Computer89 v. The Atlasian Senate

[Lumine]

I understand that, for various reasons, no one has been able to take up representation on behalf of the Senate. As I also understand it, said reasons have been reasonable and/or personal, but I nonetheless express an apology to the Court for any inconveniences and to remove any impression of disrespect or disregard for the case.

As a current - if not for long - Senator, and if it pleases the Court, I am willing to make an attempt to post a brief. I must note, however, that I am not trained at law (historian by profession in RL), which poses an intellectual challenge. Without wanting to overextend matters and in due deference to the need for a verdict, I humbly ask the Court for a final 24 hour extension - starting on midnight today - to give me sufficient time to prepare something.

If this is judged inadvisable, I nonetheless thank the Court for its time.

[Lumine]

I thank the Court for its understanding, and am writing now in order to meet the deadline.

[Lumine]

1.- INTRODUCTION

In order to appropriately consider the impact of this case and its implications, we must not make the mistake to restrict ourselves to a war of semantics about the literal meaning of a single expression. We must consider the context in which the Senate of the Republic of Atlasia made a decision and the justifications and believes that it had in doing so. It is then that we will get a clearer understanding of this case, which is far removed from mere procedural quibbles while having more to do with a specific tactical approach to the ordeal our Republic – and the rule of law itself - has faced over the past few weeks and months.

2.- THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

On May 16th, 2023, Articles of Impeachment against Old School Republican (hereafter OSR) were introduced before the Senate.

These were introduced by members of the Senate in order to uphold the Union, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, taking action against an officer of the government who had willingly and voluntarily placed himself outside of those boundaries through overt endorsement, support and aid to violent and unlawful secession. An officer which, in effect, had committed treason and disgraced the dignity of his august office only shortly before.

Said impeachment trial did not emerge out of nowhere, a made up invention for the purposes of the abuses of power that some actors would prefer to attribute to the Senate. It was, from its very beginning, deeply rooted in the Fifth Constitution of the Republic of Atlasia, following three simple but key precepts:

-The Senate has the power to discipline its members. (Art. III, Section 1.6)

-The Senate has the sole Power to adopt and try Articles of Impeachment. (Art. III, Section 1.7)

-Officers (noted as “civil officers”) of the government – among others – can be removed from office via impeachment in case of certain high crimes and misdemeanors. (Art. IV, Section 4)

Precepts two and three are further clarified earlier in our Constitutional text, for the Senate has the power to impeach the officers of this government (Art. III, Section 3).

The Senator was impeached, then tried and convicted in a period of three weeks. At all points, all regulations regarding impeachment outlined in our Constitution were followed. The charges were debated, and the Senators reached a clear cut conclusion: Senator OSR had committed high crimes and misdemeanors, understood to be treason through his overt endorsement of violent and unlawful secession. Therefore, the Senate, backed up by several articles of the Constitution, had to do its duty and remove this officer from the responsibilities he had willingly abandoned.

3.- THE CHARGES

The opposing counsel who has decided to take legal action to reverse this measure, stands before us with a fascinating interpretation of the Constitution. He also stands indicted of several charges related to the actions taken by the impeached Senator, including Refutation of Federal Supremacy in Law, Secession, Aiding a Rebellion, and Obstruction of Justice.

Justices, I do not point this out to invoke prejudices against the opposing counsel, a talented and eloquent voice in defense of OSR. But I do point them out in the context of the impeachment trial that took place in the first place, a necessary action at one of the darkest moments of the history of our nation.

The opposing counsel has every legal right to challenge the Senate’s actions. But we would be remiss not to mention that this case is not born out of a genuine alternative interpretation of the Constitution. It is there to halt the work of Senate when trying to take legal and constitutional action to defend the rule of law. And it is there to derail the response of the Government and its officers when crimes are being committed, responsibility must be determined, and consequences as stated by the Constitution put in place.

The main charge laid upon by opposing counsel is that impeachment as enacted by the Senate against Senator OSR is unconstitutional, because the Senate has no impeachment power over its members.
This interpretation, when we get to the real semantic point of the matter, rests on the opposing counsel’s own interpretation of what an officer of the government, in this case a “civil officer”, means. It attempts to make different classifications of officers by citing various constitutional provisions, in the hopes of proving that different groupings of specific offices are to be read as a restrictive understanding of what a civil officer means. If the Constitution mentions in otherwise unrelated passages these specific executive and/or judicial officers, then it means it only considers them as civil officers, even though said term is not used in those articles.

Following on a similar procedural behavior unsuccessfully employed before this court before, it rests much of its case on interpretations or understandings based on the Constitution of the United States of America, a currently defunct text. I think we can say with confidence that, much as there are undeniable influences, constitutional tradition in Atlasia has sufficiently evolved over twenty years of existence so as to not instantly bind us upon invoking those interpretations as valid precedents.

The case for the Senate, expertly and ably defended by several citizens of good standing – who have done a far better job than I could possibly hope for – has been clear enough.

The impeachment of OSR had solid foundation on several Articles of the Constitution, was conducted lawfully in accordance to the Constitution, was justified on account of the charges laid before the Senator, and it was necessary and urgent on account of the ongoing crisis as a result of the actions of a secessionist group.

The Senate has the authority to discipline its members. It did so, by using a constitutional mechanism which is entirely compatible with said authority.

The Senate has the authority to impeach officers of the government, of which we firmly believe Senator OSR constitutes one of them. Again, the Senate did so.

I do not wish to test this honorable Court’s patience by dwelling on the matter of oversight. Rather, and with the kind forgiveness of those who have pressed that point with skills, I would like to emphasize the reasons why the inherent flaw that opposing counsel wishes to identify is not there, nor is there such a flaw to warrant the reversal of a necessary and lawful measure as unconstitutional. Procedure was flawed, with proper invocation of the specific articles of the Constitution that sustained them.

Even if the arguments being put forward were in good faith, rather than rooted in obstructionism disguised via a discussion on semantics focused on a single expression, they would still rest on a vague interpretation of the Constitution that rests solely on suppositions. The case that the Senate is making rests and sustains itself on the next, and not its spurious interpretation for ulterior motives.

Impeachment of a Senator, unlike what is suggested – or stated – by opposing counsel, does not make expulsion of a Senator redundant. They may bring similar thresholds, but not similar penalties. I think we can reasonably agree that in the middle of a secession crisis – which is not yet fully solved – choosing one’s mechanisms carefully for the sake of upholding the Constitution and the rule of law is important. And impeachment is indeed appropriate for a Senator nakedly and willfully endorsing treason.

4.- CONCLUSION

Distinguished Justices, I cannot claim ignorance of judicial procedure as a suitable justification for any shortcomings my arguments may have. But even in said ignorance, I see a clear-cut dilemma facing us. Do we allow for the derailment of Senate proceedings in a matter of grave urgency out of an interpretation of the Constitution tailored to suit officers of the government endorsing treason against it? Do we allow said interpretation to directly affect a key institution of our Republic, rendering it less capable of defending itself and the Constitution against said acts of treason? Do we deny the Senate a right based on the Constitution to discipline its members and take action against officers who engage in high crimes or misdemeanors?

Such notions are what’s at stake should the opposing counsel’s interpretations be followed.

The Supreme Court is and must be an impartial actor. Perhaps in defiance of that, the position that opposing counsel upholds seeks to assign a mission to the Court, hoping to enforce an arbitrary interpretation to obstruct and derail perfectly constitutional procedures. I humbly beg the Court not to allow that interpretation, based on the interpretation of yet another document, to do so.

As a final word, I wish to extend my apologies once again for the delay in the presentation of a brief on behalf of the Senate, and thank the Justices for their patience.  

[Lumine]

Same question for you, Lumine, if you please:

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

Apologies for the delay!

I think it could, yes, and the opposing counsel seems to agree with that assessment, although our interpretation diverges on whether the Senate has impeachment power over its own members. Since we maintain that it does, and on account of the urgency of the crisis, we believed - and still do so - that the mechanisms adopted were consistent with the concept of adopting rules to both expel AND discipline a member.

That we did not mean impeachment as a simple expulsion can be drawn from the stance we've defended and the actions that we took, which is where we have yet another point of divergence.

As the new constitutional President of the Senate, I do think there are grounds to update the rules to further clarify proceedings and prevent any sort of future ambiguity being claimed to justify a court case, in the understanding that we maintain that the Senate had the constitutional power to do what it did in the first case.

[Lumine]

     To the respondent, what are your thoughts on the mootness question? I recognize that you did not raise that issue, but the original amicus brief that did raise it came after your response, so I am curious if you would like to comment on it.

At the risk of disagreeing with a citizen who took it upon himself to try and help with this case (for which I'm immensely grateful, and I think it's a sign of civic virture), and though I think he has a point in that any resolution to this case will not have practical effects in terms of the Senate term that ended a week ago, I think there's merit to be had in resolving this dispute to clear up any possible ambiguity.

I, for one, have no objections to this Court issuing a ruling from which we as legislators - or myself as President of the Senate - can either react to, or consider as a meaningful precedent.

[Lumine]

Although the ruling has favored the opposite side, I nonetheless thank the Court for its hard work and for providing clarification on an important constitutional point. I also greatly appreciate the willingness to put up with my improvised remarks on behalf of the Senate.

My congratulations also on the petitioner and his counsel for putting up a dedicated and successful effort. It is my personal hope that, one day, we will reach a different state of affairs conductive to reconciliation and, I hope, the preservation of our Union.