Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited

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The British Grand Fleet Sailing in Parallel Columns, c. 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Secure in the knowledge that the U.S. voting population sanctioned President Roosevelt's call to action, the exiting 63rd Senate reluctantly agreed to take up the legislative proposals offered by the head of state. Preparedness, an idea that had gained a torrent of traction since the president's August address on the subject, seeped into the daily American lexicon and bubbled into a full-fledged movement by the conclusion of 1914. Advocates for war readiness spurred the growth of a handful of local and state "Defense Clubs," manifesting a lobbying force aside from war-hungry weapons manufacturers. Senator Fairbanks, the univocal leader of the Senate Republicans during Roosevelt's tenure, voiced his favor with the program and urged his party to follow suit. The Falconer-Colt Bill, also known as the Preparedness Bill, reached the floor of the Senate on December 10th.

Falconer-Colt, named for Senator LeBaron Colt (R-RI) and Representative Jacob Falconer (P-WA), furnished a base level of preparedness that included a dramatic upsurge in military spending, a wide-ranging expansion of federal recruitment efforts, the renewal of naval contracts, and a numbered increase in State and War Department officials. When Roosevelt took office, the State Department operated with a meager, bare-bones budget and employed only about two hundred workers. In the case of unexpected conflict, such an abysmal figure would leave the U.S. far below the typical requirements of a capable and advanced, industrialized nation. Falconer-Colt also outfitted expanded presidential powers in the eventuality of war involving the United States: a prospect exceedingly unacceptable to the Democratic Party. Indeed, congressional Democrats fought vehemently against Preparedness at every turn, exhaustingly reiterating their perspective that enlarging the scope of the Executive branch and dedicating a higher percentage of the national budget to the military would not stave off war, but perhaps have the opposite effect.

A secondary aspect to the bill in Congress concerned the economy. At the outbreak of war in August, insanity struck the London Stock Exchange and forced its indefinite closure. Demand for raw gold shot through the roof, draining U.S. reserves and stirring bank runs and panic hoarding by the American citizenry. Stocks crumbled, food prices rose, unemployment figures skyrocketed, and the export market dissipated short of nothingness. Any small chance of recovery appeared to evaporate, or at least that was how it seemed. Alongside its war fever, the late-summer Roosevelt Administration primarily focused on how best to deal with the national economy in a world rife with bloodshed and mistrust. Roosevelt and his political comrades believed that the answer to the United States' economic woes lied with its root problem: the war. After all, once the pure shock of the world plunging into a deadly battlefield wore off, someone needed to produce the means necessary to conduct said war. Therefore, the president insisted that the Preparedness legislation incorporate a portion that entailed looser restrictions on overseas trading and light subsidies for steel and cooper manufacturers (a major turnaround from Roosevelt's belligerent legal assault on U.S. Steel).

Roosevelt placed all of the nation's metaphorical eggs into the export basket, explicitly refusing to either advise the New York Stock Exchange to close or order the Treasury seize on depleting gold reserves. Some Progressives joined with Democrats in deriding the president's choice, albeit in private correspondence, wary of rolling the dice on exports. Fortunately for Roosevelt, the drying up of industry in Europe and a sudden rise in demand of most raw goods validated his decision. If managed and coordinated properly, the U.S. was on track to be a significant economic player despite its poor contemporaneous condition. Furthermore, the warring continent was ripe for investment, and that caught the eyes of Rockefeller and Morgan interests. Between 1910 and 1915, U.S. banking forces invested millions into various European governments and often served as their purchasing agents. Especially in the wake of favorable trading conditions with Germany, Morocco, and China from years of open-door negotiations and diplomatic endeavors, the House of Rockefeller operated as a benevolent, non-aligned lender to these countries. Historians estimate well over two billion dollars in loans were dispersed to the Central Powers prior to, and too at the start of, the Great War.

Congress signed off on Falconer-Colt in December, altering very little of the text and complying to much of the president's demands (it did not include universal conscription). Just as predicted, the American economy underwent an industrial boom in the first half of 1915 partially due to the Preparedness doctrine. Steel and oil demand bounced back from sharp cutbacks and overall unemployment dipped slightly with the reinforcement of naval bases, speedy construction of a revitalized Navy, and, of course, rising enlistment figures. The only piece of the puzzle that stayed unresolved was the stunted American exports wing. European need for American goods was at an all-time high due to the wartime draining of resources and ever-higher manpower costs, but Great Britain tactically made international trade abundantly nightmarish. The British Naval Blockade, established at the onset of war in August, effectively blocked off German ports from receiving any outside trade whatsoever, including from neutral powers. Britain forbade all commerce with Germany and mandated all merchant vessels, even if they held cargo unrelated to the war, dock in Entente-controlled ports for examination. For Americans, the Royal Navy exhibited especially strict scrutiny. It was not unheard of for seafaring traders to have their stock depleted or ruined in that process.

U.S. traders were endlessly frustrated at the idea that British intrusion culled profiteering opportunities, and many avoided the North Sea completely to stave off the risk of losing cargo. Britain and France were, in theory, more easily accessible trading partners with the restrictions of the blockade in mind, but German rates had been massaged over the last decade and U.S. industries preferred existing arrangements over being bullied into accepting uglier rates for the same work. Commercial forces had no love for Britain prior to the war, but this development sickened them and drove many to lobby the Roosevelt Administration to act. The president delayed the choice as long as possible, but now he either needed to acquiesce to British demands and start from scratch or bully London right back. Truthfully, Roosevelt's less-emphasized imperial ambitions, that of the United States as a world power, counted heavily on utilizing its standing deals with the Kaiser as a foundation. Trade with the British Empire and France was miniscule by comparison. Endangering relations with an amiable German Empire at a moment when France acted in an outright antagonistic manner to the administration and Britain mocked the U.S. with its snatching away of the "Freedom of the Seas" was no option at all.

Before the United States laid a golden valley. The omnipresent powers of international commerce, those interests that greedily profited off exploitation in the Philippines and colonialism in South America, viewed the Great War not as a catastrophe, but as an opportunity for new profits. In the unquestioning service of their home countries, men were driven off to war to die in one of the most inhumane conflicts in human history. They were ordered to dig their own graves, and capitalists happily sold the shovels. [...] U.S. financiers, banks, and investors long since coveted a plate at the table in Europe. Germany was their entry-point to total economic domination in the Eastern Hemisphere. Once the Ottomans completed their Bosporus-to-Baghdad railway, and forcibly swung open the doors of the Middle Eastern markets to plundering, investing in the Central Powers was all but inevitable. Desperate American merchants were offered fabulous riches by these same investors if they dared to traverse the Mediterranean or the North Sea. It just so happened that the Captain of the Rose took such an offer.

         Benjamin McIntyre, The Workers' Struggle: The Birth of a Columbian International, 2018​

Over the objection of Anglophile Leonard Wood, Theodore Roosevelt chose to, quite literally, test the waters. In a fateful, controversial move that has since become one of the most oft discussed resolutions of the Columbian president, Roosevelt personally sent notice to London that American commercial ships would no longer abide by the blockade. He decreed that the American economy would not "kowtow to [...] an assault on our freedom," insofar as the intercepting and forced docking of commercial vehicles was concerned. Noting the innate neutrality of the seas and the unprecedented nature of enforcing a blockade against peaceful traders, Roosevelt stated that vessels containing no war materiel had no reason to abide by the British government. He did not pass a formal issue contesting the status of European waters or otherwise officially challenge the blockade, but instead sent the above memorandum and waited for a return letter - presumably anticipating the British would back down from their hardline offensive. Secretary Garfield followed-up with a more cordial message, but that too was seemingly ignored.

Four days later, on April 30th, 1915, a transatlantic ship named "The Yellow Rose," sailed into the North Sea. According to a copy of its manifest, it contained fourteen crew members, twenty passengers, and a diverse stock of foodstuffs and medical supplies. The Yellow Rose was bound for the seaport town of Esbjerg in Denmark but was stopped by British authorities along the Western blockade just South of Dover. Reports vary, but the official assessment by the Dover Patrol was that the ship refused standard orders to dock at Dover and continued pressing East (though some historians assert that the shipping vessel was first halted and boarded). Declaring the rogue captain in criminal disregard to submit to their jurisdiction, and apparently under a premonition that it was carrying more nefarious goods than wheat and medicine, the Royal Navy unceremoniously fired upon the ship. The Yellow Rose sunk into the English Channel, and all onboard perished on that April afternoon.

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San Francisco Preparedness Parade, June 2nd, 1915 - Source: SF Chronicle

News of the Yellow Rose soon reached American shores. A horrified public had trouble comprehending the disaster. Humanists and intellectuals perhaps disbelieved the story, but learning of the tragedy was unavoidable. Plastered across every major newspaper read some variation of the same headline, accompanied by either a photograph of the ship itself or of its captain. The New York Times printed, "Yellow Rose Sunk By Royal Navy, 34 Aboard Believed Dead," and followed with a smaller subtitle remarking, "A Grave Crisis Is At Hand." Indeed, the unjust murder of American citizens did not merely invoke alarm, but immense anger at the perpetrators for ordering the assault. Editorials universally condemned the officers responsible for the deaths at sea, yet hundreds of publications took the extra step in insulting the British government for instituting the blockade to begin with.

The American answer to the destruction of the Yellow Rose in the English Channel was outrage and acrimony as much, if not more so, than it was grief and sadness. Not entirely unlike the Austrian knee-jerk reaction to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the people themselves demanded retribution. A wave of anti-British emotion washed over the United States at a level unseen in a generation. Articles from reputable sources freely referred to sailors aboard the blockading vessels as, "pirates," and "barbarians." The Nation famously named the event, "a deed for which a Hun would blush, a Turk be ashamed, and a Barbary pirate apologize." No longer were concerns about the blockade limited to commercial interests - the policy of interdiction was now personal.

Insofar as political leaders responded, they certainly proved more divided than the public at large. The Great War saturated political discourse since, at the latest, the debate over Falconer-Colt, and now that debate overshadowed all other issues. Five full months of preparation lessened war anxiety to an extent and left the country in a far better position, militarily, that it would have been otherwise. Few in Washington wanted U.S. involvement in the affairs of Europe, but at least the Army no longer upkept nineteenth century weaponry as it did at the dawn of the 1910s. Democrats who had fought the president on Preparedness struggled to gain a worthwhile foothold in the foreign policy debates moving forward. Former President Bryan consistently advised against the Roosevelt position on war readiness and stressed the need to establish diplomatic channels as an alternative. His fledgling Commoner, reduced by 1913 to a milquetoast, pro-Democratic paper, printed each week a heartfelt plea for arbitration. "Militarism will not stop militarism," it read.

Bryan and fellow war-wary advocates like Governor Woodrow Wilson labored twice as hard to silence the march to war after the sinking of the Yellow Rose. Before British authorities delivered their non-defense on the atrocity and hours prior to the official presidential statement, Bryan spoke to a gathering of the neutral Friends of Peace association. He indicated sorrow for the lives lost and empathy with those desirous of revenge, but urged a calm, measured counter. "Accountability can be achieved," he explained, "without rushing headlong into war." Millions of Europeans were already slaughtered in the bloody overseas conflict, lost in the spray of machine-gun fire and artillery shells. Europe was at a stalemate wrought with deplorable trench-warfare and poison gas attacks. No reasonable American, Bryan thought, could possibly crave embroilment in such a fiasco. That too quickly became the mindset of pacifists and proponents of international cooperation, but Roosevelt disagreed.

British officials and representatives reportedly touched base with the Roosevelt Administration on the morning of May 1st, regretting the sinking of the commercial ship but stopping short of apologizing or renouncing their ongoing naval policies. U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom Paul Drennan Cravath warned President Roosevelt that the British were unwilling to alter the state of their blockade. According to Cravath's testimonials, Prime Minister H.H. Asquith spared few words for the 34 American deaths, and in fact planned to coordinate with the recently created War Propaganda Bureau to frame the incident in a manner that reflected negatively on the United States. Cravath, as well as the presidential Cabinet, implored the president exhaust diplomacy. "[Wood and Garfield] advised against a sudden, emotion-driven reply," wrote Ackerman, "but one does have trouble reasoning with the unreasonable. Roosevelt itched for war, and he rebuffed every point against declaration. If Wood brought up the German advance in Belgium, Roosevelt retorted with reports of French and British atrocities in occupied Greek territory. When asked about the unstable U.S. economy, the president could answer that the recovery counted on the success of Germany. The dominoes fell one by one, and perhaps all it took was a smidge of disrespect by Asquith to push him over the brink."

Gentlemen of the Congress.

In their respective lifetimes, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln confronted crises of different types, and therefore in any given crisis it is now the example of one, now the example of the other, which it is most essential for us to follow. Each stood absolutely for the National ideal, for a full Union and of all our people, perpetual and indestructible, and for the full employment of our entire collective strength to any extent that was necessary in order to meet the nation's needs. The lesson of nationalism and therefore of efficient action through the national government is taught by both careers. At the present moment we need to apply this principle in our social and industrial life to a degree far greater than was the case in either Washington's day or Lincoln's.

Washington loved peace. Perhaps Lincoln loved peace even more. But when the choice was between peace and righteousness, both alike trod undaunted the dark path that led through terror and suffering and the imminent menace of death to the shining goal beyond. We remember that Lincoln said that a government dedicated to freedom should not perish from the earth. Our sacred past guides us to this day. Peace cannot reign where evil prevails. Freedom cannot breathe when tyranny looms near. On the 30th of April, we as a nation endured tremendous loss at the bequest of a tyrannical policy distilled by pirates on the open sea. American lives and property were ruthlessly and without provocation stolen away in a senselessly cruel and unspeakable act that exhibits an innate threat on our independence. This belligerence, an inhumane assault on neutrality and our right to free commerce, has made neutrality impossible.

          Theodore Roosevelt, War Message to Congress, May 8th, 1915

At once, upon learning that diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were formally severed, sprawling Defense Club branches, the pro-war Patriotic Society for American Security, the munitions-minded Navy League, and other such groups sprang into action. Congress, they understood, would only concur with the president on the need for war if swayed to do so by the people. Inspired by the enormously influential, Bryan-esque style of presidential campaigning, these groups initiated mammoth-sized parades featuring jingoistic speakers in the same vein as Albert Beveridge and his "March of the Flag." Processions donning patriotic themes reminiscent of Independence Day (Nostalgic banners with depictions of the Founding Fathers, the Betsy Ross flag, etc) flooded the streets of St. Louis, Chicago, Sacramento, New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., throughout May of 1915. In the words of one propagandist, "We're no strangers to British subjugation. Our forefathers wrestled for independence and for economic liberty from those blasted redcoats, and now we do the same. [....] Hail, Columbia, now and forever, land that I love."

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Peace Advocates in New York, June 11th, 1915 - Source: BoweryBoys

American popular opinion demonstrated a clear, intense disfavor with the prospect of entering the war at the start of 1915. Most preferred staying neutral, or, at the extreme end of the spectrum, siding with the Central Powers economically. Polling projects found public approval for war declaration hovering in the high teens. The Yellow Rose disaster shifted that figure upward, and President Roosevelt's speech further rocketed interest in engaging in the conflict. Enacting revenge seemed a more enticing plea than protecting the economy. Preparedness began to place the U.S. on relatively equal footing with the belligerents, and the growth of pro-war organizations and city-wide demonstrations increased notoriety of the militarist movement as it unfolded. In cities with substantial Irish Catholic, German, and Scandinavian communities, ever-larger Defense Clubs were especially vitriolic toward Britain.  

The Roosevelt Administration, in the immediate aftermath of the presidential address to Congress, worked to engineer the prevailing narrative concerning entrance in the war. Roosevelt founded an independent agency via executive order named the United States Information Council. Headed by Brigadier General William Wright Harts with assistance from illustrator Leon Barritt and "Cowboy Artist" Charles Marion Russell, the USIC sponsored a spree of propaganda to promote the administration's point of view. USIC materials flooded the mainstream press and blanketed prominent parks and city centers, all with positive, patriotic messaging aimed at young adults to enlist. On the flip side, the committee would seek to censor all British media that countered the administration. Some of the more blatant propaganda issued by the agency depicted imagery like a British lion tearing apart Europe with its teeth and claws. The sometimes-shocking illustrations incensed a public ill at ease with neutrality. "How many men must die before we act?" asked one pro-intervention editorial. "The English do not own the sea and they ought never to control our trade." All in all, it worked. Before much time at all had passed, the Republican Party and most Progressives pledged to support Roosevelt's War Declaration.

Even as the airhorns blared and the war drums thundered, an unmoving segment of the population refused to get caught up in the fervor. Swathes of working Americans (like working Europeans) were unaffected by the propaganda. Protestant religious leaders were vocally opposed to any involvement overseas, as was the brunt of the women's movement. Women, especially, became the centerpiece of an anti-war appeal to the president in 1914 and 1915. Notable social reformists like Lillian Wald and Jane Addams, individuals who had joined with the Progressives and fueled their push for universal suffrage, now broke with Roosevelt and incessantly urged he reconsider the choice to plead Congress for military action. Lasting members of the Republican Old Guard, labor union officials, progressive journalists, and industrialists like Model-T automobile developer Henry Ford denounced war as a waste of human lives and intervention as a thankless task. Adams frequently wrote to the president on such topics as isolation and rekindled diplomacy, but by April she no longer received return messages.

Of all four of the major American political parties, only the Socialist Party emerged forcefully and consistently against the U.S. dipping its toes into the cesspool of war. Socialist leaders like Eugene Debs quickly came to recognize the gigantic problem of warring nations and escalating jingoism in relation to cross-national working-class solidarity and international cooperation. In stark contrast to socialists in Europe who capitulated to patriotism and nationalist sentiment, Debs, and the majority of American Socialists (apart from a few Preparedness advocates like Mayor Daniel Hoan (S-WI) of Milwaukee), fended off any such inclination. Debate pertaining to their official position on the issue would not be cemented into party policy until 1916 at their national convention. Debs, however, jumped the gun, refusing to shy away from taking a stand on this delicate and malleable issue.

It is "patriotism" of the workers of one nation to fall upon and foully murder the workers of another nation to enlarge the possessions of their masters and increase the piles of their bloodstained riches, and as long as the poor, deluded toiling masses are fired by this brand of "patriotism," they will serve as cannon fodder and no power on earth can save them from their sodden fate. Ours is a wider patriotism — as wide as humanity. We abhor murder in uniform even more than we do in midnight assassination. Preparedness, from the working-class point of view, means for the workers that they are to cease fighting and losing for their masters and for once in the world’s history fight and win for themselves. [...] I am not a capitalist soldier; I am a proletarian revolutionist. I am opposed to every war but one; I am for that war with heart and soul, and that is the world-wide war of the social revolution.

         Eugene V. Debs, Socialism and Patriotism, May 29th, 1915

Looking to copy the seemingly fruitful tactics of the Preparedness and pro-war advocates, about 8,000 activists stemming from a variety of local organizations took to the streets of New York in a contentious march for peace. Dressed in monochrome attire to honor the fallen soldiers in Europe, as well as to signify future deaths of American enlistees, the collective of marchers stepped silently and in unison along busy metropolitan streets. This cadre included members of the New York Socialist Party, the Workingwomen's Craft and Industrial Union League, the New York Board of Women's Suffrage, and well-known figures like antimilitarist Crystal Catherine Eastman and suffragette Carrie Chapman Catt.

The Women's March for Peace was designed to promote peace and solidarity with grieving mothers off in Europe, and to the participants they anticipated quiet solidarity by observers. Still, regardless of the event's intent, the country was now more equally divided on the issue. War hawks equivocated pacifism with cowardice and a lack of patriotism. For them, marching for peace was outright traitorous. Therefore, marchers crossing the intersection of West 47th Street and 5th Avenue were greeted with blowback in the form of an attack by opposing war proponents. Banners were ripped from women's hands and promptly destroyed as marchers were pushed to the ground and berated. The situation devolved into panic and the scattering of activists, though local police on standby intervened and broke the engagement up. Officers arrested forty-two women marchers and three oppositionists. The New York Police Department went on to cite the Women's March for Peace as an instigator of "street violence and thuggery" and recommended the women abstain from repeating the event. Mayor John Mitchel (P-NY), a close ally to Roosevelt, went as far as to advise the city government to consider "preventative measures" to deter future incidents.

The failure of the Women's March, juxtaposed with the invariable success of the Preparedness parades, epitomized the transformation taking place within the country. Patriotism and Roosevelt-branded progressivism, sometimes viewed as one in the same, influenced the United States to an extent that cannot be underestimated. Swept up in the propaganda and vengeful, post-Yellow Rose sprit, the U.S. Congress brought to a vote a formal declaration of war. Overruling an attempted filibuster by Democratic Caucus Chairman Robert Owen, the senatorial Progressive-Republican coalition passed the proposal, 64 to 32. Senator La Follette famously cast his vote against the measure following a heartfelt plea to deny Roosevelt the war, although only two other Progressives joined the Wisconsinite in that direction. The House passed the proposal with minimal fanfare, 302 to 133. That evening, on June 28th, 1915, President Roosevelt announced that the United States now existed in a state of war against the United Kingdom. He finally had his war. Next came the tricky part.

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Benedict Crowell, Co-Architect of the Canadian Plan, c. 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XXI: In Service of the Nation: Breaking the Washington Doctrine

Officially embroiled in the Great War as of June 28th, the United States required nimble reflexes and a quick wit in order to gain an early upper hand. President Roosevelt authorized mass mobilization of the armed forces and put into motion a military operation meticulously constructed by his team long before entering the fray. Via secret diplomatic channels, the U.S. government was later revealed to have communicated back-and-forth with the German Foreign Office in the weeks preceding the passage of war declaration in Congress. Secretary of State James Garfield and German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow partook in this series of coded telegraph conversations through May of 1915, articulating their strategies and hypothesizing how best to bushwhack the overconfident Entente. This channel provided for the exclusive, direct input from President Roosevelt, Assistant War Secretary Benedict Crowell, and General John J. Pershing at the outset. Knowing Secretary Leonard Wood's objection to binding relations with Germany, the president deliberately kept him out of the loop on this matter. Shortly after the U.S. declared war on the United Kingdom, Roosevelt reassigned Wood to a co-commanding position under Pershing and, thereafter, called on Crowell to serve in Wood's place.

The Roosevelt Administration established these links with the German government for military as well as commercial purposes. According to historians dedicated to understanding the events leading up to U.S. entering the war, the president primarily aspired to supply the Central Powers with much-requested export goods like steel, cooper, and wheat. Collapsing the British blockade would be the easiest and most straightforward way to accomplish such an aim, but an overt combined naval offensive would likely spell disaster for all parties. A mutually beneficial economic assistance program counted on either discovering an alternative trade route or otherwise dismantling the Royal Navy's dominance of the seas. In cooperating with the German Empire, Roosevelt settled on, perhaps, the only available path to overcome the hurdle outlined above.

Insofar as the military-centric details of the communications were concerned, the two de facto allies covered a range of subjects. Crowell urged Germany more stringently monitor its submarine movements via tighter restrictions and discipline. He also recommended German troops focus their fight almost entirely on the Western Front while leaving the Eastern Front to the other Central Empires. More so than all else, the powers discussed the manifestation of the Canadian offensive. Crowell and Pershing conceived of a rapid, northward campaign tactic that could be developed and jumpstarted without interception by British officers. It was inspired, in part, by Alfred von Schlieffen's envelopment strategy as well as the German advance in Belgium. Due to Canada's lower base population and the shipping off of much of its military forces to engage on the tumultuous European front, the northerly neighbor of the United States was left vulnerable. Britain had not ended its diplomatic efforts to calm American leadership until June 28th, thus leaving more than enough room for the U.S. to prepare its clever play in secrecy.

Within days of announcing war, the president launched a lightning attack along the International Boundary. The maneuver propelled dozens of trained regiments across the border and into the neighboring nation whilst simultaneously dispatching a supportive fleet along the Eastern coastline. Unsuspecting British-Canadian police could not withstand the influx of American troops, and in the opening days of the offensive often surrendered without conflict. Canadian Minister of Defence Sam S. Hughes scurried to awaken those soldiers present nearest to the border and organized a swift, though disordered, defensive line.

By July, a section of the U.S. Army under direction of Generals LeRoy Eltinge and William H. Carter broke through the last of the often-criticized "hodgepodge of a garrison" and reached the city limits of Toronto, Ontario. Canadian military personnel stationed around Toronto managed to stall the American advance for roughly four days with pluming artillery fire, allowing for the evacuation of city residents. It was a true and honest effort, but the sheer abundance of practiced U.S. regiments easily overwhelmed the defenders. Military historian John Altmin summed up the engagement as a "shellacking of epic proportions. The decisive U.S. victory set the tone for the Northern Front as their lightning warfare thundered on through the provinces." Southeastern Ontario was fully captured and occupied by Carter and Eltinge's battalion within weeks, as were portions of Manitoba and Saskatchewan in a joint assault.

The invasion of Canada was swift, unforgiving, and viewed by contemporaneous war-skeptics as a unnecessary onslaught. It resulted relatively few U.S. deaths, but did end in massive casualties on the Canadian side (a fact mostly censured in the United States press). Still, these American victories on the battlefield, secured far ahead of schedule, boosted morale among the soldiers and fed into Roosevelt's projection of an unstoppable and unafraid league of warriors. Accompanying the ground assault was an active portion of the U.S. Navy commanded by Admiral William Sowden Sims. Sims' Northern Armada protected soldiers as they passed beyond the border into Canada and interrupted the North American supply route to Great Britain. Standing alongside Sims was fellow Admiral Hugh Rodman, a veteran of the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars and an individual well-experienced in naval combat. Rodman and Sims recognized that the amplification of the Navy was a work in progress, and not enough time had passed since the enactment of Preparedness to sincerely benefit from the law's advantages. Victory on the open seas against the Royal Navy, for instance, was an absolute pipe dream. The sheer number of British armored cruisers and destroyers outsized that of the U.S. almost 5 to 1. All depended upon a smart strategy.

Admiral Rodman oversaw a secondary operation: one built out of necessity rather than shock-and-awe. On the West Coast of the U.S., fortified naval bases constructed during the Beveridge and Depew presidencies launched a separate fleet of warships and cruisers to protect its Pacific territories and holdings - specifically, its puppet government in the Philippines. Rodman guided the mission throughout, ensuring the safe passage of his navy to the archipelago. The U.S. Pacific Fleet met with a small contingent of aggressive Australian cruisers en-route to Manila, but the U.S. vessels handily defeated them. Following that brief morning of combat and the hasty retreat of the Australian vessels, Rodman's crew safely entered Manila docks. The now-bolstered island brigades were now free to plot their next move. That aspect, one of a sitting tiger in the Philippines, terrified an Entente hyper-focused on the war effort in Europe.

With the summer overrun of Toronto imminent and Rodman's naval contingent muddling the security of Britain's Eastern allies, British commanders had little choice but to abandon a segment of their blockading fleet to reinforce Canada. Elsewise, they risked total capitulation in North America. Britain too called upon its Pacific allies, Japan as well as satellite governments in Australia and New Zealand, to prepare defensive campaigns. John Fisher, British Admiral of the Fleet, originally assumed that Japan could launch a counter-offensive from a presupposed base in British Columbia, but news of the U.S. Pacific advance scuttled such plans. The speed at which the U.S. forces descended upon the Pacific left Japan scrambled. Japanese officials did not wish to dedicate troops to a rag-tag venture in Western Canada if that risked losing control of their ongoing occupation in German-leased Shandong settlements and German Marshall Islands. At the close of August 1915, the United States, having made its rambunctious debut on the global stage, successfully jostled a rather hubristic Entente. In the words of President Roosevelt, "It is futile to speak softy while the world howls. Our lungs may be untested, but will produce a mighty roar."

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It’d be really interesting to see possible territorial gains!

I agree! It'll be a long and windy road, though

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Wallace Morgan's "American Soldiers on the March," September 18th, 1915 - Source: Smithsonian

As the United States dizzied Canada and barreled its way into the Pacific, the British Empire was forced to reckon with the frightening new reality of a new front in the Western Hemisphere. Prime Minister Asquith had tasked a squad of foreign policy professionals to ease tensions with President Roosevelt in the aftermath of the Yellow Rose catastrophe, specifically naming the British Ambassador to the U.S., Cecil S. Rice, responsible if all should fail. Rice was a close personal friend of Theodore Roosevelt for decades, perfectly illustrated when the former served as the latter's best man during his 1886 marriage to Edith Carow. Their bond kept U.S.-U.K. relations afloat despite the destructive outcome of the Morocco ordeal, but it could not deter Roosevelt's eventual decision to declare all-out war. The diplomat did everything possible to decelerate the process and soothe the wailing president, but his breathe was ultimately wasted. Asquith sacked Rice for it, and thereby braced for the sudden stoppage of goods arriving from the West.

Asquith anticipated economic war, and though he did indeed receive that, he was also greeted with news of the American shock offensive. The economic state of United Kingdom slipped into one of destitution over the course of the year. British GDP shrunk by about 3% by 1915, the London Stock Exchange stayed shuttered, and the nation became saddled with increasing loads of debt. Private credit was thoroughly shattered. Domestic production remained on schedule, however, as the country continuously reported greater shares of its industry focusing on munitions. Still, whereas Britain once depended heavily on some measure of trade from the Americas (especially in oil, lumber, and food) the Entente power prayed that local materials, as well as supplies imported from France and Italy, could withstand its war effort. By all accounts, the clock was ticking for the British Empire as a productivity powerhouse, and France fared no better.

Militarily, the status of the European War was abject deadlock. Soldiers on both sides of the conflict sunk deep into abysmal trench warfare along the Western Front with no clear end in sight. Strong defense systems made possible through technological advances at the turn of the century kept the stalemate steady. Neither the Central Powers nor the Entente had the capability to break through enemy lines, with occasional advances only serving to raise the death count. During the late-September Second Battle of Champagne, for instance, French forces worked to penetrate German ground and force a breakthrough. Infantry led by XXXIII Corps Commander Philippe Pétain managed to briefly gain the upper hand, but reinforcements courtesy of German reserves plugged any gaps in their lines and drove back the assault. For their tried-and-failed offensive, the French Army suffered extremely high casualties (commonly numbered at around 145,000).

The Entente, a coalition plagued with tunnel-vision honed in on Europe, severely underestimated the potential of the United States to expand the war. "The Allied leadership," wrote Altmin, "foolishly discarded Theodore Roosevelt's bravado and any early signs of a supposable mobilization. That Old Guard was said to have disbelieved reports which did not fall into their preconceived stereotypes of a plucky, backwater U.S. military. Plenty knew better, and advised accordingly, but they were an overruled minority. General Henri Putz, if the tale is to be believed, guffawed in the face of his subordinates at the thought of the United States as a worthy foe. 'Let us see the Rough Riders gallop through the trenches,' he is said to have remarked. Affable anglophile Sam Hughes was no less guilty of forsaking sensibilities for the benefit of a pat on the back by British high command. The clues were in their midst, if only they cared to look closer." As one may imagine, the war in North America burdened Britain much more so than it did France. Not only did London need worry for their soldiers falling by the thousands in the death spiral of Europe, but now a perilous occupation of lower Canada seemed a genuine possibility. They miscalculated the risk once. They now pledged to never do so again.

Grand Fleet Commander and Admiral John Jellicoe issued the final order to divert ships away from the Blockade of Europe in a tactical decision to aid the Canadian counter march. This, of course, meant partial segmentation of the patrolling fleet. He knew this endangered dictatorial blockade effectiveness, but Jellicoe nonetheless settled on that choice as the best course of action. Portions of the British Grand Fleet sailed out of their reinforced seas in small, chaperoned columns. For Germany, the dumbfounding predictability of the Royal Navy was a surprise, to be sure, but a welcome one. Intervening in Britain's fallback maneuver, German U-boats took flight. The submarine campaign in the English Channel and the Celtic Sea took full advantage of the situation at hand, resulting in the total annihilation of several ships as well as seriously damaging multiple vessels beyond repair.

The Autumn U-Boat Campaign. An obvious ploy in hindsight. Rescuing Canada from a brutish invasion was never in question. Neither was the inevitability of German submarines. The mission undoubtedly necessitated this calculated loss, yet it was just that: Calculated. A touch morbid, perhaps, but scores of men died at sea as a consequence for Jellicoe's gambit. Today we may view this as confirmation of the ironfisted nature of Old World naval command, a relic of a bygone age. Thousands, abiding by their orders, clung to the hope of survival, all the while knowing certain death loomed ahead. Whether it be at the hands of a U-boat operator or an American infantrymen, the reaper was on call. Gallantry or misplaced obedience - you decide.

         George E. Smith, "War is Hell: The Great War", American Review, 2005

By the end of October, the Canadian offensive slowed to a standstill. The arrival of British ships along the Eastern seaboard led to a brief, albeit painful, naval battle betwixt the warring fleets. Admiral Sims conducted as well of a campaign that the outclassed American Navy could hope to accomplish, but the Battle of Cape Breton ended in a stalemate with equal losses apiece. Thereafter, several British divisions (as well as a bundle of returned Canadian veterans and new enlistees eager for revenge) disembarked at Quebec City and raced to join their comrades-in-arms at the Northern Front. Reinforced and reorganized defensive lines on the outskirts of Campbellford, a township mere miles from the strategically advantageous Prince Edward county and the much-coveted metropolis of Kingston, dug in and pushed back hard against the U.S. Army, promptly resulting in a complete deadlock. Eastern Ontario became the chief battleground in Canada for the remainder of the year with supplementary, immobile contests fought on the far side of Lakes Superior and Huron and the westernmost part of the 49th parallel. The Great War had indeed come to North America, bringing with it all associated idiosyncrasies, tactics, and nightmares.

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The U.S.S. San Diego Led the Cruiser Vanguard and Symbolized U.S. Strength at Sea, 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons

The United States dove headfirst into a war-centric economy as its people worked strenuously to supply the front with the all necessary resources. Production in the latter half of 1915 fixated in totality on the needs of the front over all else. Munitions and food supplies were indispensable for the soldiers in the field, and the federal government ensured that productive authorities of said stock doubled, or tripled, factorial efficiency. Soldiers served on the battlefield while workers served in their factories, and those unable to do either contributed elsewhere. Older Americans unfit to join the military and middle-class families uninterested in joining the assembly lines committed on an individual basis. Some fostered economical "victory gardens" to reduce domestic demand on the nation's food supply. Others cheerfully purchased celebrity-endorsed liberty bonds to assist in U.S. finances. All the intricacies of the war economy, from top to bottom, were laced with a hefty serving of patriotism that hoped to instill in American civilians the sense that the national interest was too their interest. "Abide by your patriotic duty" a common advertisement for war bonds read.

Local and state governments significantly ramped up recruitment efforts as trained men were shipped off to the Northern Front. With the popularity of intervention ever-growing, enlistment offices in well-populated areas filled to the brim with young men eager to fight as well as women ready to serve as military nurses. This phenomenon had an inverse effect on the labor supply, as men joining the front left behind empty positions at their workplaces. These gaps were, in turn, speedily filled with scores of working women ready and willing to take jobs along factorial assembly lines that were typically, exclusively designated for male employees. Women were already a sizeable portion of the total domestic workforce, especially so by the 1910s, but their share increased dramatically in virtually every industry from weapons manufacturing to grain harvesting. Synchronous with this development was a stark, month-by-month drop in unemployment rates that came to epitomize this moment of near-full employment.

Apart from a progressively nationalistic American populace, an overall economy on the rebound rejoiced with the latest news. Government demand for war goods from greatly assisted thousands of businesses as well as umbrella industries like steel and lumber, but now a glistening new prize was finally within the nation's grasp. Late-breaking news of the division of the British blockade opened the doors to Roosevelt's fabled export boom. Indeed, plentiful and somewhat exaggerated reports of apparent holes in the fortification reached U.S. shores before long. Navigating either the North Sea or the English Channel was still a plenty dangerous voyage with British fleets breathing down the necks of most transports, but the columns were not quite as secure as they once were. Due to the reduced and newly porous Northern Patrol, over a dozen commercial vessels (ten of which stemming from the United States) made their way through once-impenetrable waters from September to November, 1915. The brunt of the blockade stayed close to chief German ports along the Wadden Sea, but unsuspecting port towns like Husum in Southern Schleswig became prime game for international trade. When British patrols adjusted formations to compensate, new gaps appeared in at the mouth of the Skagerrak straight, therefore allowing trade into Kiel and Flensburg in Northern Germany.

True profits generated from these early treks were not particularly remarkable by any means, but the simple rebirth of U.S.-German trade unlocked an avenue few believed possible. The British roadblock starved Germany of foodstuffs and other rations for over a year. In that time, the total percentage of imports halved. German children suffered from malnutrition on a scale never before documented, and illnesses began to spread in urban communities. The depravation of staple goods harmed the civilian population both physically and psychologically, but that period waned with the arrival of fresh imports from the U.S. and other countries. The dissipation of food shortages coincided with a gradual depletion of munitions as the tide of imports inflated (Britain's greatest fear realized), and its end result led to refreshed confidence in the war effort in addition to heightened morale among the troops themselves. A similar spirit spread to Prime Minister Carl Zahle of Denmark, who in 1916 answered the plea of U.S. commercial interests to open their port cities for trade goods destined for Germany. Denmark itself pledged neutrality in the war, but its resistance to interfere with the trade restriction vanished with the blockade's impermeable reputation.

For this, President Roosevelt reached record public approval and favorable opinion on the armed conflict met its highest mark. War coverage had been exclusively positive whether it be regarding Europe or the Northern Front (an initiative demanded by the United States Information Council). News media insistent on its optimistic message kept the limelight on victories in Canada long after the advance in Ontario slowed. There was no shortage of coverage when Roosevelt unveiled the completion of five new destroyers on Christmas Eve: a solid victory for U.S. naval power as well as the steel industry. Distilling patriotic imagery and pressing it hard onto the public, the narrative was unmoving, thereby ensuring virtually no dissent apart from the occasional pacifist rally or anarchist agitator. Little news arrived from the Pacific, however, where progress was nonexistent and seafaring forces struggled to keep a lock on the Philippines, but that subject was often relegated to the editorial dustbin.

The United States' operation was proceeding satisfactorily at the close of the year. Roosevelt signed new legislation in the December session of Congress that marginally and temporarily rose the national tax rate on incomes over $100,000. Proceeds from the tax hike were directed squarely to better fund the war, namely, to expand the scope of supplies purchasable by the U.S. government. It also provided for a variety of improvements to existing military bases along the American coastlines and in states bordering Canada. Camp Grayling, a recently constructed National Guard training facility in Grayling, Michigan, received a hefty federal grant in 1916, as did Fort Drum in New York and Camp Perry in Ohio. These funding initiatives were applauded in near unanimity by Congress, as even the strictest Southern conservatives would not allow themselves to appear unpatriotic with an election around the corner.

Confident in the Canadian advance and comforted by overwhelming public approval, Roosevelt began floating to his Cabinet the idea of sending an expeditionary force into the Western Front. Pershing, restless as usual, advocated in favor of the plan and, furthermore, volunteered to lead an auxiliary squadron abroad. Critics like Garfield profusely recommended against it and brought to the president's attention the risk of stretching assets and manpower too thin. "Objectionists" in the Cabinet warned that expanding hostilities was a mighty gambit considering the plausibility for a drawn-out conflict along the Northern Front (and the death it would inevitably bring). The president was persuaded of the need to hold off for the time being, but the cloud of uncertainty hung over his head as the New Year rang in. Optimism and self-assuredness, in the end, can only bring one so far before reality rears its ugly head. Fortunately for Roosevelt, that occurred sooner rather than later.

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The 165th Infantry Regiment in Crowe Bridge, Ontario, January 19th, 1916 - Source: USArmy

When winter reared its head and blanketed the Northern Front in fresh sheets of snow and ice, any slim shot of infantry movement, let alone a meaningful advance, froze in the chilled weather. Reinforced defenses on the part of Canadian troops weaponized the local climate. Americans exerted tremendous effort just to keep up. For the invaders, especially, conditions deteriorated fast. Food remained in fair supply due their nearness to the home front, but little was done to curtail trench-borne disease from taking a foothold. Great War historians have explained in detail that soldiers died more commonly from shell fire than illness, and that is indeed the case. However, ailments like trench fever, often spread via lice, incapacitated regiments to no end. The bitter cold made recovery increasingly difficult, and the shoulder-to-shoulder proximity of some trenches rapidly spread bouts of pneumonia and meningitis.

Commander of the 2nd Canadian Brigade Sir Arthur Currie took charge of the defensive operation upon his return from France. Currie's presence did wonders to restore morale and inspire beaten-down, resisting Canadian battalions to remain vigilant in the face of seemingly unlimited American might. He studiously oversaw the installation of heavy artillery and machine gun posts when under the cover of snowy nights, and retrained his divisions on the lessons learned from his time on the Western Front. Some military analysts speculate that without Currie's arrival, General Carter may have broken through enemy lines and continued the in-land assault. As it was, the Canadian general held off the numerically superior Americans and crumbled their hope of a quick and simple war.

Whether it be on the meatgrinder of a battlefield in eastern Ontario or the freezing offensive locked in-place outside of fiercely defended cities like Winnipeg, leading U.S. strategists had trouble envisioning a silver lining.  Poor logistics plagued Army brigades along the Western part of the offensive, leading to a bungling of epic proportions. An inexcusable number of strategic mishaps came about in this area by the handiwork of a less-than-adept leadership. During the Battle of White Rock, to name one, soldiers of the 5th Division operating under the cover of night opened fire on a residential building believed to have contained a small enemy bunker (field intelligence indicated combatants had entered it day before). Instead, it housed a civilian family of four who screamed in terror as their home was doused in bullets and plundered for non-existent clues. These types of tragic errors sickened Roosevelt and, in his mind, underscored the need to cleanse the officer class. "Start with [5th Division Commander Walton] Walker," he requested of Major General Wood in early 1916, "and work your way down."

U.S. destroyer and dreadnaught construction was proceeding at double-time, but even with additional federal funding and an engorged staff, many of these vessels were not anticipating completion until sometime in 1917 at the absolute soonest. As it stood, Sims' Fleet defended American shores from British and French intrusion, but as previously indicated, they were in no shape to destroy incoming transport convoys from the East and were likewise unable to prevent capitulation in Puerto Rico and Cuba. As troubling as the situation was along the Atlantic, the light dimmed further on the West Coast. British-Canadian ships climbing down from Prince Rupert in British Columbia pummeled Major General Fox Conner's divisions as they repeatedly fought to push inward along the 49th. Not too long ago it seemed plausible that the U.S. could take Vancouver, but now, between an undisputable gap in naval power and overall war experience, the brawling pulled backward almost to Washington State. The time for mass wave tactics was over.

As if a second bullet to the head, disaster soon struck the United States in the Pacific theater. On January 5th, a combined naval force composed of Japanese, Australian, French, and British fleets bested the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a outright and decisive victory for the Entente. Admiral Rodman was purportedly finalizing plans to launch an attack on Entente shipping lanes when he caught wind of the planned bombardment. It was far too late to wire for reinforcements from the continental harbors. Thus, Rodman was forced to make do with what he had at his disposal. Outgunned almost 3-to-1, the Pacific fleet had not a prayer of triumph. Rodman consequently piloted a retreat from the Philippine archipelago at the conclusion of a humiliating loss. Japan planted their flag on the shores of Manila hours later. Months of work went to waste for the U.S., and the Pacific admiral had nothing to show for it apart from several doomed ships, a monumental bill, and a military loss for the ages. This was a low point, a devastating blow, for an America that considered itself invincible.

Per communications from the British Foreign Office to their Far East ally, Japanese forces indicated immense frustration at the idea of conscientiously waiting to invade U.S. held Pacific properties, as trepidation did not much factor into their expansionist military philosophy. For victory to be assured, British Ambassador Conyngham Greene emphasized, the Allies must utilize a combined naval strike. Japan's naval prowess equaled that of the United States, but an overwhelming assault with allied assistance could take down Rodman's legion at a glance. Greene's arithmetic was correct. The semi-independent nation was delivered to the Entente on a silver platter. British military leadership was overjoyed, and the Canadians ecstatic. When news of this striking defeat found its way to the president's ear, an enraged Roosevelt unhesitatingly fired Admiral Rodman, citing gross mismanagement and criminal negligence.

Although Roosevelt was furious with the inability of the United States to hold its Pacific territories, the president's personal documents reveal that he recognized the low chance of victory in the East China Sea. "My sole aim is to help in the successful prosecution of the war," he wrote, "and in this matter I must be as effective and efficient a leader as great men before me. I will be displeased by any defeat, but it will not serve the national interest to fall into sorrow. If we lose a thousand times, we will win ten thousand after." Roosevelt called on the overextended Pacific Navy to return to the West Coast at Port Hueneme for repairs. The fleet must, he figured, be ready at a moment's notice for defense-minded redeployment. The likelihood of Japanese occupation in Hawaii and Alaska or assistance in British Columbia seemed frighteningly real, as if it could rain down at any moment.

The stress of these losses skewed the swell of optimism that appeared to categorize the U.S. in 1915. Exports held out through the winter with occasional disruption by a now-belligerent Northern Patrol, but antagonistic raids and a new wave of British submarine attacks discouraged the recent bump in trade. In virtually all avenues confidence dipped. Public favor of Roosevelt slipped as the public learned of the Rodman's firing: a rare sign of weakness from the executive. Some citizens along the West Coast now overtly feared that the offensive into British Columbia was inverting as the line seemed to fall back into U.S. borders. For the first time (at least apart from socialists and pacifists) a perception arose that involvement in the war was a mistake.

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"Take Up the Sword of Justice" U.S. Propaganda Poster Depicting Yellow Rose Fatalities - Source: LoC

The war in Europe teeter-tottered in 1916 with neither the Entente nor the Central Powers possessing the clear initiative. Italy, a once-neutral country that joined on the side of Great Britain shortly before U.S. entry, directed its ground forces into an offensive along the Isonzo River in Slovenia. Austrian divisions kept the Italian advance largely at bay throughout successive weeks and months. Over 60,000 men in General Cadorna's Italian battalions perished in that operation. Regardless of the stronger manpower capabilities harnessed by Cadorna's divisions, the two sides found themselves sunk deep into trench warfare not unlike mirrored travesties in France and Canada.

This development taking place on the border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy epitomized the trouble with advanced warfare. Battles fought in the trenches could drag on for months at a time, and when all was said and done, they generally resulted in disappointing standstills.

Verdun, a small city on the Meuse river, would soon be known all around the world. In a strategic sense, this blip on the radar actually sat on a rather crucial location. Yet, the French forts enjoyed an uneventful war up to this point. A German offensive would soon change that. They designed a plan of attack deemed their "trial of judgement," which, in theory, concluded in the capture of Verdun as well as its key position along the river. Germans used an interconnected network of railway lines to bring supplies to the battlefield: Everything from howitzers to canned goods. The entire operation was kept under-wraps until the artillery fire rang out on the morning of February 21st. German weaponry burnt the forests to cinders and bombarded defensive fortifications as waves of infantry advanced. French forces under Pétain countered, firing artillery across from the West bank of the Meuse into the plainly visible German lines. By April, 88,000 French soldiers and 80,000 Germans were killed. Another planned shock offensive devolved to a stalemate.

         Brian Steel, Foreign Relations: A Summary of War, Peace, and Everything In-Between, 2015

The ever-shifting tide of war finally presented a bit of encouraging news to the United States as the snow melted and spring arose on the horizon. Once its repairs were completed and new vessels were integrated into its composition, the Pacific Fleet set sail. Admiral Austin M. Knight, then the President of the Naval War College, was granted control of a novel coastal procedure. Stern, authoritative, and an upstanding war tactician, Knight impressed Roosevelt with his offerings and the two soon became close confidants. With its clever utilization of a two-pronged attack featuring torpedo gunboats, the restored fleet was able to outperform British pre-dreadnought battleships and force their retreat (at least for the time being). With the barrage fleet removed from the shores of British Columbia, Major General Conner green-lit an effective counter-offensive. Soon the U.S. pushed its neighboring combatants well beyond the 49th and back toward Cloverdale. In an additional success that was widely attributed to Knight's input, Marines managed to snag an edge in the Great Lakes territories and, thanks to in-land naval superiority, took Thunder Bay and the bulk of central Ontario. Canadian supply lines were now severed down the center of the continent.

A concerned British high command was forced to issue greater and greater portions of their Grand Fleet, as well as the blockade patrollers, to North America. Commander Jellicoe was confident in the belief that even their somewhat outdated Pacific-based navy would be more than enough to eliminate U.S. counterparts along British Columbia, but he worried for the paltry Atlantic fleet and countless reports of efficient naval construction in the states. An acute loss of faith in the Asquith government, spurred in part by his inability to keep the Americas under control as well as the colossal error of assuming U.S. neutrality, carried through to his eventual resignation from office in January of 1916. Asquith was succeeded by Secretary of State David Lloyd George, a figure more in line with the military establishment. The fifty-three-year-old politician, a proud and self-righteous man through and through, assiduously gained sufficient support from both parliamentary Conservatives and anti-Asquith Liberals. Lloyd George promised an unrelenting, driving policy at sea and pledged to eliminate U.S. naval lines before the end of the year. Thereafter, Britain rapidly sunk state funds into dreadnaught construction and unquestioningly complied with Jellicoe's call to send more vessels to the Northern Front.

On the domestic front of the United States, recent gains as outlined above were not nearly comforting enough to console war critics. A new fear had arisen at the calamitous winter defeat in the South China Sea. Few dared to say so aloud, out of respect to the men and women on the front and those family members praying for their safe return, but some pondered whether entering the mess of global war was truly worth the fight. This attitude centered around an overarching worry that the U.S. was ill-equipped to handle a combined discharge of Allied power. Jingoist Americans traditionally held up the Pacific Fleet as a symbol of naval power, but if it could not withstand a joint attack by the Entente (a coalition consistently belittled in U.S. propaganda), then what hope remained of victory? Roosevelt worked to assuage fears to the best of his ability but reports of a Japanese invasion in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands begged to differ. In 1916 with war favorability slipping back down at a steady rate, the president's political opposition was positioned to take the lead.

Worse of all, an accelerating, gruesome death count at the Northern Front drove down voluntary enlistment rates since the start of the year. Patriotism was tempting to the average, glory-seeking adventurer, but stories of a nightmarish frontline made the whole idea much less appealing. Returned soldiers called it "Man's imitation of Hell," and that phrasing circulated faster than trench fever. President Roosevelt knew their chance as success shrunk to invisibility if recruitment drives came up short, and in that frame of mind he requested a brand-new, congressional war initiative. Expounding the triumph of the war economy (an exaggeration) and the bright future for the military after recent wins at the Battle of Thunder Bay and in British Columbia, the president exclaimed the necessity of increasing total enlistees. It was then that Roosevelt implored passage of a full conscription measure. He attempted crafting his message in tune with the balancing act required of him, both proclaiming that victory was all but assured whilst expressing a degree of urgency if recruitment failed.

War Secretary Crowell had floated the idea to the president at the start of the war, and again when the number of service volunteers dwindled in January. Congress was reluctant to accept the proposal, though the administration expected this. As such, Crowell spoke with the USIC leadership to promote and better guide the bill through the legislature, invoking their plea that failure to pass the bill meant likely defeat. They proposed registering and enlisting all men between the ages of 18 and 45, with the first wave to be called for action before the end of summer. For every volunteer in the U.S. Army, he estimated, the military could stand to gain the same in triplicate with conscription. Democratic opposition kept an easy passage from taking place, but a collective desire to see the war effort through with the expansion of military personnel made it difficult to stand against the measure. Still, the votes were not yet there, and the measure thusly stalled out.

"Discussions with Pershing and Knight assured the president that the national strategy was working," wrote Ackerman. "The 49th Parallel would be protected and the British blockade eliminated. Apart from trench-warfare in eastern Ontario, all was going surprisingly well. Even if the public could not see or understand it just yet, they mollified Roosevelt of his fondest wish: to lead the United States to wholesale fame on a global scale. The thousands of lives lost thus far must not die in vain. Roosevelt oversaw the admittance of the country to an unknown frontier, and damned if he would allow some wishy-washy Democrat from meddling in that process." Four days following the introduction of the conscription bill to Congress, President Roosevelt let it be known throughout the world that he would seek an extended period of rule for the sake of war supervision. He announced, in no uncertain terms, an intent to run for a third term as president.

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One of my favorites - great work!

Thank you! Glad you're enjoying it

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Senator Thomas Watson Speaking from his Front Porch in 1914 - Source: Leo Frank

Chapter XXII: The Election of 1916: Should We Stay or Should We Go?

As shrapnel coated the fields of France and young men fell by the thousands in the Ontario trenches, the United States braced for its quadrennial electoral festivities. Four long years had come and gone under President Roosevelt, and it was undoubtedly one rollercoaster presidency for the ages. Now, with the incumbent unhesitatingly declaring his ambition to stay in power, news of the upcoming election surged to the headlines - and for the first time since 1915 tales of combat were slung to the sidelines. Some Americans indubitably trusted in the president and would never allow themselves to be moved on that point. Others, like those more critical of the air-sucking war machine counted the days to the election. Very soon, the voting populace of the U.S. would greet a presidential race perhaps more consequential than any in decades. Whomever shall win the crown in November, that individual would either steer the ship of state away from the storm or proceed full throttle into the chaotic world stage.

Political analysts in 1915 and 1916 pondered potential outcomes of the vote and how Roosevelt's foreign policy could change the makeup of the Fourth Party System. The Progressive Party base was, since its 1904 inception, composed mainly of social activists, middle- and upper-class women, and small business owners. This composition, notably its reform-minded petite bourgeoise persona, solidified support among aspiring merchants and suffragettes alike. Its place in American political culture, one tucked in next to the old Republican Party on one hand and the radical Socialists on the other, also allowed the Columbians to attract industrial workers in the Midwest and thereby lock down essential swing states come election season. With the war in progress and domestic issues now pushed to the background, it was not yet clear if this diverse coalition would hold.

The Democratic Party stood alone as the sole capitalistic political party willing to challenge the incumbent on foreign affairs. Congressional Republicans may have had sharp disagreements with the president on matters of business and finance, but few could honestly claim to oppose Roosevelt's war strategy. Democrats were not so kind. Domestic reform under Roosevelt, insofar as the objectives of the Square Deal were to tackle labor reform, was appreciated by the left-leaning portion of the Party of Jefferson. Former President William Jennings Bryan apparently changed his tone again on the Roosevelt agenda, remarking that the creation of the Labor Department was "the most sensible act of an elected official this century. Federal arbitration may be labor's strongest weapon." After Ferdinand, the Yellow Rose, and the passage of the war declaration, no love remained betwixt the Democrats and the incumbent. Bryan's kudos turned to daggers as he took to the stump in the days preceding June 28th, 1915.

Bryan rallied hard against entering the conflict. Aside from submitting scathing reviews of the administration's foreign policy in The Commoner, the Nebraskan, as if by default, brought the argument to the people themselves. "I have always been desirous of reaching a peaceful solution of the problems arising out of the use of force against merchantmen," he asserted in a St. Louis lecture hall. "The people are naturally wary of extremism. Eastern financiers who pound the drum of war do not represent the people's interests. We ought to have had a national referendum on the question of war. I daresay we may have had peace." It was quite controversial at the time to speak so openly against accession, particularly after Congress passed its declaration. Some branded the firebrand an unpatriotic traitor, though the active speaker insisted that his position on war versus peace was one of morality. When reports of anguish on the front lines and failure in the Pacific flooded news stands across the country, much of the Democratic rank-and-file cast their eyes to the crestfallen Great Commoner. Even though it had been 16 years since he last presided in the White House, Bryan stayed just as relevant as ever.

Not yet knowing Bryan's electoral ambitions, or lack thereof, other Democrats dipped their toes into the water. Freshman Senator Charles Thomas of Colorado cited an interest in the presidency as early as December 1915, and Congressman John E. Raker (D-CA) was not far behind. Both exclaimed aversion to President Roosevelt's carrying out of the war. Thomas especially picked up early momentum for speaking out loudly against conscription. He took part in Senator Owen's brief summer filibuster and remained one of the fiercest critics of the invasion of Canada out of any sitting office holder. Yet, when push came to shove, neither man could elucidate quite how their techniques would differ from the president if designated Commander-in-Chief. Their reluctance to enter the war was duly noted, and that played well with a Democratic electorate weary of the conflict, but if a presidential candidate was unable to sufficiently articulate his exit plan, they had zero hope of taking down the Roosevelt operation. Neither Thomas nor Raker ended up tossing their hat into the ring.

In the realm of properly expressing one's political perspectives and prospective agenda, few were as crystal clear as Senator Thomas E. Watson (D-GA). Once a Populist and now an untethered populistic Democrat, Watson made no secret where he stood on the issues. To describe those positions as controversial may be a bit of an understatement. He was elected in 1908 on a viciously anti-Catholic, white supremacist program, and throughout his years in Congress fought to draft and advance segregationist bills at the federal level. Watson promoted in his 1914 senatorial re-election campaign a resolution to enshrine racial and religious segregation into the Constitution, and on this platform he won 67% of the vote - though, thankfully, that proposal failed to gain any traction in the legislature. The Georgian politician announced in mid-February, "a campaign for the presidency [...] that shall oppose this war, a greedy pursuit by the Jewish aristocracy to sacrifice our fine boys to a hapless cause. From the foundation of this government to this very moment, the South has never had justice in history or in legislation. She has never got it, and now the proposition is that this government of one hundred millions of men, with criminals every which way going unwhipped, this great government, will pick out one southern man and use the powers of the Government to grind him to powder."

Watson grabbed plenty of headlines, but the first to officially join the primary contest was the sitting Governor of Arizona, George W.P. Hunt (D-AZ). Hunt represented an entirely different type of Democrat. He did not fit in with the Bryanite segment of the party, nor was he a conservative fixture like former presidential candidate Richard Olney. The Arizonan supported the framework of the Populist program like the institution of Free Silver and the establishment of the income tax, and he soon came to applaud the bulwark of Hearst's agenda. He also governed on the side of organized labor more so than any other state executive and was frequently lambasted in the Republican press for supposed ties to the IWW. What far removed Hunt from the pack was his out-of-step stance on the war. Unlike any other Democrat in the running, Hunt applauded intervention. In his words, it would be "un-American" to speak out against the U.S. military in times of war. "If we nominate a pacifist, we will lose. Victory in November may very well slip through our fingers if we allow Colonel Roosevelt to consolidate a monopoly on patriotism." Like-minded individuals like former Governor Simeon E. Baldwin (D-CT) and Representative Eugene N. Foss (D-MA) agreed with the contender, and swiftly endorsed his presidential campaign.

Political historians tend to acknowledge that the various candidates' position on domestic issues did not matter nearly as much as their position on the war in 1916. For this reason, Bryan kept surpassing the pack as the preferred candidate in intra-party discussions. The Nebraskan retained a reputation for opposing the war and delivering an exit plan, and his proven ability to shake the electoral landscape (as well as possibly readmitting Western farmers into the Democratic Party) kept the party leader on the minds of many Americans. Foresight, electability, and cross-demographic appeal: Seemingly the perfect blend for a successful candidacy. This sentiment regarding the favoring of Bryan above the field, it ought to be noted, was not at all universal within the party. Bryan was not viewed quite so warmly by conservatives, which as a faction never fancied the Nebraskan's sermons and oft deemed him an outright pest. Establishment Southerners again appealed to Minority Leader Oscar Underwood and the Midwestern leadership petitioned Governor Thomas Marshall to give it another go. If this had been four years earlier, the pool of candidates would have ballooned with potential frontrunners sparring for the top spot. In 1916, however, unity was paramount in the fight against Roosevelt. As thus, the above candidates waited for the final word from Bryan. Marshall, Underwood, and other mainstream heavyweights like Champ Clark received their answer on March 1st in a short-form letter. "I will campaign if Hearst does not."

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Mayor Emil Seidel, c. 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons

In the wake of failed peace demonstrations and wary of potential prosecution from city governments over their objection to the war, the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party voted against holding a traditional nominating event. Originally, the leadership planned to rent out a standard-sized venue for convention purposes, likely Madison Square Garden in New York, but for a multitude of concerns the NEC decided to try an alternate method. The SP, as always, finalized its platform only after a majority confirmation vote by the members themselves. In 1916, the same would be true for its nation-wide nominees. The NEC permitted its rank-and-file membership to have the final say on the composition of the presidential ticket, not the delegates. Their nominees were chosen through a national, mail-in primary conducted in mid-January, right around the time when the war first appeared to be going south.

Membership growth within the anti-capitalist movement seemed to stagnate in the period following Roosevelt's election, despite Eugene Debs' historic performance that year. SP-labeled congressmen held onto their seats in 1912 and 1914, but five mayoral incumbents, ten state representatives, and some two dozen city officials lost their re-election bids in that span. Membership largely flattened at the pinnacle of the pre-war Progressive period, plateauing at about 245,000. Its most populous constituencies stemmed from workers affiliated with the IWW, and a discernable segment of this group was made up of immigrants (to the chagrin of the more conservative and xenophobic wing of the party). Non-English speaking federations within the larger organization surfaced in "Second Wave" immigrant communities, as was the case for Finns in New England, Germans in Milwaukee, and Yiddish-speaking Jewish New Yorkers and Philadelphians. Committee members planned on discussing membership drives as a chief component of their 1916 convention, but the war, as one may imagine, skewed their plans.

With the outbreak of war, enthusiasm for the Socialist program rebounded. A series of strikes in New England munitions factories kicked off a year of heightened labor activity. Over 4,000 lockouts and strikes took place over the course of 1916, most involving the IWW in some capacity and nearly all correlating with the fall in unemployment. War orders increased the need for new workers and substantially lessened the likelihood of mass firings as a punishment for workplace organizing. Workers across the U.S. won on signature issues like the eight-hour day and union recognition because of their active labor disputes, and this phenomenon understandably coincided with a bump in IWW membership. AFL-affiliated unions shrunk dramatically in size and scope during the Great War, due in part to Gompers' insistence that their workers refrain from walkouts out of respect for war production, but workers in those industries nonetheless engaged in "wildcat" strikes and crafted their own independent unions (many of these impromptu micro unions were later absorbed into the IWW.)

IWW leaders in the mold of Bill Haywood regularly advised their card-carrying members to consider joining with the Socialist Party to promote political safeguards and build toward a cooperative commonwealth. Newly unionized workers brought into the fold by the IWW-led strikes, men and women unfazed and uninterested in the Socialist Old Guard and petty intra-party battles, opposed the war to the nth degree, but not every Socialist opposed it. The leadership of the SP was very much so divided on the subject. Some defended the Roosevelt Administration and the president's call for war, even if engaging in pro-war sentiment arbitrarily partitioned the working class into factions based on national origin. In the terms of former Party Chairman Morris Hillquit, a defender of the German war mission, "National feeling stands for existence primarily, for the chance to earn a livelihood. The working man has a country as well as class. Even before he has a class." Other prominent activists and officials who felt concurred on Hillquit's terms included Charles Russel, Walter Lippmann, and Algie Simons. This type of nationalist sentiment spread war and wide among the European Socialists to the extreme detriment of the Second International, and now it loomed over the American Party.

An overpowering majority of the Socialist Party, however, managed to recognize the fallacies of Hillquit's arguments and coined it as such, referring to their fellow comrade as a "German Imperialist" and requesting his expulsion. Rank-and-file members spared no mind for patriotism. Death totals in Ontario rose ever-higher by each passing day. National identity, they determined, did not merit the loss of life on this grand a scale. This majority cemented their position into the national program by 1916 with the passage of a "World Peace" manifesto that stridently reprimanded the needless march to the trenches. "Nobody wins if we all lose," one activist recalled. This core of the left-wing organization stayed bitterly opposed to entry into the war, and in that respect did share much of the same perspective as William J. Bryan, but the Socialists took an extra step in their assessment of the situation. They recognized that long-term peace could not be attained by merely exiting the war, or even through mediation in Europe. True peace necessitated an end to capitalist exploitation at home and abroad.

The present world war is, then, the result of jealousies engendered by the recent rise of armed national associations of labor and capital whose aim is the exploitation of the wealth of the world mainly outside the European circle of nations. These associations, grown jealous and suspicious at the division of the spoils of trade-empire, are fighting to enlarge their respective shares; they look for expansion, not in Europe but in Asia, and particularly in Africa. ‘We want no inch of French territory,’ said Germany to England, but Germany was ‘unable to give’ similar assurances as to France in Africa. [...] We, then, who want peace, must remove the real causes of war. We have extended gradually our conception of democracy beyond our social class to all social classes in our nation; we have gone further and extended our democratic ideals not simply to all classes of our nation, but to those of other nations of our blood and lineage—to what we call ‘European’ civilization. If we want real peace and lasting culture, however, we must go further. We must extend the democratic ideal to the yellow, brown, and black peoples.

        W.E.B. Du Bois, "The African Roots of War," The Crisis, May 1915

Party favorite Eugene Debs was, in 1916, in no condition to run a new national campaign. He suffered a collapse in 1915 and stayed bedridden for over a month due to torn muscles and general exhaustion. He retook the speaking circuit in a reduced capacity by autumn, but his health would not be strong enough to embark on an all-new Red Express. Like Bryan, Debs spoke out against the growing war fever in the lead-up and aftermath of the Yellow Rose disaster, and his lobbying efforts ensured that every Socialist incumbent in the U.S. House would vote against the declaration of war against the United Kingdom. He did, after a tsunami of convincing, acquiesce to consistent pleas to run for Indiana's 5th Congressional seat, believing he could possibly unite the varied constituency of UMW coal miners, factory workers and farmers.

Stepping aside allowed for a new face to take the lead as the head of the Socialist Party ticket. Therefore, the candidate which won was a vocal opponent to the war games and fervently detested the national trend toward intoxicating patriotism. The nomination fell to the three-term Mayor of Milwaukee, Emil Seidel (S-WI). Like many of his contemporaries on the side of Debs, Seidel stated extreme uneasiness with the march to war and consistently urged neutrality for the benefit of the global working class. As mayor, he vetoed city council measures to purchase liberty bonds and criminalize peace demonstrations, instead pressuring municipal officials to regulate the presence of police at both pacifist and Preparedness marches. Seidel was a sitting politician, not so much a labor activist or a outside agitator (to the displeasure of the new class of members). He was therefore thrilled with the selection of a less-known entity for vice president.

James Maurer (S-PA), an incumbent representative in Congress, was nominated to a place on the ticket alongside Seidel. Maurer joined the party at the dawn of its founding in 1901, and as a trade unionist brought along a key labor perspective. He had close ties with steel workers and coal miners in Pennsylvania, as well as their affixed IWW locals, and was commonly viewed as the friendliest public official to the goals of the Wobblies. Maurer was too a fierce critic to the war effort and a long-standing advocate of peace, personally appealing to the president at the height of tensions with the U.K. to remain a conscientious, neutral mediator. Like the rest of the Socialist delegation in Congress, Maurer stalled the passage of the war declaration and ultimately cast his vote against the resolution. Seidel and Maurer, with Debs' blessing, took to the road in the spring of 1916.

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The Republican Convention at the Chicago Coliseum, June 1916 - Source: Wiki Commons

During the Presidential Contingent Election in 1913, Senate Republicans set a new and unorthodox tone by casting their votes for the Progressive vice-presidential nominee, Hiram Johnson. Press guesswork regarding cooperation between the Columbian and GOP managers was in no short supply since the initial rise of Theodore Roosevelt as a prospective contender on the national stage, but nothing definitively materialized until the Cullom-La Follette compromise. The two political parties disagreed vehemently over implementation of the Square Deal and the constitutionality of each individual policy therein, yet President Roosevelt achieved a greater share of cross-over, bipartisan support for his legislation than any elected leader in recent memory. The incumbent strode that political tightrope well and indeed secured some degree of respect among even the toughest partisans lining the aisles of Congress.

A varied assortment of Republican bigwigs gradually arrived at a novel idea, a shot in the dark, to name Roosevelt president on the Republican ticket. These "fusionists", named so by historians after the Democratic/Populist phenomenon of the 1890s, supported the president's war effort in an absolute fashion. Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, sharply disapproved of intrusive regulation into private enterprise, but he and the executive lined up on foreign affairs like peas in a pod. Lodge feared that a presidential swap in this historic moment risked an uncertain outcome in the war. In this the senator was not alone. Seeking a temporary truce for the purpose of settling international scores, some Republicans kickstarted a genuine movement for the nomination of Roosevelt in the lead-up to their convention, and for a time their path seemed tangible.

The rightmost section of the Republicans never let their anger and frustration over the contingent election results fade from memory. Figures like Representative William S. Greene (R-MA), who failed thrice to be elected GOP House minority leader, let bitterness block pragmatism from view. Refusing to allow Roosevelt to characterize them as foolish or subservient, they openly disapproved of his nomination and sought after it themselves. Curiously, historical accounts do not name conservatism as the dominant thread running through the Republicans' 1916 anti-Roosevelt current. Although it is fair to assume that staunch conservatives preferred a White House occupant more attentive to financial "soundness" and raising tariffs, the tide of war, as insinuated above, overwrote that inclination. Whether liberal or conservative, the politicians most displeased with Roosevelt were agitated exclusively over the war issue. These were no pacifists. On the contrary, they wholeheartedly supported Preparedness. The matter of contention squared down to which side the U.S. was on.

A steady stream of Northeastern Republicans, namely attorneys, bankers, and academics, belonged to a foreign policy school of thought dubbed "Atlanticism". This cadre, albeit a somewhat contrarian and out-of-place philosophy in the 1910s to the average American, strongly believed in cooperative internationalism with the United Kingdom and European democracies. Some trusted in this brand of fetishistic Anglophilia over concerns of how a post-war Europe could operate under the thumb of the German Empire and earnestly feared for the future of Europe. Others had a vested, monetary interest in the success and profitability of the Entente and simply wagered on the wrong horse. Manhattan lawyer Paul Drennan Cravath was particularly influential in this field of thought and had been a guiding figure of Atlanticism within the Republican Party. Cravath detested Roosevelt not for military engagement, as he desired U.S. entry just as fervently as the president, but for performing the heathenish act of joining with the Central Powers. Atlanticists bristled at the mere thought of a third term Roosevelt presidency.

These disparate factions settled in at the Republican National Convention in Chicago. The scene was lighthearted enough to distract from the tumultuous state of the world, though somber in recognition of the lives lost thus far in the war. Attendance had also fallen from its 1912 height, probably due to a combination of lacking interest in Republican politics at the peak of the Progressive Era and a sharp reduction in donor expenditures. High-dollar donors were a mainstay of the Republican Party, and they always sent out commissaries for the conventions at the state and national level, but as a consequence of the unstable economy and in the knowledge that their wealth hinged on success in Europe and Canada, financial investment in the party was low.

Platform debates were tempered. Atlanticists did not stress the inclusion of a pro-Entente sentiment, obviously fearing that doing so would jeopardize their electoral chances come November, and instead voted approvingly on a more neutral and concealed foreign relations plank. The section read, "We believe that the dignity and influence of the United States cannot be preserved by shifty expedients, by phrase-making, by performances in language, or by attitudes ever changing in an effort to secure votes or voters. The present Administration has destroyed our influence abroad and humiliated us in our own eyes." Elsewise, the Republicans supported peacemaking missions in Mexico, a rigid defense of hegemony in the Pacific, a heightened tariff, a lowered income tax, a federal child labor law, and women's suffrage. This middle-of-the-road, even reformist, platform reflected the changing landscape of the country and the shifting of acceptable political philosophy ever slightly to the left.

Sparks finally flew on the third day of the convention as mixed reactions to the nominating speeches quickly produced a spotlight on factional division.

Seeds planted from the Roosevelt-Fairbanks Bargain sprouted at last at the national convention. J.P. Morgan partner and an on-again, off-again ally to the Progressives, George W. Perkins, organized divergent tendencies of the party into a single, loud advocacy for fusion. Campaigns running counter to the fusionist strategy struggled at first to match the energy and momentum of the Perkins' and Fairbanks' of the time, but by June they did stand on equal footing. [...] Senator Root nominated Theodore Roosevelt for president. "The first duty of the Republican Party in the coming campaign," he explained, "is to retain the material prosperity of the Republic, which has been built up during the last half century. Prosperity cannot exist without exerting our influence and position beyond our own borders. To do this we must have a candidate who will command support beyond the strict limits of the party..." At Root's conclusion, half of the convention cheered, and half hissed. Senators Lodge, Fairbanks, and Hale, Minority Leader James Mann, Governor Charles Evans Hughes, and former Vice President William Howard Taft were among those who applauded the speech.

Of the four Republicans industriously competing for the nomination, only one carried substantive delegate support and shone above the field: Senator (John W.) Weeks of Massachusetts. His colleague, Representative Frederick Gillett, presented the nominating speech. "Not long ago, our party was still the majority party," Gillett said. "In numerical strength, in mental and moral force, and in adaptability to and in experience with the affairs of government, it was by far the superior party, and it ought to have won in that election. By unfortunately bitter antagonisms and an underhanded ploy thrust defeat upon us. We are now assembled to formulate an alternative for a madness that has taken hold of the government. It is a grave responsibility that rests upon us. The time is a serious one. Almost the entire world is ablaze with the fires of war, and the continent on which we stand is not exempt. We must make the world safe for democracy." Now it was the other half of the room that rose and delivered a standing ovation. Weeks, they assumed, wielded the political chops necessary to challenge an incumbent and win.

         Jay R. Morgan, The American Elephant: A Study of the Republican Party, 1980

Conservatives and Atlanticists alike held Weeks in high regard. Opposing candidates simply did not carry the same appeal with state delegates and thereby fell to the wayside. Former Speaker Thomas Butler, the Republican presidential nominee four years earlier, was on the fence on fusion tactics and reportedly spoke at length with George Perkins on the subject. Gillett's remarks seemed to change his mind, however, and Butler thenceforth quietly supported Weeks for president. Each of the supposed rising stars in the party did the same, like Senator Warren G. Harding and Congressman James Wolcott Wadsworth (R-NY). Former President Depew, now aged 82 yet still beloved in Republican circles, also emerged opposed to a unity plea with the Progressives. He drove home support for the Weeks Campaign during a brief in-person appearance and professed admiration for Gillett's exuberant words on the convention floor. Perkins, meanwhile, struggled to preserve his movement's own momentum, but he was not blind to the writing on the wall. The financier ceded the win to the senator as the first roll call finalized the nomination, but fusionists nonetheless maintained their reservations.

SIXTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		1080 DELEGATES
John W. Weeks ☑		562
Theodore Roosevelt		440
Jacob Edwin Meeker		33
LeBaron B. Colt		28
George T. Oliver		11
OTHERS/BLANK		6

SIXTEENTH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		1080 DELEGATES
James P. Goodrich ☑		622
Martin G. Brumbaugh		237
William G. Webster		119
Hiram W. Johnson		44
Paul D. Cravath		40
Reed Smoot		9
Hempstead Washburne		4
OTHERS/BLANK		5

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The National Democratic Convention In Session at St. Louis, June 1916 - Source: wiki Commons

Former President William R. Hearst spent the second Roosevelt presidency in political exile at his New York City abode: A five-story penthouse on Riverside Drive. His ongoing political investment, the Civic League of America, held just six seats in Congress and a smattering of statewide offices elsewhere. That delegation was run by CL House Minority Leader Daniel Driscoll, a shrewd, anti-machine politician. Driscoll, who was facing his own tough re-election battle at home, held the fledgling, six-person group together as a statement of opposition to the present Democratic leadership. Driscoll and Hearst knew that if the Civic League fielded a presidential candidate that would virtually assure Democratic defeat and lock-in a third term for the incumbent. Alternatively, Hearst running as a Democratic primary contender could, with adequate financial support, siphon enough Bryan voters and state delegate commitments to transform the summer nominating convention into a shot at retribution. That being said, the exiled leader and his closest allies were unable to picture a viable endgame that accounted for an actual Hearst victory. If the media magnate wished to keep his new political project relevant, his own likeness must first be removed center stage. Hearst therefore announced to a curious gaggle of journalists in spring of 1916, "my time in government is behind me. I have no plans to run."

Political historians typically have not judged its conclusively as either truth or fiction, but speculation popped up concerning an under-the-table deal involving leading Democrats and the Hearst men. The House investigation into the Manhattan Scandal continued in the mid-1910s supplementary to slackened investigatory procedures by New York State. These were quite plainly relegated to the backburner with Hearst no longer in the public eye (then furthermore pushed aside with the outbreak of world war), but such simultaneous examinations had not yet officially ended. It may have simply been a mere coincidence, or perhaps something a bit more nefarious, but both investigations wrapped up in March 1916. No additional wrongdoing of the Hearst Campaign was unearthed by either the New York Justice Department or the House. Conspiracies surrounding the ceased inquiries were, and are, aplenty, as the timeline may suggest a quid pro quo, but nothing had been provable.

19 states held presidential primary contests from March through June. Results did not bind delegates for the convention, but it did certainly indicate which direction Democratic voters were headed. Governor Hunt nabbed Arizona by over 90% of the vote and Senator Watson easily outperformed the field in Georgia. Inactive favorite son candidates succeeded in South Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont, but voters in the remaining 14 states chose former President Bryan in a walloping for the ages. Reconfiguring a long-since abandoned base, the Nebraskan toured the countryside in search of support among those who shared in his point of view. These events were packed, regardless of location, and wherever the candidate traveled a crop of patrons arose from thin air to see the Great Commoner in person. Albeit balding, a bit heavier, and with a touch less boom to his oratory, the now-56-year-old populist champion retained his celebrity status.

Curiously, the fiery Nebraskan partially reformed his tone upon officially entering the battle for the presidential nomination. Bryan was never one to hold back in speaking his mind, especially if he felt assured that the American people were on his side. He had no scruples in defending the cause of peace and mutual cooperation when Roosevelt shouted from the rooftops for militarism, but he sensed the need to tread carefully as to not appear overly unpatriotic. He no longer brought forward the suggestion that the question for intervention be brought to a national referendum. Likewise, the famed orator now refused to explicitly denounce the war itself as a natural pursuit of corporations. He still insisted that an upper-class of businessmen milking the conflict for profits was morally repugnant, but Bryan never again took that additional step into pacifism. Americanism was the new reality, he believed, and it would do his campaign a disservice to insinuate fault in national loyalty.

Bryan professed a moralist worldview in all things. He saw war as an unjust creature unless designed to liberate, supported women's suffrage in the belief that all mothers were inherently trustworthy, and pledged to enact a national ban on alcohol as a way to preserve social order. Regarding the latter proposal, the former president unhesitatingly doubled down on his endorsement of temperance laws in 1916. Over 25 states had thus far passed some form or another of a "dry" ordinance and Bryan took this as a sign. He maintained that the banning of saloons would prompt the birth of a fruitful and devout United States. Social Gospelers, Anti-Saloon League, and the Federal Council of Churches loved the candidate for it. As later noted in a biographical interview, Bryan confessed that prohibition was a policy "nearer his heart," than the quest for peace, although both achievements slotted into his vision of a purer world.

By the time DNC Chair Judson Harmon's gavel struck the podium's sound block and brought the St. Louis Coliseum to silent order, few doubted the final outcome of the gathering. The Democratic National Convention, which began on June 14th, featured representatives of the varied and growing Democratic constituency all eager to spell the end for President Roosevelt. It was jubilant, optimistic, and housed a massive crowd. All in all, it exemplified the party's more promising optics than the rather pitiful Chicago convention one week beforehand. However, a quiet unease and sense of urgency shadowed over the festivities. For the first time in decades, the Democratic Party did not control a single branch of the federal government. Progressives controlled both the presidency and the House of Representatives, and in 1914 Senator Owen lost his majority leader status to Charles Fairbanks. 1916 was their definitive moment of truth, and many in the party's upper echelon signaled potential retirements if the Democrats failed to gain back a foothold in Washington.

The platform of the Democrats, one that dedicated just half of its total text to international relations and the ongoing global catastrophe (and loosely implied that the Central Powers were not reliable allies), passed without a hitch. Then, the nominating speeches commenced with the powerful, pro-peace address by Congressman George Huddleston (D-AL). "In a time like this," he contended, "it takes a lion-hearted courage for a man to stand up on his feet and dare to speak for peace." He gave a heartfelt plea for Bryan's nomination, followed by Claude Kitchin (D-NC) and his assertion that, "This nation is civilization's last hope, and the only remaining star of hope for Christendom." In stark contrast, Clifford Walker's (D-GA) remarks in favor of Watson stressed ire at "Bankers in the East" for pushing the country into war and a short digression aimed ending the enlistment of black Americans - a common talking point of white supremacists during the conscription debate. In one of his final public appearances prior to his death in 1917, former Senator Richard Olney presented a short commemoration of past achievements by the party and paid tribute to the late Grover Cleveland.

In examining the sole delegate vote for the presidential nomination, one may observe Watson's startling overperformance. In spite (or perhaps because) of his demagoguery, outwardly racist views and religious bigotry, the Georgian senator placed an uncomfortably close second to Bryan. For the convention-goers, this was not particularly surprising. Segments of the Democratic and Civic League parties, at least since Hearst's rise, began dipping their toes into overt nativism. In conjunction with flourishing Southern Populism had been the amplification and greater acceptance of conspiratorial anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish sentiment alongside undisguised white supremacy. Self-described "Native Americans" were a minority in Democratic circles, but Watson's second-place finish symbolized just how far of range their influence spread. Watson-ites hoped to lengthen the balloting process, but due to the ear-tugging persuasion of giants like Champ Clark, the Midwest went conclusively for Bryan and ended any discussion of a potential second ballot. Fellow peace advocate Woodrow Wilson was selected as vice president thereafter.

TWENTY-SECOND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		1059 DELEGATES
William J. Bryan ☑		714		1059
Thomas E. Watson		305		0
George W.P. Hunt		33		0
Lawrence Tyson		3		0
William R. Hearst		2		0
Thomas R. Marshall		1		0
OTHERS/BLANK		1		0

TWENTY-SECOND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT:VICE PRES		1st Call		Unanimous		1059 DELEGATES
Woodrow Wilson ☑		720		1059
Oscar Underwood		195		0
Coleman L. Blease		101		0
Ollie M. James		25		0
Charles S. Thomas		8		0
E. H. Moore		8		0
OTHERS/BLANK		2		0

The Nebraskan smiled, rose to his feet, trekked to the stage, and delivered a remarkably confident, in-person acceptance speech.

It was twenty years ago that I became acquainted with a notable victory. (Applause.) Our party became responsible for national affairs. It was in sole control of all the departments of the Federal Government. It took away the power of the court system to criminalize work stoppages. It took away the power of trusts to exploit the American people. It took that first step into the wilderness and stood up to the unholy combination of the powers of high finance. In these great measures constitute achievements which that the Republican party dare not attack and the Columbians adopt as their own. They have not the courage to either admit their value or to condemn them. They cowardly evade the issue. Did they condemn the income tax at Chicago? No; and they will have the people to settle with, if they dare to go before them and propose to undo what has been done.

Your great Chairman today pointed out that our foreign policy had been successful. Republican politicians would have us invade and annex Mexico, then Central America. Their demands would have us conquering nations and destroying all the advantage we have gained in half a century in our efforts to cultivate the confidence of Latin America in Central and South America. The President would do the same, and then claim the inevitability of annexation. (Laughter and Applause.) And what of Canada? And what of the Philippines? We accepted the throngs of responsibility when tyranny crashed down upon the people of Cuba, and our engagement was conducted with a single objective. We did not seek subjugation, nor did our government then seek empire. Now, we mourn the loss of a colonial possession that was never ours to colonize. [...] My friends, we do not know when it will be possible to bring this war to a close, but we do know that ours, the greatest nation, is the one to which the world must look to to act as a mediator when the time for mediation comes.

But, my countrymen, we have a record that we can go to the country on, without fear and without blush. And I believe the American people will not be unmindful of the fact that it was a Democratic President that once brought us peace and prosperity, and a Columbian-Republican President that has bound us to war. If the nations now at war had spent one-tenth as much trying to cultivate friendship as they spent cultivating hatred, there would be no war today. (Applause.) If I understand this nation's opportunity and this nation's task, it is to lead the world away from its false philosophy and help it to build its hope of peace on the enduring foundation of love and brotherhood and cooperation. (Applause.)

         William Jennings Bryan, Democratic Convention Acceptance Speech, Excerpt, June 16th, 1916

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Independence Day Parade Coinciding with Progressive National Convention, July 4th, 1916 - Source: U.S. Archives

Theodore Roosevelt's national image was of paramount importance for his fate in the presidential election. The dominant perception of the president shifted from a hero among heroes, ablaze in a rush atop San Juan Hill, to a sober yet eccentric war organizer. In essence, this was everything Roosevelt searched for and aspired to achieve in regaining the power of the Executive Branch. During the greatest global crisis of his lifetime, he was in a position of leadership and guidance. Much like Abraham Lincoln, of whom he admired profoundly, the president desired above all else to be a guiding light in otherwise dismal times. His status as a war leader inspirited the public at the start of the war, but an increasingly war weary populace swung this advantage into a disadvantage. The elected leader took to heart each and every report detailing a loss in public faith in government and of the U.S. war effort. To win, he believed, that trend necessitated a reversal.

As if the logical answer to Roosevelt's prayers, the National Progressive Convention of 1916 was designed to thrust the country into "a heroic mood," per the president's own words. Its organizers sought to aggressively outsize, outmatch, and out-Americanize the competition. Patriotism was at the forefront of this agenda, and as such the political party set the start date of the convention for the Fourth of July. Taking place at Madison Square Garden in New York, the somewhat ironically nicknamed "Empire Convention" excessively capitalized on planned Independence Day theming for their own political profits. A July 4th march planned for the seasonal festivities incorporated elements of the Preparedness parades and other garnishes courtesy of the White House, and that event in and of itself captured national headlines. It was a clever use of tradition to advance the president's patriotic campaign, and it perfectly exemplified the well-developed political astuteness of the incumbent.

The entire methodology of implanting patriotism and Americanism as a primary focal point of the Progressive Party, a continued trend from 1912, straightforwardly presented the president as a fitting chief executive for the moment. "Roosevelt and Victory!" read hundreds of leaflets and posters pasted throughout the convention halls. Others copied USIC anti-British sloganeering to illicit anger at the nation's enemy and provoke nationalist sentiment. "Stay the Course," another poster plead, donning an illustration of a ship captained by Uncle Sam, a murky ocean below tinted with the Union Jack, and a bright, yellowish horizon labeled "Prosperity". "Remember the Yellow Rose, Enlist and Fight On!" read other pamphlets littered throughout Manhattan. These messages did occasionally note the tribulations at the front, but always to merit a patriotic response, never to grieve.

Progressives on the national committee became more rigid and disciplined than in years prior. Now it barred, as a written prerequisite, anyone who spoke out against the war. It would not risk the slightest diversion from the course, even if that track sacrificed a bit of ceremonial unity. Similarly, the final party platform discernably downsized its once-profuse descriptions of domestic reform and allotted that space for foreign affairs and the importance of patriotism and respect for one's country. It passed out one or two sentence responses to questions of suffrage, taxation, and the tariff, but otherwise insisted upon the war as the main focal point - win or lose. These alterations were despised by Senate Conference Chairman La Follette and the bulk of the Progressives' left wing, and they certainly opposed the changes on the floor of the convention, but an unmoving two-thirds of the delegates shot them down. "If an expulsion proposal had managed to reach the floor," pondered Ackerman, "it would almost certainly have passed."

Convention speeches arranged intermittently throughout the event gave some insight into internal strife at the PNC. Remarks by House Speaker Wesley Jones and Louisiana gubernatorial candidate John M. Parker threaded the needle betwixt the divisions, noting little of the platform and instead praising the president and reprimanding their Democratic foe. In their respective addresses, Senator Joseph Dixon of Montana complimented the administration's reform initiatives as they related to his constituency, Representative Ira C. Copley (P-IL) lauded the economic recovery, and Frank Munsey, Chairman of the Equitable Trust Company, expressed a hopeful view on the future of a Progressive-led U.S. Congress. For their loyalty in siding with the administration on the war resolution, several invited Republicans were also granted speaking time (incidentally validating Hearst's argument on double-dealing by the political establishment).

Without a doubt, the most remarkable feature about much of the convention rhetoric was how negatively it painted the anti-war movement in conjunction with the labor movement. Some of these speakers did not hold back an ounce of pure acrimony, and that was too true of figures who once posed as friends of labor. Governor William Stephens (P-CA) is perhaps the finest example. Stephens ran for a seat in the House of Representatives in 1910 and won based on a pro-reform and pro-union moniker, and in that time voiced favor of federal arbitration and the Square Deal. He was also a full-fledged supporter of the Roosevelt-sponsored drive to war and articulated tremendous outrage at the idea of pacifist interference. He served as Hiram Johnson's lieutenant governor, and, on the former's ascension to the vice presidency, Stephens became the new governor of California. The two saw eye-to-eye on the issues, including of the need to quell peace rallies, so the changeover was rather unmemorable to most Californians. In his convention speech, Stephens stirred the delegation by firmly denouncing, "Radicals in our midst," who opposed the war. "The chaos of that vile demonstration last June has been replicated in cities all across this country. At the same time, we have endured threats of violence. In my city of San Francisco, we have uncovered reports of an alleged anarchist bomb threat as a deformed and detestable method of protesting patriotism." Stephens went on, citing the IWW as a plausible source of the threat per police documentation of the foiled plot.

Stephens' mentor, Hiram Johnson, was in 1916 the sitting vice president. Johnson instilled in his prodigy many of the same values that characterized the former's time in Sacramento, including pragmatic progressivism and an efficient, secure state government. "Hiram Warren Johnson underwent a transition that reflected the gradual transformation of the Progressive Party," wrote Ackerman. "In 1912 he took the place of former Vice President Taft as Roosevelt's first mate. His role in the Cabinet did not exceed any predecessor apart from his maintaining a tight-knit relationship with the president and encouraging bipartisanship and coalition-building in the Senate. Adopting a wary yet supportive posture on the war, he bridged the gap between Peace Progressives like La Follette and Addams and the internationalist faithful. Johnson originally had reservations against entry into the war but quietly evolved that position in time. He was uneasy at the thought of mass bloodshed as a cost of war yet emphatically supported the president's decision to join the conflict. In 1915 he may have urged caution, but one year later he was pushing for total conscription like the rest."

Vice President Johnson ardently defended the cause for war and held contempt for vocal opponents of it, a facet of the Senate President made evident through his striking convention speech.

This war is our defense of liberty and of civilization against the attack of militarism. We fight not only to protect American's interests, influence, and her commerce, but to safeguard justice and freedom. We are fighting for the rights of traders, workers, and of all citizens, that never shall the civilized world see another Yellow Rose crucifixion. [...] We opened our eyes to the reddening horizon about us and we realize that civilization hangs in the balance. We must not indulge any faction that seeks surrender on that front. Those factions threaten the development of progress and, in doing so, they disrupt national security. Subversives who have conspired to devastate our industries or defy enlistment procedures risk endangering American service to mankind.

         Hiram W. Johnson, Progressive Convention Speech, July 6th, 1916

The vice president's address did not sit at all well with the Peace Progressives and the so-called "Radical" Columbians, but there was no remote chance of mounting a last-ditch challenge to the incumbent second-in-command. The speech, from its insinuation that the IWW was un-American to the assertion that war critics bared the responsibility of a potential U.S. defeat, seemed to indicate that the party was moving away from what it was meant to embody: a genuine alternative to the status quo. None of these statements would feel out-of-place at the Republican convention, but in some regards the internationalists, imperialists and jingoists in the Progressive ranks went even further than their GOP colleagues. Once Roosevelt and Johnson were each unanimously re-nominated on the first call and the universally respected incumbent delivered his brief acceptance message (one more in line with the party mainstream), the convention seemed to breathe a sigh of relief. "I only wish we saw then the writing on the wall," recounted Progressive activist and future Socialist official Harold L. Ickes. "By God, we should have seen it. What fools we were."

FOURTH PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		2009 DELEGATES
Theodore Roosevelt ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

FOURTH PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		2009 DELEGATES
Hiram Johnson ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

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"The Reports of His Political Death Seem to Have Been Exaggerated," June 1916 - Source: NebraskaDotGov

As the general election kicked off, the prime domestic contention dominating headlines was that of permitting Roosevelt a third term. Much of America flatly disapproved of handing any president time in office beyond the traditional eight-year limit. That precedent was set by President George Washington over a hundred years ago with the fateful decision to restrict his reign, and every leader since abided by that unwritten rule. Undaunted Progressives deemed it the incumbent's duty to continue leading the country through the nation's greatest war in a generation, where perceived belligerence from the Entente alliance required a worthy figure to fit the moment. The president's supporters championed this breaking of the two-term tradition as a sign of progress, though others feared it demonstrated the incumbent's kingly ambitions.

The presidential campaigns of John Weeks and William J. Bryan noted the third term issue as part of their respective stump speeches, especially the former. Weeks commonly dug into the president for his refusal to step aside and exclaimed horror at the precedent being set. Referencing the matter, he stated, "The United States is to represent democracy at home and defend it abroad. How are we meant to combat the old kings and queens of Europe if we ourselves condone imperial rule?" The included quote as derived from the Bay Stater was roughly as far as the Republican was willing to go, vaguely insinuating that Roosevelt sought royalty (indeed his closest campaign advisor, Frederick Gillett, once named the president "King Theodore the First" at the 1908 national convention). Both within and beyond the Republican Party proper, concerned political obsessives sympathized with Weeks' argument.

One such obsessive was Bavarian-born saloonkeeper John Flammang Schrank. According to his journals, Schrank believed himself haunted, controlled by an other-worldly force to prevent a power-hungry administration from clenching onto Executive Branch. Theodore Roosevelt personified unmitigated tyranny in his disoriented mind. The saloonkeeper’s writings detailed a vivid dream in which the ghost of Albert Beveridge appeared and demanded Roosevelt be put to death as punishment for soiling his legacy and shattering his party. Schrank apparently internalized that dream as well as the notion of Roosevelt as an endlessly ambitious Napoleonic figure. On July 30th he tracked the president down at an Annapolis campaign stop, approached him, aimed, and fired off a shot. The bullet struck. It lodged itself in the leader's left shoulder and, as if fate itself intervened, its path did not penetrate any vital organs.

Schrank was immediately captured and arrested, while Roosevelt shockingly returned to his feet. Determining that the attack was non-lethal, the president initially rejected medical assistance, but soon surrendered to the wishes of the secret service. Thereafter, doctors confirmed Roosevelt's suspicions that the wound would not kill him, and that leaving the bullet in place posed less of a threat to the president's life than a removal attempt. That notwithstanding, the Rough Rider was forcibly taken away from his national tour: A detrimental prospect for any presidential campaign. Out of respect for the incumbent, Bryan and Weeks temporarily suspended their campaigning until the incumbent was fit to return to the trail.

For Bryan, the shared decision to depart from the speaking circuit did not dampen his presidential hopes. It is true to assert that both the Democratic and Progressive nominees performed best before large crowds, but the former had already accumulated an astounding degree of momentum. His trailblazing from state to state drove up interest in the Democratic platform and ignited a newfound sense of fondness for the former president. Nostalgia for Bryan's classic, nineteenth-century morals and vision for an enlightened tomorrow went hand-in-hand with a collective desire to return to brighter days. Sorrowful war news underscored the Nebraskan's pledge to revert the damage done to the American way of life, and fear of an imminent attack by the Japanese Navy made scores of otherwise fervently patriotic citizens give Bryan a second glance. The only demographics firmly opposed to the Democratic challenger by July were Socialist-leaning industrial workers, the ultra-wealthy, and immigrant communities which remained determined to defeat the Entente: German-Americans, Austro-Hungarians, those of the Jewish faith, and, perhaps most of all, the Irish.

Thousands of Irish enlisted in the British war effort and paid the ultimate price for it. "Defend Belgium from Subjugation," they were told, with ne'er a thought spared for the subjugation in their own backyard. Surely the British Administration ought to hold up its end of the bargain, surviving Irish volunteers thought, but two years now passed since the dawn of the Great War and Home Rule was nowhere to be found. Audacious rebels under the authority of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and its commanding activists, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, aimed at the heart of the Empire and set their sights for independence that April.

"Starting thus," said Connolly, "Ireland may yet set the torch to a European conflagration that will not burn out until the last throne and the last capitalist bond and debenture will be shriveled on the funeral pyre of the last warlord." Smuggled weaponry and war materiel from Germany and the United States assisted in the mobilization but the response was far quicker and deadlier than any dared to guess. Britain reacted with such ire it was as if Pearse and Connolly threatened King George himself. Dublin was razed and civilians and freedom fighters alike were massacred. Suspected rebels were indefinitely detained without trail. Martial law thenceforth reigned across the country. That is the story of the Easter Rising.

         Benjamin McIntyre, "The Long Death of Imperialism," The Resistance, 2013

Americans of Irish descent were in 1916 likely more loyal to the Progressive Party and President Roosevelt than any other ethnic group. Irish Americans generally voiced favor for the Democratic candidate in federal elections, as was traditionally the case in cities with large Irish populations like New York and Boston. With this election, however, due to Bryan's implied support of an armistice, they turned almost uniformly away from the alleged "British sympathizing" Democrats. The Easter Rising validated many of Roosevelt's arguments which suggested an inherent evil in the British Empire (a concept he first coined at the sinking of the Yellow Rose), and it too confirmed his theory that Britain would defend its holdings to the very last man. If he meant to win this war, the Commander-in-Chief needed an evolution in strategy. From the time of the Progressive Party nominating convention, the Roosevelt administration openly admitted its monumentally consequential shift in naval priorities.

The defeat of the Pacific Fleet in the South China Sea drove the president somewhat mad. He read over engagement documents incessantly in the aftermath of the Allied assault but could not conceive of any other outcome than the one which was carried out. While winning that battle may have been impossible, it was not too late to react accordingly. The Royal Navy, now more than ever, intently focused on pure dominance and might over speed, agility, and strength of numbers. Lloyd George sponsored the creation of dozens more battleships and battlecruisers upon taking over from Asquith (sharply reducing production of most other ship types), meaning their cards were all on the table. Several coal-burning and oil-burning battleships did indeed join the Atlantic Fleet and were of notable consequence in some mid-war naval battles, but these factors were not destined to be a catalyst in the greater tide of war.

President Roosevelt, Admirals Sims and Knight, and other high-ranking U.S. military strategists, knowing full well the impossibility of outmatching the Entente in terms of raw power, put their resources into modern destroyers. Prevailing in the seas counted on defeating not just the dreadnaughts, but the submarines. Therefore, the U.S. directed a large portion of naval construction funds into long-endurance warships: Building and completing hundreds instead of prioritizing a mere half dozen or so dreadnaughts (Although, as a side note, the U.S. did introduce a handful of new battlecruisers in 1916). These destroyers, traveling in a newly instituted convoy system, effectively challenged the British submarine assaults as well as some of their mightier ships. With depth charges, U.S. destroyers - affectionately dubbed the "Sub Hunters" in contemporaneous war serials and American popular culture - forced undersea vessels to the surface. From that point, an all-out gunfight would end it. Dozens of British submarines encircling the Caribbean thereby faced certain doom as a consequence for their merchant hunting endeavors.

This sneaky tactic was formed in coordination with German High Command who simultaneously fostered a reorganization of their own. Mutual planning immeasurably assisted the two de facto military allies, so much so that each side sunk finances into developing a communication link that totally sidestepped standard Atlantic cables. Generals Pershing and Erich von Falkenhayn lettered one another on numerous occasions and openly discussed workable scenarios and construction schedules. This solidified relations and unified trust to the point that the Kaiser wrote Roosevelt the 1910s equivalent to a "Get Well Soon" letter upon learning of the attempt on his life. Military historians have since credited this development for Falkenhayn's decision to fake-out French forces at the Fort de Souville during the Battle of Verdun. Believing the Germans on their doorstep, French machine-gunners exited the fortification and prepared to counter-attack. Instead of German platoons, the infantry was greeted with an explosive barrage of artillery. Falkenhayn's men took Souville on July 15th with minor (comparative) losses and pressed onward ever closer to Verdun.

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The Friedrichshafen G.II, the Inspiration for the U.S. Curtiss B1-Eagle Aircraft - Source: Wiki Commons

September saw the unfolding of an entirely redesigned, twisted chapter in the war. Amid the election, President Roosevelt put into action the North American Autumnal Offensive. Residual pain from Schrank's bullet largely restrained the Progressive hero to the White House for the duration of August, but in that time he oversaw the completion of all preparations needed to embark on the next evolution of "lightning war." Modeled after the successful initial push into Canada though transformed with the latest technological advancements and military intelligence, the Autumnal Offensive incorporated Atlantic Sub Hunters, the often-undercounted Great Lakes fleet, modified tractors for use as prototypical armored vehicles, and, most significantly, air power.

The U.S. previously invested the lion's share of its military funding into munitions, artillery, and naval projects, thus playing the Entente's game by their rules whilst not recognizing the innate advantage of open skies. Fighter-class air units were present to a meager extent on either side of the Northern Front, but the British were not keen on shipping additional planes to North America with calamity shadowing over a battered Europe. Upon witnessing the course of modern warfare in the European theater, particularly the effectiveness of German zeppelin raids, U.S. observers in 1915 reported to their superiors the pivotal importance of air superiority. If implemented correctly, the United States military could possess an unmitigated advantage in the air, both in terms of raw numbers and technical supremacy. Secretary Meyer oversaw the aviation transition team (including the pilot training program) and signed off on federally mandated orders to U.S. automobile and airplane manufacturers for an expeditious adjustment in mass production. Congress readily appropriated over half a billion to war-related manufacturing at the start of their December 1915 session, and an appreciable chunk of those funds carried over to aviation. By October, the United States flew over 2,200 planes and planned a minimum reinforcement rate of 1,750 per month by 1917 - easily outpacing operational British air units in Canada.

Roosevelt's assailment initiated with the launch of an aviation-centric bombing wave on British-Canadian lines on September 23rd. The scourge was relentless. Wave upon wave of twin-engine bombers descended on the Northern Front and ramped up the bloodshed to amounts unseen since the shock strike on the U.S.-Canada border. Pilots under the command of Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske struck hard and fast, never discriminating soldier versus civilian. These heavier-than-air vehicles were equipped with state-of-the-art gun and bombsights to allow for better aim, in addition to radio communication devices and synchronization gear. Some fell in due course from anti-air artillery, but an overwhelming majority survived, nailed their intended targets, and blew apart Entente trench fortifications. Aircraft was no longer limited to serving as observational tools, now they outshined even the most hardened infantrymen. During breaks in-between raids, named "Eclipse" periods, American divisions as accompanied by crude armored tractors and naval support were given the green-light to advance, and miles of land was won at a time. The pure numerical difference of division width was essential, but the advance may have been constrained if not for each cog of the offensive turning in efficient succession.

Gains made by the United States at the Northern Front in the mere three-week span of the Autumnal Offensive far excelled any other that year. Literally blasted apart like dynamite, Canadian field soldiers fell back to Ottawa on October 20th, all but abandoning the Ontario bank of the St. Lawrence River apart from easternmost towns bordering Quebec. Morale plummeted to its lowest yet in Canada, as the stoppage of British imports and endless U.S. raids chipped away at civilian willpower to hold out through the storm. The severing of trade routes earlier that year meant utter catastrophe for average working people in non-Quebecois provinces. Statistics show a similar scene to that of 1914-1915 Germany with childhood hunger on the rise and an increasingly rapid spread of disease in heavily populated cities. Toronto and Winnipeg lied firmly in the grip of the United States, the Vancouver suburbs struggled to hold off endlessly-replenishable offensive armies, and now it appeared Ottawa would fall. U.S. leadership viewed this scene play out through the narrow scope of war games, paying no mind to the suffering of Canadians. This perspective was perfectly encapsulated by the words of General Pershing when he wrote to Roosevelt, "Montréal will soon fly the stars and stripes. Freedom is on the march."

Rumors stirred by late October that the British High Command was seriously considering downsizing its participation on the Northern Front in order to triage a teetering landscape much closer to home. Lloyd George said nothing aloud and wrote nothing concrete, thus thwarting the risk of disintegration on the Western Front, but even national militarists like himself could not deny reality. He exhausted British manpower and locked Australian and New Zealander armies in the European trenches. His nation's singular best asset in times of overseas conflict, the Royal Navy, was plainly not enough to win the battle for North America. Salvaging Europe looked to be the safest option for long-term British economic and imperial longevity. Furthermore, the Autumnal Offensive and subsequent whispers of a British retreat made the all-too bullish Japanese military think twice about embarking on an invasion of Western North America. If the British were not present to provide extensive assistance, the game was over before it had started. Japanese forces, thereafter, would proceed no further than the Hawaiian Islands, where a rebuffed U.S. Pacific Fleet stuck a cork in their plans to overwhelm the territory. As one may imagine, this dramatically alleviated American fears.

This most recent fundamental change in the dynamic of the armed conflict equally altered the shape of the election. Electoral forecasts to this point predicted an easy win, bordering a thoroughbred landslide, for former President Bryan. The Democratic nominee was set up to receive an electoral majority on a silver platter. The Progressive-affiliated press dove at Bryan with the same strategy used against Hearst, that of comparing domestic achievements and warning the public of vitriolic demagoguery, and in that realm occasionally printing the cautionary words of patriotic and duty-bound conservatives like New York Supreme Court Justice Alton Parker to prove their point, but the polls had not budged. Now the situation seemed pliable. In examining political polling from July versus October, it is readily apparent that the Bryan Campaign lost substantial ground among middle-class voters and easily impressionable swing demographics. The Nebraskan's incessant preaching of an alternate war tactic failed to impress in conjunction with the undisputed victories taking place as the front. Roosevelt was naturally trusted on this issue, and Bryan was not.
    

Literary Digest Poll
July 1916

William J. Bryan		41% Pop., 289 Electoral Votes, 29 States
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.		29% Pop., 131 Electoral Votes, 10 States
John W. Weeks		16% Pop., 100 Electoral Votes, 07 States
Emil Seidel		13% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States
Other		01% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States

    

Literary Digest Poll
October 1916

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.		36% Pop., 270 Electoral Votes, 19 States
William J. Bryan		36% Pop., 245 Electoral Votes, 26 States
John W. Weeks		13% Pop., 016 Electoral Votes, 03 States
Emil Seidel		15% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States
Other		00% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States

Roosevelt's support strengthened considerably at the expense of Weeks and Bryan, and the same was true for Seidel of the Socialist Party. The Milwaukee mayor retained not only Debs' 1912 foundation of radicalized industrial workers and members of the Industrial Workers of the World, but spectacularly merged components of the anti-war movement left high and dry by Bryan. The Seidel Campaign and the leadership of the SP performed such an unprecedented stunt over the course of the election season, and it all happened to piece together before November. Signaling the wider affiliation of Socialism and opposition to the war, critique typically reserved for the Democratic Party was now laid at the doorstep of Seidel and the Socialists. Spanish-American War veteran and Congressman Sydney Anderson (P-MN) went on the record lambasting Seidel ahead of the election and called for his imprisonment for hindering the U.S. war effort. "Peace can only be achieved with victory," he announced, "...even a god-forsaken Democrat like Bryan knows it."

Prideful (Progressive politicians), once claiming to represent of a future free from capitalist consolidation and oligarchic government, emerged as the greatest political threat to the homegrown working class in a generation. Theodore Roosevelt, the living titanic spirit of patriotism, saluted departing soldiers as they marched off to the trenches of Canada. Defending the Columbian Beacon for Progress in one voice whilst denouncing freedom of expression and calling for its suspension in another, the administration never disguised its bloodlust nor limitless disdain for criticism. Roosevelt was for war and Bryan was for a softer, kindler war. Neither opposed it. Seidel did.

American Socialists were in 1916 hardwired to oppose the systematic and outright criminal slaughter of the World War on humanitarian grounds and in recognition of the class dimension of capitalist war. Seidel's presidential campaign joined with the League of Conscientious Objectors in condemning the Conscription Law as the ultimate, reactionary degradation of human civilization, and together provided the backbone for the protests to come. Seidel manufactured his base among all men and women desirous of a people's peace, and in that cultivated a barrier-shattering buildup of the Socialist Movement.

        Louis Waldman, "What I Saw At Dawn: A Eulogy for Emil Seidel," New York Worker's Journal, 1947

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Bryan and Wilson on the Campaign Trail, November 1916 - Source: LoC

Time was running out for the candidates to issue their final pleas to the public. Polling looked bleaker by the day for non-Progressive contenders, though Bryan ignored that shift and chose to stay on-message. He nipped at the heels of the incumbent in a last-second blitz of the Industrial Midwest alongside Democratic officeholders in those states. From his perspective, the party must win united in the pursuit of ridding the country of its Rough Rider warlord and his foul jingoism, or else defeat was guaranteed. Bryan was therefore pleased with his cross-endorsement by the Prohibition Party earlier that summer, proof that the Democratic tent was capable of an outward expansion. This also awarded the Democratic contender a monumental ally in former Governor Frank Hanley (Pro-IN), a mainstay in Hoosier politics. Bryan shared a stage with men like Hanly in addition to prominent Democrats, and that won him substantial respect in socially conservative circles. John Weeks, on the other end of the traditional party dichotomy, allowed his surrogates to speak on his behalf. Weeks' alleged sympathies for the Atlanticists made him a popular option with the Eastern establishment, but he secured virtually no support elsewhere. Those who opposed his nomination now refused to work to see him elected, including Lodge and Fairbanks who quietly lent use of their office staff to the Roosevelt Campaign.

President Roosevelt significantly limited his time on the campaign trail despite the apparent closeness of the race. His campaign operation may have treated the contest as if their nominee was still ten points behind the Democrat, but the incumbent halted personalized canvassing in the final stretch, citing undeviating oversight of the war as an excuse. This may have been a ploy to make the war leader appear more presidential, however the truth of the matter was that he remained in a state of cascading residual pain from the assassination attempt in August. In the president's stead, Vice President Johnson toured much of the country and espoused the promise of a future prosperity. Following the Independence Day Convention in New York, the Progressives neglected domestic issues in favor of showy Americanism, and their attacks on Bryan and Weeks preached supremely important foreign policy differences. "Bryan Trumpeted Peace from his Golden Cross. Roosevelt Fought and Bled for Peace at San Juan Hill," read a pro-Columbian advertisement referring to the Spanish-American War. To some effect, the Roosevelt Campaign tackled its Democratic opposition from a strikingly similar angle as Beveridge in 1900. Back then, debate revolved around imperialism vs. anti-imperialism, or, in the terms of Bryan, "plutocracy and democracy." Patriotism, economic opportunity, and empire were in 1916 once again dominant issues in the political zeitgeist.

The Socialist nominee concluded his campaign in his home town of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to an adoring crowd awaiting his arrival. Seidel knew that like Haywood and Debs before him, a genuine majority vote victory was highly unlikely. Yet a newfound spirit was in the air, a feeling that the anti-war movement had synthesized  disparate forces that otherwise would never have voted his way. Former Progressive lobbyist and attorney Amos Pinchot, brother to the reformist Pennsylvanian senator Gifford Pinchot, famously broke with the Columbians and expressed support for the Seidel Campaign. "I am wary of Socialism," he stated, "but the Milwaukeean is an honest man, has a progressive mayoral record, will defend the rights of workers, and opposes the carrying out of this war." Men like Pinchot who were active in the creation of the Progressive Party in 1904 lost their love for the organization they now viewed as feckless and mindlessly infatuated with empire building. The Socialists and their credibility on the war issue had finally led to mainstream respectability unlike ever before. Whether this was enough to propel the workers' party to a position of power was not yet determined.

This election, aside from the third term issue and the varied economic and social perspectives offered by the assorted aspirants, squarely narrowed down to the question of active participation in the Great War. A rejection of the titan of American political culture meant a fundamental change in the United States' foreign affairs, whether it be Bryan's alternative strategy, Weeks' proposed distancing from the Central Powers, or Seidel's call for an immediate peace at any price. Each represented a defining and unique pathway branched off of the status quo, yet these substitute courses were equal parts mysterious and thrilling. The stakes were high, and arguably higher than any balloting since 1900. The people of the United States would once more cast their judgement on the direction of the country, but now that decision could potentially affect the national makeup of the entire planet. European powers glanced Westward and held their collective breath on November 7th.

When the results began pouring in on Election Day, Literary Digest editors were relieved to find that their latest model appeared more accurate than any of their competitors'. In other words, Roosevelt and Bryan were sparring on a leveled playing field. The Literary Digest won a reputation by this point of providing the most precise gauge of public opinion out of any pollster, and in 1916 that held true just the same. Its October poll found Weeks with a distant third place electoral finish. That finding suggested a nightmare scenario for the Republican Party: A replication of the 1904 Chauncey Depew campaign. This election's final product, however, presented the GOP with an outcome that made the party long for the days of Depew and Knox. Weeks' favorability was proven to be all but nonexistent outside of the strongest of strongholds for his aging party. He carried Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island for a grand total of 16 Electoral Votes. Rhode Island was the closest of the three, won by Weeks by 45% of the vote. The 1916 Republican Party performance would go down as the worst ever for a mainline presidential candidate.

New England's shift from unquestioned Republican dominance mainly pertained to the war. Atlanticists in these areas voted Weeks, but the middle-class pro-intervention vote (a demographic that voted overwhelmingly for Albert Beveridge in 1900) was picked up decisively by President Roosevelt. The incumbent did best in five key categories: Interventionists/Preparedness advocates, men over the age of 45, non-unionized workers, Western European immigrants, and women. That last constituency was not able to vote in all 48 states per the lack of universal suffrage, but 18 states allowed women voting rights through state law. As such, raw ballot totals in suffrage states like Illinois and Nevada far exceeded previous figures, and in 1916 women favored Roosevelt over the field. Seidel was up to par in this demographic as well, but a majority of voting women, particularly in the middle and upper classes, believed the Progressive Party spoke to women's issues more so than other factions. Indeed, despite Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives all expressing support for suffrage in their national platforms, only the latter forced the 1913 Constitutional amendment resolution in Congress.

Accompanied by these advantages, Roosevelt discovered unexpected triumphs in New Hampshire and Massachusetts (Weeks' home state). Maine confidently navigated itself to the Columbian column with a commanding 47% of the vote. This breakthrough was momentous for the Progressives, a party that several months ago some analysts considered at death's door, but it would not be the last this cycle. "Election data in New York County," wrote author Gene Sharov in "Election Analysis Series: 1916", "tells us that turnout was higher in precincts that leaned Progressive in 1912 and 1908. Democratic turnout was up from its woeful 1912 low. Republican districts voted overwhelmingly Progressive on the federal level. Bryan won the county by roughly 40-45%, in addition to Queens County, Kings County, and several others upstate. Weeks won four border counties with higher Canadian-American populations. Seidel did not win any counties, though he finished in second place in Bronx and Schenectady counties, and third place in twenty-six other counties. Roosevelt won the remaining counties as well as the state. Roosevelt 40%, Bryan 33%, Seidel 17%, Weeks 10%."

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President Roosevelt Casting His Ballot, November 7th, 1916 - Source: Wiki Commons

The victory of the Roosevelt Campaign in locking down New York State on Election Day set the novel tone that Bryan would, in fact, be the candidate playing 'catch-up' moving forward: A complete reversal of what most contemporary analysts predicted on the eve of the vote. Some hypothesized that either the Autumn Offensive would flood new, pro-Roosevelt voters to the polls or Bryan would sail to the White House on an antiwar wave, a backlash of the administration's foreign policies. In either case, prominent journals and newsprints like the New York Times considered Bryan the frontrunner, and wrote that a Roosevelt win would manifest only through a gradual, come-from-behind effort. Thus far, the exact opposite scenario was unfolding.

Progressives prevailed in areas that had grown accustomed to voting for the Columbian standard-bearer, including the densely populated cities of Newark and Jersey City, but it was not until the Democratic-tilted rural counties ticked in with their reported ballots that Bryan appeared on the metaphorical radar. Roosevelt was certified as the clear winner regardless of agrarian Democratic votes evening the score to some extent. Rural portions of the Garden State opting for the Democratic nominee was nothing new, though this trend was now exacerbated as never before. Agricultural workers and populistic tenant farmers returned to the Jeffersonian fold in droves, doubtlessly due to Bryan's unique appeal to these types of voters. President Roosevelt retained a modicum of support among this group for his conservation agenda and anti-trust reputation, but this was an absolute core of Bryan's base. One of Thomas Marshall's greatest flaws as a presidential candidate was his flagrant inability to captivate this exact crowd as excellently as Bryan did. Now Bryan was back on the trail, and it certainly paid off.

Four years earlier, Roosevelt conquered the West. He once nabbed the Great Plains with ease, wiped the floor with Governor Marshall in the Mountain states, and reigned supreme on the West Coast. Due to the mass exodus of farmers and other rural workers from the Progressive camp (and the distinct absence of Hearst splitting the Democratic vote) the American West was hotly contested. Bryan confidently regained Nebraska for the Democrats and did the same in the border states of West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. Likewise, the depreciation of non-Democratic voters returned Wyoming and Colorado to Bryan - with the latter state's turnaround accredited to a November rally featuring Bryan with Senator Charles Thomas. Utah, thrice a Republican state on the federal level, shifted to the Bryan Column just as it did in 1896 and 1900. The Nebraskan may not have won over the Northeastern U.S. with his promise of a more moralistic nation, and Wilson's presence on the ticket may not have swayed the voters of New Jersey, but the nominee reawakened a dozing Bryanite crowd and effortlessly tapped into that often underrepresented electorate.

Democratic margins in the South were astronomical. Southerners despised Roosevelt, hated him for dragging the country to war, and deeply distrusted his expansion and perceived overreach of the federal government. Democrats did not quarrel with the president on the prosecution of trusts or other matters that contested the rule of consolidated industries, but they vastly disapproved the breaking of the Washington doctrine (i.e., "no entangling alliances") and the ongoing push for mandatory service in the armed forces. Senator Watson's sentiments on this front were felt by Americans below the Mason-Dixon line, and they universally voted to elect Bryan president and Wilson vice-president. The Great Commoner outperformed his Democratic predecessors in the Solid South, scoring upwards of 90% of the vote in states like South Carolina and Louisiana. Remarkably, Seidel captured decent enough margins in Florida and Texas to land in third place over the totally absent and now thoroughly humiliated John Weeks.

Indeed, it was Emil Seidel, not Theodore Roosevelt, that attracted the scorn of William J. Bryan in the days preceding November 7th. The Socialist Party won favor by tens of thousands of disaffected Progressive voters, and it too fared splendidly with white, working-class voters. Bryan desperately needed a minimum plurality support by this voting bloc in order to stay afloat in the Midwest. Reports of Seidel's surge disrupted that quest. The Democratic nominee was uninterested in polling, a project he called "political gamesmanship," but the likelihood is high that he fretted over an overperformance by the left-wing political party, and much to his chagrin, the industrial Midwestern states were precisely where the Socialists did their best in this election.

Seidel won over 10% of the vote in unlikely SP havens like Florida and Oklahoma, but in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, the Socialist mayor shocked the system. He surpassed the total GOP vote in these four states, equaled the Democrats' in Ohio and Pennsylvania, and managed to outshine Bryan in the latter two. Wisconsin was, by far, the Socialists' strongest showing in 1916. The Badger State, where the mayor barnstormed at the start and end of his national campaign, delivered to the Socialist Movement an encouraging sign in the makeup of its ballot count. It resulted in Seidel's 31% of the vote to Roosevelt's 33%, Bryan's 26%, and Weeks' 10%. Debs took roughly 17% of the Wisconsin vote in 1912, Haywood managed 12% in 1908, but in no state had a Socialist succeeded in breaking the upper 20 percentile. It was astounding, and a discernable wake-up call to the powers that be.

Needless to say, Roosevelt carried pluralities in the Midwest with Indiana as the sole exclusion (To note, historians point to high numbers of German-Americans voting Progressive, not Socialists winning over Democratic voters, as the tipping point in the Midwest). Progressives' prosperous roundup of the industrial Midwest granted them a moment to breathe, but winning the election still necessitated commanding finishes in as many of the remaining states as possible. As such, Roosevelt grabbed Kansas, Washington, and the Dakotas as expected, succeeding in each with about the same percentages as 1912. The American Southwest, namely New Mexico and Arizona, was eventually called for Bryan with margins around 5-8% apiece. Bryan too won a plurality in Montana, Idaho, and Nevada - all states won by the Columbians four years ago and the former two since the inception of the Progressive Party. Oregon was called for Roosevelt on the evening of Election Day, and on the morning of November 8th the Californian Secretary of State confirmed the incumbent as the winner of the state's thirteen Electoral Votes - a win Roosevelt affably credited to Vice President Johnson, Governor Stephens, and Speaker Jones to the day he died.

Thereby, thankfully without the need of a contingent election, Theodore Roosevelt was elected to a third term as president of the United States. He thereafter received 275 Electoral Votes to Bryan's 239.

[Pyro]

The Election of 1916: Final Results

[Pyro]

Without American capital and especially an American exit from the war, I don't really see how the Entente can win the war. I'll be curious how post-war Europe shakes out.

Great work as always Pyro. This is by far my favorite timeline at the moment.

Thank you so much!

[Pyro]

1916 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Democratic: 37 (+7)
Progressive: 32 (+1)
Republican: 26 (-8)
Socialist: 1 (0)

House
Progressive: 156 (-2)
Democratic: 126 (+9)
Republican: 115 (-20)
Socialist: 31 (+13)
Civic League: 6 (0)
Independent: 1 (0)

  Senate Leadership

Senate President Hiram W. Johnson (P-CA)
President pro tempore John H. Bankhead (D-AL)
Caucus Chairman Robert L. Owen (D-OK)
Conference Chairman Robert La Follette (P-WI)
Conference Chairman Warren G. Harding (R-OH)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader Champ Clark (D-MO)
Minority Leader James R. Mann (R-IL)
Minority Leader Meyer London (S-NY)
Minority Leader Daniel A. Driscoll (CL-NY)

On the presidential stage, Theodore Roosevelt vanquished William Jennings Bryan and attained slim yet definitive Popular and Electoral Vote pluralities. Progressives succeeded and outmaneuvered the polls, though their failure to blow the Democratic candidate out of the water appeared to exemplify the lack of a coherent mandate. Congressional, gubernatorial, and municipal elections played out much the same, with no overall impression of victory for any one domestic or foreign policy proposal over another. The war had drawn new lines in the sand and tug once-allied demographics apart from one another, leading to an indeterminate conclusion. Hearty results for congressional Columbians preserved their standing in the House of Representatives and allowed for a Senate pickup, Democratic candidates excelled spectacularly in statewide Senate races whilst failing to bump off Progressive House incumbents, and Socialists made substantive gains on all levels apart from the upper chamber.

The Republican National Committee in 1916 looked to the congressional races to salvage an otherwise disappointing year. John Weeks, within committee ranks, was never viewed as a figure capable of surpassing some of his less controversial predecessors in the presidential contest. It was thought that the nominee would run about even with Knox, thereby adequately meeting subpar expectations and kicking the can down the road for a post-Roosevelt political comeback. News of Emil Seidel garnering more support than Weeks in the October polls crumbled RNC morale as they began to realize the upcoming electoral abyss. Coming to terms with an all but certain presidential defeat prior to Election Day, the RNC expended all available inertia on conserving its three-seat Senate majority and somehow dispelling reports of a party in absolute disarray. Relevance in and of itself superseded tangible Election Day gains. The prime issue with that concept was its near impossibility.

For over twelve years, Senator Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana was in a position of leadership atop Senate Republicans. He famously (or, infamously) pulled Roosevelt to the right during the 1906 Grand Bargain, initiated the upper chamber's investigation into President Hearst's alleged corruption, received over two-hundred delegate votes for president at the 1912 Republican National Convention, and, as conference chairman, became the most powerful ranking Republican in the Senate. The mustachioed Hoosier waddled slightly leftward in his tenure to accommodate for the natural shift of the political tide, and frequently uplifted bipartisanship (particularly with moderate Progressives) as a sign of a functioning government. In 1916 he announced an intent to retire from Congress, joining prospective retirees Thomas B. Caltron (R-NM), Eugene Hale (R-ME), and William J. Browning (R-NJ). Fairbanks' departure from the Senate most consequentially opened the door to a new leadership slate.

Maine Senator Eugene Hale's retirement likewise blew wide open the opportunity for a Progressive senatorial pickup. He was urged at length by GOP colleagues and allies to reconsider the decision, but at 80-years old he considered his time in government at an end. Republicans fell into despair, figuring their loss in Maine all but inevitable. Virtually every forecast as early as July suggested Roosevelt as the winner of the state's six Electoral Votes. Senator E.M. Thompson (P-ME) won his seat with 42% of the vote in 1912 against an 'Eastern Establishment' Republican, even though Hale himself managed 74% in 1910 and 72% in 1904. Waterville Mayor and State Representative Charles F. Johnson, a Democrat who recently changed affiliation to the Columbians, declared his candidacy for Hale's seat and was considered an early frontrunner. Four respected state polling agencies found Johnson with an averaged 5-point advantage over any challenger. Then, in a stunning turnaround which defied expectations, the Republican candidate took control of the situation. To the immense fortune of the Maine Republican Party, Eugene Hale's son, Frederick Hale, agreed to take up the family mantle. He was perhaps the only member of the GOP fit to win this election, and he did just that: 46% to 39%.

Republicans would hardly be as lucky in dozens of other races as they struggled to escape Weeks' shadow. Nine senatorial candidates running on their respective GOP tickets lost to either Democratic or Progressive challengers. Senator Du Pont (R-DE) lost by four points to neutrality proponent John Bassett Moore (P-DE), a former Republican and Secretary of State under President Depew. Senator Moses Clapp (R-MN) was defeated in a close re-election fight against Progressive internationalist and federal prosecutor Frank B. Kellogg. Peace Democrat James A. Reed (D-MO) prevailed in his race versus incumbent Senator John McKinley (R-MO), industrialist Walter S. Dickey (P-MO), and anti-militarist Kate Richards O'Hare of the Socialist Party. Democratic state party chair Andrieus Jones ousted Senator Thomas B. Catron (R-MN), citing his vote on the war resolution as reason enough to force the sitting congressman to a timely retirement. Democrat John Burke, the former North Dakotan senator who had narrowly lost in 1914 against Progressive James H. Sinclair, returned to bring down three-term incumbent Porter J. McCumber (R-ND). In the special election to fill Fairbanks' seat, perhaps the most symbolic of any race of this caliber, Indiana RNC Chairman Harry S. New (R-IN) was defeated by Governor Thomas Marshall (D-IN) in a landslide.

Fairbanks notwithstanding, the most well-known and respected figure of Republican politics was undoubtedly Henry Cabot Lodge. Serving the public since the 1880s, the Massachusetts politician pioneered the familiar imperialist practices of the United States alongside Roosevelt and Beveridge, remaining friendly with both presidents despite any differences in procedure and demeaner. He was known as the quintessential Man of the Senate and a power-broker unmatched by his contemporaries. Few in government possessed the same degree of influence as Lodge, and that paradigm held true regardless of the party's slow-motion collapse from 1904 to 1916. His home state awarded the senator a 73% majority in 1910, but six protracted years had since elapsed. Lodge's passionate insistence that Roosevelt advance Preparedness and subsequently enter the Great War was not greeted kindly by the Massachusetts Progressive Party: An organization that once endorsed the incumbent for re-election but increasingly drifted away from the senator as the war dredged on. Massachusetts Progressives supported President Roosevelt as a superior option to Weeks and likewise desired a senatorial candidate superior to Lodge. Their nomination eventually fell to Representative Alvan T. Fuller (P-MA).

Sensing a rare opening in their state's political sphere, the Democratic Party of Massachusetts went all-in on the Senate race and opted to field their best bet against Lodge. Boston Mayor and former 9th District Representative John Francis Fitzgerald (D-MA) threw his hat into the ring to topple an incumbent he deemed, "Morally and ethically unsound." Fitzgerald, the son of Irish immigrants, rose to the forefront of Boston politics starting in 1891, and gradually worked his way to Boston City Hall. He wrestled with Democratic city bosses for control over the government, mounting a campaign that ended in the passage of a $9 million investment act for Boston Harbor. In 1916, upon his nomination by the state party (likely a Platt-like move to expunge Fitzgerald from the city), the Bostonian embarked on the electoral campaign of a lifetime. He rallied hard against Lodge from day one, coining the senator a fossil of a bygone age. With Fuller criticizing Lodge's foreign policy from a pacifistic point of view, Fitzgerald tied the incumbent to the Atlanticism movement, denouncing "forces that would see our government allied with colonists and oppressors. The interests of America are one with Ireland, not the boot under which she suffocates." Captivating Irish Progressives and Massachusetts Democrats, Fitzgerald secured 35% of the vote to Lodge's 34% and Fuller's 24%, thus delivering a shockwave across the entire political spectrum.

Judging from this phenomenon, the nationwide rejection of the rump, out-of-step Republican Party, the country was steadily reverting to its traditional two-party system. GOP officeholders and voters primarily directed their outrage not at John Weeks and his lackluster campaign, nor at Roosevelt, but at the national leadership for its inability to stave off repetitious calamity. Remnants of the long-discarded McKinley and Reid-era policies of abject and unthinking congressional obstruction failed. Fairbanks and Butler's strategy to cooperate with moderates in opposing parties went nowhere. Now, Committee Chairman Joseph Burnquist (R-MN) was proven to be precisely as inept as the previous chairs. Survival required something untried. Knox, not unbeknownst of resentment facing his class of party leaders, bowed out of consideration for Senate conference chair. That title was therefore won by Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio, a thoroughbred business conservative. "We Republicans," he declared, "mean to hold the heritage of American nationality unimpaired and unsurrendered. We are united in our resolve to safeguard America and preserve our independence. We were resolved then, even as we are today, and will be tomorrow, to preserve this free and independent Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic."

Senators Elected in 1916 (Class 1)

Henry F. Ashurst (D-AZ): Democratic Hold, 54%
*William F. Kirby (D-AR): Democratic Hold, 67%
John D. Works (P-CA): Progressive Hold, 60%
George P. McLean (R-CT): Republican Hold, 50%
John B. Moore (P-DE): Progressive Gain, 41%
James Taliaferro (D-FL): Democratic Hold, 76%
*Thomas W. Hardwick (D-GA): Democratic Hold, 91%
Gilbert N. Haugen (P-IA): Progressive Hold, 44%
James A. Hemenway (R-IN): Republican Hold, 43%
*Thomas R. Marshall (D-IN): Democratic Gain, 46%
Frederick Hale (R-ME): Republican Hold, 46%
Charles J. Bonaparte (P-MD): Progressive Hold, 44%
John F. Fitzgerald (D-MA): Democratic Gain, 35%
Roy O. Woodruff (P-MI): Progressive Hold, 40%
Frank B. Kellogg (P-MN): Progressive Gain, 40%
James K. Vardaman (D-MS): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
James A. Reed (D-MO): Democratic Gain, 50%
Charles N. Pray (R-MT): Republican Hold, 33%
Gilbert M. Hitchcock (D-NE): Democratic Gain, 44%
Key D. Pittman (D-NV): Democratic Gain, 39%
Mahlon R. Pitney (P-NJ): Progressive Hold, 45%
Andrieus A. Jones (D-NM): Democratic Gain, 45%
George B. McClellan, Jr. (D-NY): Democratic Hold, 40%
John Burke (D-ND): Democratic Gain, 36%
Myron T. Herrick (R-OH): Republican Hold, 42%
Philander C. Knox (R-PA): Republican Hold, 50%
Henry F. Lippitt (R-RI): Republican Hold, 51%
Kenneth McKellar (D-TN): Democratic Hold, 56%
Charles Allen Culberson (D-TX): Democratic Hold, 82%
George Sutherland (R-UT): Republican Hold, 51%
Carroll S. Page (R-VT): Republican Hold, 64%
Claude A. Swanson (D-VA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
Miles Poindexter (P-WA): Progressive Hold, 55%
Nathan B. Scott (R-WV): Republican Hold, 44%
Robert M. La Follette (P-WI): Progressive Hold, 63%
Robert D. Carey (P-WY): Progressive Gain, 40%

* Special Election

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Theodore Roosevelt, 28th and 30th President of the United States - Source: Wiki Commons

Part 7: Come Rally

Chapter XXIII: Strengthened Resolve: C'mon Johnny Get Your Gun, the War Has Only Just Begun

President Theodore Roosevelt's November triumph categorically ended any leftover rumination on the subject of the United States' role in the war. American intervention was now a static fixture of the national consciousness, at least under its present governance. Roosevelt's vision for America's foreign policy, one centered on the protection of commerce, the freedom of the seas, and an active presence on the world stage, was fully legitimized as the law of the land. Once the president met and exceeded the vote threshold required for re-election, all mainstream publications ceased speculation of alternate military tactics and furthermore forbade the printing of war-skeptic editorials. These papers flatly deemed it inappropriate to comment negatively on the president's plan of attack with the election ended, thenceforth leaving Socialist newsletters like Appeal to Reason and American Socialist as the only nationally circulated publications wholly opposed to the global conflict.

The Democratic Party and former President Bryan admitted immense sorrow at the election results. Bryan typed up a short concession which briefly relayed his domestic concerns. Aside from a generic prayer for U.S. soldiers at the front, the Nebraskan keenly submitted no mention of foreign policy. Party leaders presumed that 1916 would turn on the page on a nearly two-decade march to empire and promptly usher in a new period of American politics, but alas that had not come to pass. Unlike in the aftermath of the 1900 presidential race, Democratic officeholders did not blame Bryan for the loss, frankly recognizing the fruitlessness of asserting any other candidate could have outperformed their nominee. There was no major conservative overreaction to Bryan's defeat and no signature move to reevaluate national marketing and outreach tactics. Even Southern Democrats who voraciously opposed the Great Commoner's nomination commended their colleague for a well-run campaign, offering commiserations for the loss whilst highlighting the success of Senate Democrats in regaining control of the legislature. That sentiment notwithstanding, the Democratic National Committee was now forced to reckon with a continuation of the Roosevelt presidency. Committee members quietly contemplated their next steps and, noting how Bryan represented the purest of the Old Guard, started searching out new blood to inject some adrenaline into the party.

Below the obvious "Roosevelt Re-Elected" headlines, dozens of newsprints remarked on the curious nature of the ascent of Socialist Party politicians. Polls predicted as much, but observing the vote play out was another experience entirely. Emil Seidel overtaking John Weeks in the Popular Vote was not thought as a reasonable outcome some months beforehand, yet with every vote counted that indeed turned out to be the case. Seidel's exceptional nationwide performance juxtaposed with down-ballot Socialist gains obligated impartial journalists to ponder the effectiveness of left-wing policy proposals and coordination with the IWW in driving voters to the polls. The SP, after all, owed tremendous thanks to the assistance offered by the radical labor union. Some articles also thoughtfully mentioned the historical nature of Socialist Representatives-elect Rose Schneiderman and Pauline Newman in becoming the first women to hold federal office in the United States and state office in New York, respectively. Both were active feminists, union organizers, surrogates for the Seidel Campaign, and well-known faces in their respective communities. Newman won a seat in the New York State Assembly and Schneiderman was elected to Congress from the Empire State's 14th District.

Just South of Newman's Manhattan-based district, an incumbent Progressive state senator succeeded in overtaking a Socialist challenger to assume his third term. That officeholder was none other than 34 year-old Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Not entirely dissimilar to his distant relative in the White House, the younger Roosevelt believed wholeheartedly in progressive politics. He thoroughly championed the ABCs of Progressivism during his service in the New York State Senate, including instituting an active government that fought on behalf of the public and sought to serve working people above corporate interests. The state senator was strongly influenced by his political cousin, so much so that he rejected a recruitment opportunity by the New York Democratic Party in favor of remaining in the same lineage as his respected hero. That decision initially placed Franklin Roosevelt in a minority faction of the state government, but following the statewide Progressive upsurge in 1912, the Columbians nabbed a slim majority. President Roosevelt, in a show of appreciation for his cousin's promising career, made it a point to invite him to the official inaugural in March. The two Roosevelts appeared together at that event on March 5th, 1917.

The Inaugural itself was less of a spectacle than either of the president's first two wins. Theodore Roosevelt himself was indeed personally less animated by the festivities and opted to restrain the more flamboyant aspects of the commencement ceremony, thus reserving time and money better spent on the war. He celebrated with the crowd, nonetheless, yet mostly wished for the pomp and circumstance to be over and done with to proceed with governing. Looking a tad grayer and walking a bit slower than four years prior, Roosevelt took the Oath of Office and delivered to the crowd a characteristically forceful address.

An intense Americanism is the prerequisite to good citizenship in this country; and when I speak of the work of citizenship, I mean not only doing one's political and public duty, but also every form of activity which is predominately for the public good, from writing a book or painting a picture to building a railway station or founding a museum. The only way to be a really useful citizen of the world is first to be a good citizen of your own country. I care not a rap where a man was born or where his parents were born so long as he is a good American; but if he tries to be half American and half something else, he isn't an American at all. At this moment, the great majority of the Americans of Saxon stock offer the finest example of straightout Americanism whereas the citizens of this country who have been the most insidious foes of true Americanism and the most efficient allies of Great Britain are the men who have followed or have worked with and under such native Americans as Hearst or expunge citizenship altogether as is with Debs.

We are at war with the greatest militaristic and capitalistic nations on the earth. Over a year has passed since we were brought into the war and, thanks to our program of Preparedness, we were equipped with the trained soldiers and artillery and other instruments of war necessary in order to face any hostile army. Thanks to the efficiency of Preparedness, the production of these instruments are months ahead of schedule. Yet we owe our safely to the American soldier, the American sailor, and the American pilot. These men understand Americanism, and they know that if we don't insist upon thoroughgoing Americanism we won't be a nation. The next stage of Preparedness must proceed, based on universal obligatory military training, else we won't remain a nation. If we are not utterly blinded by folly the events of the last two and half years must teach us that the professional pacifists and all who follow them and pander to them are mischievous foes not only of this nation but of all liberty loving mankind. Above all they are the foes of every well-behaved nation and the allies and tools of every brutal and remorseless big colonial despotism.

Foolish or disloyal creatures tell us not to agitate at this time the question of permanent preparedness, because even the sane pacifists are now backing the war, we ought to think of nothing but winning it. I not merely agree but insist, and have always insisted, that our first object should be at all costs to win the war and that it would be infamous to accept any peace except the peace of overwhelming victory. But to introduce universal military training for our young men under twenty-one and service for all men above eighteen now and will be a most efficient step for winning the war; and if we wait until peace comes all the professional pacifists, being gentry of inconceivably short memories, will at once raise their old-time shrill clamor against preparedness. In the end pacifists generally fight, but as they never begin to prepare until the end has come, they never fight effectively. Pacifists don't avert war. They merely avert preparedness for war - or rather preparedness against war, for while preparedness does not make peace certain it is the one method of making it probable.

Woe to those who invite a sterile death; a death not for them only, but for the race; the death which is ensured by a life of sterile selfishness. But honor, highest honor, to those who fearlessly face death for a good cause; no life is so honorable or so fruitful as such a death. Unless men are willing to fight and die for great ideals, including love of country, ideals will vanish, and the world will become one huge sty of materialism. In America to-day all our people are summoned to service and sacrifice. Pride is the portion only of those who know bitter sorrow or the foreboding of bitter sorrow. But all of us who give service, and stand ready for sacrifice, are the torchbearers. We run with the torches until we fall, content if we can then pass them to the hands of other runners. The torches whose flame is brightest are borne by the gallant men at the front, and by the gallant women whose husbands and lovers, whose sons and brothers, are at the front. These are the torchbearers; these are they who have dared the Great Adventure.

          Theodore Roosevelt, Inaugural Address Excerpt, March 4th, 1917

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Sheet Music for the Pro-War "America Here's My Boy," c. 1916 - Source: Wiki Commons

The Roosevelt Administration, its hands tied by the larger-than-life world war, spared little time and effort on reforming the presidential Cabinet. Roosevelt himself was pleased with the present makeup of the Executive Branch and in his third term hardly cared to switch out any of the department heads with new faces. The most essential pieces to the administrative puzzle, namely the Departments of State, War, and the Navy, were, in the president's eyes, orchestrated by top-notch conductors. Of these three, the Commander-in-Chief outright forbade retirements. Secretaries Garfield, Crowell, and Meyer represented the organization of the United States military domestically in the same manner Pershing and Knight did at the front. Apart from Leonard Wood commanding operations from within the U.S. Army and ousted Senator Henry Cabot Lodge accepting the position of Assistant State Secretary, the third Roosevelt Cabinet mirrored the second.

The Roosevelt Cabinet III

Office		Name
President		Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.
Vice President		Hiram W. Johnson
Sec. of State		James R. Garfield
Sec. of Treasury		George B. Cortelyou
Sec. of War		Benedict Crowell
Attorney General		Joseph McKenna
Postmaster General		James J. Britt
Sec. of the Navy		George von Lengerke Meyer
Sec. of Interior		Henry W. Temple
Sec. of Agriculture		Henry C. Wallace
Sec. of Commerce		Nelson B. Clark
Sec. of Labor		Raymond Robins
Sec. of Social Welfare		William B. Wilson

Vice President Johnson, a significant part of the administration's amiable association with Congress, was tasked with securing the president's legislative agenda. That process was thus far relatively simple due to the Progressive House plurality and a soothingly receptive Republican leadership in the Senate. However, Democratic gains in the congressional elections amounted to a trickier challenge for the new 65th Congress. Democrats led by Caucus Chairman Robert Owen snagged the mantle of power from the GOP in the upper chamber, and that contingent swore to fight more aggressively on reigning in the Executive Branch and tackling "limitless federal expenditures." Owen's alluring demand for fiscal responsibility and an 'elastic currency' made him a much tougher nut to crack than Fairbanks, but the de facto Senate leader was far from Johnson's only hurdle.

The Progressives too had to fend with a reinvigorated Champ Clark in the House. Risen like a phoenix, the newly re-ascended Democratic leader immediately rescinded policies promoted and upheld by former Minority Leader Oscar Underwood - Including the scheduling of regular meetings with leaders of the other four House delegations. Clark expressed dissatisfaction with the coalition-style system normalized in Congress, and as such supported internal reforms to the leadership system and derided 'bandages' like Underwood's leader conferences. It is no wonder he despised the status quo, considering it led to Speaker Wesley Jones' retention of the speakership. Jones accumulated enough Republican votes and peeled away a handful of Democrats, further angering Clark, yet the speaker's workable coalition was clearly built on an unsound foundation.

Hiram Johnson often communicated with members of the legislature to unearth common ground in the early days of the first session. He forged a cooperative committee with James Mann (R-IL) in the House, completely sidestepping the need to temper Clark's antagonism, and in doing so laid down some support beams for Jones' majority. Conference Chairman Robert La Follette worked to engineer a similar measure to slightly calm Owen's anti-administration antipathy. Albeit modestly successful in their joint task, Johnson and La Follette nonetheless struggled in the Senate against the stonewall-like Warren Harding: A figure that attracted fierce, enthusiastic loyalty from the Republican Party. Harding voted with Senate Progressives on matters of foreign policy, specifically the war resolution and subsequent funding initiatives, but he sharply disapproved of the president's domestic reforms. Therefore, all 25 sitting Republican senators from thence on followed the example of their leader. They fortuitously blocked an anemic attempt to reintroduce a suffrage amendment to the floor but voted in unison to approve an extension of the 1915 War Appropriations Act and its signature income tax hike.

Dozens of various war-related bills passed through the April session of the 65th Congress, among them a dramatic rebalancing of the 1915 Liberty Bond Act, the anti-immigration Passport Act, and the Appropriations Act extension. Although, beneath this tidy list, one monumental point of debate captivated national attention. Upon their prompt passage of the Nelson Service Reform Act, a measure that placed the Secret Service under the maintenance of the U.S. Army, the new class of congressmen discussed the contentious matter of conscription. President Roosevelt frequently demanded of Congress the implementation of the draft, citing reduced enlistment figures as reason enough to pass it, but the onset of the election kept staunch Democratic opposition and some moderate Republican skepticism unmoving. Now, with Harding assuring absolute allegiance to the "resolve to safeguard America," the president was guaranteed every last Republican vote plus the 16 so-called 'War Progressives' (opponents of the La Follette wing). Pressure mounted on the Democrats and Peace Progressives to supply the final seven votes needed, as each day of prolonged debate maddened Roosevelt voters. The Selective Service bill had already passed narrowly through the House, so all that stood between the president and his law was a small sect of circumspect senators. "Abide the Results of the Election," read a Washington Post editorial headline. "Cowards and foes of democracy must surrender to the will of the people. Enough debate! Vote!"

Southern Democrats wary of the war voiced plans to vote down the measure, as did Senator La Follette. During these proceedings, Ashley Grant Miller of Nevada, the lone Socialist senator, gave an impassioned speech objecting to conscription. He forecasted, "If we plunge the young men and boys of America to the trenches, half will perish and half will return revolutionists. The working class will not tolerate an expansion of the bloodiest conflict the world has ever known. Mr. Roosevelt must withdraw, not escalate." Echoing the president, Senator Philo Hall (P-SD) answered Miller with the standard counter argument. "These disloyal creatures, your foes of patriotism, do not represent the interests of American workers. [...] We exist in a state of war. If we do not allocate the manpower, we may be overrun." This type of back-and-forth debate lasted to April 10th. On that day, the floor opened at last for a final vote.

The Selective Service Act passed 58 to 36, with two not present. Over a dozen Democrats cast their votes in favor of conscription, including all seven of the freshmen class. This act authorized the federal government to enact a system of mandated registration for all men aged 18 to 45 for potential military service selection. No substitutes were allowed, and no exceptions were made for dependent spouses or children. Likewise, War Secretary Crowell announced that the draft would not exclude Black Americans, a facet of conscription detested by Southern segregationists like Ben Tillman and Coleman Blease. The only men exempt from the pool were present or former officeholders, licensed pilots, members of the clergy, the medically or physically handicapped, non-citizens, and felons. Everyone else was fair game starting in May 1917. This, the passage of the Selective Service Act, unleashed an alarming phase in the Great War. The death toll was on the precipice of skyrocketing to unforeseen heights.

[Pyro]

Destruction at Verdun, c. 1917 - Source: UMass Library

The Great War stayed as hot as ever when 1917 rang in. Its tide adjusted to a discernable extent in North America, but in the murky trenches of Western Europe that was not the case. Authorities on either side of the conflict were capable of pointing to certain strategic advantages and military achievements which throughout 1916 kept the match a dead heat. In the Battle of Verdun, for example, German divisions managed to capture and reinforce Fort Souville, but General Falkenhayn's men failed to break through Frenches lines dug-in roughly three miles from that position. Verdun itself and nearby depots were routinely bombarded by German artillery hidden beyond the sight of observation, but Commander Pétain was ready with artillery barrages of his own. Looking to bolster fledgling French morale, Pétain lettered a career-defining call to officers at the front. "The furious attacks of soldiers of the crown prince have broken down everywhere. Honor to all." This memo wished into existence a synopsis that had not yet been exhibited. Falkenhayn's forces were not breaking down, and as a matter of fact were consistently reinforced. Pétain issued that decree in the summer of 1916. The fires at Verdun raged unceasing six months later.

The American Autumnal Offensive, as ought to be noted, reverberated far and wide. German High Command was splendidly impressed with Roosevelt's plan, and unspeakably grateful that a world power essentially belonging to the Central Powers struck so efficiently against Great Britain. This act was tremendously inspiring to an increasingly war-weary citizenry in Germany, and it too ballooned newfound hope of victory in the hearts and minds of beaten-down German soldiers (and, on the flipside, it was innately detrimental to the morale of the Entente). "Verdun, the Somme, and Pozières were unmitigated slaughterhouses, explained George Smith. "There is no inspiration to be found in the trenches. Patriotism and nationalism drowned away in those vile pits of mud and blood, leaving only survival as the lasting motivator. British-Canadian defeat in Ottawa signaled to German troops the first true sign of light at the end of the tunnel. Its influence certainly may have changed the course of the war."

As U.S. destroyer convoys battled with British and Canadian vessels along the Eastern Seaboard, German Admiral Reinhard Scheer planned to enact his latest defensive maneuvers against the ever-depleting British blockade. Scheer, in coordination with fellow Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, dispatched repeated waves of U-boats interspaced with unstoppable zeppelin bombing raids during much of 1915 and all of 1916. German sweeps cast a surefire blow, just as the U.S. Navy did to enemy dreadnaughts in North America. Despite concentrated efforts to retool the Royal Navy auxiliary patrols to secure the three seas of Northern Europe whilst maintaining a toughened defense in North America, British naval superiority was being steadily pieced apart. The blockade never truly stood down, but it may as well have. Prime Minister Lloyd George insisted as late as January 1917 that ongoing deterrence efforts prevented 90% of imports from reaching the German Empire, although historical evidence does not back up that claim. George's mobilization of naval resources to prepare for a decisive sea battle that never arrived occurred at the expense of cruiser reinforcements. Its Grand Fleet divided and technologically outmatched, like a knife in a gun fight, Britain incidentally allowed themselves to be outwitted.

Starting July 1st, 1916, the British and French unleashed a cataclysmic assault on the German Army occupying northern France. This, the Battle of the Somme, would emerge as a defining struggle in the war and a testament to the sad reality of modern warfare. The Entente's desperate push at the early part of the battle cost more lives than weeks of fighting elsewhere on the front. Tens of thousands of British soldiers were killed on the first day of the offensive, trapped by stronger-than-anticipated German defenses. Infantry, bogged down by heavy equipment and barbed wire, walked into machine gun fire like herded cattle. 200,000 Entente-allied enlistees were dead by July 31st. 130,000 on the German side. General Falkenhayn trusted in German perseverance and employed the use of an elastic defense, a doctrine he and Pershing modernized (According to hearsay, the Americans most likely caught wind of the Entente offensive, leading to Pershing's discussions with Falkenhayn on the topic of a more developed defensive operation. Some war historians like to imagine that the Revolutionary War's Battle of Cowpens and Brigadier General Daniel Morgan's 1781 defensive arose as a topic betwixt the two commanders, but that is unsubstantiated).

In spite of poor coordination by British command and the forced downsizing of French reinforcement to compensate for losses at Verdun, the Entente gained territory that stretched on for several miles. Those gains were achieved at a deadly cost, a price they paid in full. Great War offensives, like the U.S. Autumnal Offensive, necessitated profound sacrifice, yet the number of American troops who fell at the Battle of Ottawa were viewed as proportional to the number of British-Canadian casualties. At the Somme, Franco-British losses far outnumbered that of their German counterparts as the fighting endured through October. German-built heavy artillery fired upon waves of advancing divisions, poison gas shrouded the air, and machine-guns shredded to pieces any lonely survivors. One soldier wrote, "It is absolutely impossible to describe what losses the French and British must suffer in these attacks. Nothing can give an idea of it. Under the storm of machine gun, rifle, and artillery fire, the columns were plowed into furrows of death."

         Brian Steel, Foreign Relations: A Summary of War, Peace, and Everything In-Between, 2015

The German lines at the Somme never did break. Forces commanding the Entente infantry drove hundreds of thousands of their men into a caked-in meatgrinder as the Germans meticulously fell back. It was not until November that the offensive operations finally stalled upon days of pouring rain and intolerable fog. British Field Marshal Douglas Haig referred to the Somme as a strategic victory. He proudly claimed that the overall goal to push back the Germans succeeded, and never uttered a word for the disproportionate death count nor the costly war of attrition. The Somme epitomized to the world, as if there was any remaining doubt, the endless determination of sparring nations to conquer with no regard to human life. Land mattered more to the British and French high command than the men spilling blood for the acquiring of said land, and surviving soldiers finally started to come to terms with that.

Soldiers serving at Verdun in October and November of 1916 learned the fate of their friends and comrades-in-arms just northwest of their position. Streams of French infantrymen received word not only of the death spiral in front of them on the frontlines, but the frivolousness to which the officers directed men at the Somme to suffer for measly territorial gains. Stories also emerged toward the end of 1916 of forced French-Canadian conscription and the similar doomsday facing those soldiers at the Northern Front. With the British blockade falling to bits and German imports sufficient in keeping their war effort going strong, all while the Entente's food rations and munitions started to run thin, discontent brewed within the core of the French Army. Exhaustion and depleted morale indicated trouble on the horizon for France, but a stunning new transpiration in Russia rattled the cage first.