amongst yourselves on the courtroom floor, but the court may or may not choose to pay attention to it.

The proper form of addressing the other person's argument is through a reply brief.

How would that be filed? I am unfamiliar with the exact structure.

Basically, it's a brief without a statement of facts that replies to the other side's argument by placing forth one's own.

Technically, the privilege of a reply brief in this situation should belong to the Plaintiff, but considering that you were not defense counsel (and I am presuming you are defense counsel) when you wrote the original brief, I am personally willing to be a bit flexible in this regard.

[Purple State]

You are free to argue amongst yourselves on the courtroom floor, but the court may or may not choose to pay attention to it.

The proper form of addressing the other person's argument is through a reply brief.

How would that be filed? I am unfamiliar with the exact structure.

Basically, it's a brief without a statement of facts that replies to the other side's argument by placing forth one's own.

Technically, the privilege of a reply brief in this situation should belong to the Plaintiff, but considering that you were not defense counsel (and I am presuming you are defense counsel) when you wrote the original brief, I am personally willing to be a bit flexible in this regard.

I was simply going to reply to the Plaintiff's reply (which I quoted in my reply post). My brief, which I ask the Court to accept as defense counsel's brief, is my general response to opposing counsel.

[Sam Spade]

PS, you can reply to Plaintiff all you want.  I'm not here to stop posting.

[Purple State]

As there does not appear to be additional replies by opposing counsel, the defense rests pending questions from the bench.

[Sam Spade]

ok, thanks.

I don't have any questions at this moment, but I have also been quite busy this weekend, so I haven't had a chance to do a major review of this case yet (can't speak for the others).

[Sam Spade]

I was wondering if both parties could address, in their own words, how the impact of this Court's decision in Jas v. InksLWC affects their arguments in this case and the conclusions they would draw therein.  Specifically, I wish to address this court's finding in Part II, Section B.

https://uselectionatlas.org/AFEWIKI/index.php/Jas_v._Inks.LWC

This question, I suspect, goes to petitioner's argument more than respondent's, so it is his answer I am greatly interested in.

[Purple State]

I was wondering if both parties could address, in their own words, how the impact of this Court's decision in Jas v. InksLWC affects their arguments in this case and the conclusions they would draw therein.  Specifically, I wish to address this court's finding in Part II, Section B.

Based on the findings of the Court in the case of Jas v. Inks.LWC, the defense believes that its case is only strengthened. The ruling indicates that those offices not explicitly created as "Principal Officers" of the President, such as the GM, do not fall under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution which places the power to appoint and dismiss such officers solely in the office of the President.

In fact, the ruling in this case states clearly that non-Cabinet positions, such as the Deputy SoFA, lay in the hands of the President unless there be a procedure mandated by statute. So long as we view the GM as a non-Cabinet position, as is clear by its absence in Article VIII, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, we must accept that it may be regulated by Senate legislation.

[Ebowed]

I would only note that the Senate may regulate the Deputy SoFA insofar as they are the ones responsible for its creation - whereas the GM has been an established part of the game long before the Senate has hoped to regulate it.  The decision states:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

If the Senate's power to assign duties to the Deputy SoFA comes from a clause referring to to executive department officers, of which the GM is not, I do not believe there is sufficient constitutional justification to allow the Senate to completely subvert standard protocols for removing appointed officers by creating its own method which bypasses both the input of the public and of the executive, which on its own has the power to unilaterally remove a GM from office.  The idea that the GM is the only position which can altered both by solely the President and solely the Senate is a curious one.

[Purple State]

Bump awaiting verdict or additional questions.

[Sam Spade]

We are working on an opinion, I can tell you that.

Problem is:  All court members are quite busy at this moment.

[Purple State]

We are working on an opinion, I can tell you that.

Problem is:  All court members are quite busy at this moment.

Understandable. Just making sure you didn't forget about us pleebs. I know how it can get with the lifetime appointments and all.

[bgwah]

*Cough*

[Sam Spade]

Opinion should be coming fairly shortly.  It's been a bad week, for this party in particular.

[Sam Spade]

Oyez Oyez

A decision has been reached.  Justice Sam Spade will deliver it from the bench.

[Sam Spade]

Justice Sam Spade delivers the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice Bullmoose88 joins.

Introduction
Today the Court addresses the legality of the Game Moderator Replacement Act under the Constitution of the Republic of Atlasia.  In short, we find this Act unconstitutional because the Senate has illegally granted itself the power to “remove” the Game Moderator, an officer of a “constitutionally created executive office.”

We think it appropriate to step back a moment and place this decision within past precedent, specifically Sam Spade v. Porce and Jas v. Inks.LWC.  In sum, we will address the creation of “executive offices” and “Executive Departments” and the creation of “officers” within said departments before making sense of the authority over “appointment and removal” of the Game Moderator

PART I
A.
At the outset, we think that our prior cases and the text of the Constitution have established, without doubt, that there are three categories of officers that may be properly labeled “executive officers” within the larger category of “government officials.”  The three categories of executive officers may be named: 1) “officers of the executive offices”; 2) “Principal Officers of the Executive Departments”; 3) “officers of the Executive Departments.” 

As such, the first question we must ask is:  Who may create executive offices and Executive Departments?  Article I, Section 5, Clause 28 clearly empowers the Senate to create “Executive Departments as it may deem necessary” but does not describe any Senatorial power to create offices outside or within the Executive Departments.  Thus, in Jas v. Inks.LWC, we found that the Senate has power to create offices within the Executive Departments under the “necessary and proper” clause of Article I, Section 5.

Today, we extend this power to “legislatively created” executive offices.  We believe that the Senate’s power to legislatively create executive offices arises implicitly through the “necessary and proper” language given the Senate in exercising its Article I, Section 5 powers.  In simple terms, when the Senate legislates under its Article I, Section 5 powers, it possesses the implicit power to create offices, specifically executive offices, to carry out the legislation enacted.  While we acknowledge that the Senate could also create “legislative offices” or “judicial offices” to carry out its Article I, Section 5 powers, the strong limitations of such offices means that such opportunities shall undoubtedly be rare and shall need explicit authorization.

Two important issues must be addressed concerning the Senate’s “office creation” abilities.  First, we note that in many situations the Senate is unclear in its legislation as to what types of offices are being created.  We addressed an earlier form of this question in Jas v. Inks.LWC and now expand on our rule today:

For the Senate to create an Executive Department under Article I, Section 5, Clause 28, it must unequivocally state in the plain text of the statute that an “[E]xecutive Department is hereby established…” (the words of the Cabinet Restructuring Act) or words of similar import.  If the required language is not present, we will presume that the Senate has either legislatively created an “executive office” or another office within an established Executive Department.  The creation of other offices within an established Executive Department may be indicated through the plain text of the statute (as with the Executive Department requirement above) but, at minimum, requires Senatorial intent (see Jas v. Inks.LWC).  Senatorial intent shall be evaluated through court interpretation of the language of the statute, as well as all other relevant facts and circumstances.  These same rules also apply for elimination of legislatively created executive offices, Executive Departments and other offices within the Executive Departments, powers that clearly lie with the Senate.

The second issue follows from the first.  In many situations, the Senate does not create an office to, or does not specify which already existing office shall carry out legislation pursuant to its Article I, Section 5 powers.  In the absence of this clarity, the sole responsibility of determining which offices shall implement the objectives of legislation falls to the executive, who may separately create executive offices via executive order to realize these unspecified statutory mandates.  The executive may also assign these powers to the Executive Departments or offices within the Executive Departments via executive order if he chooses but, in the face of statutory silence, the option of creating separate executive offices is always an option.  Naturally, the Senate clearly possesses the capability to change the executive’s implementation of the statutory directive by statute, but the Senate must do so expressly

We spend time laying out these basic principles in order to give a framework whereby we can analyze the fit of the Game Moderator within the gamut of executive officers.  It is without great fanfare that we note the position of Game Moderator occupies a peculiar place in Atlasia as an officer without an office.  The Game Moderator is mentioned once in Article I, Section 8, Clause 2 without reference to status and the court in Sam Spade v. Porce found that the power to appoint the Game Moderator vested solely in the President.  We believe that this acknowledged executive power to appoint necessarily means that the Game Moderator functions as an executive office.  Neither the text of the GM Act or the Game Moderator Replacement Act changes this result.

But the creation of the Game Moderator, unlike our earlier mentioned executive offices, did not occur from the Senate.  Rather, its beginnings come from the Constitution itself, namely Article I, Section 8, Clause 2.  Undoubtedly there are situations where the Senate may pass legislation under its Article I, Section 5 powers and delegate responsibility to the Game Moderator, but the Senate’s ability to alter or eliminate the Game Moderator does not extend further, unlike executive offices created by the legislature or executive branch. 

The lone exception to this rule is that the Senate may transform the Game Moderator into an Executive Department with the Game Moderator as its Principal Officer through Article I, Section 5, Clause 28.  Applying the rule above, which requires express creation of Executive Departments, we find that the Senate has not specifically availed itself of this method in this case through the GM Act or the Game Moderator Replacement Act.

Therefore, we hold that the Game Moderator is a “constitutionally created executive office” and as such, the Senate does not have power to eliminate the Game Moderator or transform it into another executive office, save by changing the Constitution itself or by utilizing Article I, Section 5, Clause 28.

[Sam Spade]

B.
Although not particularly germane to our ruling today, for the sake of completeness, we will also address the power to create officers within executive offices and the Executive Departments.  This court believes that, although our holding on the merits is quite narrow, as shall be seen shortly, the rationalization to reach this holding is fairly complex and requires the creation of a few bright-line rules that will also help future legislators and Presidents in the legislative process.  Therefore, our second question must be: Who may create officer positions within executive offices and the Executive Departments, including Principal Officer positions

As noted earlier, since the Senate has power to create or eliminate legislatively created executive offices, Executive Departments and offices within Executive Departments, it follows that the Senate has authority to create or eliminate “officers” within executive offices, Executive Departments and offices within Executive Departments, as well as the Principal Officers with the Executive Departments through Article I, Section 5, Clause 28 and the “necessary and proper” clause of Article I, Section 5.

Furthermore, the Senate’s “officer creation” powers run alongside its “office creation” powers, so where the Senate is unclear in its legislation as to what types of officers are being created, the following bright-line rule applies.

For the Senate to create a Principal Officer position within an Executive Department under Article I, Section 5, Clause 28, it must unequivocally state in the plain text of the statute that the “Principal Officer of the Executive Departments shall be secretaries” (the words of the Cabinet Restructuring Act) or words of similar import.  If the required language is not present, we will inquire as to whether the Senate has created a) an officer position within a pre-existing or legislatively created new executive office, b) an officer position within a pre-existing or newly created Executive Department, or c) an officerposition within a pre-existing or legislatively created new office within an Executive Department.  The placement of these officer positions may be indicated through the plain text of the statute (as with the Principal Officer requirement above) but, at minimum, requires Senatorial intent (see Jas v. Inks.LWC).  Senatorial intent shall be evaluated through court interpretation of the language of the statute, as well as all other relevant facts and circumstances.  These same rules also apply for elimination of officer positions within the offices provided above.  Finally, if no Senatorial intent is present in the designation of the officer positions, as a residual category, we shall presume that the officer position created is within a separate legislatively created executive office.

We note once more that the Game Moderator officer position arises from the Constitution, along with the Game Moderator office, as a “constitutionally created executive office”.  Therefore, the Senate lacks the ability to alter or eliminate the Game Moderator office position except if the Senate transforms the Game Moderator into an Executive Department with the Game Moderator as its Principal Officer through Article I, Section 5, Clause 28.  This has not been done.  Accordingly, we hold that the Game Moderator is an “constitutionally created officer” within the “constitutionally created executive office” of Game Moderator and as such, the Senate does not have the capability to eliminate or transform the Game Moderator officer position, unless Article I, Section 5, Clause 28 is utilized or the Constitution is changed.

PART II
Having addressed the rules concerning creation of “executive offices”, “Executive Departments”, officers and Principal Officers alike, we now turn to the subject of the litigation, namely the removal authority given to the Senate through the Game Moderator Replacement Act. 

As mentioned earlier, the Game Moderator is the officer of a constitutionally created executive office.  Earlier we found that since the Senate did not create the Game Moderator through its Article I, Section 5 powers, the Senate therefore lacks the ability to eliminate or transform this executive office, except by valid Constitutional changes or through transformation to an Executive Department under Article I, Section 5, Clause 28.  Accordingly, we now hold that, unless the Constitution itself is altered or Article I, Section 5, Clause 28 is utilized, the Senate lacks power under Article I, Section 5 to alter the appointment and removal of the Game Moderator given to the President.

Although the issue of appointment is not presently before us, we noted earlier that the court in Sam Spade v. Porce found that the power to appoint the Game Moderator vested solely in the President.  Furthermore, we noted that since the creation of the Game Moderator, as well as its appointment authority, are found in the Constitution, the Game Moderator is the officer of a constitutionally created executive office.  Therefore, unless the Senate has power to alter this appointment scheme in its Article I, Section 5 powers, any such legislation purporting to alter the appointment power is illegal.  Since we are not adjudged with such a task, we do not reach its implications at this time, although we note that our answer on the “removal” question probably gives the answer away.

Consequently, we must now address removal of the Game Moderator.  It follows that if the power to appoint the Game Moderator vests solely in the President, then the removal of the Game Moderator also belongs solely to the President.  Without delving into the details of the Act, the Game Moderator Replacement Act essentially curtails this executive prerogative by giving the Senate the authority to remove the Game Moderator for grave inactivity.  The Act also prescribes certain procedures for exercise of the removal, which has already been performed by the Senate during the pendency of this case. 

In its brief, Respondent fails to provide any basis for the Senate to legislate removal of the Game Moderator and this court’s similar inquiries into the text of Article I, Section 5 produce no grounds for the Senate to validly exercise this power.  Therefore, we hold that, save for grounds provided in the Constitution for legislative removal of executive officers, specifically impeachment, the Senate may not remove the Game Moderator by statute. 

We limit this holding specifically to the Game Moderator.  Furthermore, we limit the bright-line rule concerning whether the Senate has capacity to legislate removal of executive offices provided in Part II to “constitutionally created executive offices” only.  We do not address the removal of legislatively created executive offices at this time.

We note, in passing, that the Senate’s power to change the removal authority of the Game Moderator outside of impeachment is far broader than it may appear on first glance.  As noted earlier, the Senate may, through Article I, Section 5, Clause 28, validly transform the Game Moderator into an Executive Department and the Game Moderator officer into a Principal Officer.  Additionally, the Senate may choose to amend the removal powers of the President over the Game Moderator in the Constitution itself.  Lastly, the Senate may remove the Game Moderator from the Constitution altogether, allowing itself the power to recreate the office by statute.  There may be other valid options not examined by this court.

However, the present option chosen by the Senate is not among these valid options.  Therefore, we find the Game Moderator Replacement Act unconstitutional as an illegal grant of power to the Senate to “remove” the Game Moderator, an officer of a “constitutionally created executive office.”  Any present attempts, as well as any future acts by the Senate to remove the Game Moderator based on the validity of this legislation are hereby deemed invalid.

So ordered.

[Ebowed]

I thank the Court for their time.

[opebo]

I concur.