Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited

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The Election of 1904: Final Results

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1904 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Republican: 48 (+2)
Democratic: 42 (-2)

House
Republican: 219 (+19)
Democratic: 159 (-21)
Progressive: 5 (+5)
Socialist: 1 (+1)
Independent: 0 (-4)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-IL)
Minority Leader Champ Clark (D-MO)
Minority Leader Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader John C. Chase (S-NY)

As the Progressive Party officially opted against fielding congressional or statewide challengers in 1904, the vote-splitting which categorized the presidential race was notably absent in all other races this cycle. That is not to say, however, that the Progressives did not have a role in these lesser elections. Roosevelt was the sole endorsee of the novel national organization, but a select few incumbents swapped party affiliation in advance of the election. This included Governors Robert M. La Follette and George Pardee, as well as Representatives James McLachlan (P-CA), Wesley L. Jones (P-WA), Howard M. Snapp (P-IL), Charles T. Dunwell (P-NY), and Charles L. Knapp (P-NY).

Governor La Follette, having been unanimously nominated by the Wisconsin Republican Party to run for the United States Senate, challenged incumbent Democratic Senator Timoth E. Ryan for his seat. Ryan, a Bourbon Democrat and Milwaukee attorney, lost the confidence of Wisconsinite Bryan Democrats after joining conservative Republicans in affirmatively voting to repeal Sulzer-Hepburn. This minority faction of the state Democratic party failed in preventing Ryan's renomination, but shortly thereafter professed a willingness to back the reformist La Follette. Unlike his opponent, the governor promoted Progressive objectives like a nationwide primary system, merger regulation, and the passage of Bryan's income tax amendment. Listed on the state ballot as a Republican and a Progressive, the insurgent candidate defeated Senator Ryan, 51% to 48%.

Senate seats once belonging to Mark Hanna and Robert Pattison were vacated upon the deaths of these two senators. Governors Myron Herrick (R-OH) and Samuel Pennypacker appointed interim replacements for Hanna and Pattison, respectively, over the course of the 58th Congress. In Ohio, Representative Charles W. F. Dick (R-OH) filled the senatorial vacancy, but later lost the nomination of the Ohio Republican Party to McKinley's former Lieutenant Governor Andrew L. Harris (R-OH). Harris possessed some middling support by the progressive Republicans for speaking out against corporate donations, yet only narrowly defeated Democrat financier John H. Clarke, 53% to 46%. In the face of a dangerous nominating fight, corporate attorney John M. Bell, Pennypacker's appointee to the Senate, chose to endorse his opponent instead of running for a full, 6-year term. Therefore, Attorney General Philander C. Knox won that nomination unopposed, and sailed to an easy win against Representative James K.P. Hall (D-PA).

William V. Allen, the once-Populist senator from Nebraska, sorrowfully decided against running for re-election. Knowing the intense uphill and presumably fruitless endeavor of contesting the Democratic nomination, Allen instead sought a return to his private law practice. He did offer an enthusiastic endorsement of Bryan Democrat Richard L. Metcalfe (D-NE) for his seat, hoping to reignite the fire in the Nebraskan population that once carried William J. Bryan to the presidency. Former President Bryan himself also submitted a written endorsement of the Democratic candidate in The Commoner just prior to November. Representative Elmer Burkett (R-NE) resoundingly won the Republican nomination and received well-publicized endorsements by Governor John H. Mickey (R-NE) and former Senator John M. Thurston (R-NE). Although the local press predicted a landslide win for Congressman Burkett, Mr. Metcalfe won the election by a margin of 1,181 votes (out of about 230,000). It appeared Bryan, and his agrarian army, remained a formidable presence in the American West.

The Class 1 U.S. Senate seat in New York was held by Chauncey Depew until his ascension to the vice presidency in 1901. Republicans fell in line behind his successor, James S. Sherman, who won that seat handily against David Hill that same year. Sherman governed as a stubborn, staunch conservative whilst in office and allied himself closely with the Republican Old Guard against the Roosevelt faction. He campaigned extensively for Depew's re-election in 1904, applauding the incumbent president's legislative effort and "proving invulnerable to the anarchists, socialists, and hoodlum radicals" demanding reform. Backed by the RNC, and possibly in the process of being groomed for committee leadership, Sherman towered over the New York delegation not unlike Depew before him.

New York Democrats, left somewhat in the wilderness following the back-to-back defeats of Dave Hill, turned to the one figure believed to stand a snowball's chance at victory: New York City Mayor George B. McClellan, Jr. Hardly in line with the liberal Bryan sect of the national party (despite serving as Bryan's Assistant Secretary of the Navy), McClellan was a trusted social conservative, a dyed-in-the-wool Tammany Hall favorite, and an advocate for education reform. Upon an agreement to accept the party nomination if offered, McClellan energetically campaigned for Sherman's seat in the Senate. He concentrated heavily on driving up voter participation in his city, often reaching out to Irish and Italian immigrant neighborhoods to request their favor. He also won the endorsements of former Mayor Van Wyck (D-NY) and Democratic Boss Richard Crocker while, by contrast, Sherman failed to garner support by McClellan's mayoral predecessor, Seth Low. The vote was close, but McClellan did manage to topple Sherman and succeed to the Senate. Aside from his defeat on the presidential level, Depew later listed Sherman's loss in this race as one of his greatest political regrets.

On the whole, and especially in regards to the House of Representatives elections, scores of Republican candidates for election and re-election indicated malleability to work with Roosevelt in the off-chance he was indeed elected. Progressively-leaning Republican voters, chiefly made up of middle-class workers and small businessmen, cast their ballots for the war secretary for president, but voted straight ticket Republican otherwise. On the opposing end, Bryan Democrats, who otherwise abandoned Olney to vote for Roosevelt, elsewhere voted Democratic. As such, the House only tilted slightly toward the Republican Party. Speaker Cannon would linger as an overarching force in the House and commanded his Republican delegation as he so pleased, but Minority Leader John Lentz, exhausted from dealings with an antithetical DNC, retired in 1905. Following a rather grueling sparing match for Lentz' position, frontrunner John S. Williams (detested by the Bryanites for his conduct at the St. Louis convention) lost his bid to lesser-known Missouri Representative Champ Clark (D-MO).

  

Senators Elected in 1904 (Class 1)

Frank Putnam Flint (R-CA): Republican Gain, 61%
Morgan Bulkeley (R-CT): Republican Hold, 67%
George Gray (D-DE): Democratic Hold, 53%
James Taliaferro (D-FL): Democratic Hold, 89%
James A. Hemenway (R-IN): Republican Hold, 59%
Eugene Hale (R-ME): Republican Hold, 72%
Isidor Rayner (D-MD): Democratic Hold, 69%
Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA): Republican Hold, 68%
Julius C. Burrows (R-MI): Republican Hold, 58%
Moses E. Clapp (R-MN): Republican Gain, 58%
Hernando Money (D-MS): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Francis Cockrell (D-MO): Democratic Hold, 61%
William A. Clark (D-MT): Democratic Hold, 52%
Richard L. Metcalfe (D-NE): Democratic Hold, 50%
George S. Nixon (R-NV): Republican Hold, 51%
John Kean (R-NJ): Republican Hold, 54%
George B. McClellan, Jr. (D-NY): Democratic Gain, 51%
Porter J. McCumber (R-ND): Republican Hold, 64%
Andrew L. Harris (R-OH): Republican Hold, 53%
Philander C. Knox (R-PA): Republican Hold, 63%
Nelson W. Aldrich (R-RI): Republican Hold, 59%
William B. Bate (D-TN): Democratic Hold, 60%
Charles Allen Culberson (D-TX): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
George Sutherland (R-UT): Republican Hold, 68%
Redfield Proctor (R-VT): Republican Hold, 80%
John W. Daniel (D-VA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Samuel H. Piles (R-WA): Republican Hold, 56%
J.F. McGraw (D-WV): Democratic Hold, 51%
Robert M. La Follette (R/P-WI): Republican Hold, 51%
Clarence D. Clark (R-WY): Republican Gain, 56%

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Theodore Roosevelt, 28th President of the United States - Source: Wiki Commons

Part 4: Lion's Roar

Chapter XI: Birth of the Progressive Era: Rooseveltian America and the Third Party Problem

Once the immediate aftershocks of the presidential election wore off, the disparate political forces in the United States attempted to regain their balance. A joint effort by DNC Chair Thomas Taggart (D-IN) and RNC Chair William McKinley to challenge the results in the three closest states stalled as no evidence emerged of foul play. The cross-over of Bryan Democrats to the Roosevelt Camp appeared to have been the catalyst that allowed the Progressive nominee to squeak by the other two candidates in these states, and although the Depew and Olney campaigns worked tirelessly to discover evidence of voter fraud or illegal collusion with local tellers, there was simply no reasonable case to suspect the vote as illegitimate. An intensive, last ditch effort by the campaigns to influence electors in Ohio also ended in embarrassing and disgraceful failure. It dragged on for weeks, but the Republican-Democratic investigation of the count and their resistance to recognize Roosevelt as the winner eventually faded into grumbled displeasure.

A smattering of relatively neutral figures within the Republican National Committee approached McKinley sometime in December regarding how to treat the president-elect. Led by Representative James Eli Watson (R-IN), this contingent suggested that the party ought to work with Roosevelt as if he were an elected Republican, and perhaps make amends for the ill-fated decision to renominate Depew. McKinley, operating in somewhat of a hive-mind with the Old Guard faction of conservative Republicans, declined Watson's proposal. Along with Senators Foraker, Fairbanks, and Frye, House Majority Whip James A. Tawney (R-MN), and Speaker Joseph Cannon, McKinley reaffirmed the Republican commitment to their traditionalist values and defense of American commerce above all else. He acknowledged the results of the election, and released a public statement accepting the loss, but in private exhibited gratitude for the Progressives' defection and the "purification" of the GOP. McKinley stepped down as chairman in 1905, retiring from public life and allowing for the rise of his successor: Whitelaw Reid.

The headline appearing in the post-election issue of The Commoner, the newspaper published and edited by William J. Bryan, was titled, "The Plutocratic Threat and Roosevelt's Opportunity". The article presented a side-by-side contrast between the activities of the Democratic Party and the Olney Campaign versus Roosevelt and the Progressives. According to this piece (likely written by the former president's brother, Charles W. Bryan), the conservative takeover of his party, exemplified by the adoption of a 'sound money' plank at the convention and the forced nomination of a Cleveland-era Bourbon, practically guaranteed the loss of the American West. "While the campaign was applauded by the eastern press," the article read, "it surely alienated a large number of Democrats of the West and South. The reorganizers, in complete control of the party and the planners of the campaign, led this party to its worse defeat in its lifetime. The Democratic Party, if it hopes to win success, must take the side of the plain, common people." In the ensuing months, Bryan Democrats would begin demanding the resignations of national committee members.

Progressives (and, to an extent, the Socialist Party with its astounding 4.42% of the Popular Vote) were the true winners of the 1904 election. New York notwithstanding, Roosevelt captured every major American city outside of the South, and did so on an unprecedented new party line. This shattering of the old, two party system demonstrated its shaky foundations as well as the urgency many Americans felt regarding breaking the federal government free from its associations with big business. With Roosevelt's victory the country braced itself for a strange new period in political history that neither Bryan, nor Beveridge, had enacted. The Progressive Era had begun.

On March 4th, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt was sworn in as president by Chief Justice Melville Fuller at the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. Raring to move ahead with his agenda and plot a path forward, the new president delivered a short inaugural address encapsulating some key parts of his platform and lexicon.

Practical equality of opportunity for all citizens, when we achieve it, will have two great results. First, every man will have a fair chance to make of himself all that in him lies; to reach the highest point to which his capacities, unassisted by special privilege of his own and unhampered by the special privilege of others, can carry him, and to get for himself and his family substantially what he has earned. Second, equality of opportunity means that the commonwealth will get from every citizen the highest service of which he is capable. No man who carries the burden of the special privileges of another can give to the commonwealth that service to which it is fairly entitled.

Now there has sprung up a feeling deep in the hearts of the people-not of the bosses and professional politicians, not of the beneficiaries of special privilege-a pervading belief of thinking men that when the majority of the people do in fact, as well as theory, rule, then the servants of the people will come more quickly to answer and obey, not the commands of the special interests, but those of the whole people. Our relations with the other powers of the world are important; but still more important are our relations among ourselves. Such growth in wealth, in population, and in power as this nation has seen during the century and a quarter of its national life is inevitably accompanied by a like growth in the problems which are ever before every nation that rises to greatness. Power invariably means both responsibility and danger. Our forefathers faced certain perils which we have outgrown. We now face other perils, the very existence of which it was impossible that they should foresee.

It is my personal belief that the same kind and degree of control and supervision which should be exercised over public-service corporations should be extended also to combinations which control necessaries of life, such as meat, oil, and coal, or which deal in them on an important scale. I have not doubt that the ordinary man who has control of them is much like ourselves. I have no doubt he would like to do well, but I want to have enough supervision to help him realize that desire to do well. I believe that the officers, and, especially, the directors, of corporations should be held personally responsible when any corporation breaks the law.

We are the heirs of the ages, and yet we have had to pay few of the penalties which in old countries are exacted by the dead hand of a bygone civilization. We have not been obliged to fight for our existence against any alien race; and yet our life has called for the vigor and effort without which the manlier and hardier virtues wither away. Under such conditions it would be our own fault if we failed; and the success which we have had in the past, the success which we confidently believe the future will bring, should cause in us no feeling of vainglory, but rather a deep and abiding realization of all which life has offered us; a full acknowledgment of the responsibility which is ours; and a fixed determination to show that under a free government a mighty people can thrive best, alike as regards the things of the body and the things of the soul.

         Theodore Roosvelt, Inaugural Address Excerpt, March 4th, 1904

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Huzzah for Roosevelt! It will be interesting to see how 1905-1909 plays out versus IOTL.

Indeed! Roosevelt serving as a Progressive in 1905 is a whole new ballgame from OTL.

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John Hay Walking with Adelbert Hay, March 15th, 1905 - Source: Wiki Commons

During the Grover Cleveland Administration, and those which preceded it, the function of the United States presidency had merely been one of stable stewardship and sensible supervision. Nothing epitomized this clearer than Cleveland's frank aversion to assisting working Americans when the banking establishment collapsed under his watch. Once President Bryan claimed center stage, the role of chief executive finally evolved from a silent and rather submissive doorkeeper into one that spoke to and reacted alongside the general population. He, and Beveridge to a lesser extent, morphed public perception of how a president ought to act and conduct the business of governing. Depew seemed to turn back the clock on this oddity, stepping back from the Bryan period. Should, for instance, either he or Olney have won the 1904 election, history may have looked back on the Bryan-Beveridge stage of as a strange interim. However, Roosevelt won that race, and he was certainly not willing to return to the days of presidential caretakers. As he himself recalled, backing down from the task of utilizing an active presence  was not an option. "I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the substance."

President Roosevelt conceived a unique method of commanding an executive position, one thoroughly displayed during his time serving as governor of New York. He saw the potential of governing as a limitless vehicle for positive and reactive government working on behalf of the American citizenry. Caring not for party bosses or polite dealings with corporate leaders, Roosevelt wished to offer genuine, concrete solutions for the unaddressed issues facing the country. However, that is not to say he concurred with Bryan's, or for that matter Debs', methodology to bring forth beneficial reform for the suffering masses. He may have viewed himself as a defender of the moral right, but he sharply disapproved of Bryan's 'change from below' ideal and the socialistic call to uproot society altogether. Regardless of the conservative press describing Roosevelt's frantic rhetoric as inciting socialist tendencies, he and the Progressives were far from labor-centric.

The Progressives generally found issue with radical calls to foster a political party for laborers, believing that the duty of manifesting true reform squarely fell with the moralistic, sophisticated, and well-bred (protestant) middle-class. Such a demographic - journalists, lawyers, social workers, mechanics, and craftsmen - composed the central core of the new Progressive Party. They did not appeal to workers, nor did they have any interest in affiliating with labor union organizations. When Roosevelt proclaimed, as he often did in the lead-up to his presidential win, that the country was in crisis, he cited "the depths of an evil plutocracy" as well as a class war instigated "by the mob" as significant threats. The president's proposed reforms, in his own determination, were necessary in order to save the country from unfathomable corporate power on one hand and unbridled socialism on the other.

Upon his move to the Executive Mansion, or as he so affectionately coined it, the White House, Roosevelt was almost instantaneously approached by varied men of finance who pleaded he back down from the Progressive platform. A partner of J.P. Morgan, George W. Perkins, professed to Roosevelt his empathy with "co-operation rather than competition", but quietly instructed him to "do nothing at all, and say nothing except platitudes," regarding trusts and the power of corporations. The novel president listened with amusement, as he did to scores of other businessmen requesting an absence of serious legislation. As anyone who knew Roosevelt could attest, he was not easily swayed on such core principles. The president later wrote, "Perkins might just as well make up his mind that I will not make my message one hair's breadth milder. Perkins simply represented the effort to sit back in the harness. Such effort was worse than useless."

Anticipating a discordant Congress, Roosevelt sought to acquire his preferred selection of political allies in his presidential Cabinet. There were virtually no outright Progressives in the legislature in 1905, so the president desperately needed to appoint men who were capable of securing legislative coadjutors. Vice President Taft, in the aforementioned regard, was an invaluable asset to the Roosevelt Administration. He had ties to dozens of prominent Republican figures and, potentially, could lead an effort to sway certain congressional fence-sitters should resistance arise. George von Lengerke Meyer, a Massachusetts politician and the U.S. Ambassador to Italy under Beveridge, was granted the position of Navy Secretary with a similar belief that he could garner Republican loyalties.

Roosevelt selected, without a second thought, Leonard Wood for War Secretary. He admired Wood's conduct in the Spanish-American War and his advisory service during the Philippines War, and for this was offered the Cabinet position determined most suitable for the major general. Other Progressive figures were appointed as a combined show of gratitude and recognition of their abilities - including PNC official James R. Garfield for Interior Secretary, anti-trust Ninth Circuit Judge Joseph McKenna for Attorney General, and former Iowa Governor L.M. Shaw as Treasury Secretary. He also offered former Mayor Seth Low a position within the Department of the Interior, but he declined.

Insofar as the remaining position was concerned, Roosevelt knew precisely who to award the post to. John Hay, who previously served in this role and guided promising overseas development right up until his resignation, respectfully agreed to once more take up the role as State Secretary. Hay began losing interest in public service after his spat with President Beveridge and, as debated by historians, his health worsened due to work stress. Along with his son, Adelbert, a low-ranking official within the State Department, John Hay enjoyed retired life yet eagerly joined Roosevelt during the presidential campaign. He may not have anticipated the offer, but Hay gladly returned to his post. As he wrote, "Barring a surprise execution, I intend on fulfilling my obligation to serve to the end of my usefulness."

The Roosevelt Cabinet

Office		Name
President		Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.
Vice President		William H. Taft
Sec. of State		John M. Hay
Sec. of Treasury		L.M. Shaw
Sec. of War		Leonard Wood
Attorney General		Joseph McKenna
Postmaster General		Frank Harris Hitchcock
Sec. of the Navy		George von Lengerke Meyer
Sec. of Interior		James R. Garfield
Sec. of Agriculture		James Wilson

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U.S. House of Representatives in Session, March 17th, 1905 - Source: LoC

In a letter submitted before Congress, the young and ambitious President Roosevelt presented a collection of ideas he deemed imperative for the maintenance of the country. The protracted and sententious message entailed a wide assortment of policy proposals, citing recent studies to further embody their soundness. An overarching theme of these legislative suggestions was a reaction to the material conditions of the late Gilded Age and its many inequalities. The president, wishing to start his reign with a wallop, referred to his demanding domestic program as a "Square Deal for every man."

In the opening of the twentieth century, working men, women and children did not possess the slightest modicum of protection against expansive working hours or sickeningly low wages. Workers also did not have access to safe working conditions, as exemplified through staggering statistics estimating half a million workplace injuries and 30,000 workplace deaths in the United States each year. No other nation came close to such sobering figures. These individuals were not able to collect compensation for workplace casualties, nor could they attain anything resembling unemployment restitution if laid off as a result of an on-site injury. Some workers, on a private basis, negotiated slightly improved contracts with their employers, yet, in the absence of a labor union, an individual worker had no actual power if the owner chose to whisk away conciliated benefits as a cost-saving measure.

These conditions, largely unchanged over the previous decades, drove millions of workers to organize in their respective industries as well as lean away from the prevailing laissez-faire conservatism of the era. Regardless of public support for reform, however, seemingly unbreakable ties between huge businesses and powerful legislators ensured that domestic policy resisted revision. President of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, perhaps the only reputable union chief capable of influencing federal policy on the side of the workers, rejected any notion to involve either himself or the AFL in political action. He continuously and strictly upheld "pure and simple unionism," and forbade AFL-affiliated unions from championing political interference. Regardless of their leader's stance, much of the rank and file AFL membership expressed support for Roosevelt's candidacy in the 1904 presidential election.

President Roosevelt's Square Deal, in part, was meant to address many of the base issues associated with unfettered capitalism. The old, Gilded Age approach to governing was no longer suitable to present day circumstances, and, as the president summarized, time was far overdue for reform. His proposals included pieces of the Progressive platform, in addition to unaddressed segments of previous Republican platforms and Roosevelt's own spur-of-the-moment whims. He favored instituting safer working conditions and limiting daily hours, as well as granting monetary compensation for industrial accidents. Roosevelt also concurred with Bryan over the need to bolster the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission and grant new supervisory powers to federal "watch dog" boards. The president held nothing back when openly censuring, "the huge monnied men to whom money is the be-all and end-all of existence; to whom the acquisition of untold millions is the supreme goal of life, and who are too often utterly indifferent as to how these millions are obtained." Unless these villainous businesses were vigorously and consistently regulated by the federal government, they would operate contrary to the interests of the American citizenry.

Roosevelt directed his letter primarily to his former colleagues in the Republican Party. He directly challenged them, exclaiming that federal regulation was all that stood to reduce class warfare and stop the accelerating interest in socialism. In setting up an arbitration commission, for example, the pure creation of bureaucratic machinery to solve smaller labor disputes could actively prevent the growth of radicalism (which was the consequence of inaction during the Anthracite Strike). Roosevelt firmly believed that Depew failed in justly responding to the Pennsylvania labor dispute. By not intervening, Depew and reactionary open-shop owners like George Baer had proved the validity of the socialists' claims that the federal government would side against the people in all cases, even when the owners were blatantly in the wrong.

Roosevelt made it clear that he was willing to proceed with arbitration and the recognition of sensible unions led by "reasonable men" like John Mitchell. Unions, he believed, could be responsible partners of business if intervention took place. It was either stable trade unionism, through what he theorized as a fair, multi-member conciliation board, or radical and revolutionary unionism that threatened the entire system. As Civic Federation Attorney Louis D. Brandeis elucidated, the stability of trade unionism would allow leaders like Mitchell the opportunity to gain a stronger understanding of business, which "almost invariably makes the leaders responsible and conservative."

Congressional Republicans did not view President Roosevelt as one of their own, nor had they ever. He was elected on a strange and alien third party ticket, one that robbed the Republican Party of their financial security and national prestige. Roosevelt was a traitor, and they cared nothing for his presidency nor his legacy. "If (Roosevelt) should starve the public of a promising future," one party official wrote, "so be it. He will perish in the inferno he so recklessly lit." Judging by the insinuations of the national committee, they planned to rally support behind a conservative contender in 1908. [...] Reality proved a significant hurdle. As was demonstrated in the election; Roosevelt, as well as his policies, were immensely popular. Otherwise, the candidate would have miserably failed and fallen to obscurity as third party cavaliers tend to do.

         Jay R. Morgan, The American Elephant: A Study of the Republican Party, 1980

Once revived from a laughing fit upon receipt of the president's demands, the congressional Republicans responded, in no uncertain terms, that they would not consider enacting Roosevelt's legislation. GOP leadership, conducting themselves in the manner as described above by Morgan, rejected the mere prospect of submitting the proposals for legislative debate. In some ways, the opposition was even fiercer than it was when dealing with Bryan. "Democracy is a known menace and purveyor of financial disruption," Senator John Spooner blasted in a letter to Whitelaw Reid, "but an opportunist and turncoat is a most malicious demon." Spooner, as well as Senators Aldrich and Fairbanks, composed the chief conservative obstruction to Roosevelt in the upper house. In the lower house, Speaker Cannon acted in a similar role.

Although both were earnest ideologues of Republicanism, Theodore Roosevelt and Speaker Joseph Cannon never could come to terms with the role of Congress in the American system. While the President professed a belief in curtailing the excesses of corporate hegemony and plutocratic rule, Cannon dismissed it all, top to bottom. The speaker viciously opposed every last point in Roosevelt's Square Deal. Regarding the Progressives' proposal to explore federal land conservation, Cannon famously surcharged with disgust, "Not one cent for scenery." His unambiguous autocratic control over the House of Representatives meant the likelihood for debate or designating legislative committees on such reformist subjects was microscopic.

The president may have expected a bit more courtesy from his once-allies, but there is little historical evidence to indicate that he believed Congress would budge on these foundational problems. He did not despise the conservatives on a personal level, and especially not so with regards to the more amiable Senator Lodge, but, professionally, he had trouble tolerating their positions. Roosevelt disassociated with this branch of Republicanism at every turn, doing so long before he formally joined the Progressives. Now, as the president himself noted, his deep-rooted suspicion of the "wing of the party governed by the spirit of Hanna," was confirmed. As long as the Republican leadership correlated the present state of affairs with prosperity, compromise was a dead end.

Embedded in this saddening reality was the nature of the third party problem. Should Roosevelt have succeeded in attaining the Republican nomination, congressional Republicans would have little choice but to accommodate their party leader. Progress may have proven possible under these circumstances. In this case, as it was, Roosevelt required an alternative path forward, even if meant burning some bridges to cinders and constructing new ones from scratch.

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"The Lesson It Teaches," Spencer Political Cartoon, November 18th, 1904 - Source: LoC

The Democratic Party found itself in a rather curious dilemma upon the election of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency. By the time Chief Justice Fuller administered the oath of office to the Progressive exemplar, it had become overwhelmingly certain which Democratic denomination legitimately held the reigns. Senator Richard Olney's startling defeat to the hero of San Juan Hill in that three-way race exemplified the might and influence wielded by the Bryan Democrats and their titular leader. In complying with the former president's endorsement of the Progressive platform, the Bryanites expertly disproved the myth of Bourbon competence. Now, the mantle fell to the excluded Bryan Democrats to assert their dominance.

Having been nationally discredited in the wake of the election, Democratic reorganizers began to resign en masse from the central committee. Key figures in the reactionary movement survived the exodus, like staunch conservatives Senators Joseph Bailey (D-TX) and John Daniel (D-VA), but, once more, they were confined to the minority. DNC Chair Thomas Taggart voluntary resigned in December of 1904, thereby allowing for Cleveland Mayor Tom L. Johnson (D-OH) to fulfill the duties of party chairman. The Kentucky-born mayor, an unalterable reformist and anti-monopolist, symbolized the grand return of the left-leaning faction of Democrats to party leadership. Upon the confirmation of the vote, Johnson promptly stripped David Hill and John Williams of their prominent committee assignments and released a biting statement condemning their "irrefutably undemocratic and suspect engagements during the 1904 DNC in forcing Olney's nomination. Hill and Williams each retired in disgrace, with the latter defeated in 1906 for his House seat.

William J. Bryan, indisputably the leader of the Democratic Party in the post-1904 period, corresponded with Johnson during these leadership spars, crafting new techniques for the party in the process. Among these was a request to unite the non-Bourbon elements of the party in a joint-effort alongside the burgeoning Progressives. "If there is a lesson to be drawn from this last election," Bryan publicly purported, "it is that our struggle is one in the same. The people's voice rejects the plutocrats, it rejects the monopolists, and it rejects the corrupt policies represented by the reactionaries. In 1900, the Democratic platform read that, 'a private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable.' That ticket won over 6.5 million votes. In 1904, that proclamation, and others like it, were striped bare. The total votes under that conservative mantra were fewer than 5 million. There is no chance for a conservative Democratic Party. [...] Roosevelt has the ire of plutocracy, as do I. In order to cull the dictatorial rule of trusts in the government, and enshrine the right of the people to rule, we must find areas of commonality and respond to the country's evident demand for reforms."

Southern Democrats, an integral part to the national party, were more receptive to Bryan's plea than one may expect. They were no revolutionists, overtly disapproving of Bryan's latest proposals for public ownership of railroads and disregarding the Socialists' anti-capitalist plea, but they were not all conservatives. Despite maliciously tearing away the rights of Southern black voters, these politicians applauded an assortment of socio-economic reforms not unlike the new president. Dixie reformers like Governor Jeff Davis (D-AR), a populist leader and avid white supremacist, indeed advocated for Roosevelt's crusade to dismantle the powers of trusts and corporations and vastly supported the Progressive position on federal infrastructure projects, the protection of union organizers, education reform, and the implementation of the progressive income tax.

Especially once Bryan Democracy returned to the forefront of the party, but too throughout the preceding decade, Democrats in the Southern states sounded far more like President Bryan than President Cleveland. Representatives of the wealthy planter class were gradually overshadowed by a new class of politicians resembling the heyday of Populism. The aforementioned Arkansas governor belonged to this league, as had the recently elected firebrand Mississippian Governor James K. Vardaman (D-MS), textile worker advocate Representative Coleman Blease (D-SC), former Populist Representative Thomas E. Watson (D-GA), co-owner of the Raleigh News & Observer Josephus Daniels (D-NC), and 'Godfather of Demagoguery' Senator Benjamin Tillman. These anchors for anti-plutocracy fought out of a sense of extreme resentment for the economic elite and industrial titans of the North, sometimes allying themselves with militant unionists when many early Progressives would have turned away.

Chairman Tom Johnson corralled this field to lead his mission for progressive reform, paying little mind to their explicitly racist views. Johnson and Bryan deliberately ignored their deplorable racism in order to concentrate solely on the more agreeable portions of Southern populism. As long as the theoretical legislation did not threaten to reduce the powers of local and state control of racial affairs and deliver that authority to D.C., the new Democratic leadership understood that most non-Bourbon Southerners were onboard. Therein lied the golden opportunity, for both Bryan and Roosevelt, to achieve their respective goals.

The Revolt in the Congress. President Roosevelt's Square Deal was met with antipathy by Republican lawmakers as the Speaker of the House, Joseph Cannon, denied the will of the people to be heard in the legislature. Cannon, the ultimate determiner of House agenda, maintained party discipline as increasingly impassioned demands from the chief executive piled up. Mass derision by the Democrats in Congress ensued, with Minority Leader Champ Clark proving an unlikely ally of the once-Republican Roosevelt. New York Congressman William Sulzer, cheered on by Mr. Clark and President Roosevelt, guided the bipartisan 225-man coalition in outright rebellion against the dictatorial House Speaker.

Mr. Sulzer forcibly introduced a resolution to withdraw the Speaker from the all-important House Rules Committee and strip him of his committee assignment powers - a move which served to effectively eliminate Cannon's iron rule. Outnumbered and caught off-guard, Cannon's League of Stalwarts could not withstand the appeal, and it was adopted by the day's end. Realizing his abasement, Cannon slyly requested a vote to remove him from the Speakership, confident he would win. Congress complied. To Cannon's utter shock, they voted in favor of removal. "Sometimes in politics one must duel with skunks," Cannon later remarked, "but no one should be fool enough to allow skunks to choose the weapons."

Once the smoke cleared, 37 of the 60 young Republican insurgents who partook in Sulzer's coalition formally disaffiliated from the Republicans and joined with the Columbian Party. Seven Democrats did the same. Moderate Republican Thomas S. Butler, the father of Major General Smedley Butler, rose as the new Speaker. Although not an admirer of Roosevelt, Butler gracefully adhered to the swelling tide of reform and allowed each and every Square Deal proposal to come before the floor.

         Robert Porter, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressives, Released 1996

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"The Treason of the Senate," Cover from Cosmopolitan Magazine, April 30th, 1905 - Source: Starkman/Cosmo

Speaker Cannon's spectacular fall from grace appeared to embody yet another political earthquake courtesy of President Roosevelt. The House Revolt and its subsequent passage of the Sulzer Resolution proved an intense blow to the Old Guard and its notion of congressional invincibility. Congress had pulled the brakes on Bryan's radical proposals - Why was Roosevelt immune? The keen New Yorker, as became apparent early on in his tenure, possessed a knack for putting together informal coalitions regardless of political party. Bryan, for all his base popularity, did not carry an equivalent degree of professional statesmanship and blanket progressive appeal. He would not have been able to accomplish such a bipartisan feat, but Roosevelt represented its possibility.

The president won a substantial battle over effective command of the House of Representatives, illustrated through the election of the unprincipled, conciliatory Speaker Butler, but succeeding in a duplicate manner for senatorial control would require nothing short of a miracle. Even in the period following the enactment of the 16th Amendment, the United States Senate did not contain the same democratic expectations of accountability that the House had. Many long-serving senators, like Senators Thomas Platt, Nelson Aldrich, and John Spooner, skillfully established that they could win direct elections to the legislature. Unlike in the lower chamber, the Senate did not designate official leadership positions (aside from the vice president), but the Republican Party ceremoniously recognized an appointed conference chairperson as their de facto floor manager. In the 59th Congress, this post was awarded to fierce anti-progressive Senator Charles Fairbanks.

Fairbanks, commander of the Indiana Republican Party since the death of President Beveridge, validated his worth to the Old Guard from the moment of his 1896 senatorial ascension. He played a key part the organization of the 1904 Depew Campaign (famously bowing out of the race to support Depew's renomination alongside Foraker) and was nominated vice president by the Republican Party that same year. Fairbanks was granted a seat at the table with fellow influential conservatives, and at only 52 years of age was designated Chairman of the U.S. Senate Republican Conference. With the future of his career at stake, Fairbanks paid close attention to the House Revolt and took steps to ensure an identical scenario would not play out in the Senate.

At about the same time Cannon was facing removal from power, Senate Republicans were placing the finishing touches on a vital new piece of legislation. Looking to spurn Roosevelt and cast revenge for the electoral degradation of President Depew, Fairbanks authorized the creation of a bill, co-authored by Senator Nelson Aldrich, intended to repeal in its totality the American Safeguards Act. This, the law which forbade the issuing of injunctions by courts to breakup labor strikes, was widely viewed as the final vestige of anarchic pro-labor reform passed by President Bryan. Depew reportedly planned to go forward with such a repeal if he were to be elected, but Roosevelt had no such inclination. Fairbanks needed support from two-thirds of the Senate in the likely outcome of a presidential veto, and, by all historical accounts of this moment in history, he may have been on the verge of attaining it. Conservatism, as well as the fortitude of the Republican Old Guard, evidently thrived in the upper chamber far more so than the lower.

However, fewer than 48-hours prior to the initial vote on the repeal at the tail end of April 1905, a Cosmopolitan magazine article ominously entitled, "The Treason of the Senate," reached store shelves. Written by "muckracker" (a slang term for a reform-minded anti-corruption journalist) David Graham Phillips, this editorial was a toxic exposé on the corrupt tendencies of Senator Aldrich. "Treason is a strong word," the article began, "but not too strong to characterize the situation in which the Senate is the eager, resourceful, and indefatigable agent of interests as hostile to the American people as any invading army could be." Phillips accused Aldrich of possessing close ties with the vast Rockefeller interests, and that "the millions for watchers, spellbinders, halls, processions, posters, pamphlets, that are spent in national, state and local campaigns" were paid in full by that wealthy dynasty. The article went on, claiming that the Rhode Island senator controlled his state legislature, bribed his electoral opponents, forged an unholy alliance with Arthur Gorman, and guided public policy to systematically benefit the Rockefeller trusts via tariff legislation.

Yet again, the nation was captivated with the outrageous dealings in Washington. With the powerful Aldrich name ran through the theoretical muck, the American public questioned why his likeness was attached to the Safeguards repeal. The simple answer was, of course, that Rockefeller interests would benefit tremendously by the (re)legalization of strike injunctions. A deafening outcry for the bill's defeat followed suit, threatening to relegate its fate to the historical dustbin. Fairbanks and the Republican leadership, albeit shaken by the ordeal, retained the party line that such yellow journalism was untrustworthy and "ridiculous falsehoods masterminded by Bill Hearst." Ironically, Hearst did assist Phillips with the sensationalist story, but historical evidence, not conjecture, backs up many of the aforementioned claims.

Flagrantly ignoring the demand of the people and the command of the president, Fairbanks reiterated his intent to see the vote take place. In spite of his wish to see it through, the senator's staff discovered, upon further examination, that the odds of overriding Roosevelt's anticipated veto were very poor. About a dozen Republicans announced their intent to vote against the measure, and nearly the entire Democratic delegation readied itself to sink the bill. Forgoing the embarrassment of a failed vote, Fairbanks scuttled the effort and declared the Aldrich bill dead. As Senator Tillman relayed to the press that day, "Poor Johnny (Rockefeller) will have a good long cry into his wallet."

Nevertheless, the base issue of blocking the majority of Roosevelt's Square Deal endured. Phillips pressed on, printing monthly iterations of "The Treason of the Senate" as its revealings continuously pummeled self-righteous senators. As it went on, the series highlighted the blatant corruptibility of Senator Gorman taking bribes from the sugar industry, Senator Spooner's sketchy connections with the Great Lake railway barons, Senator Knox silently working against the prosecution of banking trusts, and Former President Depew's dealings with the Vanderbilt family. 20 senators (and one president) in all were criticized by the Phillips articles. Although some notable incumbents treated the accusations as frivolous yellow journalism, others feared electoral consequences and gradually softened their anti-Roosevelt stances. "The 'Treason'," explained historian Gus J. Thompson in The Political Press, "had a profound effect on the actual ability of the Senate leadership to maintain order and discipline among the ranks. Moderates who sought to distance themselves from any remote association with the increasingly unpopular Old Guard broke ranks and called for a debate on the Square Deal."

Fortunately for the president, he did manage to enact part of his ambitious legislative agenda as planned. The 59th Congress passed several Rooseveltian proposals in 1905 and 1906. First, the Patterson Agricultural Reclamation Act was signed in mid-July, appropriating federal funds for the construction of irrigation projects in the American West and placing 230 million acres of land under federal protection. Congress also agreed to vote affirmatively on the American Antiquities Act in 1905, a measure granting the president newfound executive authority to create national monuments to protect natural or cultural environments. Roosevelt secured passage, narrowly in the Senate but rather easily in the House, of the Federal Employers Liability Act in 1906, compensating railroad workers injured on the job due to "legally negligent" conditions. Last, and perhaps the initiative which required the most arm-twisting, was the reinstatement of the Sulzer-Hepburn Act (reintroduced as the Hepburn Rebate Act of 1906) with finer guidelines that more broadly affected consolidation. The HRA passed 287-99 in the House, 46-45 in the Senate (Taft broke the tie).

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"Next On the Waiting List of the Roosevelt Club," Chicago Tribune Cartoon, April 10th, 1906 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XII: A Few Bad Men: Market Resistance and the Invisible Government

President Roosevelt was ecstatic to witness genuine progress win out in Congress, but his impatience led to a discovery that executive privilege allowed for a quicker and more forceful route of reform. More so than any predecessor, the Progressive president was fascinated by the prospect of an executive order. He enjoyed the idea of issuing presidential directives to better suit his policy objectives, and was undeterred by conservative criticism on the matter. Cannon commented on the president's inclination to supplant congressional policy-making, remarking "That fellow at the other end of the avenue wants everything from the birth of Christ to the death of the devil." Roosevelt later wrote in response, "There was a great clamor that I was usurping legislative power. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power."

The first area in which the president utilized the executive order was in conservation. He was a champion of preserving the majesty of untouched nature and taking precious care of the American countryside and its fauna. Passage of the American Antiquities and Patterson Reclamation Acts were a fine start, but far more had yet to be accomplished. Roosevelt passed executive initiatives to quadruple the amount of protected land (to 172 million) and designate hundreds of new national forests under jurisdiction of the National Forest Service. He also crafted dozens of federal monuments under the Antiquities Act, most significant of which was the Arizona-based Grand Canyon.

Beyond conservation, the president explicitly wished to tackle economic issues on the Executive level and without congressional input. By 1905, the 200 or so monopolistic trusts that ransacked the entrepreneurial landscape of the United States mastered the nation as firmly, if not more so, than Cannon once did the House. Trusts implanted themselves into every avenue of trade and controlled prices on common goods - from coal and steel to tobacco and animal products. They set the railroad rates (until the late-1906 implementation of the HRA), managed worker wages, and decimated small businesses who had the nerve to compete. As previously inferred, over 30% of American companies disappeared during the merger wave of the early twentieth century. Roosevelt, having been elected on a platform of regulating the vast consolidation of American industries, now had these trusts in his sights.

Outraged by villainous consolidation, Roosevelt charted a course for active intervention in opposition to "the restraint of trade." In the belief that the government needed to act as a counterweight to corporate power, the president hastened the creation of an informal Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, spearheaded by Attorney General McKenna, to enforce U.S. antitrust laws. Despite intense pressure by the Rockefeller and Morgan interests, McKenna's Justice Department brought forth a spree of antitrust lawsuits targeting these omnipresent powers. "The great corporations," President Roosevelt proclaimed, "which we have grown to speak of rather loosely as trusts are the creatures of the State, and the State not only has the right to control them, but it is duty bound to control them wherever the need of such control is shown."

The Antitrust Division considered its options and soon arrived at the conclusion that the first step ought to be its most monumental. Instructed by Roosevelt and McKenna, the Justice Department opened a heavily-publicized suit regarding the monopolistic nature of the Northern Securities Company. This specific trust, bolstered by President Depew's tolerant, laissez-faire administration, now effectively controlled the railway system of the American West. Rates and shipping fees had skyrocketed in the span of 1902 to 1905 in areas managed by Northern Securities. Just as they feared at the onset of the merger, Midwestern and Western state governors were forced to placate the owners of the company and submit to its demands, lest their cities be ransacked by deliberately worsened schedules and fees. Roosevelt watched this unfold during his time in the Depew Administration, and recounted in his personal memoirs that his predecessor's toleration of Northern Securities played a significant part in the decision to formally break from the Republican Party.

This was one of the first major SCOTUS cases decided in the post-Gilded Age period. Theodore Roosevelt's Justice Department argued for the prosecution of the merged interstate railroad corporation stating that its establishment was the textbook definition of a monopoly, and under the guidelines of the Sherman Antitrust Act, its formation and existence was an illegality. Attorneys working in the service of the company's chief executive, James J. Hill, argued for the defense, pleading their case that the merger did not fit the parameters of a monopoly and, furthermore, that the prosecution gravely threatened a precedent of federal overreach. On February 19th, 1906, the Supreme Court decided against the trust and ordered its breakup.

Northern Securities Company v. United States: Decision 5-4
Chief Justice Melville Fuller - Dissent
Justice John M Harlan - Plurality
Justice David J Brewer - Concurrence
Justice Henry B. Brown - Plurality
Justice Edward D. White - Dissent
Justice Rufus W. Peckham - Dissent
Justice Joseph M. Carey - Plurality
Justice William R. Day - Plurality
Justice John W. Warrington - Dissent

          Ronald L. Chapman, A Concise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 2011

Experiencing an unexpected morale boost from the decision, the Antitrust Division conducted itself in double time, pressing forward with an unprecedented chain of new lawsuits. Roosevelt brought twenty more cases before the federal court system within a period of two years, surpassing the combined 14 antitrust violations prosecuted by the previous five presidents. Northern Securities' defeat, and the court precedence of recognizing prominent trusts as illegal monopolies, frankly spelled misery for the fate of the merger wave. In a lettered response to a plea from J.P. Morgan for an arbitrated agreement on the remainder of his industrial holdings, Roosevelt wrote, "If your enterprises are proven unlawful, there is no alternative solution than that which befell Northern Securities."

To make matters worse for the commercial giants, the Supreme Court ruled thrice more in 1906 on the side of the oft-described 'trust-buster.' In Swift & Co. v. United States, the court ruled unanimously in favor of the prosecution, concurring that the federal government's regulation of the meat industry (the infamous Beef Trust which commanded half of the national market) was lawful as it protected commerce from a monopolistic force. Mirroring the case opinions cited above, the Supreme Court ruled again against massive corporate combinations in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States and U.S. Steel Co. v. United States. In both instances, as was the case in the Northern Securities decision, the plurality sided with the Justice Department's allegations pertaining to monopolistic illegality. Standard Oil, in its gobbling up of virtually all petroleum refining companies in the country, and U.S. Steel, in controlling a 3/4ths market share, were each found violating the Sherman Act. To the immense displeasure of John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan, SCOTUS ordered the breakup of their trusts in mid-to-late 1906.

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"The Busy Showman," Harper's Weekly Cartoon, May 6th, 1906 - Source: Wiki Commons

Drawing on the power of the Executive Branch, President Roosevelt sought an active presence on the world stage not unlike President Beveridge before him. From his time in the War Department, and in numerous consultations with Secretaries Hay and Moore, Roosevelt developed his knowledge on world affairs and became an astute inquisitor of American overseas influence. Blusterous jingoism oft characterized the Roosevelt wing of the Republican Party and the Beveridge presidency as a whole, but the New Yorker was not blind to the fact that the U.S. needed to utilize diplomatic means and work alongside other global governments whenever possible.

During the 1904 campaign, in a speech delivered to a crowd of enthusiasts at the St. Louis World's Fair, Roosevelt perfectly encapsulated his perspective on international matters. He exclaimed that the United States could assert its national power and expand itself economically without resorting to the horrors of the Philippines. "Right here," he said, "let me make as vigorous a plea as I know how in favor of saying nothing that we do not mean, and of acting without hesitation up to whatever we say. A good many of you are probably acquainted with the old proverb, 'Speak softly and carry a big stick – you will go far.' If a man continually blusters, if he lacks civility, a big stick will not save him from trouble, and neither will speaking softly avail, if back of the softness there does not lie strength, power." Proclaiming that the nation ought not to take part in self-glorification and outright condemnation of other peoples and governments, Roosevelt indicated a centralized approach far removed from the Beveridge years.

Roosevelt understood that the disaster of the Philippines War could never be allowed to repeat itself. The stunning death toll of that war was unconscionable, and the imperial ends did not brush away those deplorable means. He was contented with the result of that war, but from thence on the president looked to less glaring intervention that would not invoke a harsh reaction by the American press. For all intents and purposes, Roosevelt's stance served as a response to Democratic criticism of the war in the Philippines and helped to assuage Bryan's worst fears of an magisterial regime. The president pledged to only utilize a ground invasion when all other tactics were exhausted in the name of preserving democratic governance/ Nevertheless, Roosevelt refused to evolve past the opinion that expansion was inevitable and it was the divine destiny of the United States to step onto the international stage.

Under the guidance of Navy Secretary Mahan, and with halfhearted approval by then-President Depew, the U.S. Navy modernized with a major face-lift. Mahan's Navy Department and Roosevelt's War Department enacted a proliferation initiative that dramatically expanded the capabilities of both sections of the Armed Forces. Naval fortifications were renovated and the number of cruisers, battleships, and submarines doubled on Mahan's watch. The Navy Secretary had argued that an improved fleet was necessary for securing efficient and safe trade throughout the Pacific and the Americas. "Whether they will or no," Mahan once declared, "Americans must now continue to look outward. The growing production of the country demands it." His successor, George von Lengerke Meyer, held similar views regarding naval expansion. Leonard Wood, Roosevelt's pick for War Secretary, too dreamed for the perpetuation of the modernization effort.

Alongside their president, Root and Meyer concurred that the preceding administrations were focused so intensely on the Pacific markets that they passed on their own backyard. It was long past due, according to the Roosevelt Administration, for the United States to act with a tougher line in Latin America: the natural locale for economic and strategic benefits. Since the end of the Spanish-American War and the explosion of U.S. investment into the region to its South, exports tripled and commercial investments escalated three-fold. John Hay's Open Door Policy accelerated entrepreneurial interest in profitable commercial havens like Puerto Rico and Dominican Republic, but Roosevelt looked to expand the U.S. sphere of influence into Central and South America as well. He plotted ahead toward several consequential goalposts, including more stridently intervening in Honduras and Nicaragua as well as exploring the pursuit of an isthmian canal in Central America, but one in particular caught his attention.

More than anything, Roosevelt desired and championed for an international policy which served to garner prestige and notoriety for the republic. In time, the president stated, the United States would become a sufficient world power. At the time, however, the recent activities of the young nation tarnished its legitimate place as a haven for peaceful democracy. Roosevelt was profoundly discouraged by the tumultuous foreign policy choices enacted by his friend and mentor, Albert Beveridge, during the Philippines War. That conflict, from the shameful execution of Aguinaldo to the genocidal practices of the Generals Otis and Smith, considerably eroded the perception of the United States as a global force for benevolence. Though he did not condone these facets of the war and, with Hay at his side, worked to convince Beveridge to pursue a less blood-soaked path, Roosevelt's public insistence that there was no systematic cruelty did a severe number to his reputation in the Pacific. The consequences of this development did not become clear until the autumn of 1905 when the Japanese government flatly declined an offer by President Roosevelt to mediate a treaty with Russia to formally end hostilities in the Russo-Japanese War. This instance exemplified the urgent need to restore national prestige.

A second chance arose with the dawn of 1906. In the North African country of Morocco, a crisis had broken out pertaining to European oversight. The German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, proclaimed during a tour of Tangier that the Sultan of Morocco rightly deserved sovereignty from French influence. He demanded a neutral conference be held to discuss the rights of the African power to self-govern, or, more specifically, be released from its de facto status as a French protectorate. Wilhelm reached out to President Roosevelt to assist in mediating the affair, trusting that their Pacific trading partner would come to their side as needed and thereby avoid total isolation. Roosevelt was hesitant, considering the reluctance of the Senate to condone international dealings with European matters, but, recounting the missed opportunity in settling the Russo-Japanese War and wishing to retain friendly relations with the German government, he agreed.

The Algeciras Conference, taking place in Southern Spain, began in January of 1906 and lasted through April. Thirteen nations were present, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Britain, Spain, Italy, the United States, and, of course, Morocco. From the get-go, lines were drawn separating the Entente Cordial (Britain and France) from Germany. Representatives from the Italian and Spanish governments hedged their bets on the Entente side of the room, supporting their proposals and shaking their heads at the German ministers. The main issues meant to be discussed, ownership and control of the banking and police systems in Morocco, essentially surrounded the idea of French oversight. French diplomat Paul Révoil transparently fought in favor of subjecting the Bank of Morocco to French laws and a French-style judicial system, a division of capital in which France would hold a majority share (27%), and the preferential right to make loans held by France. They also hoped to ensure police instructors were French and that their own officers would determine the distribution of precincts.

Knowing their chance of victory was extraordinarily slim, German representative Joseph Maria von Radowitz proposed a compromise. Objecting to France's terms, the Germans offered an equal division of capital among the powers of Europe and neutral supervision of the institution. They also upheld the original concept that the Sultan would retain organizational powers over the police, and any foreign officers would be freely selected by him. This arrangement fell far short of the expectation of Kaiser Wilhelm to totally eradicate Entente influence in Morocco, but it too prevented an outright French protectorate. Initially, the opposing powers deemed the German plan unacceptable with Britain firm in the belief that France should have a greater share of influence. Dissuading the German ministers from displaying bluster or otherwise bullying the smaller powers present, the U.S. Ambassador Henry White urged the Entente to concede their ground avoid any further crisis. Gaining support of Austria and Italy, the United States pressed the compromise to the Entenete, arguing that the German plan offered the greatest possible compromise. Losing face, Révoil reluctantly backed down.

Tension immediately relaxed at the tail-end of the Algeciras Conference. The Moroccan government, albeit strengthened by the compromise, was not thrilled with Radowitz' concessions, nor was he disappointed by France's trouncing. Undoubtedly, France lost this bout and the Entente, weakened, was reeling from that gut-punch. Succeeding in their mission to reduce French influence, the outcome of the Moroccan Crisis was a solid victory for the German Empire. Roosevelt, on a personal level, was unsure whether White navigated the arena properly, but a closer relationship with their trading partner was not a terrible after-effect. White and Roosevelt were certainly under tremendous pressure from Pacific interests to not jeopardize ongoing arrangements with the German government, so the end result was not a complete shock. All in all, the conference concluded with the United States gaining the valuable prestige it desired, but too worsened ties with the British and the French.

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The level of detail in this TL is amazing.

Excellent stuff there. I sense we'll see the rise of the Columbians as the successor to the Republicans?

Also I'm not too well versed on the Morocco affairs in real-life, but could this be setting up a very different World War?

Thank you very much!

The old Republican Party remains a powerful organization during TR's presidency - will it stay that way? Well we will see! As for the Morocco segment, I think it's fair to say the reverberations from that conference will be felt in the coming decade

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First Charter of the Industrial Workers of the World, 1906 - Source: Wiki Commons

Since the 1904 elections, the Socialist Party bounded forward and grew steadily each passing year. Fierce and strenuous rank-and-file organization, the wide circulation of radical publications like Wayland's Appeal to Reason, and the extensive touring by orators in the mold of Eugene Debs had led to the left-wing party's massive increase in notoriety. Socialists were elated when former shoe factory worker John C. Chase (S-NY) won a seat in the national legislature on the SP line - the first in U.S. history. Chase now formally represented New York's 13th District in Congress, and although he collaborated with Progressive leaders in the lower house, he officially served as the minority leader for the Socialist Party.

Debs recognized that, despite the natural growth of Socialism manifesting with a slow-drip of political representation, the educational procedure of whistle-stop campaigning and assistance in unionizing efforts more directly influenced the changing current in America. As cemented at its 1901 founding, the official labor policy of the Socialist Party did not take an absolutist stance on unionism. Instead, it recommended socialists of all creeds join, develop, or create trade unions within their own workplaces in conjunction with the American Federation of Labor framework.

The main complication with this plank was that the AFL actively worked against the mission of the Socialist Party. In addition to their well-documented ineptitude during the Anthracite Strike, the AFL was managed by, as described by Hillquit, "conservative and incapable leaders.". Samuel Gompers, the AFL President, was especially emblematic of such criticism. In 1903, during a Boston convention of the union, Gompers self-righteously announced, "I want to say to you [Socialists] that I am entirely at variance with your philosophy. I declare it to you, I am not only at variance with your doctrines, but with your philosophy. Economically, you are unsound; socially, you are wrong; industrially, you are an impossibility."

Berger, Hillquit, and others in the central organizing committees of the SP began to reckon with an veritable truth that the AFL, in its viciously anti-socialist policies and unmovable insistence on limited craft unionism (which rejected unskilled workers - the majority of the working class), was counterproductive to their progressive ideals. Gompers' and Mitchell's conservatism, Debs recalled, undermined the strength of the working class. The socialist leader evolved past the position of AFL-affiliation at about the time of Roosevelt's presidency, but the prospect of abandonment with the entire labor movement never entered the organizer's mind. Something new was necessary to replace the old, and a suitable stand-in for the AFL finally came about in the summer of 1905.

Mine worker and prospector William Dudley "Big Bill" Haywood was a part of a contingent of Idaho silver miners that joined the militant Western Federation of Miners in the 1890s. The active and eager Haywood quickly rose up the ranks of the union, operating the WFM local and shifting leftward in the process. In his time involved with that union, he led its turn to industrial unionism, Marxist-inspired class analysis, and its 1901 promotion of "a complete revolution of social and economic conditions." These notions directly and deliberately countered the more conservative craft union theories espoused by the AFL. The WFM headed a handful of violent miner's strikes typically grouped together as the 'Colorado Labor Wars' in 1903 and 1904, and those experiences forced the workers to consider a broader industrial collective: a radical iteration of the AFL, if you will.

Haywood, in addition to Western labor leaders and members of the WFM, agreed to meet in June of 1905 to found a novel revolutionary union with a staunch commitment to class struggle. That union became the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Over three hundred delegates traveled to Brand's Hall in Chicago, including an assortment of well-known political activists and labor movement icons. Among them were Eugene Debs, Daniel DeLeon, socialist theorist Algie M. Simons, WFM Local 63 President Vincent Saint John, Catholic priest and Colorado organizer Thomas J. Hagerty, prominent community activist Mary "Mother" Jones, radical orator Lucy Parsons, and Irish republican activist James Connolly. The tall and booming Haywood opened the first meeting of the IWW.

Fellow Workers. In calling this convention to order I do so with a sense of the responsibility that rests upon me and rests upon every delegate that is here assembled. This is the Continental Congress of the working class. We are here to confederate the workers of this country into a working class movement that shall have for its purpose the emancipation of the working class from the slave bondage of capitalism. [...] The American Federation of Labor, which presumes to be the labor movement of this country, is not a working class movement. There are organizations that are affiliated with the A.F. of L. in which their constitution and by-laws prohibit the initiation of a colored man; that prohibit the same of foreigners. What we want to establish at this time is a labor organization that will open wide its doors to every man that earns his living by brain or his muscle.

         Bill Haywood, "IWW Opening Plenary Address", June 26th, 1905

The radical approach of the IWW rejected craft divisions and binding trade agreements, turning away from the labor policies of the nineteenth century and asserting the "foundational right to strike". These delegates agreed in the proposition that the union should never depend on government benevolence as the AFL had, seeing as the calamitous Anthracite Strike proved that policy's flagrant irresponsibility. The IWW also outright refused business unionism and the notion of mediation with the employing class, proposing instead an explicitly revolutionary strategy of worker-owned industries.

These ferocious attacks on "morally bankrupt" conservative unionism resonated with a significant faction of workers associated with the United Mine Workers of America. Still recovering from the abysmal failure of their Pennsylvania strike, as well as an additional wretched defeat in the Cripple Creek District of Colorado, a wide swathe of the AFL-affiliated union was immeasurably disillusioned with Mitchell's leadership, or lack thereof. Observing the discontent of their fellow miners, IWW advocates began reaching out to UMWA members in order to elucidate the idea of broad industrial unionism and the IWW framework through which the WFM and UMWA might, theoretically, coalesce. Such a scenario, that of a united miners' union, stood to categorically weaken the AFL and seriously bolster the IWW (as well as confute pro-AFL SP members).

With opposition to Mitchell and Gompers at its apex, an outline for a joint-meeting of the two unions came to a vote at the 1907 UMWA convention. Debs and Haywood ( who were extremely active in rallying support behind the scenes) opted to address the convention delegates personally. "Mere craft unionism," Debs put forth, "no matter how well it may be organized, is in the present highly developed capitalist system utterly unable to successfully cope with the capitalist class. [...] It is no part of the mission of this revolutionary working class union to conciliate the capitalist class. We are organized to fight that class, and we want that class to distinctly understand it." Then, in a moment that forever stood to alter the landscape of the United States labor movement, the dissident socialist faction broke through.

Signifying an evolution, and perhaps a revolution, the vote to break with the AFL passed with a slim majority. The United Mine Workers, from thence on, would be associated with the Industrial Workers of the World. This not only meant a far stronger mining coalition, but it gave the legitimized IWW a significant union base that it hadn't yet achieved. Debs was astonished, gladdened yet shocked, and cheerfully expressed a pledge to Haywood that the Socialist Party would do all it could to foster deep ties with the IWW: the logical organizing arm of the revolutionists. This result brought Haywood and Debs closer, effectively ended John Mitchell's career, and practically guaranteed the Socialist Party's final abandonment of the AFL. On the less optimistic side of the coin, however, the now-infuriated Gompers would introduce an element that otherwise might never have come to pass. Starting in 1907, the AFL president explored the drafting of paid informants to spy on the new national union organization. Conservative resistance, after all, is a common feature of revolutionary progressive change.

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Crowd at the Federal Hall National Memorial in New York City, September 10th, 1906 - Source: Wiki Commons

On July 19th, 1906, John D. Rockefeller recorded his thoughts on the state of the economy in a letter to banker Charles W. Morse. He wrote, "[Roosevelt] has declared war on prosperity. That madman will disrupt every acquisition administered from the Atlantic to the Pacific. I fear for the future of United Copper. Our economy may sink to a depression if nothing is done." Morse, a crooked shipping, banking, and ice magnate (in some circles he was known as the "Ice King"), concurred with Rockefeller that the economy was teetering on the brink. Shining a light on his timely insight, the banker returned a short message to Rockefeller. "I will say this - if prosperity is snuffed out, nevermore will a man like Roosevelt win a position of authority above dogcatcher."

There is no historical evidence indicting Roosevelt's policies for the market conditions of the latter half of 1906, despite what some contemporary conservative economists may assert, but it was certainly the case that the stock market began sliding from the moment the Supreme Court justices read aloud their decision in the Northern Securities case. Rumors had begun to circulate among stockholders that the National Bank of Commerce, a relatively powerful financial institution based out of Kansas City, would be considered a future target of the courts for its position as the prime correspondence bank in Missouri and Illinois. Its stock value sharply fell on September 2nd, and all but collapsed by the 3rd. In a ripple effect, spurred on by reports of mismanagement and overextended credit by high-profile institutions like the Knickerbocker Trust Company and the First National Band of Brooklyn, patrons of other banking conglomerates began fearing for their savings. A series of textbook bank runs ensued as tens of thousands demanded their holdings withdrawn.  

Coinciding with the rising trend of bank closures, the New York Stock Exchange very nearly shut down as stock prices plummeted by the hour. Stockholders rushed to the exchange at the same speed account holders darted to the banks, causing an uproar in the financial district. Only by the private insistence by J.P. Morgan that closing the exchange could reinforce economic uncertainty was the decision made to keep the doors open. By this point, around September 10th, the ongoing banking panic rose to a fever pitch with confidence at its lowest in a decade. Wall Street, it appeared, faced the prospect of ruination. The situation seemed bleak, and those in charge of the financial sector had immense difficulty in manufacturing a viable solution.

Speculators, financiers, and political analysts squarely blamed Roosevelt for the crisis, deeming him responsible for inciting the panic by prosecuting the trusts. Many Standpatter Republican senators concurred, with Fairbanks leading that charge in Congress. "The actions by this administration," proclaimed the Indianan, "to tarnish the good name of American commerce have led us here. The unfounded charges of widespread misdeeds and malfeasance have taken a mighty toll. [...] To quote scripture, 'For whatever a man sows, this he will also reap.'" The upper class, in one unified voice, damned Roosevelt for the sudden financial hardship, but did little to actually remedy the crisis.

President Roosevelt, having embraced the hatred of corporate economists and wealthy capitalists, ignored their verbal assaults and explored the necessary steps to calm the air. He recognized that a tumble on Wall Street and an escalation of bank closures could adversely affect the larger United States economy and spread hardship unforeseen since the early 1890s. Still, he was not delighted with the idea of assisting the very businessmen who resoundingly despised his presence in Washington, nor was he thrilled to help the trusts that operated in a mannerism counter to the people's interest. It was a textbook quagmire, but Roosevelt, being a man of action, did not see fit to let it all crumble away.

Roosevelt, not desirous of new enemies, struggled to find the correct tone in addressing the ears of the citizenry. All he could do was to soothe the public with unspecific promises of forthcoming recovery. At the White House, the president held a Cabinet meeting to discuss the administration's plan, and eventually did settle on a verdict. Roosevelt directed Treasury Secretary L.M. Shaw, a former commercial banker, to conduct a cordial gathering of bank owners and elites in New York. Mr. Shaw followed the directive, and by the end of the week met with red-nosed J.P. Morgan, First National Bank President George Baker, and National City Bank Chairman James Stillman. None of these aristocrats were particularly conciliatory, but Shaw hoped for a mediated settlement as they conferred for an entire evening.

The inevitable impasse arrived soon enough, it being on the central topic of recovery investment. In the simplest terms, Shaw insinuated that it was the patriotic obligation of Morgan and his clan to invest their vast fortunes in the banks to retain solvency. It ought not to be the duty of the government, he professed, to bail out the financial sector responsible for the crisis. Morgan thought otherwise. To him, and his financier partners, the burden lied with Roosevelt to accumulate the funds. Morgan pointed to the president's incessant demonization of big business as the cause of the panic, and, already acutely enraged by the administration's prosecution of Northern Securities and U.S. Steel, would not consider investing his own monies. [...] Shaw wired Roosevelt with the details. Roosevelt asked whether the ordeal was rectifiable, to which Shaw responded negatively.

         Thomas O'Conner, A Radical History of American Politics: Vol. 5, 2016

On the morning of September 18th, when Secretary Shaw was in the process of boarding a D.C.-bound train, President Roosevelt delivered an address on the subject of Progressivism to a gaggle of reporters in Buffalo, New York. He motioned to several landmark initiatives that had the potential to curb an outright collapse, such as launching inquiries into the closed banks and coordinating a deal with the New York Cleaning House. Roosevelt also (begrudgingly) authorized the U.S. Treasury to dedicate tens of millions in accumulated funds, and an equal amount in loans, toward the recovery. However, he made it a point to emphasize that the best-known names on Wall Street had seen fit to lean back and witness the chaos unfold (in truth, Rockefeller and Morgan deposited some millions into a number of New York banks, yet, when scaled with their total amassed fortune, the donations were minuscule).

Roosevelt stated, "The investigation of malignant trusts conducted by the Justice Department have unearthed the rotted core of plutocratic indulgence. In the interest of the public welfare, we must be sure of the proper conduct of the interstate railways and the proper management of interstate business as we are now sure of the conduct and management of the national banks, and we should have as effective supervision in one case as in the other. Ridding the notorious rascality of industry combinations is what shall save the economy. Succumbing to plutocracy is what leads to calamity." This segment of the speech, thus far in his presidency the harshest Roosevelt had been to corporate America, boosted middle and working class adoration to new heights and succeeding in restoring a degree of public confidence within the Empire State.

Morgan, innately disturbed by the virulently anti-business demeanor of Secretary Shaw at their meeting, was further appalled by the presidential address. Roosevelt demolished his most valuable holdings, disregarded his advice at every turn, and now publicly deflected blame onto the trusts for the panic. Driven to spitefulness, Morgan refused to allow the president to escape the crisis unscathed. In a move typically cited by historians as a slice of requital against the administration, he retracted a last-ditch fundraising appeal by New York City Mayor Edward M. Shepard (D-NY). The mayor had worked throughout the crisis to raise sufficient funds to avert a double-drip panic, but, in defiance of ample bond purchases by the some of the city's wealthiest residents, he remained $20 million short. With October on the horizon, Mayor Shepard prepared to announce that the City of New York had fallen into bankruptcy. "He made his bed," Morgan said of Roosevelt, "and now he shall lie in it."

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Site at the New York Stock Exchange, September 29th, 1906 - Source: Wiki Commons

New York City's economic outlook appeared grim. Once Morgan disclosed his refusal to service the struggling government, Mayor Shepard worried for the financial solvency of his city. At the start of the crisis, even as bank runs threatened the fate of Wall Street, the mayor felt assured in the his government's ability to speedily settle its existing loans (underwritten by J.P. Morgan). The city owed upwards of $40 million in loans it initially requested as a means to transiently finance its expenditures. Now, with the municipal government already unable to meet payroll contracts and recompense its contractors, it required a minimum $20 million just to keep itself afloat.

Mayor Shepard, along with the city controller, asked to meet with Morgan personally, but the robber baron would not see them. They appealed four times that September, but were constantly rebuffed. On the 25th, a message arrived from J.P. Morgan & Company (likely written by George Perkins) addressed to the Office of the Mayor. "Discuss city finances elsewhere," the correspondence read. "We realize the gravity of your situation, but this company has accommodated sufficient capital and will do so no more unless the allowance is repaid." Perkins also snidely indicated that Shepard would have no better luck dealing with Baker and Stillman. Evidently, the New York City brush fire would not be extinguished by the capitalists.

Disgruntlement resonating from New Yorkers toward the banker class was intense. Socialists generally anticipated such activity by the moneyed elite, but the more judicious Progressives were astonished by the audacity of those like Morgan who happily allowed the governments of the United States to bail out an ungrateful Wall Street, yet knowingly turned away at the prospect of paying that kindness forward. Morgan's scornfullness for the Roosevelt Administration was not a well-kept secret by 1906, but to refuse monetary assistance when New York was in such dire straights was inexcusably reprehensible. Even some conservatively-oriented Republicans, who otherwise would never dare to criticize affluent industrialists, could not help but express their discontent with the circumstances as well. This aforementioned group did not include the Republican National Committee, nor its most reputable politicians who heavily relied on financial investitures by the elite banking clan.

President Roosevelt expected no better from his fiercest antagonists. He thenceforth bristled at the mere mention of J. Pierpont Morgan, and vowed never again to grant the trust owners the benefit of the doubt. It was the duty of the wealthiest Americans, he once configured, to contribute what it could to ensure a functioning republic. The bad trusts required regulation, he had reckoned, but there were too upstanding businessmen who earned their wealth through legal means and knew how to responsibility manage it. Now, a fortiori, the president realized that those of profound wealth were, by their very class status, adversaries of the general welfare. There was no longer a separation in Roosevelt's mind between benevolent elites and wicked elites. All of them were immoral, and redistribution was the only viable path.

During a presidential address pertaining to the handling of the city budget crisis, held on September 27th at the base of the New York Public Library in Manhattan, Roosevelt contemptuously declared, "It may well be that the determination of the government (in which, gentlemen, it will not waver) to punish certain malefactors of great wealth, has been responsible for something of the trouble; at least to the extent of having caused these men to combine to bring about as much financial stress as possible, in order to discredit the policy of the government and thereby secure a reversal of that policy, so that they may enjoy unmolested the fruits of their own evil-doing. [...] I regard this contest as one to determine who shall rule this free country—the people through their governmental agents, or a few ruthless and domineering men whose wealth makes them peculiarly formidable because they hide behind the breastworks of corporate organization." The gloves were thrown off, and, at the end of the bankruptcy emergency, the president had his sights at the ready.

Insofar as the solution was concerned, President Roosevelt, working closely with Governor Frank W. Higgins (R-NY) and Mayor Shepard, confirmed a viable plan that stood to forestall bankruptcy. First, the governor authorized the creation of a rather haphazard Emergency Financial Solvency Board. This agency conducted significant budget cuts to reduce expenditures, including reducing municipal worker pay, freezing new appointments in all city service branches, and cutting the police, ambulatory, and government workforces(temporarily) by about half. Secondly, Roosevelt bludgeoned any lingering affable New York bankers and businessmen into merging resources to shore up the necessary funding. In addition to meager pledges by the federal and state treasurers and some notable revenue bond acquisitions by prominent officials like Senators Platt and McClellan, the zero-hour effort raised a sufficient sum: $21.5 million.

Therefore, the final push was successful and the city staved off bankruptcy. It bounced back over the ensuing months, and Mayor Shepard was extensively commended for his role in that recovery. Budgetary constraints lessened the effectiveness of the city administration and its services, but by 1909 the bulk of the emergency measures were rescinded. When discussing long-term effects of the bankruptcy squeeze, the chief consequence had been a significant shift in how working Americans perceived profane wealth (particularly in New York). Fortunes once hailed as proof of American ingenuity and promise were now eyed by an increasingly critical general public as undeserved.

"J.P. Morgan's legacy in the twentieth century," wrote biographer John Hauser, "was not his dynastical rule, nor was it the consolidated steel and railroad companies he built up. Morgan's role in the Panic of 1906 and the New York City Bankruptcy Crisis validated the Socialist argument against capitalist accumulation and accelerated the movement for economic democracy, and it is for that he is remembered."

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1906 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Republican: 43 (-4)
Democratic: 40 (-2)
Progressive: 7 (+6)

House
Democratic: 165 (+13)
Republican: 153 (-29)
Progressive: 70 (+21)
Socialist: 2 (+1)
Independent: 1 (+1)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Thomas S. Butler (R-PA)
Minority Leader Champ Clark (D-MO)
Minority Leader Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader John C. Chase (S-NY)

Leading into the congressional elections for the 60th Congress, President Roosevelt actively campaigned for those politicians he found most likely to support his agenda for the remainder of his presidential term. The Progressive Party's notoriety was indeed substantially bolstered from the presidential election, but its role in defenestrating Joseph Cannon from the speakership demonstrated the seriousness to which the new party planned to meet the public's demand. To those incumbent congressmen who disliked the prospect of switching parties mid-session, the legislative elections in 1906 granted them their first opportunity to voluntarily affiliate with and win re-election as a Columbian representative. The bulk of Democratic officeholders, predominantly from the South, preferred to retain their traditional banners, but for those Republicans who otherwise would face arduous re-election challenges, switching over seemed a more favorable option.

Others in the GOP, mainly conservatives and strict party loyalists, allowed fate to take the wheel. Two years prior, 219 Republicans were elected to the 59th House of Representatives. In 1906, only 153 Republicans won on that label. Democrats raked in on Republican losses in most districts, increasing their House delegation to 165. Progressives fared marvelously, compiling onto their existing 49 seats with an additional 21; chiefly in Wisconsin, Illinois, and along the West Coast. The Socialist Party also won their second federal representative in California's 8th district, when a contentious four-way race concluded with labor activist Noble A. Richardson (S-CA) defeating his nearest opponent by about 102 votes. No one party possessed a 196-seat majority in the 60th Congress, yet enough Progressives cast their vote for Butler that he remained Speaker of the House.

Unlike their counterparts in the House, Senate Republicans overall proved far less willing to abandon ship. Only Senator Robert M. La Follette officially brandished the Progressive mantle over the course of the expired Congress. As Roosevelt's closest senatorial ally and an organizer within the party itself, La Follette reasoned that he could better assist the administration and entice more to their side by tossing away GOP affiliation. In Milwaukee speech, the senator declared, "Our government was designed to be representative of the will of the people. Have we such a government today? Or is this country fast coming to be dominated by forces that threaten the true principle of representative government? The infectious and nefarious force of corporate consolidation has hollowed out the Party of Lincoln and sentenced its politicians to plutocratic servitude. The restoration of representative government, once given to this people by the God of Nations, cannot occur unless guided by a political faction untainted by outside influence. It is for that reason I call upon my fellow Americans dedicate yourselves to winning back the independence of this country, to emancipate this generation and throwing off from the neck of the freemen of America, the yoke of the political machine."

Republicans, especially as compared with the prior elections, significantly underperformed. The GOP Old Guard anticipated a move against them as a rippling effect of alleged Treason, but reactions differed immensely, senator to senator. Some failed to recognize the scope of the extraordinarily disadvantageous wave and suffered as a result, while others bailed out to avoid tarnishing their political reputations. Aside from Senator Shelby Cullom (R-IL), who outwardly expressed an alliance with the Progressives at the onset of his re-election bid, all other incumbent Republicans who managed to hang on in 1906 did so with less than a majority vote. The retirements of Senators Russell Alger (R-MI), George Wetmore (R-RI), Henry Burnham (R-NH), and John F. Dryden (R-NJ) served to fuel the fire as Democratic and Progressive challengers sensed blood in the water.

Senator Henry A. du Pont (R-DE), a typified pro-business and anti-Rooseveltian Republican, would have likely remained untouched in any other congressional year. He won over 60% of the electorate in the 1902 special election for that seat, exemplifying Delawarean support for the prominent public official. Few reasonably expected a genuine contest, and fewer still envisioned the senator's downfall. The Middletown DE Transcript even went as far as to exclaim, "For Senator Du Pont, it is clear that his tenure shall only end when he wills it." Reality, however, was not so rosy for the wealthy incumbent. Former Governor Ebe W. Tunnell (D-DE), who bombarded Du Pont with a steady stream of effective campaign assaults, was victorious in that Senate election. Tunnell captured 46% of the vote, compared with Du Pont's 30% and lesser-known Progressive John M. Mendinhall's 21%.

A three-way senatorial race in Idaho also ended rather fascinatingly. Incumbent Senator Fred Dubois (D-ID), a former Silver Republican and moderate Bryan Democrat, ran once more for re-election in 1906. He had been in office for sixteen years at that point, and was eyed curiously by the electorate due to his ever-shifting policy views. Dubois was extensively criticized for backing the Olney Campaign in 1904 instead of supporting Roosevelt, and for that he failed to garner support by the Progressives moving forward. The Republicans nominated Philippine-American War veteran Thomas Ray Hamer (R-ID), a member of the Idaho House of Representatives, to challenge Dubois for the seat. Hamer, in the end, was unable to sufficiently establish himself as an agreeable alternative to the incumbent, allowing for the ascension of attorney William E. Borah (P-ID). Endorsed and financially boosted by the Progressive committee, Borah characterized himself as the only reliable Roosevelt ally in the running, and, primarily for this, won that election.

In New Jersey, the nominee of the Republican Party for Senate, Representative Henry C. Loudenslager (R-NJ), was (like Du Pont) initially thought to easily exceed 60% of the vote and come out victorious. The chief opposition compromised of Democratic real estate businessman James Edgar Martine (D-NJ), who bankrolled his own campaign yet found difficulty culminating a sufficient base of support. About one month prior to the election, former Governor Franklin Murphy, a reform-minded Republican, decided to make a last-minute announcement at a small venue in Trenton. He announced his own candidacy as an independent Progressive for the Senate race, claiming that neither Standpatter Republican Loudenslager nor wealthy businessman Martine adequately represented the people of New Jersey. He promptly received an avid endorsement from President Roosevelt, and went on to win that race by a slim margin over Loudenslager.

In the Gilded Age period, the state of Maine was perhaps the most ardently Republican state. Both of its senators were members the Republican Party, and all four of its House representatives were as well. William Pierce Frye (R-ME) was the incumbent Pine Tree State Class 2 senator since 1881, when James G. Blaine vacated that seat to serve as President's Garfield's Secretary of state. Exceptionally conservative, expansionist, and a proponent of protectionism, Frye had been the epitome of a late-19th century Old Guard Republican. Unfortunately for this legacy, Frye was ruthlessly depicted as a shipping industry stooge in a Phillips article, and for that lost a great deal of public adoration. Disregarding the potential of a serious Democratic challenger, the incumbent refused to actively campaign. Maine State Senator Oakley C. Curtis (P-ME) and law official William Pennell (D-ME) put up a tough contest, but Frye narrowly escaped a humiliating loss. With a mere 44% of the vote, Frye was re-elected. Although Frye was never toppled, the closeness of this race demonstrated how precarious a position the Old Guard was in.

Taking place alongside the congressional races, New York State residents voted for their preferred candidate for the governorship. Incumbent Governor Frank W. Higgins opted against running for re-election due to an escalating illness. Not wishing to provoke a Progressive insurgency in the Empire State, Governor Higgins eventually convinced GOP Boss and former Governor Benjamin Odell (R-NY) to allow President Roosevelt an opportunity to select a fusion candidate. Roosevelt selected public utility investigator, corporation lawyer, and Cornell Law School professor Charles Evans Hughes (R-NY). A picturesque critic of corporate corruption, Hughes was described by the president as, "a sane and sincere reformer, who [...] is free from any taint of demagogy." Progressives united around him, as did the Republicans, and Hughes became an early frontrunner in the gubernatorial election that year.

Defeating fellow contenders John Alden Dix (D-NY) and Representative William Sulzer, notorious agitator and celebrated yellow journalist William R. Hearst won the Democratic nomination for governor in 1906. Hearst, having served as a congressman from New York since 1902, constantly and viciously objected to conservative governing at the federal level. He most recently had led a short-lived filibuster against a House version of the American Safeguards repeal bill (which was rescinded in March of 1905) and helped to engineer the anti-Cannon Revolt in Congress. Now, as a gubernatorial candidate, Hearst pledged to institute a state-wide 8-hour working day, recognize and arbitrate with labor unions, and abolish child labor in totality. He worked to display himself as a "bonafide progressive" challenging the "machinist" Republican establishment which stood against regulation of the financial sector. Hughes, who was a rather poor public speaker, had trouble articulating a rebuttal to Hearst's charges.

The race shifted in late-October when, in the aftermath of the bankruptcy crisis, Hughes was discovered to have accepted a hefty campaign donation from banker James Stillman. Democrats seized on the news, reciting the slogan "Hughes is for Wall Street, Hearst is for Main Street". Hearst professionally sensationalized the controversy by his own framing in the New York Journal, popularizing the transaction enough to garner the attention of Former President Bryan. The Nebraskan formally endorsed Hearst for Governor on October 30th, stressing the rare opportunity for New Yorkers to be represented by an individual who "knew all the names, and all the faces, of all the men who wronged working people in New York." Pundits forecasted a close race, and neither side took a moment to subside activity until the last minutes of the campaign. Hughes benefited enormously from Roosevelt's backing, but it seemed the Wall Street and GOP support harmed the candidate more than it assisted him. Boosted by depressed Progressive turnout and an energized contingent of New York City Democrats, William Randolph Hearst defeated Charles Evans Hughes: 737,046 votes (or 49.7%) to 724,812 (48.9%). A new era was dawning for the Democratic Party, and Hearst's victory proved the first true defeat for Roosevelt since 1900.

  

Senators Elected in 1906 (Class 2)

John Tyler Morgan (D-AL): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Jeff Davis (D-AK): Democratic Hold, 80%
John F. Shafroth (D-CO): Democratic Hold, 48%
Ebe W. Tunnell (D-DE): Democratic Gain, 46%
Augustus Bacon (D-GA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
William E. Borah (P-ID): Progressive Gain, 43%
Shelby M. Cullom (R-IL): Republican Hold, 51%
William P. Hepburn (P-IA): Progressive Gain, 49%
Charles Curtis (P-KS): Progressive Gain, 46%
Thomas H. Paynter (D-KY): Democratic Hold, 66%
Murphy J. Foster (D-LA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
William P. Frye (R-ME): Republican Hold, 44%
*Charles J. Bonaparte (P-MD): Progressive Gain, 37%
Winthrop M. Crane (R-MA): Republican Gain, 47%
William A. Smith (R-MI): Republican Hold, 45%
Knute Nelson (R-MN): Republican Hold, 44%
Anselm J. McLaurin (D-MS): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Joseph K. Toole (D-MT): Democratic Hold, 48%
William A. Poynter (D-NE): Democratic Hold, 51%
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R-NH): Republican Hold, 46%
Franklin Murphy (P-NJ): Progressive Gain, 40%
Furnifold Simmons (D-NC): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Jonathan Bourne Jr. (P-OR): Progressive Gain, 40%
Samuel P. Colt (R-RI): Republican Hold, 45%
Benjamin Tillman (D-SC): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Andrew E. Lee (D-SD): Democratic Gain, 44%
Robert L. Taylor (D-TN): Democratic Hold, 64%
Joseph W. Bailey (D-TX): Democratic Hold, 70%
Thomas S. Martin (D-VA): Democratic Hold, 68%
Stephen B. Elkins (R-WV): Republican Hold, 41%
C.H. Parmelee (D-WY): Democratic Hold, 45%

*Special Election

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The First Family, August 24th, 1907 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XIII: A Grand Bargain: The Unlucky Fortune of Jurgis Rudkus

Subsequent to the legislative elections, President Roosevelt, despite his eagerness to plow ahead with progressive reform, took some time to define the image of his presidency in advance of the upcoming presidential race. The 60th Congress would not meet for its first session until December of 1907. In that interim, the president fostered a more harmonious representation of himself than the prototypical blustering cowboy that so often flooded the popular imagination. Unlike any of his recent predecessors, Roosevelt allowed reporters into the now-renovated White House and cultivated incessant coverage for his administrations. It had been many years since the United States president built a decent relationship with newspaper correspondents,and the incumbent thought it wise to change that.

Newsmen followed the daily activities of the personable leader, capturing frequent informal photographs and witty one-liners. He granted them, essentially, the first modern press briefings. This resulted in considerably favorable coverage that spanned every mainstream publication regardless of its political orientation (aside from extreme partisans). Positive reporting from daily columnists allowed Roosevelt to connect with middle-class supporters who gobbled up the latest presidential news as if it was candy. Especially in the post-Panic period, but even at the onset of his 1898 gubernatorial election, Roosevelt was a celebrity leader - and he knew it, loved it, and used it to his advantage whenever possible.

Around the autumn of 1906, President Roosevelt completing his reading of The Jungle, a novel authored by muckraker and anti-corruption advocate Upton Sinclair. The Jungle was a contemporaneous story of a Lithuanian immigrant as he strives to establish a promising life for himself and his family in the United States. The protagonist, Jurgis Rudkis, works in the meat industry, and it through his viewpoint that the reader is taught the unsanitary and gruesome conditions of the Chicago meatpacking plants. Rudkis endures rancid wage slavery, workplace accidents, and frequent mistreatment by the factory employers until he is driven to homelessness and addiction.

Author Upton Sinclair, who based the tale on his own experience working undercover in the meat industry, meant to expose the very real conditions of the meatpacking plants and that of poor, second-wave immigrants through the fictionalized perspective of Rudkis. Sinclair hoped that capturing the essence of unregulated capitalism and extreme systematic inequality would not only spur interest in worker's rights, but indicate the base faults with capitalism itself. The novel ends with Rudkis finding purpose and financial support in a socialist community, thereby demonstrating socialism's innate humanism and focus on cooperative labor in place of competition. Rudkis learns to embrace community-oriented socialism and his story ends on a hopeful note. With such an ending, Sinclair believed that the readership, numbering in the millions by the end of 1906, would arrive to a similar anti-capitalist conclusion.

President Roosevelt, who initially balked at Sinclair and his audience for instilling socialism in the public psyche, stated his "utter contempt" for the author, and affirmed that "three-fourths of the things he said were absolute falsehoods." Once he took the time to read the story, however, the president became appalled by the bleakly described factory conditions. He was disgusted less so by the foundational condition of immigrant workers than the nauseatingly unsanitary meat packing plants, allegedly tossing aside a plate of sausage mid-meal and promptly ordering an investigation of the industrialized workplaces. That research, headed by Commissioner Charles P. Neill, verified the legitimacy of Sinclair's assertions.

When the Congress did convene, Roosevelt required an attentive avenue of reform. The administration toyed with several monumental initiatives, and, due to the favorable congressional elections, coalition-building was far more viable than it had been previously. The Square Deal, as previously inferred, carried with it an ample amount of proposals, and it was up to the president to designate which legislative endeavors were more worthy of immediate implementation. Acting on his own accord, but too pressured by public demands, he would move meatpacking regulation to the top of that list.

Agricultural regulatory measures notwithstanding, Roosevelt funneled his frustrations with the economic status quo into a single objective. The greatest legacy Roosevelt wished to his administration to leave behind was lessening excessive economic inequality. After the numerous scraps over his first two years in office, he witnessed first-hand the dangerous notion of extreme wealth in the hands of a select few puffed-up individuals. Therefore, Roosevelt's number one priority narrowed down to implementing the Bryan-era Constitutional amendment pertaining to the income tax. "The really big fortune," he declared, "the swollen fortune, by the mere fact of its size, acquires qualities which differentiate it in kind as well as in degree from what is possessed by men of relatively small means, Therefore, I believe in a graduated income tax on big fortunes, and in another tax which is far more easily collected and far more effective—a graduated inheritance tax on big fortunes, properly safeguarded against evasion, and increasing rapidly in amount with the size of the estate."

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Senator Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana, 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

From the moment of Chairman McKinley's retirement and his handing of the reigns to Whitelaw Reid, the Republican Party's future  was set in stone. Much like his predecessor, Reid took it upon himself to reaffirm the party's mantra of arch-conservatism and stringent defiance of Theodore Roosevelt. The national committee first looked to resist the new president at an even stronger level than Bryan, returning to the consensus of the late Garret Hobart's mandate in 1897. Chairman Reid, with the 'Big Four' leading U.S. Senators, managed the party with an iron fist through the brunt of Roosevelt's presidency. However, that scene began to shift as the events of the last several years played out. In the aftermath of David Phillips' publishing of "The Treason of the Senate," Once-dominant Senators Spooner and Platt privately indicated their shared intention to step down after completing their terms in March of 1909. Aldrich, thoroughly defamed and dragged through the mud, began to fear that his political strength had been stripped as a result of allegations of blatant corruption.

Senator Fairbanks, not yet reprimanded by the "Treason" series, had been the sole member of the upper echelon of Republican senatorial power untarnished during the course of the 59th Congress. Even the aged hardliner Senator Frye was publicly disgraced by his near-loss in a bastion of Eastern Republicanism, leaving Fairbanks as one of the few remaining influential Old Guard Republicans as the new Congress came to order. The Hoosier shepherded resistance to the noisy president and his Senate agenda up to this point, and he planned an identical tactic for the incoming session. Losses in the congressional elections substantially weakened his position, however, and eschewed Fairbanks' intent to keep up unmoving resistance. His league of oppositionist hardliners stayed in command despite these losses, but Fairbanks, who hoped to retain Republican superiority in the upper chamber, was not blind to the fact that his party was in jeopardy.

The results in the Senate contests reduced the total number of Republican senators to 43 from 47. Although the GOP figure outnumbered the Democrats' 40, the inclusion of Columbian Party into the new Congress muddled the true senatorial composition. Independent Progressives had gained seven seats of their own. In the case of a Democratic-Progressive alliance, albeit not incredibly likely in the Senate but a possibility nonetheless, the Republicans would have lost their position of authority altogether and be relegated to a minority contingent. Fairbanks, frightened by the mere thought, took steps to avoid such a culmination. Therefore, just before the 60th Senate met for its first session on December 2nd, Fairbanks requested a face-to-face meeting with President Roosevelt.

Recognizing deep distrust betwixt the factions, stemming from years of infighting and further symbolized by the 1904 split, Fairbanks approached Roosevelt in a cordial manner. Roosevelt accepted the request upon considerable contemplation, likely believing the humbled Republican leader prepared to, at long last, lower the barriers. More or less, the president was correct in his assumption. Fairbanks gently implored the president to work alongside the Republican Party instead of allying himself with Senate Democrats. He granted the president that a workable coalition was already garnered in the House, and short-term alliances were built in the previous congressional session, but Fairbanks insisted that it would better suit the president in the long-term to work with the GOP instead of either the Southern-based States' Rights Democrats or their anarchic Bryanite counterparts. Roosevelt, shocking his visitor, largely concurred.

There were assuredly areas of reasonable accommodation, especially considering the concerns of fierce anti-reformists like Spooner could be passably disregarded moving forward. For example, each deeply distrusted exposé-oriented scandal-mongering muckrakers. TR had certainly fostered a healthy relationship with the press as a whole, and had moved marginally leftward to the extent that he sympathized with printed media in their aim to reveal corruption where it existed, but he did not not agree with unethical journalists publishing (supposed) wild charges and unsubstantiated claims against fellow politicians. "The liar," he said, "is no whit better than the thief, and if his mendacity takes the form of slander he may be worse than most thieves." Roosevelt was no friend to muckrakers like David Phillips and William R. Hearst, regardless of the breadth to which he benefited from their works.

Legislatively, the two men found avenues of agreement as well. Recognizing the near-calamity of the Panic of 1906, Fairbanks did not shoot down Roosevelt's assertions pertaining to the old natural laws of the marketplace no longer proving sustainable. He disliked the precedent it set, but admitted that the economic wrongs highlighted in the banking panic required being righted through legislation. Both Fairbanks and Roosevelt eventually concurred in the need for some semblance of reform on this front, yet the final decision rested with a massive compromise from each side, or, in other terms, a 'Grand Bargain'.

President Roosevelt somewhat subscribed to the notion of labor reform as described in the Chicago Progressive platform, specifically a shortened work week and the bolstering of the American Safeguards Act, but he too understood that legislative effort expended precious political capital. Curtailing the "malefactors of great wealth" and regulating the stock market were the president's chief priorities late in his term, and his foundational belief that "predatory wealth" irreparably harmed Americans of all classes transcended direct labor reforms. Roosevelt thenceforth offered Fairbanks his proposal; he would lower his sights on businesses and soothe rowdy Progressives who demanded wage standardization, and in exchange the Republicans would back a Constitutional amendment enshrining the income and inheritance taxes.

It was met with mixed reception. Radical Columbians referred to the agreement as "The Betrayal," and cited it as evidence that the party ought to back an aggressive stand-in for Roosevelt. Others reflected on the deal as "A Grand Bargain" that facilitated legislative movement and cooled tension between the warring factions. Liberal Democrats belonged to the former camp, frankly outraged that the president seemingly spurned the Bryan-endorsed Chicago platform. It planted a seed of distrust in their minds that Roosevelt would fight tooth-and-nail to dig back up. [...] Some detractors returned to the fold as results began emanating from Congress. For others, their disappointment had been immeasurable - and their optimism ruined.

         H. William Ackerman, Columbians in Washington: Great Expectations and the Hope of a Nation, 2013​

By the summer of 1908, Congress passed an assortment of progressively leaning legislation. This included an aggressive Meat Inspection Act and Clean Liquid Products Act that mandated government supervision and inspection of factorial food and alcohol production, and a Pure Food and Drug Act which banned interstate traffic in mislabeled food products. The 60th Congress also approved, in a unanimous fashion, admitting New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma as three new states (the first territory transformation since Utah in 1896). Finally, making good on the promise to do so, an overwhelming majority of Republicans signed off on the joint-resolution to amend the Constitution in May of 1908, joining the majority of Democratic and all Progressive officeholders. In what would soon become the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, this resolution stated, "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect a taxes on estates and incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

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W.E.B. Du Bois (Middle Row, Second from Right) and the Niagara Movement, 1905 - Source: Wiki Commons

For all of the reassuring rhetoric so liberally flaunted by Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressives, race relations in the United States had not improved whatsoever during his tenure. White supremacy in the South, at its height since the Civil War, guaranteed that the widespread and systematic discrimination of black Americans would continue unperturbed. Neither Bryan populism nor Roosevelt progressivism challenged the racial hierarchy imposed on much of the country by virulent racist governing. Voiceless and no longer satisfied with the direction of the nation under pompous non-savior presidents and politicians, a growing segment of the black population sought more direct means of attaining civil rights.

Bowing to pressure from his tenuous Democratic allies in Congress, President Roosevelt not only deliberately hushed fellow insurgents from delving into racial matters, but he too declined an opportunity to invite author Booker T. Washington to the White House and, to his reputation's detriment, ordered the discharge of the all-Black 25th Infantry Regiment. On the former issue, Washington, an out-and-out conservative advocate of Black entrepreneurship and a proponent of racial uplift, discovered that the president retracted an invite to the black leader for dinner at the White House. As was later revealed, Roosevelt considered bringing the spokesman to the Executive Mansion out of a personal wish to do so, but settled against it out of fear of retribution by temporary legislative partners in the House and Senate. Washington, rightly disturbed and betrayed, never again spoke to the president.

Regarding the 25th Infantry, that subject had been another monumental moral failure on the part of Roosevelt. In August of 1906, white residents in Brownsville, Texas falsely accused the regiment of stirring a riot and of attacking white women. An alleged shooting that had taken place in the city was also attributed to the black soldiers. Investigators ordered to the scene accepted unchallenged testimony and bogus forensic evidence as proof that men belonging to the regiment were the perpetrators, and they recommended an immediate dismissal. At the recommendation of his Cabinet and the Army Inspector General, President Roosevelt formally decreed a dishonorable discharge of the 25th. Booker Washington and the National Negro Business League, as well as many contemporary newspapers and organizations concerned with the case, denounced the president wholeheartedly and maintained the soldiers' innocence.

One of the most significant leaders of the early twentieth century struggle for black liberation, activist and author W.E.B. Du Bois, came to prominence at this historical moment. A professor at Atlanta University, Du Bois became known as an influential intellectual in the movement for civil rights and emerged as a leader in that movement following the publication of The Souls of Black Folk in 1903. In staunch opposition to the Southern-centric practicality and gradual uplift offered by Washington, Du Bois stressed distrust of white leaders and politicians who espoused damning disenfranchisement and segregation. Criticizing his ideological opponent, he wrote, "But so far as Mr. Washington apologizes for injustice, North or South, does not rightly value the privilege and duty of voting, opposes the higher training and ambition of our brighter minds,—so far as he, the South, or the Nation, does this,—we must unceasingly and firmly oppose them" Rejecting a harmonious relationship with those who unapologetically avowed civil inferiority, Du Bois embodied the urgent need for revolutionary change for the black community.

Two brutal race riots also characterized the Roosevelt presidency as armed white mobs instigated horrific cruelty against local black residents. A 1908 Springfield race riot, or more accurately 'lynch mob', saw the rise of a tumultuous anti-black militia as they brutalized black homes and businesses for two nights. Mayhem also erupted in the Atlanta Massacre of 1906, when armed mobs of white supremacists tormented and assaulted the city's black population until forcibly halted by the Georgia National Guard. Several dozen black Americans were killed in these calamitous riots and, for those crimes, no one was held accountable. Georgia Governor M. Hoke Smith (D-GA), then a gubernatorial candidate, praised the violence against black residents as the only means available to protect "fair young girlhood of the South" from assault. He won his election with over 99% of the vote.

Of anything, the race riots demonstrated the undeniable need for a civil rights organization in the United States. Politicians in the major parties showed outward antipathy for the rights of black Americans, save the occasional broad denouncement of lynchings, so the duty fell to the citizens themselves to fight for self-preservation. In February of 1909, a group of intellectuals, activists and authors - ranging from social and economic reformers like Florence Kelley and William English Walling to civil rights advocates Ida B. Wells, Mary Church Terrell and Henry Moskowitz - founded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Flatly and without question, this organization exclaimed its primary mission "To promote equality of rights and to eradicate caste or race prejudice among the citizens of the United States." It stood against Jim Crow disenfranchisement and fought to abolish poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and all other methods utilized to de-legitimize the black vote and dehumanize black lives.

Some of these same figures also supported unionized labor and cooperative economics, and employed political activism to oppose white supremacy. Those in the same vein as West-Indian American postal worker and theorist Hubert Harrison denounced capitalism altogether. To Harrison, racism in and of itself stemmed from "fallacy of economic fear" inherent in the capitalist competition.

If the overturning of the present system should elevate a new class into power; a class to which the Negro belongs; a class which has nothing to gain by the degradation of any portion of itself; that class will remove the economic reason for the degradation of the Negro. That is the promise of Socialism, the all-inclusive working-class movement. In the final triumph of that movement lies the only hope of salvation from this second slavery; of black men and of white.

         Hubert H. Harrison, "Summary and Conclusion," NYC, December 16th, 1911

Like NAACP founders Du Bois and Walling, Harrison would seek progress from the Socialist Party. The emphasis of the SP on class struggle appealed to those who were disconcerted with capitalist exploitation in conjunction with the major parties. In contrast to the Republicans, Democrats, and Progressives, the Socialists sought a radical societal and economic change that could certainly benefit black Americans who, as Harrison once stated, were "more essentially proletarian than any other American group." Insofar as the party was specifically concerned with the civil rights, its lack of a strong opposition to lynching and refusal to change racist membership practices in its Southern branches left much to be desired. The influx of civil rights activists into the party proper, however, looked to change that.

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"The White Flag?" Cartoon Depicting Roosevelt's Surrender to the Trusts, April 10th, 1908 - Source: LoC

In the face of an ever-changing Progressive Party and the arguable capitulation of Theodore Roosevelt to the demands of the Republicans for political purpose, the Democrats re-awakened with a sense of purpose. Former President Bryan and DNC Chair Johnson scorched the administration for folding into the conservative appeal to ameliorate its stance on regulating corporations and instituting labor reform. Johnson issued a statement condemning the president for his contemptible Grand Bargain, and Bryan, utilizing his famous voice, continued to orate in favor of unforgiving trust prosecution and assistance programs for working Americans. In stark contrast to Roosevelt's concentration on tax reform and mild regulatory measures, the Nebraskan implored the need for more direct fixes to the national woes. The platform adopted by the Nebraska Democratic Party in March of 1908 synthesized Bryan's messaging.

The various investigations have traced graft and political corruption to the representatives of predatory wealth and laid bare the unscrupulous methods by which they have debauched elections and preyed upon a defenseless public through the subservient officials whom they have raised to place and power. The conscience of the nation is now aroused and will, if honestly appealed to, free the government from the grip of those who have made it a business asset of the favor-seeking corporations; it must become again a "government of the people, by the people and for the people;" and be administered in all its departments according to the Jeffersonian maxim, "equal rights to all and special privileges to none."

         The Nebraskan Democratic Platform, March 5th, 1908

The varied planks of the 1908 Omaha platform broadly referred to Roosevelt as a sham, citing his newfound alliance with the "trust magnates" of the Republican Party as prime example of the incumbent's insincerity. The Nebraskan delegates demanded an administration in which there would be no reluctance to annihilate trusts, no hesitation to assert the right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and no swearing-off of tariff reduction. It proposed most of what the 1904 Progressives did: an eight-hour working day, an employer's liability law, and an enlargement of the railway commissions, determinately deeming the Rooseveltian deal with Republican elites forces a sample case of what could be expected in an elongated Roosevelt presidency.

As the Democrats looked forward, they recognized the need to overcome Roosevelt's grip on the popular imagination and his celebrity stature. Public adoration of the incumbent president lessened only marginally as a result of his surrender to Fairbanks and the 60th Congress, meaning the Democratic contender still faced a rigorous obstacle in the incumbent's substantial grassroots support. In order to win and circumvent the odds, the Democrats required the enlistment of a candidate capable of coalescing Bryan's agrarian allies as well as embittered Progressives. In the words of former Chicago Mayor Carter Harrison, Jr. (D-IL), a prosperous campaigned needed, "a standard bearer representative of all men. [...] He must appeal to the common people of every state and city, and do so ad nauseam. The voters should see themselves in (the nominee.)" If one could sufficiently enlighten the masses to the brilliance of Bryan Democracy, the party membership believed, they could turn the tables on the seemingly impervious president and his standpatter friends.

Three competent candidates had already joined the presidential race for the Democratic nomination by the spring of 1908: Reformist Governor John A. Johnson (D-MA), antitrust advocate and former Tennessee Governor Benton McMillin (D-TN), and octogenarian former Senator Henry G. Davis (D-WV). Most of the political heavyweights, those in the vein of Minority Leader Champ Clark, patiently awaited former President Bryan's plans. Bryan, as it was, gave no indication of his future plans in any of his national speeches, deliberately ignoring desperate audience pleas to run once more. Judging by his personal letters, we today have little doubt that Bryan possessed a burning desire to take back his presidential crown. If he had entered, Bryan likely would have won the nomination. The central problem with this scenario, however, was that the second  foreseeable frontrunner to the Democratic nomination would certainly have splintered off into an independent candidacy. If it meant to convey unified opposition to President Roosevelt, the Democratic Party could not afford forsaking the high-profile, de facto leader of the Northern Democrats: William Randolph Hearst.

Aside from a potential Bryan candidacy, it was Hearst who was eyed by the public as the Democratic standard bearer. Having been elected governor of New York in 1906, the tenor-voiced, 6'1" businessman and publisher departed his congressional residence to fully relocate his base of operations to the Empire State. Just as he had done during his entire political career, the Californian focused vehemently on rooting out governmental corruption and enacting pro-labor legislation. Within his first three months in office, Governor Hearst partnered with muckraking journalists Samuel S. McClure and Lincoln Steffans to expose four state senators in the pocket of corporate influence. Hearst also oversaw an investigation into New York State Democratic Committee Chairman John A. Dix for allegations of tax fraud related to an Albany lumber business owned by Dix' father-in-law, Lemon Thomson. Dix was not formally prosecuted, though he did ashamedly resign from the committee in May 1907.

Governor Hearst, intent on making good on his campaign promises, passed some notable and much-needed labor reforms ranging from child labor prohibition to the institution of an eight-hour working day for state workers. A shy yet effective public speaker, the governor also managed to convince the reluctant State Assembly to approve legislation which called for limitations on corporate donations to political campaigns and an Office of Campaign Expenditures (working under the New York Comptroller) to conduct general oversight. Albeit barred from initiating much else due to limitations placed on the budget in the aftermath of the 1906 Panic and Bankruptcy Crisis, Hearst succeeded in manifesting a degree of public adoration unmatched by any other officeholder in the State of New York. It was said by contemporaneous magazines that only Roosevelt equaled the favor instilled by the public in Governor Hearst.

It was not an extraordinary shock when the ambitious Hearst declared his interest in seeking the Democratic nomination for 1908. Running as an officeholder of the most populous state in the Union, and as a successful businessman independent not beholden to any party organization or financial backers, Hearst embodied perhaps the gravest threat to the Roosevelt Administration. The gubernatorial incumbent also ran a media empire spanning coast to coast, from the New York Journal to the San Francisco Examiner. Just prior to taking office in Albany, Hearst also acquired the Los Angeles Examiner and the Boston American, adding these two publications to his newspaper repertoire. The same sensationalist features, manipulative editorials and cartoonish supplements were run across the various papers regardless of location, and every Hearst possession vigorously championed the same line: "HEARST FOR PRESIDENT!" Spending tens of thousands per week in his spring campaign to the nomination (allegedly bribing delegate votes in that process), the Hearst Campaign prepared to make a stand at the national convention.

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Cartoon Depicting Roosevent and Taft En-Route to the RNC, February 9th, 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

It is a fool's errand for one to underestimate the significance of the Roosevelt-Fairbanks Bargain on the political landscape in 1908. That deal had been a bipartisan milestone, or so it was perceived. It not only served as an olive branch from the Republican National Committee to Roosevelt, thus validating his call for federal regulation, but it had been the first open admission by the Republican Party that they were wrong on policy. It unintentionally admitted the fallacy of laissez-faire economics: something the modern GOP had never before dared to insinuate. No longer was there a question who called the shots - it was President Roosevelt, not Whitelaw Reid. [...] Fairbanks left that meeting with an impression of an unambiguous victory, thinking the deal fenced-in boundless progressivism to a more business-friendly zone, but others were patently discouraged that the upstart senator had given away the farm.

         Jay R. Morgan, The American Elephant: A Study of the Republican Party, 1980

Indeed, Roosevelt's bargain appeared to symbolize the rebuilding of certain bridges once burned to a cinder. It managed to bring together two wholly disparate forces in an apparent show of shared belief in collegial government. For those who viewed the agreement in a positive light, mostly moderate and reluctant Progressives akin to Vice President Taft, it had opened the doors to further negotiation and a closer bond with American commercial interests. Now that President Roosevelt was talked down from the ledge of incessant trust-busting and business demonization, perhaps the stock market could rebound to its pre-Panic figures. More so than anything, the Grand Bargain appeared to spell the beginning of the end for the Progressive Party in a rather unprecedented development.

The Progressives, fundamentally a splintered faction of the old Republicans (albeit joined by a small segment of disassociated Democrats within its first four years of existence), built itself squarely upon the shoulders of Theodore Roosevelt. Numerous divisive tendencies joined together at the Chicago Convention Hall in 1904 with an undivided purpose to nominate the only figure they found perceptive to the ideals of Progressivism and economic fairness. Without Roosevelt, the building of the Columbian Party would have proven impossible at worst and forgettable at best. His victory, and the further victories of his party in the midterm congressional races, proved that his forces could withstand scrutiny and garner massive public support, but it had all been centered around a single politician and the ideas he professed. Was this truly a sustainable model, or could recent circumstances and accusations of betrayal shatter the durability of the new party?

If, leading Progressives supposed, the Grand Bargain exemplified more than a simple disarmament, what then could the looming presidential election have in store? The notion began to stir in early 1908 that President Roosevelt would seek the nomination of both the Progressives as well as the Republicans. Some, like contributor Joseph M. Ryan of The Washington Post, theorized that that had been the president's genuine objective in his meeting with Senator Fairbanks. "Appealing to the business community," Ryan hypothesized, "is not Roosevelt's forte, yet that may be his electoral strategy following four years of coarse vilification and disparagement. It is thus far unclear whether the man behind the famous breakup of Standard Oil and United States Steel could reshape himself to be palatable." As was also the subject of mass speculation, would a cross-endorsement relegate the Progressive Party to the same fate as the Populists? Fusion tactics eliminated the People's Party as a worthwhile force in American politics, there is little doubt an identical outcome would befall the similarly anti-establishment Columbians.

Achieving dual nomination would virtually ensure the incumbent an additional term, while the prospect of a second three-way race jeopardized the party's now-noteworthy standing. The Progressive leader would not have the benefit of a Democratic nominee avidly out-of-touch with the base of that party, no matter how much he wished it. Furthermore, the plausibility that Bryan would once more endorse President Roosevelt was very unlikely. He instead appealed to the opposing party's moderate wing, holding several discussions with Senator Cullom to craft congressional policy and, as a result, solidified the votes necessary to pass the Constitutional resolution on May 15th.

Regardless of the recent moves transparently designed to gain favor, the powerful GOP Old Guard saw it as political maneuvering. They were vastly distrustful of what they viewed as Roosevelt's conspiracy to steal their party nomination. It was unsurprising in retrospect, considering the president's constant belligerence to the Republican committee, ruthless criticism of President Depew, and accusations that the party machine fought against basic American principles. More so than all else, an ingrained opposition to anti-trust action and the Hepburn Rebate Act made the two forces completely incompatible. Chairman Reid officially coined their stance in early April, proclaiming, "This June, those who favor the sound basis of industry and the cardinal principles of political faith will nominate a true Republican to the presidency."

Reid's proclamation gifted those Republicans eager to challenge Roosevelt the green light to go forward to declare their respective candidates. Seven candidates did just that, including arch conservative Former Senator James Sherman, Galesburg attorney and Representative George W. Prince (R-IL), and consistent anti-Progressive Illinois Lieutenant Governor Lawrence Yates Sherman (R-IL). Former President Depew refused to consider a renewed run at the presidency despite encouragement by the party elite. Likewise, Fairbanks, Reid, and McKinley turned down offers to take the mantle. Former Speaker Cannon had been expected to announce his intention to run in April, but he restated disinterest in re-entering the political fray.

The moniker of frontrunner fell to Pennsylvanian Philander Chase Knox, the incumbent Class 1 senator from that state. Knox had served as Attorney General for Beveridge and Depew, annihilated the 1904 Democratic adversary with over 60% of the vote, and continually championed pro-business resistance to Roosevelt all throughout the 59th and 60th Congresses (famously disregarding the tension-dissipating provisions of the Grand Bargain). Although not quite a member of the party's elite, Knox speedily won over much of the national committee and began sweeping state nominating conventions. He had the nomination all but sewn up by June, eliminating the chance of a contested convention. Of course, in Knox' victory lied a significant drawback for Roosevelt. Any remaining hope that the president would bring back together the disparate factions of the GOP was dashed. In this fateful move that, plausibly, permanently skewed American politics to a multi-party system, the Progressives would go their own way, and the parties in 1908 would fail to unite in spite of incessant speculation.

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Internal View of the Republican National Convention, June 17th, 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XIV: The Election of 1908: Democracy for the Highest Bidder

Over nine hundred delegates and thousands of guests and onlookers arrived to Chicago on June 16th. They did so in order to take part in the opening of the Republican National Convention: To craft the renewed platform and formally nominate their ideal suitor to clash with President Roosevelt in November. Knowing that the opposing parties were not winnable to their cause, convention security staff upheld a strict identification policy for all visitors as a means to ensure that the festivities were inaccessible to "socialists, anarchists, and nefarious Progressive and Democrat informers." Participants were visually scanned upon entry, and any individuals deemed unsuitable (including anyone under the age of 25 and all unaccompanied women) were denied access to the venue.

Even though the festivities were, by their very nature, exuberant and celebratory, an aura of unpleasantness pervaded the Chicago Coliseum. Despite assurances by the party leadership that the GOP was in a position to deliver a decisive blow to the president, much of the party remained unconvinced. President Chauncey Depew's miserable third-place performance in the 1904 election was commonly attributed to public distaste for avid conservatism as well as Depew's own rather despicable reaction to consolidation and labor agitation. Still, even with these drawbacks, Depew had had the advantage of incumbency. Now that the party was readying itself to designate a presidential challenger that essentially mirrored the much-loathed 1904 platform, some delegates doubted that any such candidate could sufficiently conquer burgeoning progressivism and zoom past Roosevelt in the Electoral Vote count.

Led by Senators Fairbanks and Cullom, a minority contingent proposed altering the convention platform to better recognize the validity of the Grand Bargain instead of acting as if it had never been struck. Appealing to the moderate Progressive faction could prove advantageous, men like Fairbanks presumed, so offering them enticing rhetoric had the potential to sink a huge section of the Roosevelt vote while sacrificing virtually nothing in terms of genuine policy. "We trust in the spirit of conservative progress," explained Representative Frederick H. Gillett (R-MA) during the platform dispute, "and that is why it is in the party's best interest to readmit those elements of the [1900] platform that had carried Albert Beveridge to the White House. Unrelenting orthodoxy will serve us no benefit if our position allows King Theodore I to grow ever fatter in his Oval Office throne."

Temporary Convention Chairman Morgan Bulkeley, Aetna Life Insurance Company president and incumbent Connecticut senator, allowed the plank proposals to come to a vote. Senator Frye spoke to the defense of the status quo, fiercely decrying the mediated platform amendment as a, "rotten component of the Progressive conspiracy to overturn the basis [of the Republican Party]." Representative John W. Weeks (R-MA), the former Mayor of Newton, Massachusetts and present congressman of the 12th District of the Bay State, firmly planted his flag on the side of the status quo. Weeks seconded Frye's defense of reiterating the previous platform as-is. "Surrendering our ideals to the league of radicals paraded by the charlatan president is not an option. If we resort to alteration, we may as well cast our lot with Bill Bryan! Weeks' exhilarating statement won over an adequate number of fence-sitter delegates to vanquish the mediation proposal, effectively ending that debate once and for all.

On June 18th, time arrived for the nomination. An overwhelming majority of delegates had all but settled their bets on Senator Knox after his rampage through the state conventions awarded the Pennsylvanian with confident support. His nomination was virtually safeguarded from any attempts to upend it, but the candidate looked to sew up any loose ends regardless. Not everyone was thrilled with Knox as the nominee, and the former Attorney General understood this. Some of the delegates quietly desired the renomination of Depew to the presidency, while others believed a more prominent figure like Senator Henry C. Lodge stood the best shot against the incumbent. Fortunately for the aspiring nominee, he had been gifted a worthwhile advocate who agreed to speak to Knox's nomination and rally support.

Roosevelt assures us of his readjustment. He swears to it, that no man in that Columbian catastrophe could sway his awakened convictions. If this is true, I ask, Mr. President, how then can we assume you hold to your word to any bargain? If you are a free agent, unrestrained by fraternization, all that you have sworn before Congress, and the country, is bunk. [...] It is folly to close our eyes to outstanding facts. The agents of discord and destruction have lit their torches in the homes of radical Columbians and wayward Democrats. Ours, the Party of Lincoln and Beveridge, is the temple of liberty under the law. Ours is the appealing voice to sober the nation. There can be no resolution but that truth. Now, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my countrymen all. I obey the command of my state and the mandate of all Republicans, when I offer the name of the next President of the United States, Philander Chase Knox.

         Warren Gamaliel Harding, Republican Convention Speech, 1908

That did the trick. This nominating address by the incumbent lieutenant governor of Ohio, Warren G. Harding, was received warmly by the crowd. In effect, it considerably bolstered the plausibility that Knox would retain a two-thirds vote on the first ballot. Serving beside Ohio Governor Myron Herrick, Harding gained statewide notoriety for skillfully managing the Ohio State Senate and thwarting a lackluster Progressive uprising in that legislative body. Now in the midst of his second term in office, the stone-faced Ohioan arrived to Chicago as a delegate for his state's Republican Party representing the majority pro-Knox faction. His speech presenting the frontrunner not only assisted Knox's prospects, but perhaps his own as well. "I daresay," former Chairman McKinley was reportedly heard in conversation with Senator Harris, "that man has a future in the party. We would do well to keep an eye on that one."

FOURTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		980 DELEGATES
Philander C. Knox ☑		762
James S. Sherman		62
Lawrence Y. Sherman		50
Steward L. Woodford		43
George W. Prince		39
Joseph G. Cannon		21
Theodore Roosevelt		1
OTHERS/BLANK		2

Exhaling a breath of relief, the Knox camp cleared the road ahead and passed the necessary delegate threshold on the first call. Not one vote went to either former President Depew or Senator Lodge, relegating that fear to the political graveyard. Knox's team, studious of the failures of the 1904 Republican ticket, settled on a vice president they believed would appeal to the oft-ignored Western Republican segment of the party. To this end, Knox recommended James Norris Gillett (R-CA), the railroad-friendly incumbent governor of California. Gillett promptly accepted, and the ticket was thence settled.

FOURTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		980 DELEGATES
James N. Gillett ☑		809
Jonathan P. Dolliver		71
Albert B. Cummins		70
Thomas N. McCarter		17
William H. Taft		13
OTHERS/BLANK		0

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Madison Square Garden in New York City, July 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

From all corners of the country, Democratic politicians of prominence and state-designated representatives traveled to the party's nominating convention in New York City. Chairman Johnson headed the tie-breaking vote to settle on the venue, opposing the Western branch of Democracy which had preferred Denver. From Johnson's perspective, Senator Richard Olney's success in the Empire State four years prior exemplified that New York still proved a definitive swing state. If the party played its cards correctly, those 39 Electoral Votes could very well decide the outcome of the presidential race. Therefore, on July 6th, the doors of Madison Square Garden in Manhattan opened to the enormous, varied assemblage of the Democratic National Convention.

From the get-go, one of the earliest surprises of the DNC was the appearance of Governor Hearst alongside the New York delegation. Typically, the candidates did not personally attend (Bryan in 1896 and Beveridge in 1900 were the exceptions, as neither anticipated the nomination landing in their lap). This caused quite an uproar in the press, whose journalists profusely cataloged the provocative governor's movements and reactions to the daily proceedings. It launched him onto the front pages far above the other potential nominees, and all but assured that Hearst's political career and public favorability stayed on the up and up regardless of the results of the convention. It was opportunistic to a T, and the Democratic leadership despised him for it.

As the delegates poured in amid stirring animation, the atmosphere seemed light and lively. No one candidate had the nomination sewn up on the first day of the event, yet the various sects were prepared to unite around whomever won out the day. Unity was the name of the game, as it was extremely important for the party to convey a spirit of solidarity as contrasted with the divisive Progressive-Republican spat. Most Democrats hoped to steer clear altogether of any contentious risks, and, in fact, they would congregate to form a strong, standardized platform clear of any controversy or alienating portions. It closely resembled the Omaha platform constructed by the Nebraska Democrats, combining pledges to suitably regulate industry with denouncements of President Roosevelt for failing to live up to progressives' expectations. Hearst and some of his Northern Democratic allies wished to add additional planks for nationalizing the railroads, a proposal previously brought up by former President Bryan, but they left the matter alone. The platform, Hearst believed, did not matter a pittance in comparison to the nominee.

Going into the convention, Governor Hearst had more delegates in his pocket than any other competitor, but not yet enough to claim a sure-fire majority. He was naturally suspicious of the party functionaries and immensely distrusted the pseudo-democratic nominating process. Democratic officials did not conduct their business openly, and, although they jeered at the Republicans for the same crime, all presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial nominations were made behind closed doors and in smoke-filled rooms. Only when the candidate was an incumbent, already deemed a presumptive nominee, or somehow captivated the delegation in a frenzy were the wills of party leadership no serious concern. The 1904 convention and the sudden injection of Olney by the Reorganizers demonstrated the alternative. Hearst was not interested in playing their game, and fully intended to lock-in the nomination before it could be nabbed.

Those present at the convention anticipated a drawn-out affair engorged with successive ballots and rambunctious in-fighting on the floor. "They were always circuses," wrote Charles W. Bryan, brother to the former president and editor of The Commoner. "Patriotism stirs agitation, and it matters not the party affiliation or candidate preference. In New York, it felt no different. There was no drift of enthusiasm to any one man in particular on that first day. The newsmen speculated the fates of the twenty, or so, contenders in the evening papers. Theodore Bell, the temporary chairman, spoke at tiring length to the galleries, and alluded to the achievements of historical Democratic presidents. When he reached the 'earthshaking Bryan Administration,' the crowd leapt to its feet and wildly, frantically, burst into demonstration. That was as good a hint as any who they truly wanted." Ravenous applause for former President Bryan, who had been present and stood briefly to accept the clamor, concluded after nearly a full hour. Hearst, who watched the standing ovation with his teeth tightly clenched, was reportedly more nervous at that juncture than any preceding moment. The convention, if left to its own devices, would certainly renominate Bryan if given the opportunity.

The precise timetable is debated by political historians, but sometime between the evening of July 6th and the afternoon of July 7th, Governor Hearst and his operatives scrambled together impromptu appointments with several dozen delegates of varying states as well as with the beloved former president. The objective was simple: win the votes on the first call. Any other result practically guaranteed a Bryan nod. "He was your textbook crook," historian Russell Kirk wrote of Hearst in American Politics Reconsidered. "Unseen for decades, Bill Hearst unearthed the hideous customs of fraudulent electoral manipulation and political blackmail. It has been said by liberal historians that these allegations were unproven, but that is their muddling modus operandi. Hearst called to order those backroom deals and he certainly threatened Bryan to his weathering face." As has been hypothesized as the dawn of a greater scandal, Governor Hearst may, or may not, have approached Bryan and forewarned him of his plan to run as an independent candidate if denied the nomination.

It is crucial to recall that Hearst's publications played a significant role in Bryan's election campaigns, and assisted in spreading the Nebraskan's message to the American citizenry via the Hearst media empire. The New York Journal had been a pivotal ally of Bryan and an undeniable vehicle for Democratic reform for many years. Hearst also personally donated tens of thousands in campaign funds to the Nebraskan in 1896, and urged his readership to do the same. If he did indeed threaten a third party run, Hearst absolutely utilized the above points to guilt Bryan to act accordingly. For what ever the reason, the former president did his part to deliver his publishing ally the nomination. Bryan authored a brief memorandum to every last delegate expressing support for Governor Hearst and doubly affirming his unwillingness to accept the nomination of the party for president. Some blindly followed Bryan's statement. Others saw through the wool placed over their eyes.

What followed, on the third day on the convention, could only be described as a small-scale rebellion. A "Stop Hearst" sentiment rose amongst the delegates opposed to his nomination or otherwise incensed by Bryan's odd and uncharacteristic remarks. Through the nominating speeches of the non-Hearst candidates, a small segment of the party voiced their extreme displeasure of a Hearst presidency. Congressman Richmond Hobson (D-AL), for instance, asserted that, "Dirty money cannot buy the presidency. Not from any banker, nor oil magnate, nor publisher." He emphasized that final word in an obvious reference to Hearst, expectorating it like a foul curse.

Unfortunately for the Alabaman, it was far too late to close the floodgates. Hearst is said to have exhibited a sly grin on his face whilst observing Hobson's vicious speech, likely understanding that nothing could stop the locomotive he put into motion. Delegates from California, 100% behind the Hearst candidacy, brushed off the suspicions of their choice as sensationalist nonsense and held firm. "Hearst," a pro-Hearst Michigan delegate relayed, "draws upon a legitimate sense of resentment against the fleecing of Americans by the moneyed elite and political bosses. He's an outsider who cares for the common man." Another was recorded stating, "[Hearst] cannot be bought, and that is how we know he speaks the absolute truth."

At five minutes past 12 o'clock, Chairman Bell announced that the roll call would commence.
The tally was struck, and the fix was in.

TWENTIETH DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:PRES		1st Call Before Shifts		1st Call After Shifts		1002 DELEGATES
William R. Hearst ☑		684		855
James K. Vardaman		77		71
Clark Howell		65		35
Archibald McNeil		51		14
Charles A. Towne		33		4
William G. Conrad		30		4
David R. Francis		10		3
Jerry B. Sullivan		10		3
William H. Berry		8		1
William L. Douglas		4		1
Ollie M. James		2		1
John Mitchell		2		0
Thomas C. Platt		1		0
John S. Williams		1		0
William J. Bryan		1		0
OTHERS/BLANK		23		10

On the final day of the convention, July 11th, the delegates unanimously selected Minority Leader Champ Clark to join Hearst on the ticket. Clark had been a favorite of the delegates for his competent leadership in the House as well as his favor by the Southern and Midwestern Democrats. Few doubted the honesty of the Missourian representative, and it was said of the delegates that they simmered down once Clark won the vice presidential slot. They hoped that if the nominee was truly a man as dangerous as his opponents insisted, the running-mate could surely reign in the worst of it.

TWENTIETH DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		1002 DELEGATES
Champ Clark ☑		Unanimous

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Internal View of the Progressive National Convention, August 2nd, 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

Undeterred by the activities of the two major political parties, scores of Progressive delegates met to officially renominate President Theodore Roosevelt for a second term. Taking place shortly after the Democratic convention in mid-July, these men and women united under a common banner at the Chicago Coliseum intent on shredding the opposing contenders and defending the Roosevelt domestic agenda. In their view, the president had been brutally and unfairly judged by the other nominees. Progressives now prepared to relish in cathartic rebuttal.

It was largely an uneventful affair, especially when compared with the preceding convention, and relatively few members arrived with any plans to adjust the party platform or otherwise earnestly contest the national committee. Delegates universally held the Square Deal in high regard and championed the Roosevelt initiatives with critical acclaim. They too extolled McKenna's Justice Department in its high-profile prosecutions of Northern Securities, U.S. Steel, and Standard Oil. House Minority Leader Wesley Jones remarked during the PNC platform discussions that, "President Roosevelt confirmed only what we all already knew. He, as president, and the Progressive Party constituted the successors to Beveridge and his vision of Republicanism. Others may do quite a lot of talk, but from this leader we've seen action. Do not be misguided! Overturning the most successful leader of our generation would be a great historical error."

A compounded, multi-hour debate did ensue on the first day of the festivities regarding the party program in relation to the Grand Bargain. As was inevitable following the deal termed by some more radical Progressive affiliates as a "betrayal," a discernible segment of the party looked to instill a modification in the existing platform that addressed the perceived corrupt bargain with Fairbanks and the Republican Old Guard. This faction, albeit a minority in the overall scheme of the convention makeup, called for an amendment that more stridently chastised Republican Standpatters and aggressively reprimanded corporate influence in American politics (partially inspired by Hearst's similar virulence against corporations).

The final vote to amend the platform in this fashion failed, 4-1, although an alternative proposal to dedicate a plank to the New York City Bankruptcy Crisis did pass. The latter resolution called attention to the federal government's efforts in saving the city from total financial collapse at a time when the wealthy elite brushed off their public duty. To the chagrin of the further-left Progressives, this addition did not directly censure accumulated wealth in and of itself, nor did it name J.P. Morgan as a guilty party. The charge did little to mend the wounds of the so-called betrayal, and it is likely that resistance to the leftward pull additionally entrenched sentiment that Roosevelt's politics had mutated in the wake of the Grand Bargain.

Once the mainstays in the Columbian Party began, one after another, speaking to the credentials of President Roosevelt, ill-will from the platform debate fluttered away for a time. State representatives of the Progressive Party, in addition to assemblymen, local officials and mayors, spoke out in affection to the Square Deal and its architect. At the same time, the speakers intensely criticized the Republican establishment's renewed efforts to cut into Roosevelt's support, by, as described by Senator Borah, "Utilizing deceptive messaging and revising history to overlook the tragic consequences of Standpat Republican leadership." Governor Hearst, however, received the bulk of the attack. Congressman Albert Douglas (P-OH) called the publisher a "downright lout unfit for office," and State Senator John D. Achison (P-DE) referred to the Democrat as a "yahoo sensationalist." Senator Franklin Murphy tore the governor apart, dedicating fifteen minutes solely to attack the Californian for his sketchy business ties and suspected vote-buying.

It is fair to assert that the Progressive delegation in its entirety abhorred Knox and Hearst equally. Likewise, once the convention took its first (and only) state-by-state call, it was too evident that the party held steadfast behind President Roosevelt.

SECOND PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		1993 DELEGATES
Theodore Roosevelt ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

As predicted, Roosevelt stormed in on the initial tally without a whisper of opposition. No other figure in the premier band of Columbians could have hoped to contend with the mighty incumbent even if were to wish it so. Those like Senator La Follette privately toyed with the concept of challenging Roosevelt for the nomination, if only to push him further left and force disassociation with the Republican Party. A fair amount of delegates, specifically those representing populist bastions in the Prairie and Mountain states, discreetly looked to reign in the president and deter him from a second Grand Bargain. To them, garnering minor policy achievements in exchange for succumbing to the corporate-influenced GOP sacrificed their sense of moral superiority and belief in the Progressive program.

After Roosevelt presented a welcome acceptance speech, one that subtly pricked the hardline left-wing with the line, "I believe in men who take the next step, not those who theorize about the 200th step," the aforementioned skeptics pushed one final objective. In no short order, they schemed to remove Vice President Taft from the ticket. Taft, as a center-right Progressive, embodied everything the La Follette's of the party had issue with. The vice president had been overly accommodating to congressional Republicans and cast only a single tie-breaking vote for the entirety of his four-year service. By all accounts, Taft failed in convincing Republicans to lean toward President Roosevelt and the Square Deal. For what purpose did it serve the party for Taft to then remain on the ticket?

The Vice Presidential situation offered the greatest encouragement to that class of delegates which is looking always for excitement at a political convention. Delegates opposed to incumbent William Howard Taft hoped to invigorate a well-fought contest in the race for second place. They appealed to the aggressive nature of progressive philosophy, calling for a second-in-command more closely resembling La Follette or Borah. After a period of time and consultation with state officials, Roosevelt shut down the debate. He demanded of his friends the selection of Taft. [...] Pro-Taft delegate Herman West officially nominated the incumbent, noting that his achievements in office merited re-nomination. Clarifying the appeal of the Columbian Party to business owners, West said that the conservatives "fight socialism blindly" while Taft and Roosevelt "fight it intelligently in the pursuit of eliminating the conditions that allows radicalism to flourish." Taft was confirmed on the first ballot with few dissidents.

         Jacob B. Allison, "Brief War for Vice President," Chicago Tribune, August 5th, 1908

SECOND PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		1993 DELEGATES
William H. Taft ☑		1773
OTHERS/BLANK		220

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Bill Haywood Portrait, Circa 1907 - Source: Wiki Commons

The cause of American Socialism was in a puzzling place. Socialists experienced tremendous success on the electoral front, capturing a handful of mayoral and municipal offices in addition to its two congressmen. Eugene Debs' performance in the 1904 election was incontrovertibly staggering. Metropolitan centers like Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Pasadena, and Flint demonstrated huge favor for the Socialist Party and their reputations as radical havens began to reflect that new reality. The activist lifeblood of the left-wing also took a leading role in developing early twentieth century popular culture with publications like Appeal to Reason, Forward, and the International Socialist Review reaping mass circulation and significant readerships. Still, the growth of leftist tendencies brought about a new facet to the movement that these organizations hadn't yet dealt with. Namely, co-option.

Upton Sinclair had written The Jungle in 1906 not to provoke an interest in commodity oversight, but to stir empathy for the condition of the laborer and present socialism as the sensible solution. The author had helped found the Intercollegiate Socialist Society in 1905 to act as an intellectual organization for student activists and organizers. It was constructed, chapter-by-chapter, to elucidate the principles of socialism to the next generation and build a class of revolutionaries from below. When Roosevelt declared an interest in The Jungle, Sinclair may have been hopeful that his work had been popularized to such an extent. Yet, when all that it generated was inoffensive food product regulation, the author famously quipped, "I aimed at the public's heart, and by accident I hit it in the stomach." Similarly, novelist Jack London indicted capitalism at length in The Iron Hell, postulating a nightmarish right-wing society void of true personhood. "Let us control them," London wrote. "Let us profit by [machine] efficiency and cheapness. Let us run them for ourselves. That, gentlemen, is socialism."

Dynamic Socialist literature that filtered through the American citizenry did not seem to connect as well as intended. Muckrakers agitating the public likewise meant to incense anti-establishment fervor, but, on a consistent basis, little to nothing was gained from it. Fundamental conditions hadn't changed for the working class under a Progressive presidency - the party most often identified as co-opting socialistic rhetoric. Some felt as though the Columbians had undercut the Socialists' work, naming capitalist excesses problematic whilst proposing ineffective solutions. Moreover, Hearst's populism was viewed skeptically by scores of SP members who detected a deceptive aura around the publisher. Progressives and Democrats both muddied the waters for the American Left with their own reformist solutions, falling far short of what class-conscious workers desired from their government. A moderate expansion of federal oversight was simply futile if one hoped to quell the ABCs of capitalist contradiction.

In the midst of this rise of middle-class, liberal reformism, the Socialist Party congregated in Chicago to name their presidential nominee. Hopefully, the delegates prayed, their candidate could break through the mold and present theirs as the dominant vision for a brighter future. Despite having run twice and failed to overcome the opposition, Eugene Debs stayed the obvious choice. Just as he was in 1900, Debs remained the most well-known standard bearer of socialism in the modern American era and the greatest asset to the organization he once called, "A monument above internal dissension and factional strife." He had written to the effect of disfavor with a third consecutive run, however granted that he would head the campaign if nominated. Those like Illinois UMWA organizer Adolph Germer egged the mainstay candidate on. Germer stressed in April of 1908 that, "No man is better suited to appeal to the cause of a worker-ran society than [Debs.]"

As an aftereffect of the newfound camaraderie shared by Eugene Debs and the Industrial Workers of the World, Bill Haywood became more receptive to the Socialist Party than he had once been. Haywood's notoriety by industrial workers was towering by this point in the public consciousness, so it had made sense for the former to enter as a candidate if Debs declined the offer. The Western organizer lettered the SP that he would be willing to accept the nomination if offered. A majority of convention delegates were not convinced, however, with moderates and conservatives ardently opposing Haywood's interpretation of socialism. Other candidates like State Senator James Carey of Massachusetts (Morris Hillquit's associate), former ISR editor Algie Simmons (preferred by civil liberties lawyer Seymour Stedman), and Wisconsin State Representative Carl D. Thompson (propped up by Victor Berger) sharply obstructed the Haywood candidacy.

Executive Secretary John Mahlon Barnes, acting as chairman of the convention, worked to retain order as debate escalated on the second day. The fate of the nominee, it seemed, would also decide the fate of the Socialist Party's union policy. Haywood, as a member and founder of the IWW, would obviously support intimacy with that organization. A more conservative selection, like Thompson, called to continue efforts to reform the AFL. This fight that had heated the convention hall in entrenched deliberation lasted until a telegram arrived from Eugene Debs. Debs, recalled by one delegate as "the embodiment of the American proletarian movement," offered Haywood a personal endorsement. Though that did not suddenly end all debate, nor did it dissipate the sense that the nomination was an open free-for-all, his invisible hand did, eventually, guide the delegates.

THIRD SOCIALIST NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		216 DELEGATES
William D. Haywood ☑		145		216
James F. Carey		26
Carl D. Thompson		22
Algie M. Simons		16
OTHERS/BLANK		7

THIRD SOCIALIST NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		216 DELEGATES
John W. Slayton ☑		101		216
Benjamin Hanford		48
Seymour Stedman		41
May W. Simons		20
Caleb Lipscomb		4
G.W. Woodby		1
OTHERS/BLANK		1

To Hillquit and Berger's immense dissatisfaction, the incendiary Bill Haywood won the nomination in a majority vote. He did not personally attend the SNC, instead taking time to rest at his Idaho abode following a strenuous engagement the state court system, but the nominee did telegraph an acceptance speech to the Chicago convention. During the proper campaign, Haywood reiterated the core tenants of that speech.

Tonight I am going to speak on the class struggle, and I am going to make it so plain that even a lawyer can understand it. [...] They can't stop us. No matter what they do we will go on until we, the roughnecks of the world, will take control of all production and work when we please and how much we please. The man who makes the wagon will ride in it himself. The capitalist has no heart, but harpoon him in the pocketbook and you will draw blood. [...] So, on this great force of the working class I believe we can agree that we should unite into one great organization—big enough to take in the children that are now working; big enough to take in the black man; the white man; big enough to take in all nationalities, an organization that will be strong enough to obliterate state boundaries, to obliterate national boundaries, and one that will become the great industrial force of the working class of the world.

         Bill Haywood, "Speech to Cleveland Steelworkers", September 9th, 1908

Traveling state-by-state in a customized train, referred to in the press as the "Red Special," the Haywood Campaign brought its arguments to the people. Alongside Barnes and vice presidential nominee John Slayton of Pennsylvania, the campaign darted across the country for a period of four months straight. It distributed radical literature to the huge audiences it encountered, and occasionally brought on other well-known figures like Debs for short duration of the tour. Haywood recognized the compounded problems facing industrial workers at the turn of the century and looked to attach the lines betwixt individualized cases of exploitation and employer negligence with the grander mission of attaining socialism.

[Pyro]

President Roosevelt Speaking in Madison, Wisconsin, October 2nd, 1908 - Source: Wiki Commons

Four prominent presidential candidates took center stage as the election season rolled into the autumnal equinox. Democrat William Hearst, Republican Philander Knox, Socialist Bill Haywood, and Progressive Theodore Roosevelt were the prime contestants for the administrative pageant. Plentiful policy points ranging from trust-busting to the income tax swarmed throughout the race, but let there be no doubt that President Roosevelt was the primary focal point of the election. Nominees for the Republican and Democratic parties, reversing their flippant evasion of the boisterous New Yorker four years earlier, concentrated all fire on the Progressive. Differing policy proposals were doubtlessly relevant, as in any electoral bout, but a worthwhile challenger to President Roosevelt would not find success unless they fixated on the incumbent's perceived shortcomings.

Senator Knox modeled his campaigning style after Albert Beveridge, appealing to the electorate in a whistle-stop format (a move that somewhat displeased RNC traditionalists). He spoke to the merits of "conservative progress," and, "the return to prosperity and sensibility to aid the business of the nation." Knox was not an inflexible reactionary like some of his colleagues. He had no intention of proclaiming support for a progressive agenda, but neither did he wish to fall into disconcerting obscurity as Depew had in his re-election attempt. The Pennsylvanian ran a campaign centered on the fortunes of the past set side-by-side with Roosevelt's turbulent reign. He stated, nearly verbatim from a Beveridge address, "Always and in all places, the Republican Party in control means prosperity of the people, debt reduction, and a common sense handling of revenues. Prosperous times are always Republican times. In four years of Progressive rule, our government has declared all-out war on American enterprise. It peered down into the gaping hole of economic calamity and just nearly fell in - a hole dug by Mr. Roosevelt."

The Roosevelt Campaign struck back, attesting that neither a return to Gilded Age Republicanism nor a dangerous leap into "Hearst Demagoguery" would magically cure the cantankerous issues facing the country. Progressive businessmen towed the party line on capitalist critique and offered that a reformed economy was safer for systematic longevity than an archaic, private economy. If the federal government were to neglect its responsibility in initiating the necessary changes to liberalize and stabilize capitalism, protest from below would seek its total overthrow. This had been the essence of Roosevelt's governing policy, and, especially after observing the steady growth of socialist organizations and political parties, the president feared that a return to the Depew Economy would virtually ensure the supplanting of American democracy with radicalism and mob-rule.

Hiram Johnson, a district attorney and anti-corruption reform advocate, administered the Roosevelt Campaign's Western branch based out of San Francisco. He directed leaflet printing for the region and communicated daily events and experiences to the president via telegraph. By all measures of gauging public opinion, Johnson discovered that city residents were not squarely committed to any one candidate. In San Francisco, as was the case along much of the West Coast, voters who favored the Progressives in wide margins four years ago were presently split between Roosevelt and Hearst. The Columbian leader no longer had a monopoly on anti-establishment fervor, and the spirit of Bryanism that captivated Californians in 1896 began to bubble up for Hearst.

Progressives also noticed a corresponding trend taking shape in New York. Ceremonies for the Democratic nominee far surpassed the competition in pure audience figures, indicating public opinion favoring Hearst. Representative William Sulzer, a staunch supporter of the governor, stated in a public forum, "I know Governor Hearst well, and have known him for a long time. I regard him as one of the greatest men of our time. It is no child's play to build up seven great newspapers in three of the largest cities in the country. A man to do this must possess executive ability of a high order. From the very nature of things he must be a broad-gauge man. Such a man I know Mr. Hearst to be." Sulzer became an essential piece to Hearst's Napoleonic campaign operation, invigorating local voter interest while the governor traveled westward.

Governor Hearst ran his campaign much like his business, focusing squarely on sensationalism to vacuum public excitement to his corner. He utilized the talents of journalist muckrakers like Lincoln Steffens and Ida Tarbell to drive home his central thesis that politics as-is was filled with corrupt bureaucrats hell-bent on serving the interests of corporations above the common man. Hearst even appeared at one campaign event aside David Phillips, and personally attested to corruption in the New York political game. "These men," he thundered, "have no consciousness of their own. They ask businessmen, like myself on multiple occasions, for campaign funding. This is commonly granted under the presumption that the donor will receive a return on investment. That is why I've called on Congress to pass no-nonsense restrictions on political contributions and bar corporate donations entirely. If they refuse, my administration will prosecute and convict obstructing party bosses."

Sweeping reforms like the type offered above were frequently touted by the publishing magnate as necessary steps to eliminate corruption and malfeasance in Washington. He proposed, among other things, a national mandate that all political parties participate in state-wide primary elections, granting constituencies the option to recall their representatives at will, and enshrining some form of direct democracy to gauge public opinion of major issues. Hearst argued in favor of a 10% tax on corporations as well (eight points higher than the 2% proposed by Roosevelt), and furthermore one-upped the Progressives by calling for a national eight-hour workday law for all public and private sector workers.

President Roosevelt, to put it lightly, was disgusted by Hearst and all that he stood for. Theodore Roosevelt believed in federal regulation and reform, that much is certainly true, but he distrusted those he viewed as uneducated, irresponsible, and lacking a proper vision to carefully win the country (and Congress) to his theses. Roosevelt considered Hearst no different than the class of investigative journalists he so despised. None of them were honest actors in his mind. They all had an angle that had no regard for the public good. Still, even the most blatant demagogue was a powerful force in politics, and for that reason the incumbent president saw Hearst as the greatest possible foil to his re-election prospects - far more so than a known entity like Bryan. Roosevelt fretted often over Hearst's influence among the working class, a group the president privately figured gullible and susceptible to impossible promises. He conjoined the governor's ideology to that of the Socialist Party, finding both identically reprehensible.

Associates of President Roosevelt harmonized on the topic of Hearst. They too found him a far more intimidating presence than Philander Knox. The upper echelon of the Roosevelt Campaign realized that, regardless of early indications in swing states that Roosevelt accumulated voter preference, Hearst alone represented the chief obstacle to the president's re-election prospects. John Hay, working diligently at the completion of his term as State Secretary, abhorred Hearst. He wrote that the Democratic nominee, "simply reiterates the unquestioned truths that every man with a clean shirt is a thief and ought to be hanged: that there is no goodness and wisdom except among the illiterate & criminal classes." Others like Vice President Taft shared this feeling. Therefore, Roosevelt shifted gears to more explicitly denounce the yellow press and muckrakers overall. Two birds, one stone.