How do Democrats make sense of this counter-narrative '16 exit polling?

[Blue3]

Counter-narrative results, according to NYT's exit polling:
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html
 
1. Trump lost the working class
(Hillary won the middle class, working class, and poor... Trump won those making more money)
 
2. Minorities stayed home or were open-minded to Trump
(more Hispanics and African-Americans voted for Trump than thought, or stayed home)
 
3. Trump won the college-educated white vote
 
4. Hillary won millennials
 
5. Trump lost moderates
(Hillary won liberals and moderates, Trump only won conservatives)
 
6. Trump won Catholics and Evangelicals
(Hillary won every other religious identity)
 
7. Hillary won those who said the economy is the most important issue
 
8. More Democrats than Republicans said they supported their candidate
 
9. Hillary won those who said a caring president is important
 
10. Hillary won those who said having good judgment is important
 
11. Hillary is also winning the overall popular vote
 
 
The white working class is definitely part of the story, and they need more empathy and better understanding... but they are not all of the story.

How do we make sense of all of this? A lot of it is going against the emerging narrative.

[Mr. Smith]

2 and 3 are the only keys that threw it. Change those and everything would've worked by the old objectives.

[Person Man]

2 and 3 are the only keys that threw it. Change those and everything would've worked by the old objectives.

This is definitely a weird place to be. But we really should go with the path that is the best for the future.

[Stranger in a strange land]

A few things:

1) There definitely was a sub-set of the working class that swung hard towards Trump, even if he didn't win them outright, and it made a big difference in key states.
2) Democrats can't count on Obama-level turnout or margins with minority voters in the future, so future appeals will have to be class-based rather than race or gender-based. On a related note, waiting for the country to be majority-minority isn't a viable strategy.
2b) Latinos are never going to vote like Blacks, and we shouldn't expect them to.
3) This means that at the end of the day, the majority of college whites are going to stick with the GOP no matter what, so appeals need to be directed towards working class whites, who are far more numerous, and at least in the North, are still receptive to Democratic messaging on economics. This is why we need to push Left on economics while de-emphasizing social issues.

[7,052,770]

Wait, Trump won Catholics? That's incomprehensible.

[Chunk Yogurt for President!]

The only reason Trump did so well with Evangelicals is because of the religious liberty issue.  Most Evangelicals hated him.

[Stranger in a strange land]

The only reason Trump did so well with Evangelicals is because of the religious liberty issue.  Most Evangelicals hated him.

That and Mike Pence.

[Wiz in Wis]

Wait, Trump won Catholics? That's incomprehensible.

Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin... yeah, that makes sense.

[Blue3]

How do we make sense of #5, #7, #8 ??

(That seems independent of the "Democrats need more turnout and higher percentage of young, WWC, & minority voters)

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

How do we make sense of #5, #7, #8 ??

(That seems independent of the "Democrats need more turnout and higher percentage of young, WWC, & minority voters)

5. Doesn't the Democrat always win moderates? You might be mistaking them for independents.
7. That said it was the most important issue. Lots of other people would say it's still important. That may have more to do with the other issue they chose then how they feel about the economy.
8. Trump managed to get win by getting more people who weren't part of his original base.

[Beet]

An 11 point counter narrative is too confusing. This isn't going to go against the emerging consensus narrative. I see some interesting points in the above, but nothing as strongly convincing as a complete story, than the consensus narrative.

[Blue3]

An 11 point counter narrative is too confusing. This isn't going to go against the emerging consensus narrative. I see some interesting points in the above, but nothing as strongly convincing as a complete story, than the consensus narrative.

This isn't an 11 point counter-narrative.

These are 11 points that didn't seem to fit in with the developing narrative.

There's a big difference between the two.

[Beet]

An 11 point counter narrative is too confusing. This isn't going to go against the emerging consensus narrative. I see some interesting points in the above, but nothing as strongly convincing as a complete story, than the consensus narrative.

This isn't an 11 point counter-narrative.

These are 11 points that didn't seem to fit in with the developing narrative.

There's a big difference between the two.

Psychologically, people need a coherent and convincing story to explain the big surprise on Tuesday night (e.g., the pro-Trump overperformance, especially in the Midwest). 11 points that "didn't seem to fit" aren't going to break through unless they offer a compelling alternative story for people to latch onto.

Especially when many of these points do fit the narrative. For instance, pointing out that Hillary won the working class is uninteresting when Democrats always win the working class, Hillary won it by a smaller margin than usual, due to her clobbering among the white working class, by margins which are unusual for a Democrat.

[Blue3]

An 11 point counter narrative is too confusing. This isn't going to go against the emerging consensus narrative. I see some interesting points in the above, but nothing as strongly convincing as a complete story, than the consensus narrative.

This isn't an 11 point counter-narrative.

These are 11 points that didn't seem to fit in with the developing narrative.

There's a big difference between the two.

Psychologically, people need a coherent and convincing story to explain the big surprise on Tuesday night (e.g., the pro-Trump overperformance, especially in the Midwest). 11 points that "didn't seem to fit" aren't going to break through unless they offer a compelling alternative story for people to latch onto.

Especially when many of these points do fit the narrative. For instance, pointing out that Hillary won the working class is uninteresting when Democrats always win the working class, Hillary won it by a smaller margin than usual, due to her clobbering among the white working class, by margins which are unusual for a Democrat.

Yes I see that now, but what about the other points?

I'm not looking for a counter-narrative. I'm looking to understand these points.

[Blue3]

Any other takers?

[hueylong]

As far as religion goes, Trump won among evangelicals who don't attend church with regularity. He lost among voters who actually attend church services on a weekly basis--they broke, especially early on, for Cruz and other candidates.

[Rookie Yinzer]

Trump losing the working class vote is not counter narrative. Black and brown people are working class too.  Those groups clearly voted for HRC and were enough to help her win that demographic as a whole.

[°Leprechaun]

Number 11 is irrelevant.

What matters is why did Clinton lose the three states in her "firewall".
She lost in WI and MI because she didn't think she would, so she didn't focus
on them enough. Why did she lose PA? It might be partly because she needed
the more rural areas. I know that she spent a lot on tv ads in Philly, and won
most of the Philly burb vote as well. FL was another crucial state, as well.
So why she lost certain states is the crucial question.
Texas, ironically, was the only tipping point state, but that is a moot point.
Obviously a key problem was overconfidence. If people had thought Trump might win,
more people would have voted, more than likely.

The remaining and most important point, is will people wake up in 2020 and realize that
Trump might win.

[RINO Tom]

As for the first point and the one about White college grads, it's an interesting dynamic now.  There is a minority in both the GOP ("Trumpists") and the Democratic Party ("Clintonistas") that have a vested interest in the narrative that we had some type of huge realignment and that Democrats will slowly drift toward becoming this Rockefeller Republican-type party and the GOP will slowly start to resemble a party based off of the Dixiecrats, as it plays perfectly into how they like to portray their political enemies.  Unfortunately for both and fortunately for most, they're outnumbered in their party (a huge majority of "Trump voters" would gladly jump in line for Mitt Romney 2.0 to stop a Democrat and a huge majority of Democrats would gladly support a Sanders/Warren type), and they're wrong in the first place.

[Technocracy Timmy]

As for the first point and the one about White college grads, it's an interesting dynamic now.  There is a minority in both the GOP ("Trumpists") and the Democratic Party ("Clintonistas") that have a vested interest in the narrative that we had some type of huge realignment and that Democrats will slowly drift toward becoming this Rockefeller Republican-type party and the GOP will slowly start to resemble a party based off of the Dixiecrats, as it plays perfectly into how they like to portray their political enemies.  Unfortunately for both and fortunately for most, they're outnumbered in their party (a huge majority of "Trump voters" would gladly jump in line for Mitt Romney 2.0 to stop a Democrat and a huge majority of Democrats would gladly support a Sanders/Warren type), and they're wrong in the first place.

"Trump voters" or worse yet "Trump supporters" completely undercuts the fact that most of these people weren't voting for Trump, but were voting for the Republican nominee. The overwhelming majority of these voters casted a ballot for Mitt Romney just 4 years ago.