CO teen pregancy and abortion rate down 50%... Republicans upset

[TJ in Oregon]

Okay, a few points here.

First, as realisticidealist pointed out, contraception (in general) is distinct from abortion in that abortion is murder while contraception is merely a grave sexual sin (ie. not murder):

Contraception isn't generally denounced by the Catholic Church because of anything to do with abortion directly (unless we're talking abortifacients). Contraception use (with the intent to contracept) is a mortal sin because it artificially severs the two mutual purposes of sex as designed by God, the unitive and the procreative. It has nothing to do with killing a life as abortion or abortifacients do. There is no individual life prior to conception.

The more common explanation of why artificial contraception is forbidden in Catholicism is teleological (ie. a purpose or directedness of sexuality) rather than proximate causality (the cause of harm done to others). It has been argued by some historically that contraception is a sin against a prospective person by preventing them from coming into existence (see St. John Chrysostom), but that argument is dubious within the bounds of Catholicism let alone outside of it.

As far as I know--and I'd love it if TJ or one of our other Catholics in good standing could either back me up or correct me on this, since I'm speaking as somebody who's doing intensive but somewhat haphazard research in preparation for potentially starting RCIA--this is basically correct but isn't taken so far as to claim that contraception is morally tantamount to abortion.

This has mostly been answered by now, but I would like to point out one more distinction: the difference between contraception is a distinction of kind rather than a distinction of extent. There is not a continuum between the two but a discrete difference between preventing fertilization and preventing an embryo from implanting/continuing growth after fertilization. Both abortion and contraception lead to a similar outcome (the child is not brought to term) but both operate by different means.

I read recently (I wish I could remember where) in the context of a discussion of premarital sex that contraception doesn't actually further aggravate that particular sin unless it involves intent to abort in the event that the contraception fails. This strikes me as unpleasantly casuistic but it doesn't seem like the sort of conclusion the Church would come to if the teaching was that prophylactic contraception and abortion were actually morally equivalent.

I would be curious to see the source on this one if you ever find it. To my knowledge the argument you describe here is not the formal position of the Church in any meaningful sense, and appears to me anyway to be a fairly dubious conclusion. It seems like 70s Jesuit casuistry to me also

However, Pope Benedict did argue (he did not infallibly declare it to my knowledge, but his mere statement of a clear position is highly significant) that there are circumstances, such as when one partner has AIDS, where using a condom does not increase the gravity of a sexual sin and actually decreases it. There are also situations, such as when a woman who was raped is brought to a hospital, where emergency contraception may be licitly given. Under such circumstances, contraception that is not an abortifacient can be used as a defense against an unwanted attacker rather than a means to limit childbirth from sex.

Wouldn't this depend on the type of birth control pill? I was under the impression that this was part of the stated objection to emergency contraception (which itself may be based on an outmoded scientific understanding of how these drugs work), as opposed to your common or garden oral contraceptive. I don't know enough about either the mechanics of chemical contraception or the extent to which the Church understands the mechanics of chemical contraception to be sure, though.

If normal, non-emergency oral contraceptives can have post-fertilization effects, then that strikes me as the sort of fact that should be much more widely publicized. It strikes me as an informed consent issue, since there are a ton of Catholic women who dissent from Church teaching on prophylactic contraception but not on abortion (or who might be prescribed these drugs for any of their various other effects), to say nothing of pro-life Protestants, Orthodox/Conservadox Jews, et cetera.

As far as I know, there are two types of pills - those that keep the ovaries from releasing an egg and thicken the cervical lining to prevent the sperm from joining the egg, and others which suppress ovulation.  Or both.  But my understanding is that the RCC would oppose the use of either because so-called "artificial birth control" overrides God's plan, even if it's not an "abortifacient."

They would probably be permitted for non-contraceptive purposes, but nothing beyond that.  I'm not sure.  I also don't know of any Protestant sects that oppose abortion as well as contraceptives, but I'm sure some exist.

Scott’s distinction between two types of pills is generally correct, though in practice there is always some argument about what a pill actually does no matter what its purported effects are. For example, Plan B is thought to prevent ovulation while RU-486 is thought to prevent implantation which would make it a chemical abortifacient. There was a dubious study somewhere around 30 years ago suggesting preventing implantation was a secondary mechanism for a number of types of contraceptives, the consensus opinion of medical science at the moment seems to be that there are types of contraceptive pills that are not generally chemical abortifacients.

Though the Church does teach that both are immoral and override God’s plan, there is an important distinction still about how it overrides God’s plan. In one case it is by misusing human sexuality and in the other it is by killing someone. Remember, the Catholic Church is not like certain branches of Protestantism who consider all sins to be equal. There is a real distinction between abortion and contraception, and “emergency contraception” could potentially fall under either depending on exactly how it is practiced. Note for instance that a pill like RU-486 could not be licitly administered to a rape victim while something like Plan B may be licitly administered depending on the circumstances.

One last thing I would like to note is that Catholics (along with most Christians probably most people in general) are not consequentialists. Simply pointing to a worse outcome (such as an increase in abortions) does not necessarily justify all actions that lead to a better outcome. Whenever the issue of abortion and contraception is brought up, this point seems to get quickly buried by well-meaning but faulty arguments that ignore the means and only look at the ends. It is occasionally argued that pro-life individuals are being hypocritical or disingenuous to oppose both abortion and contraception. It is an understandable misunderstanding for people with other views to have, but it ultimately arises from a view that society is merely an equation to be optimized when there are other considerations too besides the most pressing one.

[TJ in Oregon]

One last thing I would like to note is that Catholics (along with most Christians probably most people in general) are not consequentialists. Simply pointing to a worse outcome (such as an increase in abortions) does not necessarily justify all actions that lead to a better outcome. Whenever the issue of abortion and contraception is brought up, this point seems to get quickly buried by well-meaning but faulty arguments that ignore the means and only look at the ends. It is occasionally argued that pro-life individuals are being hypocritical or disingenuous to oppose both abortion and contraception. It is an understandable misunderstanding for people with other views to have, but it ultimately arises from a view that society is merely an equation to be optimized when there are other considerations too besides the most pressing one.

Thanks for bringing up this issue, as it allows me to address what's recently become a pet peeve of mine.

I think everybody is consequentialist and nobody is. Consequentialism is simply not a coherent and logically sustainable moral framework, because it rests on an artificially constructed distinction between "means" and "ends". To say that "the ends justify the means" forgets that the means are ends in and of themselves: the most immediate consequence of committing any deed is that such deed will have been committed. This is a reality as tangible as any other. There is nothing that tells us that this most proximate consequence is of a different nature than the more remote ones, and thus no serious reason to disregard the former for the latter. People who use "the ends justify the means" as their maxim are really saying that some specific ends are more important than other - they aren't actually making a general point on the nature of morality.

I think we are in almost entirely in agreement here, with the small caveat that the more proximate a consequence is to an act, the more responsible one is to consider it when considering the act. I think all of these sorts of distinctions matter.

Now, on the other hand, I think we can all agree that deontological morality taken to its extreme does not provide appropriate moral guidance. No one would seriously argue that actions must only be considered in the abstract, without any regard for the context in which they occur. That certainly doesn't strike me as being the position of the Catholic Church, as to the contrary attention to context strikes me as paramount in its discussion of sin. When I factored in all this, I came to the conclusion that the distinction between deontology and consequentialism doesn't really provide any useful insight into the nature of morality. It might be useful in casual conversation to describe some general tendencies, but I really don't see how you can take it much further than that. Maybe there's something I'm missing, since it seems that these terms are still in wide use among philosophers, but I have no idea why.

To me, what the deontology/consequentialism distinction often serves to mask is a distinction between fundamentally materialistic and fundamentally idealistic approaches to morality. Materialists argue that the only actions/outcomes (as I argued before, those are one and the same) that are morally significant are those that have a measurable effect on the physical reality (note that, because mind processes are "physical", this does include people's emotional state). This attitude, taken to its extreme, leads down the path of utilitarianism, which is indeed "a view that society is merely an equation to be optimized". Idealism, by contrast, argues that some actions/outcomes can be right or wrong on the basis of intangible principles that transcend material reality. Personally, I find myself very firmly on the idealistic side of this divide. Although my principles are ostensibly secular, I like to think that this means my moral framework has more in common with those of many religious people than with those of secular materialists.

I suspect the reason why philosophers still use these terms is that they do provide a real distinction between different moral systems. As you note above, the distinction is not as clean as the consequentialists argue. I see it as a question of which information is important when discerning what act is the morally correct one when at a metaphorical crossroads. I would understand consequentialism, much like you describe, to limit itself to physical, measurable, effects while deontological includes the nature of the act itself. Now, yes, it is true that there versions of deontology that hold circumstances do not matter (I mean, there are versions of deontology that claim the most proximate answer to every question is “because God said so” ). However, I would argue that the circumstances, including physical consequences, have the potential to change the nature of the act itself. I think this is pretty obvious to most people. For instance if someone physically attacks me, it would not be sinful for me to use physical force back in an effort to defend myself even though using that force would be sinful in the abstract. It is this sort of deontology that is able to provide a basic moral framework.

However, I would argue this view too misses the mark by a bit. The description of deontology I’ve given is also ignoring important information about whether a decision is moral or not: that is the intent of the person making it. I would contend it is morally wrong for me to act with a bad intent, even if the act by its nature is good and has good consequences. This, although a simplistic argument, is part of why I hold that virtue ethics rather than deontology is correct (some people say that virtue ethics is a type of deontology but that’s mostly a semantic point). Morality is ultimately not an optimization of outcomes or merely following a set of rules (though both generally happen to some extent) but an interior conversion of will. I say this not because I want to add another item to the checklist that none of us are ever going to achieve, but because it is pertinent to the discussion below.

It's on the basis of this commonality that I'm hoping I can say something on the Catholic stance toward contraception. Obviously my grasp of Catholic thought on these issues is very limited, so I really hope it's not arrogant of me to speak on these issue, but I would dearly like to be able to find some common ground here. My argument is that it is morally permissible (actually, I'd like to be able to claim that it's morally required) for a Catholic to support expanded access to contraception as a matter of public policy, even if they view contraception itself as a sin. I don't want to take issue with Catholic doctrine on the morality of contraception. While it is a view that strongly offends my own values and principles, I recognize that it flows coherently from its premises (with the exception of the argument I had with RI on the validity of the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" means, which really bothers me).
 

Thank you for writing this in earnest. I greatly appreciate it; I really do

(see below for continuation)

[TJ in Oregon]

What I'm trying to argue is that, if Catholic morality values the preservation of life as much as it purports to, then it must acknowledge when, in the context of how society actually works, letting a lesser sin occur (which is not the same as condoning it) contributes to preserving life. This is not a consequentialist argument because, as I've argued in the first part of this post, there is no such thing as a consequentialist argument. And it's certainly not a utilitarian argument, because life in a Catholic perspective is clearly not a utilitarian value (and frankly, a utilitarianism that takes life as the quantity to maximize strikes me as one of the most bizarre and downright creepy moral frameworks I can think of). It is, rather, an argument about hierarchy in Catholic values and principles. I'm glad you confirmed to me that Catholicism views some sins as greater than others (which I never doubted, since the opposite view would be f**ked up).

In general, a Catholic may, in good conscience allow someone else to commit a sin under many circumstances (when one is obligated to actually stop someone from doing something wrong either as individual or through the use of other social institutions such as the government is a whole other can of worms and isn’t pertinent to the question at hand). One can, under certain circumstances, licitly cooperate with evil or even, under certain other circumstances, be required to cooperate with evil. The first and most important distinction that must be considered when asking whether it is licit to cooperate with evil is whether the person in question shares in the intent of the evil (“formal cooperation”) or does not share in the intent (“material cooperation”). Formal cooperation is never licit, regardless of the gravity of the sin involved. Material cooperation may be licit or even required if the evil that would occur without cooperating would be worse than that done through cooperation. When considering such questions, it is also important to consider how direct the cooperation is to the evil being committed.

Now this is all pretty abstract so far. To your question:

If taking a life is a worse sin than distorting the purpose God gave to sexuality, then doesn't that mean that a society that practices the latter sin as opposed to the former is less sinful than one that does the opposite?

Yes. In practice it is of course more complicated since our society (and every society) practices both. However, I would still caution here that simply because one sin is worse than the other does not necessarily make it licit to cooperate with the former sin; the situation for each individual is still subject to the discussion above and below.

I understand that Catholicism seeks to eradicate both sins and, in a pluralist society, it is welcome to try. It can make its case to women that contraception and abortion are both wrong, and that abstinence is the only moral way to avoid pregnancy. Others will make the opposite case, however, and right now it's pretty clear that they (I should probably say "we" since, even though my discomfort with the modern-liberal view of sexuality is well-known on this forum, I still find myself on their side of this issue) are winning out. This doesn't mean that it isn't a fight worth fighting, but it means that, in such an unfavorable context, some sacrifices have to be made and a lesser evil has to be chosen. Thus, you can either choose to use the tools of policy to combat the lesser sin, knowing full well that this will create new opportunities for the greater sin, and that these opportunities will oftentimes be exploited no matter what you do, or you can combat the lesser sin through other (undoubtedly less effective) means in order to preserve society from the greater one.

To be honest, choosing the former course of action strikes me as a sinful attitude in and of itself, one that prioritizes one's own moral self-satisfaction (the self-satisfaction of knowing you don't yourself partake in sin) over the desire to save one's fellow people from sin. I realize that it's arrogant of me to claim that, but at this stage of my reflection I just can't escape this conclusion. Is there something I'm missing? If saving people from sin is what matters most, then isn't it more important to save them from the greater one? Or does the wide availability of contraception somehow degrade society in a worse way than the wide prevalence of abortion does? Or is there some principle higher than life in Catholic theology that changes the nature of the problem?

I’d like to make a few points here. First, as described above, a Catholic can never licitly cooperate in evil with which he or she shares in the intent of. A Catholic should never personally provide someone with artificial contraception or advocate for them to use it (I mean this on an personal basis; not a pharmacist working at the counter) unless it is a truly exceptional situation such with a woman who has already had sex while thought to be fertile and definitively declares she will have an abortion otherwise. It is not okay (obviously) to make a statistical calculation of how likely a person is to have an abortion and then try and figure out x abortions = y contraceptions at some moral equivalence point.

Second, Catholicism views the government as a natural extension of society rather than an independent agency meant to be neutral in all situations. Thus, advocating for the government to provide contraceptives is still cooperating with evil. It is more remote than providing them on a personal basis obviously, and is thus less wrong in the abstract. I would not necessarily argue that Catholics must categorically reject all government contraceptive provision, but should consider each instance or program on its own merits. For example, I do not think the government is inherently cooperating with evil for merely telling public school students of the existence of contraceptives. I do think it is a delicate minefield to navigate without implicitly encouraging students to use them (which would be formal cooperation unless the motivation is solely to prevent abortion). I do think that this is a murky area and that selecting the appropriate course of action is subject to the social context in which it is occurring.

However, the approach outlined above must consider yet another factor that is a little less mechanistic. Remember, Catholic morality is not simply a calculation of results or the sum total of all actions but an interior conversion of will. By providing contraception, the government may also be aiding in the distortion of society’s will toward the view of sex as recreational. It is this mentality that underlies the root causes of both contraception and abortion. It is no surprise (and was predicted in Humanae Vitae) that widespread contraceptive use would lead people to view abortion as acceptable. Numerous countries have seen a relaxation of abortion restrictions within a decade or two of increased contraceptive use. I do not think this is coincidental. So when considering the issue of contraceptives as a method to reduce abortions, it does seem that there should be an immediate benefit of reducing the number of abortions performed, but it also aids in the moral distortion that led to widespread acceptance of abortion in the first place. Again, this does not necessarily mean Catholics ought to categorically reject any government provision of contraceptives, but it ought to lead to a particular skepticism toward the merits of doing so.

Lastly, you asked if there was a higher principle in Catholic theology than life, to which I would argue that the highest principle in Catholic theology is the salvation of souls. Here, it requires people being saved from both sins: abortion and contraception. Justice demands that salvation from abortion is, of course more urgent. But true mercy for sinners requires salvation from both.

Now, there can be (and there most certainly is!) argument within Catholicism over its application. One approach is to unapologetically state the truth including on topics that are socially unpopular. This sort of view is generally associated with Traditionalism and strategies such as the Benedict option. Proponents of this view would likely err on the “both or nothing” side of this proposition. They would argue that, if culpable, someone who commits the sin of contraception is in a state of mortal sin anyway, so the rest of the argument may technically be true but misses the point. The other view is that of gradualism: the idea that conversion is less a leap and more a slow turning. Under this view, it is of course an improvement to switching from the sin of abortion to the sin of contraception! The view goes on to suggest that if the person keeps this up perhaps someday they won’t be sinning at all! I would consider myself to be skeptically on the pro-gradualism side. I do believe that simply hearing a hard moral argument is not generally what makes people inclined to accept the faith. Instead of demanding immediate complete submission to God’s will, perhaps a better start would be to try and describe why anyone would believe in or care what God’s will is in the first place. But I am skeptical, ultimately, of many gradualist propositions because many of those advocating seem to lack a sincere will to ever move beyond the first step to the second.

In conclusion, I would say the issue is complicated beyond a categorical acceptance or rejection of government-sponsored contraceptive programming and that Catholics should take into consideration the many factors discussed above.

I appreciate the earnest and rational discussion Tony.

[TJ in Oregon]

I do think it is a delicate minefield to navigate without implicitly encouraging students to use them (which would be formal cooperation unless the motivation is solely to prevent abortion).

As I understand it having this as the sole motivation is actually reasonably common among (the minority of) conservative Protestants who support this, and I don't see any inherent reason why it can't be among Catholics as well.

I wouldn't go so far as to say there is an inherent reason why Catholics cannot do so. However, while not all material cooperation with evil is forbidden, not all material cooperation with evil is licit either. There is an important distinction here between Catholics and conservative Protestants in that the conservative Protestants (most likely anyway) do not actually hold that they are tacitly encouraging an intrinsic evil by encouraging artificial contraception. In their view, the use of contraceptives being wrong is not itself sinful, rather simply that premarital sex is. So they're not actually advocating for students to do something additional that is wrong. For Catholics, this leads us to something like the approach I earlier called "70s era Jesuit casuistry" wherein the position given is that you shouldn't have premarital sex or use artificial contraception but that if you're going to have premarital sex anyway using contraception isn't any worse. I would argue that that position is dubious at best, but probably not heretical or sinful to proclaim given the right intent. I do not agree with it, however, for the reasons given in my previous post (see the last few paragraphs about intent). Personally, I think the best answer in a public school under current circumstances is to make students aware of the existence of contraceptives while maintaining impartiality about their morality or use. Even Catholic students dead-set against artificial contraception ought to have an academic understanding of what it is that they are against.

[TJ in Oregon]

Sorry for the delay in responding. I haven’t had a chance to put the time into the sort of response that this deserves prior to today.

Virtue ethics is actually the moral framework I adhere to, by and large. I was already veering in this general direction before I was introduced to the concept properly speaking and, since then, my appreciation of them has only increased. It's the only standard I find stringent enough for me to be able to hold myself up to without feeling like I'm being self-indulgent, and adopting it has helped me become more lucid on what makes me a bad person and how I can try to start rectifying that (which of course I know I'll never be fully able to). The role I'm willing to give it in the realm of politics is a bit more ambiguous: I think the polity ought to further both the material welfare and the moral growth of all human beings. I hold out to the hope that, when sought with sufficient foresight and prudence, these goals are not mutually exclusive - even that they are mutually reinforcing - and as such I'm extremely distrustful of worldviews that claim to sacrifice the former in the name of the latter. That said, the latter is absolutely crucial, and I'm fully aware that forgetting it would lead us right down the path to Brave New World.

I agree that the two goals of moral growth and material welfare are not mutually exclusive. While they may occasionally be apparently at odds, I would argue it is a paradox rather than a true dichotomy. For example in this discussion, if society took sexual morality to heart in the first place (which I know we have disagreements over, but bear with me briefly), then entire conversation wouldn’t need to be had. We wouldn’t need to discuss the role of artificial contraception in reducing abortions because no one would have abortions in the first place. The discussions about rape victims would also be moot because there would be no rapes. One quickly finds that if the agents in society are perfectly virtuous rather than fallen the vast majority of our problems would be solved. Back here in reality, of course, it is much more complicated to figure out what the government should and should not do.

A Catholic should never personally provide someone with artificial contraception or advocate for them to use it (I mean this on an personal basis; not a pharmacist working at the counter).

I greatly appreciate that you are willing to draw a distinction between individuals who act of their own private initiative and those who act in a professional capacity. I think this distinction is fundamental to modern society and unavoidable in discussions of this nature. I want to be sure I understand the basis on which you draw it. Is your argument that the pharmacist's material cooperation to the practice of contraception is justified by the duty to perform one's professional obligations (and the impracticality imposing on all Catholics that they avoid the profession of pharmacist)? I'd agree with that, but I'm sure you wouldn't be willing to extend this logic to all sins - otherwise this basically legitimizes the Eichmann defense. Thus, would it be correct to say that the leeway allowed for material cooperation in a sin varies according to the gravity of said sin? And, more specifically, that in the case of contraception (and other sins of comparable or lesser gravity), material cooperation can be allowed even for reasons other than to prevent a greater sin? After all, renouncing to become a pharmacist isn't a sin, even if the aggregate social outcome of such choice would be problematic. I think that this line of thinking, then, can be taken to illustrate how the position of the policymaker deciding on contraception policy (note that this includes, and in fact is primarily intended for, the voter, who in a democracy is the real policymaker - I'll be using "policymaker" in this sense throughout my argument) is different from that of the single individual deciding whether or not to recommend contraception to another individual.

I was a little sloppy in my initial reply on this subject about exactly when it would be morally justifiable to materially cooperate with evil. It does not necessarily require the prevention of a worse sin but a worse evil overall. In such a discernment, the individual in question must consider matters such as how close to the evil itself he is, to what degree his cooperation will be seen as complicity, and the effects of both choosing to cooperate or not, both the spiritual consequences and the material consequences. In the case of a pharmacist working at a counter when someone walks in and asks for birth control, the pharmacist’s refusal to cooperate would likely result in being fired, putting his family through serious hardship, and eliminating all Catholics from the profession while only delaying the person from getting the pills a couple minutes later from the other pharmacist at the counter. The pharmacist at the counter is not himself doing evil and does not share in the intent of the evil. If the pharmacist were to privately help someone procure contraceptives he would be formally cooperating. Now, that is not to say material cooperation is objectively good; obviously it would be better if there were no evil in the first place, and we should work to eliminate it. It would also be better if the pharmacist were allowed to decline from cooperating while keeping his job. But in this context cooperating is most likely licit.

In the Eichmann case, it appears extremely unlikely he was simply materially cooperating in the first place rather than personally ordering others to do evil or doing it himself. Even if he was, since mass genocide is a much more serious sin than artificial contraception, the evil that would result from refusing to cooperate would have to still be more severe for it to be morally justifiable. Now, it may be possible that Eichmann personally did not share in Hitler’s evil intent but out of fear for his life decided to work for him anyway (maybe not though; I don’t know that much about his own personal history). If so, his culpability would be reduced but not absolved. I have a hard time fathoming circumstances that would make cooperation with mass genocide morally licit.

I would argue that the duty to perform one's professional obligations is related to the reason why the material cooperation of the pharmacist is justifiable but is not quite the reason. The reason is that the pharmacist’s professional circumstances change that nature of his actions, reduce his proximity to the evil, and increase the negative consequences of him refusing.

What Nathan pointed out, the principle of double effect is related but distinct. It is when it can be morally justifiable to do some act that is good or neutral in itself but has some evil side-effect. That is different than cooperation with evil in that in the case of the principle of double effect, the agent making the decision is also the agent brining about the evil. I don’t think it would strictly apply to the situation here.

continued below

[TJ in Oregon]

To be honest, I have a very hard time seeing how this view of the State as nothing more than a natural extension of society could be sustained. Of course, I don't want to argue that the two are completely distinct, as if the people who ran government were aliens or robots extraneous to the society that surrounds them. And I certainly wouldn't claim that the State should be "neutral in all situations"! No State action is "neutral", all affect society in one way or another (indeed, if it didn't, what would even be the point of a State?). That being said, a fundamental autonomy from the other formal and informal structures of society - both in agency and in the nature of its ties with those structures - is the basis of the modern Weberian State. In the liberal-democratic framework, the State is subordinate to society through the process of representative democracy (and of course religiously-motivated parties have a right to compete in this process) but, once this initial link is established, it should be relatively free of the influence of powerful social forces. I realize that Catholicism isn't too fond of this model of statehood, but I don't think it would want to reject it outright. It does entail separation of Church and State (which btw, is also something I'd be interested in arguing for on religious grounds), yes, but it's also what shields the State from the influence of other power structures in society, most notably economic power. This is crucial because the State, far from being neutral, sometimes has to go against society. Indeed, isn't it what many Catholics want the State to do when they advocate for certain policies that go against the general tendencies of modern society? This isn't something to which I object on principle (although my on view of which specific tendencies the State should favor or go against is quite different).

I was again a little sloppy here in my initial response when I said ”Catholicism views the government as a natural extension of society” I meant that Catholic thinkers have traditionally conceived it beginning (both historically and ontologically) as such. The purpose of the state is to protect the natural rights of its subjects and to work for the common good. This occurs in the society from which the government emerges. Its exact structure is of lesser importance to Catholics in principle. As such democracy vs. monarchism vs. a republic vs. etc. is a sort of question that Catholicism is agnostic about it. Catholic individuals may, of course, have a range of views on the subject (obviously most with want something like a democratic republic in 2016). So a disagreement between the government and the majority of the members of a society is not an area where traditional Catholic thought has a principled description of who ought to be listened it. What is important is what is decided. I would also argue that there is no such thing as a truly neutral government decision. Every decision, unless it is completely inconsequential, is some type of moral statement. The reason is because an “ought” type of statement regarding society is a moral statement. Now, that does not mean the government must dictate every moral action that occurs within society. Nor does it mean the Church should control the government. Both are institutions with largely overlapping goals, though not quite identical goals. The state’s role is to protect the natural rights of its citizens and to work for their common good. Of note here is that it is a natural right to, in earnest, seek the truth. (Indeed it is part of our very humanity.) As such the state is not simply a tool for the enforcement of doctrine. So what I favor is a distinction between Church and State but not a true separation as typically defined in the US. In the US that phrase has come to imply bizarre ideas like “the government cannot legislate morality”, which have no real meaning. The government is always legislating morality. There is very little it can legislate that isn’t morality (or a mistaken notion of morality).

I understand there is a lot more that can be said on this subject.

continued below

[TJ in Oregon]

I'm not sure I'm following you here. On the end of the Catholic policymaker, enacting a program that provides free contraception on the basis that, in the aggregate, when people have access to free contraception, the number of abortions decreases dramatically, would surely constitute material cooperation, wouldn't it? Of course, this policy will inevitably have the side effect of providing contraception to women who would never have aborted regardless, and the Catholic policymaker is aware of that. But just because she/he is aware of it and still knowingly chooses to enact such a program doesn't mean that she/he shares in the intent of the sin. Policies are always highly complex objects, and almost every policy has both positive and nefarious outcomes. Just because someone chooses to enact a policy knowing that it has a specific nefarious outcome, doesn't mean that they are intentionally causing this outcome. As I've pointed out above, a cost-benefit analysis is absolutely inevitable in this realm, and refusing to engage in it is, I've argued, is morally problematic on its own.

Here I was a little ambiguous in my initial response. I think that the situation as we’ve discussed is a prudential matter, meaning that there can be legitimate disagreement between faithful Catholics on how the principles involving cooperation with evil can be applied. I would not condemn a lawmaker for coming to either conclusion. Thus I tried the Lord of the Rings elvish approach wherein Frodo responds with “Never ask the elves for the advice for they will tell you both yes and no”. In my personal opinion, I think it would probably be a better course of action for a Catholic to reject the free contraception program. Again, I understand that others may disagree. This is a situation where a rational application of principle is insufficient to select the course of action and we must engage in speculation about how people will react to various policies.

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Of course it's not coincidental, but surely you're well aware that just because one event precedes another doesn't necessarily mean the former caused the latter. I highly doubt that the spread of contraception was what causally triggered the loosening of abortion laws. This isn't a case where X caused Y, but rather one where Z caused both X and Y. The common underlying variable behind both occurrences is a long-term shift in values throughout the West, one that preceded any change in legislation and unfolded even in countries where legislation opposed a fierce resistance. Legislative changes favorable to contraception may have, at most, accelerated the trend slightly (although even that is a claim that lacks empirical verification), but surely they haven't triggered it. Furthermore, Catholics, even if they seek to spread alternative values, must acknowledge the reality that, in the foreseeable future, these values are here to stay. One of the implications to draw from this is that policies widening the availability of contraception are one of the very few policies that remain effective at reducing the prevalence of abortions.

Here I think we’re close to agreement on our assessment of the situation. However, I would make the contention that the increased use of contraceptives is part of the long-term shift of values in the West rather than merely a byproduct of it. To speak of one without the other is very difficult. It is this shift that is the underlying root of the problem. It is exactly this shift that Catholics must combat! And contraception is part of it. That’s why I’m so hesitant to simply sit back on the licit material cooperation argument and call it a day.

I must concede that this is a logically unimpeachable argument. My problem with it is that it rests on a theological premise that, to be frank, I find horrifying. I realize that this is an entirely subjective perspective, but I hope you don't mind if I develop my thoughts a bit. Simply put, the single issue most crucial to me in my relationship to Christian thought is the question of the universality of salvation. There are many Christian values and principles that I personally hold very dear and that I believe can have a wonderful impact on the moral growth of society, but to me these values and principles only ring true if they are associated to the promise of universal salvation. Without this promise, without the certainty that God's grace will ultimately vanquish every sin, I think Christianity loses its compass and risks wandering in some very dangerous directions. I cannot accept that some sins, no matter how heinous, could be beyond redemption - that some people, no matter how wicked, could be beyond saving. I don't want to believe that about a fellow human being. I don't think this diminishes the severity of God's justice (He has, after all, the eternity to work on purifying a sinner). To the contrary, I think that believing in eternal damnation could lead confirmed sinners to believe that they have "gone too far" and that it's too late for them to change their ways. I realize that universal salvation is somewhat at odds with the Catholic mainstream but, from what I've been told, it is not explicitly condemned. I dearly wish the Church (and all Christians everywhere) would embrace this doctrine. Then, to come back to our point, if universal salvation is taken as a premise, there is no such thing as a "mortal sin" per se (some sins would still warrant damnation, but damnation would always be temporary, and the time it takes to cleanse one of their sins would depend on their number and gravity) and it makes sense to try to minimize sin rather than take an "all or nothing" approach.

Here I think we’re very close to the heart of the issue. I would say that of the two statements I bolded, the latter does not require the former. The latter is why I am not a Calvinist. I do believe that no one is beyond redemption as long as they walk this earth. However, that does necessarily mean that the person does not need to repent. The prodigal son did return home to his father to be welcomed. In general, the belief in a guarantee of universal salvation has never made much sense to me. If God’s just going to tell us it’s all okay anyway regardless of what we do, then we have no ability to choose to follow him or not. In his love, He gives us the choice to accept or reject him. I do not claim to know whether any individual person will ultimately be saved. In fact, I would consider it dangerous to speculate that anybody is or is not saved. Thus, we ought to have a care when we make decisions, both for our own sake and that of others!


I know I've rambled on a lot here and the discussion has brought up a few important tangents that volumes can be written on just themselves, but I hope this has provided some degree of explanation for Catholic thought on the issue, my speculation about it, and why anyone might oppose providing contraceptives to reduce the number of abortions.

Again thanks for taking the time to respond and write all of this! I understand just how busy a person can be and how long it takes to make lucid posts on a difficult subject