Israel General Discussion: Dawn of the Post-Netanyahu Era (user search)

Interesting:

Miri Regev in an interview says that the next Likud leader should be a Sephardi male\female (i.e., her) and if not than a new "Sephardi Likud" should form.

Interesting as it is pretty much what I anticipated for the second realignment we are saying and the third Israeli Party system. (that I think I published here a year ago?)

I don't think I've read it, and I'd be fascinated to. My impression was that the salience of the Ashkenazi/Sephardi split was generally declining over time, with a very large proportion of people now having ancestry from both groups, but it sounds like you don't think this is the case. (And obviously the premier Revisionist party having always had an Ashkenazi leader, but a primarily Sephardic electorate, isn't a state of affairs that can continue forever).

My vague impression is that the first Israeli party system (1948-1977) constituted the dominance of the forces that had won Israel's independence, and the second (1977-arguably 2005, definitely done by 2019) was polarized on issues of relations with the Palestinians. The third (maybe 2019-??) seems primarily polarized on religion-and-state issues, particularly the relationship of the Haredim with the rest of society.

I'd be interested in hearing your take. It distinctly seems to me like Tkuma and Likud are more Sephardic than Yamina and Tikva Chadasha, which are more Ashkenazic, but this is a vague impression more than anything else.

I'll have to breakdown my reply here:

1. There was a general feeling that the Ashkenazi\Sephardi was withering away in the past two decades. But the last 3 years taught us that is not the case. It was impossible to mistake the very strong Sephardi character of the pro-Bibi camp of Likud and Shas, as opposed to the very Ashkenazi nature of the current coalition.
To be more precise, there's a split between the Sephardi themselves. It seems those living in the periphery towns are staunch Bibists. While those closer to the economic singularity of Tel Aviv aren't. What made the difference in round II 2019, and 2021 was Gantz and then Sa'ar doing relatively well with the Sephardi middle class and upper class of Rishon and the "College Belt" south of Tel Aviv. While the periphery radicalized to the populist right.

The mixed heritage story turned out to be a myth with new census data showing the number of mixed people is substantially lower than thought, they are simply more concentrated in the big cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa, Ramat Gan, etc. But the periphery remained Sephardi through and through

It's not though, as a foreigner might believe, purely an economic conflict. It's now more of a culture war leading to para. 2 here

2. I identified the first political system as molded according to the structure of pre-independence Israel. The Socialist Zionist movement, the revisionist, the religious, and the general zionists. Starting from the 60's all four movements experienced change:
The Socialist Zionist movement unified into one party de facto with the Alignment.
The Revisionists morphed from being a party of intellectuals and liberals to a more populist party with Sephardi nature.
The general zionist movement evaporated. some of it became a core element of the new Likud, the other section joined Labour and the parties to its left. It's quite shocking how such a strong movement coming up to the '50s left not distinct traces in Israeli politics and culture.
The religious movement which was uniform in 48, split between the national religious and the Haredi elements going into the '60s

1973 war happened, a new middle class was forming, and then 77 happened. After a decade of an intense culture war in the '80s, our second political system was cast in 1992 election on the lines of attitudes to the Palestinian issue. Meretz was an unthinkable alliance in the '70s but was natural for 92. MAFDAL moving to the solid right only made sense. and the Haredi became kingmakers without solid identification.

But as the '60s had the origins of 77 within them, the second system had the origins of 2019 in them. Following the second Intifada, the undercurrents of Jewish nationalism and populism that always haunted the Sephardi population became increasingly dominant. with no real Palestinian issue on the agenda and general uniformity between the left and the right on the issue the focal point of the political system moved elsewhere.
The Religious Zionist elite which had more in common sociologically with Meretz than Liikud was starting to show disdain to that alliance, while on the sidelines the new Haredi Nationalists became antithetic to the liberal state.
The Haredi parties found themselves with all the old great rabbis dead and a Haredi public which identified with the right completely and wouldn't agree to sit with the secular left.
And so many more phenomena.

This leads us to the third political system being born right now. The left-right divide is on the fabric of the state.
Likud, the Haredi parties, and the Haredi nationalists (Smotric and Ben Gvir) became unified with their hate for the liberal democracy. They simply despise the state and are looking for a Jewish ethnostate with no secular supreme courts and nonsense. Jewish identity is the issue.
On the other hand, the coalition parties although with differences generally want to defer to the liberal democratic model and the rule of law.
And this divide is very distinctively Ashkenazi-Sephardi (with minor exceptions to each)

As every party system had to create new parties I believe we will see a second realignment very soon

Where do Sa'ar and Lieberman come into this?

Also, is there much of a difference in the Yamina and RZP voter bases ethnically and socioeconomically other than the obvious stuff?

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