Programmer testifies that he wrote election fraud software for FL Republican

[TheresNoMoney]

A computer programmer named Clinton Eugene Curtis testified under oath before the U.S. House Judiciary Members in Ohio (back in 2004) that he had written software in 2000 that could defraud election results in favor of Republican congressman Tom Feeney.

Yep, this came to light two years ago and everyone ignored it.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

Electronic machines are the only kind of machine that I trust.

Why do people trust paper more than a computer?  There have been thousands of cases of fraud with paper ballots.  At least with an electronic voting machine I know that I wont be discrminated against because of my skin color or party affiliation.

If an electronic machine is trustworthy enough to handle my money, its more than good enough to handle my vote.

And yet, ATM machines are able to print reciepts if you want them - along with confirmation numbers which you can use to verify your transaction should there be a dispute.

...so that someone can stuff extra receipts in the box in order to cause an election dispute.

You can't copy things like those very easily. Plus with my verification code idea, we'll have evidence the receipts are not valid.

I say screw electronic voting altogether though, go with the optical scan system like we use. It still allows machines to count them yet has much more safeguards, plus the machines that count optical scan sheets can't really be hacked.

[jerusalemcar5]

End the annoying secret ballot.  Vote, sign your name certifying it was you.  Then it is easy to check over to prevent fraud.

[minionofmidas]

I trust electronic voting more than I trust paper or punch card ballots. 

Why?  I can figure out how to fix those (we actually discussed this in a poli sci course).  I can't figure out how to fix election software.

That said, there are people out there that can.  This might make elections more secure, but not secure.

Actually, this makes elections less secure by making fraud harder to prove.

[YRABNNRM]

No(R)

[WMS]

Perhaps the results might be different if the chairman of Diebold had been an outspoken supporter of the Democratic party instead of the GOP, and the guy in the first post had testified that he wrote software that would favor a Democrat instead of a Republican.

Yes, then the results for the D's and R's would flip.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Yes, then the results for the D's and R's would flip.

[Joe Republic]

That was already my point.

[J. J.]

I trust electronic voting more than I trust paper or punch card ballots. 

Why?  I can figure out how to fix those (we actually discussed this in a poli sci course).  I can't figure out how to fix election software.

That said, there are people out there that can.  This might make elections more secure, but not secure.

Actually, this makes elections less secure by making fraud harder to prove.

Actually, in some of the punch card/paper ballot frauds, there is no paper trail either. 

This type of voting might be developed to make things more secure.

[J. J.]

No.  I've worked in the computer security field long enough to know that once you have physical access to a machine, it's endgame.

Besides, if a vulnerability is found in a printing/ballot system that would allow them to be easily copied/replaced/changed, it's a lot easier to replace than recalling all the voting machines and replacing them with newer, expensive electronics.

I'm astounded that the Republican vote is so heavily trusting.

I'm not one of the heavily trusting.  The types of fraud that I'm thinking of in traditional ballots couldn't be traced.  I just think there will be some way of coming up with a safe method.

[J. J.]

No.  I've worked in the computer security field long enough to know that once you have physical access to a machine, it's endgame.

Besides, if a vulnerability is found in a printing/ballot system that would allow them to be easily copied/replaced/changed, it's a lot easier to replace than recalling all the voting machines and replacing them with newer, expensive electronics.

I'm astounded that the Republican vote is so heavily trusting.

I'm not one of the heavily trusting.  The types of fraud that I'm thinking of in traditional ballots couldn't be traced.  I just think there will be some way of coming up with a safe method.

It's probably even harder to trade electronic fraud.

It might not be.

1.  The number of persons who have the technical skills is limited, compared to a paper ballot.

2.  It might be possible to establish safeguards.  One way might be to give every voter not only a paper receipt, but a PIN in which they can check their vote.

[J. J.]

A PIN number would require that votes no longer be private, no?  And, besides, even if people could check their votes, that wouldn't prevent fraud, just make it clear when it happened.

No, if I had a question, I could punch in my PIN.  I don't have to give anyone my PIN.

Further, suffing a ballot box with additional paper ballots wouldn't stop the fraud, but a count would show up.

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It's going to one group an most of the polling places in the US.