Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited

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Former President Roosevelt Speaking in Chicago Convention Hall - Source: Wiki Commons

With the Democratic and Republican conventions formally wrapped up and their nominees ceremoniously decided, all that remained was for the Progressives to make their pick. The RNC and DNC each captured the attention of the country, especially the latter considering it revolved around President Hearst and his fight for the nomination, but neither event expressly appreciated the mood of the country in 1912. The Republicans latched squarely onto the Manhattan Scandal and chiefly focused on deriding the administration rather than offering an alternative vision for the United States. Democrats, largely distracted by factionalism and a deadlocked convention, chose neither Hearst's nor Bryan's interpretation of Democratic progressivism. It selected a wild-card and opted to begin from square-one as opposed to settling on either of the available former presidents with their respective bases. According to contemporaneous reporting and the slant of 1912-era editorials, much of America desired a return to stable familiarity whilst maintaining a progressive course. To this, just one candidate held all the cards.

Former President Theodore Roosevelt finally declared his decision in early March, and indeed chose to run once more for the presidency. Supporters clamored for the return of the Progressive standard bearer and wrote scores of letters addressed to the Rough Rider articulating that perspective. They considered his work unfinished and found Hearst's alleged corruption to blame for the lackluster election results four years ago. Furthermore, very few believed any of the alternative options could defeat the two predominant nominees. Butler had lined up a sea of high-dollar donations behind his campaign while Marshall gained swift support by powerful Democratic city managers and the Bryan machine. As rumors swirled of Hearst preparing to launch an independent bid for the White House, the Progressives knew that this fractured contest was their greatest shot at repeating their 1904 triumph.

Their Progressive leader concurred, and thereby treated his return to the political scene as a grandiose comeback much in the style of the late Grover Cleveland. Like Cleveland, Roosevelt was tossed from power in exchange for a divisive and economically untested replacement. Both retained an air of the presidency even in exile, and constantly absorbed the attention of the press. Coverage of ex-President Roosevelt was just as excessive, if not more so, than when he resided in Washington. As was not the case for Marshall and Butler, everyone knew of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and therefore he did not need to expend any energy defining himself on the national stage. As such, when the Progressive National Convention opened its doors in the Chicago Coliseum, it felt just as if the party was on the course of re-nominating an incumbent president rather than a former one.

On August 5th, thousands of delegates as well as political celebrities like Jane Addams and Samuel Gompers arrived to Chicago ready to begin the next chapter in American history. A defining feature of the Chicago PNC, one made apparent early on, was just how united this organization truly was. It was jarring, some reporters claimed, to witness a committee and a delegation completely undivided. This was the sole convention in 1912 that gave such an impression, and that benefited the Progressives immensely when it came to satisfying a stability-craved population. Walls were adorned with patriotic memorabilia and symbols, including American flags and picturesque depictions of Columbia (referencing their nickname), in addition to enormous portraits of Beveridge and Roosevelt overlooking the convention hall. It was quite clear who the nominee would be.

The finalized list of principles combined aspects of Roosevelt's New Nationalism, the Square Deal, and unaccomplished goals as listed in prior platforms. It applauded the eight-hour working day, emphasized the need for women's suffrage, and condemned the resurgence of industrial trusts. The Progressive platform also emphasized the achievements of the Roosevelt Administration as compared with the Democratic legacy, demonstrating the party's ability to provide significant results regardless of the status and makeup of Congress. Regarding foreign policy, the Progressives doubled-down on the need to expand the American sphere of influence abroad, grow overseas markets in developing nations and territories, aggressively stave off British interference in Cuba and French involvement in Latin America, and continue to foster amiable trade relations with Germany. That platform, the most left leaning of its three thus far, was unanimously supported by every last delegate.

THIRD PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: PRES		1st Call		2105 DELEGATES
Theodore Roosevelt ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

The first and only roll call was unanimous. Theodore Roosevelt would be it. He appeared in-person at the arena and delivered a forceful and compelling speech which won a thirty-minute standing ovation and a romping iteration of "Hail, Columbia."

In every wise struggle for human betterment one of the main objects, and often the only object, has been to achieve in large measure equality of opportunity. In the struggle for this great end, nations rise from barbarism to civilization, and through its people press forward from one stage of enlightenment to the next. One of the chief factors in progress is the destruction of special privilege. The essence of any struggle for healthy liberty has always been, and must always be, to take from some one man or class of men the right to enjoy power, or wealth, or position, or immunity, which has not been earned by service to his or their fellows. That is what you fought for in the Civil War, and that is what we strive for now.

Now to you men, who, in your turn, have come together to spend and be spent in the endless crusade against wrong, to you who face the future resolute and confident, to you who strive in a spirit of brotherhood for the betterment of our nation, to you who gird yourselves for this great new fight in the never-ending warfare for the good of humankind, I say in closing what in that speech I said in closing: We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord.

         Theodore Roosevelt, Progressive Convention Acceptance Speech, Excerpt, 1912

The two-day affair concluded with the nomination of the vice president. There were several contenders, including the potential re-nomination of former Vice President Taft, but a strong recommendation by the national committee to end unsuccessful appeals to Republican voters eventually persuaded Roosevelt to prompt the delegation into its eventual direction. After some deliberation, they chose staunch progressive, railroad regulator Governor Hiram Johnson of California in unanimity. A committee majority found that Taft's probable enticing of Republicans equally deterred otherwise eager Progressive voters. Therefore, choosing a popular incumbent member of their own party was a no-brainer.

THIRD PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL CONVENTION

THE BALLOT: VICE PRES		1st Call		2105 DELEGATES
Hiram Johnson ☑		Unanimous
OTHERS/BLANK		0

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Governor Thomas Marshall and First Lady Lois Marshall of Indiana - Source: Wiki Commons

Public opinion had grown less charitable to the idea of continuing half-hearted progress by 1912, and leaned into the idea of more serious, systemic reform to achieve economic equity. Reinforced with the reality of faux reform in Washington under Hearst, a more substantial fragment of the population now questioned the issues associated with a system based on exploiting labor. It was becoming increasingly common for one to belong to a labor union, and the stigma of joining a "radical" IWW local lessened considerably in the period between 1909 and 1912. Socialist editorials stayed prevalent in the public eye with subscriptions to newsletters like Appeal to Reason and Max Eastman's The Masses far surpassing figures in previous years. Enclaves of left-wing communities began sprouting forth in coastal and Midwestern regions, such as in the famously progressive Greenwich Village in New York.

Theodore Debs, the Socialist nominee's younger brother, managed the candidate's campaign and geared it to take advantage of recent developments. He ensured that the presidential effort appealed to young Village rebels just as fervently as it did so among union activists and traditional party members. Rallies numbered in the tens of thousands in support of the Socialist Party as the Red Express of 1912 traveled from town to town. Eugene Debs appeared alongside IWW leaders like Joseph Ettor, spoke in Denver with Bill Haywood, and enthralled crowds with Meyer London and Charles Russell at Madison Square Garden. He urged his listeners organize for industrial unionism and not be carried away with electoral reform as the be-all and end-all. "Revolution cannot be achieved in a day," he repeatedly stressed. "Never for a moment confuse reform for revolution and never abandon sight of the ultimate goal."

Not every unionized worker and social activist sided with the aging Socialist star, however. Although the SP's nominee captivated gargantuan audiences and obtained far more notoriety than in any prior election, the number of voters willing to offer their vote to that party was a distinct minority. All major presidential candidates voraciously professed some degree or another of pro-reform sentiment. Case in point, Governor Marshall looked to win over many of the same voters of Debs: Industrial workers, urbanites, and young and diverse communities. He reiterated his progressive record at every opportunity and tastefully pledged to accomplish similar goals if elected. Marshall named specific measures including expanding the primary system and instituting stringent guidelines on public officials to combat corruption (introduced during a critique of Hearst).

Marshall did not go as far as to support the eight-hour working day nor promote fundraising transparency out of a conscious effort to retain Southern Democrats in the coalition. Applauding expansive federalism would be impossible for the Democrat. With so many options available on the ballot to choose from, the last development he desired would be for Southerners to splinter the party. As thus, even though Marshall favored anti-trust action and economic opportunity for outmaneuvered small businesses, he could not offer the reform-hungry populations in the North and West much beyond that. Apart from proudly embracing prohibition, Marshall ducked any and all risky or controversial topics. His fellow Democrat in the White House, on the opposing end, was not held down by such strings.

August closed with four candidates in the ring. September began with five. President Hearst formally announced his plan to run for president as an independent on September 1st. Viewing himself as a sword-wielding hero atop a white horse, the incumbent declared that the political system was despairingly corrupt and necessitated a liberator. He began his campaign by voicing virulent fury toward Congress for knee-capping his presidency with a foolhardy, retaliatory investigation. He exclaimed that, "progress perished in the Legislature," and that the only way forward would be to elect self-reliant congressional candidates unaided by political parties and associations. This intense antagonism hardly helped Hearst's image, and, of anything, buttressed memories of the Manhattan Scandal to otherwise persuadable voters. He also no longer rallied against the state boss apparatus (ie, Boss Murphy) in the same tone that he had four years earlier. This likely propped up the perception of Hearst as a corrupt politician beholden to certain interests.

Still, not all was bleak for the incumbent. Hearst's status as a 'President without a Party' granted him incessant media coverage, and his base of dedicated proponents were not so quick to abandon their leader. As written by John Gardner, "Incumbency comes with certain advantages and disadvantages. One supremely essential plus in a presidential re-election campaign is brand loyalty, and Hearst had it. Regardless of the events of the Democratic National Convention and Marshall's presence on the campaign circuit, Hearst, as the sitting president, had friends in both high places and low places. [...] His managers took on more intensive roles in the autumn of 1912 as the campaign heated up, and they sought out to win support from a pool of responsive municipal groups and businesses. When unable to fulfill their task of achieving an endorsement, they would erect spurious counterparts - see Women's League for Hearst vs. National American Woman Suffrage Association."

Having invested enormous sums of private capital into the campaign thus far, Hearst was flat broke by early October. He spent an estimated $75,000 per week on the re-election effort, and when his own supplies ran dry, he took on immense loan debt. The president sporadically incorporated his fundraising difficulties into his campaign speeches, professing that the oil and steel trusts feared his reign and opted to sink his personal investments. Over the span of the first month of campaigning it gradually appeared as if he was losing his grip on the situation. His lifesaver market connections notwithstanding, Hearst was at severe risk of bankruptcy on a financial level and finishing dead last on the political front. Despite pushing endless campaign advertisements and editorials through his media enterprises, the president's figures in public polling were abysmal. In order to remain afloat, Hearst needed a new tactic.
    

The Des Moines Register
Presidential Preference Polling, October 1912

Theodore Roosevelt		35%
Thomas S. Butler		27%
Thomas R. Marshall		25%
William R. Hearst		09%
Eugene V. Debs		03%
Other		01%

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Bitter Rivals Theodore Roosevelt and William R. Hearst - Sources: Boston Public Library & Wiki Commons

The decisive campaigning period in late September through October was principally characterized by extensive stump speechmaking and celebratory rallies from each of the presidential candidates and their respective endorsers. Normalized as a standard feature of electioneering, all parties contesting the race now adopted the whistle-stop/regional touring approach once pioneered by President Bryan. The various teams, traveling by rail and the occasional buggy, dotted the map in search of excitable crowds and untapped electorates. This five-way race was completely unpredictable from start to finish, and with parties divided and ideologies splintered, even veteran analysts had profound difficulty predicting its outcome.

Speaker Butler and former Secretary Lincoln looked to build inroads among communities in swing states like Illinois and Pennsylvania, utilizing a similar campaign strategy to that of Senator Knox in 1908. The Republican nominee opted to run predominantly negative messaging in these areas, thereby mimicking the RNC in its stinging criticisms of President Hearst. Butler never hesitated in demeaning his electoral competitors as subpar, untrustworthy, and potentially dangerous, but it was undoubtedly Hearst who absorbed the lion's share of the assaults. More so than anyone, Butler hammered Hearst's do-nothing tenure and referred to his theoretical second-term as a wellspring of economic calamity and cultural ruination. He exclaimed that the, "integrity of the republic," was dependent upon the outcome of the race, and only through a sharp rebuke of Hearst and Democratic corruption could the nation endure. Butler took on some flak from his contemporaries for stopping short of grouping Roosevelt in with Hearst, and indeed the House speaker did not frequently condemn the Progressives nor its presidential ticket - especially not with the same fire with which he condemned Hearst, but the overall strategy was working. The Pennsylvanian's October poll numbers and forecasted percentage of the vote had already exceeded expectations.

The Republican presidential campaign in 1912 was, by far, the most sophisticated and well-funded of the bunch. Progressives relied on small businesses for financial endorsements and Democrats looked to city organizations and Southern investors, but the Republicans retained an unmoving lock on corporate support. The giant trusts all sided with Butler and dedicated huge sums to his cause, as had the Pullman and Vanderbilt families. The Butler Campaign also did wonders in terms of printed advertisements along the eastern seaboard with election ads appearing in most mainstream publications (outside of the Hearst papers, of course). The congressman's greatest strengths, a proven bipartisan ability to negotiate legislatively and a knack for attaining mild cross-over appeal with moderate Progressives, made Butler a far weightier presence in the race than other GOP contenders in recent memory. His strategic dispatching of Lincoln in the Midwest helped immensely to the party's prospective fortune as well.

Even with Butler doing well in the East and Marshall garnering support in the South, the splintered field benefited no one quite as well as it had Theodore Roosevelt. The former president comfortably led every national poll, attracted the largest audiences, kept a healthy relationship with small financiers, and played to the desire of an America looking for familiarity. Roosevelt echoed the bullet points of his New Nationalism at each speaking venue and drove home the need for an active federal government that preserved economic growth and shielded average Americans from corporate leeches. He promoted an increased tariff to benefit American factorial production, promised a "living wage" for workers, and even adopted Democratic positions concerning electoral reform (national primaries, the recall, and the initiative). He spoke in unmistakably positive terms, skillfully latching onto and directing the emotions of the crowds. "What we Progressives are trying to do," he roared with his distinctive ebullience, "is to enroll rich or poor, whatever their social or industrial position, to stand together for the most elementary rights of good citizenship, those elementary rights which are the foundation of good citizenship in this great Republic of ours."

Nevertheless, trouble brewed for the Progressive standard bearer. As the frontrunner in the race, a bright red target was painted squarely on his back. Just as Butler often refused to chide the former president, Roosevelt conspicuously declined to speak to the ills of the Republican Party. It appeared to be an unspoken gentlemen's agreement betwixt the two men, likely to focus all fire at the incumbent in a joint effort. This tactic was somewhat effective in that moderates were seemingly split as opposed to tuning out in favor of the Democratic candidate, but it allowed for President Hearst to launch a rather unexpected barrage of attacks against the two leading figures. In a chain of advertisements, press interviews, and speeches, the Napoleon of the American Press charged that Butler and Roosevelt were disreputably conspiring to rob the voters of a fair election. More specifically, he decreed that the Rough Rider was merely donning a progressive persona for the purposes of winning the election. Afterward, Hearst purported, Roosevelt would inevitably regress to his 1908-era conciliatory tone with the GOP.

My fight has always been for the interests of the people. That, I expect, has been made clear these past four years. The scheming and conniving of certain characters and anti-democratic societies has made progress stagnant. They have intimidated us, they have rejected our calls for compromise, and now they have converged to permanently forestall our movement for honest governance. Mr. Roosevelt recently, and proudly, admitted to sawing the edges from his program to appeal to the enemies of progress. Mr. Roosevelt can boast of a belated honesty, so why not be completely frank with the public and tell the whole truth? To labor, to women, to the jobless, to the sick, he will not spare one crumb. It is the standpat program for which Mr. Roosevelt fights. You may vote for a Progressive, but you shall receive a Republican.

         William R. Hearst, "Campaign Speech in St. Louis", October 19th, 1912

This move revived Hearst's faltering operation in an unprecedented fashion and reinvigorated his most fervent supporters. The unrelenting assault onto Roosevelt's character and prolific accusations of under-the-table shuffling reminded Hearst's fans why they fancied the charismatic businessman to begin with. For them, Hearst spoke the gospel truth, and nothing offered by the other candidates could match that. Suspecting collusion by the old parties against the new age of reform was Hearst's bread and butter, and in making this charge a centerpiece in his campaign, the business magnate rose refreshed.  A letter in the New York Herald summarized the shape of the late autumn election. "The American people, like all people, are interested in personality. If they are asked to vote they want to know whom and what they are voting for. If any man casts a vote for Hearst for President, he will know that Hearst is answerable only to him. [...] He appeals to the people, not to a boss or corporation. Not even the most venal of newspapers has suggested that anybody owns Hearst, or that he would be influenced by anything save the will of the people in the event of his election."

In the terms of the Hearst Campaign, only with a continuance of the current policies could the country embark toward true "patriotic progressivism" and genuine reform. They drilled it in as a life-or-death choice. Hearst's professed policies of protecting the virtue of government from insidious influences went together with keeping American property and American lives safe along the border with Mexico. Of all five candidates, the incumbent alone brought up intervention in Mexico as a realistic endeavor. While Roosevelt, Butler, and Marshall mostly put a spotlight on keeping relations with Germany tidy and fending off European influence in the Caribbean, none but Hearst consistently exploited local foreign policy to their advantage. "The Others May Bring Us to the Grave, I Know Hearst Will Keep Us Safe!" one pro-Hearst pamphlet read. After a lengthy interval, it seemed Hearst had returned to his old self, and that was what the other candidates feared most of all.

    

Literary Digest Poll
November 1912

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.		27% Pop., 157 Electoral Votes, 18 States
Thomas R. Marshall		24% Pop., 152 Electoral Votes, 14 States
Thomas S. Butler		24% Pop., 127 Electoral Votes, 12 States
William R. Hearst		19% Pop., 095 Electoral Votes, 04 States
Eugene V. Debs		05% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States
Other		01% Pop., 000 Electoral Votes, 00 States

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House Speaker Thomas Butler on the Campaign Trail, October 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

Following a tumultuous set of nominating conventions and a bitter campaign season, Election Day 1912 finally arrived. The disparate candidacies completed their final events and their complex campaigns officially closed shop. Roosevelt and Hearst operations concluded in New York City at separate venues, Butler appeared for the final time as an active candidate from the front porch of his West Chester home in Southeastern Pennsylvania, Marshall settled in at a St. Louis hotel, and Debs wrapped up his last campaign showing in Sacramento. National polls proved the malleability of this race as Roosevelt's lead diminished slightly since early October, yet it could hardly be denied that the Progressive preserved the greatest degree of enthusiasm out of the presidential field. Some press contributors still estimated a landslide in favor of the Rough Rider despite the polls reflecting otherwise. In any metric, this election was Roosevelt's to lose, and coming up short would likely spell the end of the former president's career.

President Hearst, meanwhile, was met with a last-ditch effort by the Democratic Party to blockade the now-independent from interrupting the vote. Some two-dozen state governments announced, roughly six days before the scheduled election, that the president would not be included on their official ballots. These election authorities referred to various procedural missteps and errors in the Hearst Campaign's haphazard filing. As such, these powers exclaimed that the president's name would be removed from the final printing. This phenomenon was not an official policy of any political party, but the states enacting such decision making were predominantly in or along the border of the South. State election officials deliberately handed down this development at the final hour, knowing full well Hearst would not have an adequate window to fight it. Southern Democrats were not about to allow for a split Democratic electorate if it could be prevented, as even a single Republican victory would speculatively amount to utter embarrassment. Not one state overruled its ruling. This left the business magnate at a major strategic disadvantage.

The above fear among Democrats that a split vote could harm their notoriety just as the 1904 Progressive schism damaged the GOP was prevalent going into November 5th. Very few publications predicted a victory for Governor Marshall, and even fewer for President Hearst. "Frankly, neither had the numbers," wrote election historian George Alexander in The Four Elections That Shaped America. "Discounting their inherent Southern advantage, the Democratic Party was unable to withstand even a 10% loss. Even for William Jennings Bryan, the Champion of the West, victory in the Great Plains and in spotty Mountain districts counted on carrying every possible vote. [...] Roosevelt once robbed a mere portion of Bryan's sums and that was enough to carry him to the White House with an Electoral majority." As previously inferred, the potentiality of a rift in the Democratic vote benefited Roosevelt immeasurably, and he presumptively prayed that split would be enough to sidestep an underperformance.

On the evening of the election, as the vote count progressed and states began reporting their figures, early signs appeared promising for the Progressive Party. Roosevelt had a promising Popular Vote advantage in the bulk of Northeastern and Midwestern swing states, perhaps due to his middle-class precincts reporting sooner than in poorer and more diverse communities, but it slowly, steadily dissipated as the night went on. Fortunately for their standard-bearer, Maine was called for the Progressive column far sooner than in previous cycles. It seemed Hearst only won a meager 8% out of Augusta, but that 8% derived exclusively from the Democratic vote. Democratic division drove their nominee far into third place, and boosted Butler to a distant second. As for the remainder of New England, the Republican nominee performed roughly as well in that region as Knox and Depew. Massachusetts was a bit closer, and Roosevelt hoped to replicate his stunning 1904 Boston win via a superbly constructed media blitz, but Butler successfully grabbed the Bay State, 32% to 27%.

Theodore Roosevelt was, however, able to assert dominance in New Jersey. A state politically fissured between its popular Democratic governor and its two Progressive senators, New Jersey became a textbook visualization of Democratic splintering costing that party any remote chance of success. This practically assured Roosevelt an easy win with little effort required. Some analysts and Democratic operatives within the Marshall Campaign hoped that the presence of Governor Wilson would push its electorate toward their side of the ballot, but the "Hearst Factor" dividing ballots allowed the Progressive firebrand to outpace his previous attempts in the Garden State. Roosevelt won New Jersey's 14 Electoral Votes with 38% of the vote, in conjunction with Butler's 29%, Marshall's 23% and Hearst's 9%. For comparison's sake, the latter managed 33% in 1908.

Always politically capricious, New York state remained a fickle beast. State government officials as directed by Governor Chanler meticulously monitored some of the busiest polling places as a means to assuage fears of repeated corruption. In the aftermath of the endlessly discussed Manhattan Scandal, many New Yorkers residing in the five boroughs fretted that their votes may not be counted or counted incorrectly due to Tammany shenanigans. Chanler privately believed the measure was unnecessary, but he acquiesced to the demands of the population and planted 'watchdogs' in those precincts marked for high risk of malpractice. As a direct result, the 1912 election in New York may indeed have been one of the safest up to that point with few irregularities to note.

New York, in a unified voice, resoundingly rejected the prospect of re-electing President Hearst. The incumbent and former governor received a humiliating 4% of the tally in his apparent home state. Even in the event of rampant voter fraud and a recreation of the very worst practices in electoral history, the scandal-ridden businessman was always doomed to lose in the Empire State. The State Democratic Party refused to comment on the entrance of Hearst as an independent candidate, and fully endorsed Governor Marshall at the closing of the Democratic Convention. Hearst's state-wide allies, once instrumental in swaying New York to the Democratic column, were totally disinterested in the renewed candidacy. Democrats may have been dejected from the election, considering Marshall finished in a distant third nearing fourth-place Eugene Debs. Butler ran extraordinarily close to Roosevelt, but it was the latter who emerged victorious in that bout. By a margin of 3%, the Progressive leader finally won his coveted New York.

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Cartoon Depicting Eugene Debs Rising Above the Hearst-Roosevelt Fray - Source: LoC

Four years earlier, Senator Philander Knox narrowly lost his home state by a margin of about 2%. Roosevelt, in that previous election, succeeded in harvesting Pennsylvania's vote after triumphantly locking in support from municipal workers in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. It was Debs who managed to pull of this stunt in 1912. Debs captured a decent portion of the Keystone State's significant urban and left-leaning vote, albeit falling to bits in the more conservative countryside. This fortuitous rise of the Socialist candidate was a one of two sure-fire blows to the dismayed Progressive. The other was a stellar performance by the Republican nominee. Apparently a far more beloved public official than Knox, Butler conquered the home field advantage accompanied by a wide majority of middle-class voters. Therefore, Butler snagged the state out from Roosevelt's nose.

President Hearst retained some sense of adoration among former Populists in Mississippi and Arkansas, and was initially anticipated to perform fairly well in the Southern states, but on the whole his results in this region were negligible. When listed as the 1908 Democratic nominee, Hearst swept the South. In 1912, he did not exceed 3% in any one state. Indeed, Governor Marshall sailed to successive wins in the Deep South and carried Texas with ease. Beyond the Southernmost part of the nation, however, Marshall encountered pronounced difficulties the likes of which no Democrat in recent history was forced to reckon with. In states along the border of the American South, Hearst received noteworthy totals through tremendous write-in campaigns. In Kentucky, for example, the incumbent managed to pull out 8% of the total vote even though his name did not appear on the state ballot. This sharply pained the Democratic effort and produced a rather unexpected outcropping.

Marshall held on in Kentucky after a shockingly tight vote, finishing about seven points ahead of the competition. Likewise, the contender won out in Missouri by about 10% despite early reports indicating a Republican lean. The trouble came with Democratic division in the remaining three states. In West Virginia, a state traditionally won by Democrats (apart from the 1900 election), a combination of Progressive collapse and Hearst segmenting the Democratic electorate resulted in a Butler victory with about 31% of the total count. The same stunning scenario played out, scene-for-scene, in Maryland and Delaware. Marshall, of course, was furious.

As for the American West, it reconfirmed its unambiguous preference for the Progressive Party. Although many rural farmers admitted some interest in the Hearst candidacy while others leaned into the left-wing messaging offered by Debs, few seemed fascinated by the Eastern-centric Marshall/McClellan ticket. Burgeoning cities in Colorado and the Dakotas expressed clear-cut support for Roosevelt, while Butler struggled to keep up his second place standing. His wins remained stuck in the mid-30s percentile, but the former president successfully carried nearly every Western state that pledged support for the Columbians in 1904. Even Bryan's Nebraska and Hearst's California narrowly chose Roosevelt out of the five-man field. Utah alone stayed a staunch beacon of Republicanism in a sea of Progressivism.

President Hearst made a serious play at the newer Southwestern states deep into the election season. He believed that these former territories would be more receptive to antagonizing Mexican revolutionaries considering their experiences along the Mexican border. For the president, concentrating on American security potentially outshined the more positive campaign themes utilized by Marshall and Roosevelt. To some degree, he was correct in determining their infatuation with such language. Hearst did secure some his strongest showings in the Southwest, surpassing 10% in both states. This was hardly enough to set oneself apart from the field, however, and all it truly accomplished was setting back the official Democratic nominee. At the end of the day, Butler took New Mexico and Roosevelt eked ahead in Arizona - each by some thousand votes.

At last, in the central boiling pot of swing states and sheer unpredictability of the Midwest, some of the closest matches reached their end. Roosevelt maintained his natural advantages among small business owners, city workers, and tenant farmers throughout the entire region with a distinctive asterisk regarding Debs' base of unskilled industrial workers. Marshall fell far behind in this pivotal arena and could only surpass the pack in his gubernatorial base of Indiana. In any other electoral contest, Roosevelt would have attained checkmate, but the involvement of the Butler Campaign in Midwestern cities was dramatically underestimated. Possessing a near-unlimited war chest, a constant stream of favorable editorials, and endorsements by several city governments, Speaker Butler managed to do exceptionally well in Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan. The simple inclusion of Robert Todd Lincoln also seemed to profoundly help the Republican cause.  

The final results of the race did not trickle in for some time, and that aspect kept everyone on edge. Wednesday, November 6th went on with no one candidate named the winner. Michigan went to Roosevelt, then Illinois did the same. Both counts were intense, and indeed kept the attention of the prospective presidents, but at that point it no longer mattered. Due to the arrangement of the Electoral Votes as is, and upon confirmation from Governor John Tener (R-PA) that the margins in Pennsylvania were not close enough to merit a recount, it was impossible for any candidate to meet the require 266 count needed to assume the presidency. Roosevelt held an ascertained plurality in both the Electoral and Popular Vote, but the division of the electorate had finally unleashed the ultimate consequence. The Presidential Election of 1912 would not be determined by the voters, but by the United States Congress in a contingent election.

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The Election of 1912: Final Results

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1912 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Democratic: 36 (-7)
Republican: 32 (-2)
Progressive: 28 (+9)

House **
Progressive: 148 (+47)
Republican: 139 (-9)
Democratic: 121 (-15)
Socialist: 16 (+10)
Independent: 11 (+9)

  Senate Leadership

Senate President Not Yet Determined
President pro tempore Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA)
Caucus Chairman Robert L. Owen (D-OK)
Conference Chairman Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN)
Conference Chairman Robert La Follette (P-WI)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader James R. Mann (R-IL)
Minority Leader Oscar Underwood (D-AL)
Minority Leader Victor L. Berger (S-WI)
Minority Leader Daniel A. Driscoll (I-NY)

Coinciding with the presidential race was the similarly heated elections for Congress. Voters not only had to fend with a monster of a ballot concerning the five-man contest for the White House, but they too cast their preference for congressional identification. Leaving aside the Progressive slant of the national Popular Vote, the odds that the incoming president would line-up ideologically with the incoming Congress were exceptionally slim. Nevertheless, the Columbian torch shone bright as the insurgent faction captured enough House seats to outnumber either of their rival parties. Furthermore, the Socialists more than doubled their congressional representation. The elder two political organizations did not far quite so well in 1912.

The splinter within the ranks of the Democratic Party immeasurably affected the contentious election on the presidential stage, but that aspect also played a role on congressional, state, and local levels. Democratic voters were, overall, less likely to turn out to vote in 1912 than in any prior contest in the past decade. Some historians attribute that facet to Hearst rallying his supporters against the whole of the party establishment and its national committee (in addition to its sitting legislators). It is also speculated that Democratic turnout was generally depressed due to the presence of the unpopular incumbent with a lackluster record. Governor Marshall hoped to persuade voters to back a Congress receptive to their agenda, but his team performed about as poorly in 1912 as they had in 1904. This was nowhere near a 1894-esque disaster, but it did the Jeffersonian branch no favors.

A small assortment of pro-administration Democrats joined with the president's break from the party system and likewise ran as independents. Fewer than ten managed to retain congressional office after partaking in this stunt, and zero independent challengers found success. Like with Hearst, nonaffiliated candidates were largely unable to find a coherent base in the already-divided field. Only fellow Democrats seemed fascinated at all by the so-called "Civic League" (a la Hearst's Civic Liability Program) class of representatives, meaning their sole legacy had been segmenting the Democratic portion of the national electorate. This group would eventually create its own House caucus led by avid Hearst Democrat Daniel Driscoll (I-NY).

Vote-splitting and Hearst-like resentment toward the Democratic Party for allegedly conspiring to rob the incumbent of the nomination dramatically changed the outcome of the Senate races. Deeply entrenched senators like Ben Tillman (D-SC) and Furnifold Simmons (D-NC) encountered huge drop-offs in their respective vote totals. Simmons, who in 1906 was unopposed for re-election, defeated Republican and Independent Democratic challengers with a mere 14% margin to spare. For incumbents in the Solid South, this problem was a curious footnote. Yet, to those in swing states, this development proved an utter nightmare. Senator Ebe Tunnell, for example, (D-DE) lost his race by an astonishing 14% to Butler-backed Republican opponent Harry Richardson. Even in Kentucky, a state that had elected almost entirely Democrats since the Civil War, the Democratic incumbent fell to a member of the typically maligned GOP. In total, 40% of the Democratic-held Class 2 Senate seats were vanquished in the 1912 elections.

Republican candidates, on the whole, failed to capitalize on the political atmosphere in the same vein as Speaker Butler. The GOP nominee's ability to tie federal stagnation and corruption with Hearst whilst avoiding pledges to abide by popular, progressive policies turned out to be particularly pivotal. Very few could, or desired to, replicate Butler's strategy. Conservative Republicans ran as conservatives, and for this they paid a heavy price, electorally. Appointed replacements for retiring or deceased senators unanimously fell to more Progressive challengers. Former Lieutenant Governor Lawrence Sherman of Illinois, the designated successor to Senate titan and a self-proclaimed economic moderate Shelby Cullom, crumbled to avid pro-regulatory Representative Frank Hamilton Funk (P-IL) when the former opted to run his campaign on the principles of strict conservatism and opposition to Theodore Roosevelt. More so demonstrating that Butler represented an aberration of the norm, liberally minded Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN) formally ran his re-election campaign as a member of the Progressives. Of this decision, Nelson only remarked that Minnesotans stood to benefit more from the Progressive platform than that of the GOP.

Once the outcome became clear, that of a mass influx of Progressives asserting genuine power in the legislature, those newly elected congressmen gleefully awaited the assumed anointment of their influential standard-bearer on the presidential level. It was thought by Progressive politicians that Roosevelt would carry a discernable mandate, if not in a surefire landslide. New York's call for the former president rallied this crowd toward the belief that their prediction would soon be validated. When Pennsylvania and Ohio slipped through the cracks, however, Roosevelt's congressional champions faced a completely new and unanticipated reality. Regardless of their promising moves to prevail in these congressional elections, the duty of selecting a president and vice president in a contingent election fell to the outgoing class. Barring any further surprises, the Republican-majority House and Democratic-majority Senate of the seemingly expired 62nd Congress would be tasked with deciding the race. In the kindest possible terms, the Progressives were supremely outraged at that discovery and braced for the fight of their lives.

Senators Elected in 1912 (Class 2)

John H. Bankhead (D-AL): Democratic Hold, 93%
John N. Heiskell (D-AR): Democratic Hold, 69%
Frank Catlin (P-CO): Progressive Gain, 48%
Henry A. Richardson (R-DE): Republican Gain, 48%
Augustus Bacon (D-GA): Democratic Hold, 91%
William E. Borah (P-ID): Progressive Hold, 51%
Frank H. Funk (P-IL): Progressive Gain, 44%
William P. Hepburn (P-IA): Progressive Hold, 49%
Charles Curtis (P-KS): Progressive Hold, 46%
Edwin T. Morrow (R-KY): Republican Gain, 42%
Murphy J. Foster (D-LA): Democratic Hold, 90%
E.M. Thompson (P-ME): Progressive Gain, 42%
John W. Weeks (R-MA): Republican Hold, 53%
William A. Smith (R-MI): Republican Hold, 42%
Knute Nelson (P-MN): Progressive Gain, 53%
LeRoy Percy (D-MS): Democratic Hold, 81%
Joseph M. Dixon (P-MT): Progressive Gain, 47%
George W. Norris (P-NE): Progressive Gain, 44%
*Samuel Summerfield (P-NV): Progressive Gain, 41%
John H. Bartlett (R-NH): Republican Hold, 46%
Franklin Murphy (P-NJ): Progressive Hold, 48%
Albert B. Fall (P-MN): Progressive Gain, 40%
Furnifold Simmons (D-NC): Democratic Hold, 58%
Robert L. Owen (D-OK): Democratic Hold, 44%
Jonathan Bourne Jr. (P-OR): Progressive Hold, 41%
LeBaron B. Colt (R-RI): Republican Hold, 49%
Benjamin Tillman (D-SC): Democratic Hold, 82%
Thomas Sterling (P-SD): Progressive Gain, 44%
John K. Shields (D-TN): Democratic Hold, 53%
John Morris Sheppard (D-TX): Democratic Hold, 70%
Thomas S. Martin (D-VA): Democratic Hold, 71%
Nathan Goff, Jr. (R-WV): Republican Hold, 53%
Frank W. Mondell (P-WY): Progressive Gain, 47%

*Special Election
**House of Representatives expanded to 435 seats per 1910 census reapportionment.

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New York Tribune Front Page, November 6th, 1912 - Source: LoC

Following an extraneous election season ripe with drama, party splitting, and mudslinging, the country was now forced to endure an elongated period of uncertainty. None of the candidates were able to surpass the necessary number of votes in the Electoral College. That meant that the election remained contested. This predicament had not come to pass since 1824, when a multi-pronged field resulted in a corresponding split electorate. Andrew Jackson received a greater portion of the votes than any of his competitors in that race, yet Congress eventually designated John Quincy Adams the victor in the subsequent contingent election. Controversy plagued that result, with Jackson supporters proclaiming the existence of an Adams-led "corrupt bargain" involving fourth place finisher Henry Clay. Four years later, Jackson was swept into office with an outright majority.

"Election to Be Decided in Congress," read a New York Times headline on November 7th. At first, none were certain that a contingent election was necessary. It was not out of the realm of possibility for the closest states to issue a recount or otherwise further explore the vote totals, yet, once these state governments fully verified their respective votes as previously outlined, there was no longer avoiding a congressional face-off. The dreaded thought of a contingent contest was now a guaranteed reality.

Governor Thomas Marshall held onto a meager 25% of the Popular Vote and an Electoral tally of 182. Through no true fault of his own, the Hoosier did rather horribly in the presidential election and ended with fewer net votes than even Richard Olney in 1904. Marshall and his campaign staff squarely blamed President Hearst's independent run for their misfortune and took no responsibility for the failure to contain Democratic strongholds like Maryland and Delaware. The governor counted his blessings, however, when news of Ohio and Pennsylvania reached his team. Not all was lost, it seemed. In theory, Marshall could still win it out.

Theodore Roosevelt, like Marshall, unceasingly watched the election play out. He understood the severity of the situation when the lower Midwest tilted away from the Progressive line and leaned into Republican territory. Roosevelt knew the importance of making the first move instead of allowing Butler or Marshall to grasp the initiative. If left to its own devices, Congress could be unpredictable, but if properly persuaded, the chance of victory was tenable. Fiery as ever, the former president appeared before a collection of newsmen and publicists to deliver a post-election address.

In the days when all governmental power existed exclusively in the king or in the baronage and when the people had no shred of that power in their own hands, then it undoubtedly was true that the people themselves had no voice in political affairs. But today, the people have, actually or potentially, the right to voice their political will onto the government. It is theirs to use and exercise if they choose to use and exercise it. The American people by a great plurality have decided in favor of the Progressive program. Like all good citizens, I implore Congress speak to the political will of the people and cast their judgement selflessly.

         Theodore Roosevelt, Post-Election Speech, November 7th, 1912

Roosevelt expected a win and fell short. For that he intended to fight to the last vote. Butler never anticipated an outright win, but he was granted, perhaps, his single best chance at reaching it. The Republican went to bed on November 5th confident that either Marshall or Roosevelt would have won by morning, disregarding newspaper predictions and national polling in that process. He hoped to outperform Knox and Depew, and thereby secure the continued presence of the national Republican Party as a viable force in contemporary politics. When he awoke the next day and learned that he achieved about one quarter of the vote, that end-goal changed drastically. Pushing the race to Congress was the best possible result for the GOP. The 62nd House of Representatives was controlled by a Republican-led coalition, and to top it all off, Butler himself was the commander of that coalition. In the right circumstances, Butler could nab the White House and effectively mimic the John Quincy Adams strategy.

As the public eagerly awaited the upcoming session of Congress and the above three presidential campaigns erratically reconfigured their organizations, President Hearst could only stew in misery. He lost every ounce of political capital on a failed piece of legislation, confronted nation-wide humiliation, was outwitted, and outmaneuvered at the Democratic National Convention, and now met with a defeat of historic proportions. Never in American history had an incumbent president lose in such a colossal fashion, with less than 10% of the vote and zero pledged electors. Furthermore, as the fourth-place finisher, his name would not be considered for president in the House contingent election. Although, that is not to say that he would play no role in that contest.

Each of the major campaigns, Hearst's included, frantically worked to schedule meetings with members of Congress in advance of its call to order. All available congresspersons (exempting Butler) were reportedly approached by the campaign officers in one manner or another. The situation was extraordinarily fluid, regardless of party affiliations. The varying House coalitions over the past decade seemed to precisely establish the plausibility for shifting allegiances. Per the 12th Amendment to the Constitution, "the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote [...] and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice." Voting would not take place on an individual basis, but by blocs of state delegations. If one campaign had the capability to entice a majority of one state's delegation, that counted as a single vote. In order to win, 25 states, or one over half, was required. In the words of George Alexander, "1801, 1825, and 1913. None (of the contingent elections) took place smoothly as intended. Plagues of dirty politics and allegations of corruption hovered over all three processes. 1913 perchance the worst of all.

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Congressman Thomas Franklin Conway (D-NY), Hearst Ally and Co-Founder of the Civic League - Source: Wiki Commons

From December of 1912 to February of 1913, the clashing campaigns worked strenuously to tempt members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Congress was now forced into daily relevance as the officeholders of the 62nd class looked eye-to-eye with an inconceivable task. The lower legislature would designate the next president whilst the upper chamber was scheduled to allot a new vice president. Keeping in mind the creeping realization that it may take more than a single ballot to approve the chief Executive officer, senators were granted, perhaps, an indispensable duty. "Whichever path they take and whomever they choose," offered a Washington Post contributor, "we pray it is expeditiously over and done with."

The days dragged on as an uneasy normality hung low over the country. Most Americans were not witness to the extensive lobbying overtaking congressional offices. The populace was expected to sit idly by and allow for the fate of the election to be decided by exiting public officials. Voters were rendered powerless, and that perturbed some a great deal. Progressive activists, especially, cried foul. Pennsylvania State Progressive Party Chair Alexander Dover explained, "(The 62nd Congress) is expired. Voters have elected a new Congress. It is outrageous that retiring and defeated conservatives should decide the election. [...] America voted for Progress." Those favoring the ascension of Butler disagreed, often stating in printed rebuttals that the Constitution outlined the contingent process expressly to preserve stability. Forsaking the intention of the founders, they asserted, amounted to abject treason.

Headed into the contingent election, Socialists settled on a sly tactic. Debs was roundly booted from presidential consideration and needed to process a strategy for the six House Socialists. Of the three viable candidates, Debs and much of the party leadership believed Roosevelt would be their best choice. Butler was a proud servant of Wall Street while Marshall was handcuffed to a states' rights fetishizing Southern base. The Socialist Party indeed recognized that Roosevelt failed to sufficiently acknowledge the plight of workers in his previous term, and they outwardly condemned the former president's abandonment of the eight-hour working day.

Simultaneously, the SP viewed Roosevelt as the most likely of the three to deliver even the barest crumbs to a struggling American workforce. At the very least, the famed 'trust-buster' would voice opposition to consolidation in a manner alien to the Democrats. Furthermore, so-called business socialists like Berger thought it pure insanity to allow either of the two parties to overrule the interests of the democratic Popular Vote. It all boiled down to choosing a "lesser evil" for four years, or to use an alternative idiom, "Better the devil you know than the devil you don't." Pledging their allegiance under the expectation that the Progressives would jointly fight for economic democracy, the Socialist delegation in the House temporarily aligned to vote Roosevelt.

President Hearst, ad interim, sought to satisfy his own interests. He deeply resented Roosevelt politically as well as personally, so he could never claim to support his selection in the House. Marshall, a figure Hearst deemed a pawn of a criminal class of Democratic overseers and managers, was equally out of the question. He likewise could never bring himself to earnestly support a man like Butler, who not only represented all Hearst hated in Washington but directly played a role in bringing down the president's legislative agenda. The only remaining choice was to opt against an endorsement altogether, but that risked relinquishing an opportunity to influence the next administration. It took careful consideration and a documented meeting of the Hearst Campaign staff, but the outgoing president eventually arrived at an answer.

Just as Congress convened to begin the validation of the Electoral College votes, a memo reached the hands of Hearst's allies among the legislators. This note is widely believed to have altered the shape of the ensuing congressional battle. "Foment disorder," it read. "None support intervention (into Mexico). None fight the bosses. Do as you will to delay." In no uncertain terms, President Hearst requested of his supporters in Congress to needle misconduct and break decorum. He did not demand lawlessness, though he may as well have. An incumbent inciting flagrant legislative anarchy was unheard of to say the least, but to Hearst this was the only sensible scenario. According to Alexander, "Historians have differing opinions on Hearst's infamous memo to Congress. Some deem it child-like, akin to a temper tantrum - pure emotion and chaos. Others have cited it as an adept play, albeit soaked in revenge. The 61st and 62nd Congresses robbed Hearst of an accomplished presidency. Therefore, Hearst robbed Congress of its agency to appoint a new president. Tit for tat."

The Legislative Branch set in motion the procedure to conduct the contingent election on Monday, February 3rd, immediately following the confirmation of the Electoral Vote. Speaker Butler then prepared to call upon each state, alphabetically, to declare its choice. At this step, and all those which followed, the Hearst men jumped in and demanded the floor. Commanded by Representatives Daniel Driscoll and Thomas F. Conway (D-NY), about one-third of the New York Democratic delegation and a smattering of Democrats in California and Ohio stayed loyal to the president and thusly adhered to their leader's instructions. 25, all in all, played part in the charade (sixteen either lost re-election in 1912 or retired with the remaining nine transferred to the Civic League Independents). Their delay pushed the first ballot in the House to Tuesday, but the first major stall thence ended. Representatives of all 48 states issued their vote per Butler's order.

1913 United States Contingent Election

PRES BALLOT		1st Call		States		48 Delegations
Thomas R. Marshall		17		AL, AZ, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, MO, NE, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA
Thomas S. Butler		14		CT, DE, MA, MI, MN, MT, NV, NH, OH, PA, RI, UT, VT, WY
Theodore Roosevelt		07		CA, ID, IA, KS, SD, WA, WI
Divided/Tie		10		CO, IL, IN, ME, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OR, WV

The first ballot did not designate a president with majority support. Many states landed precisely where most analysts predicted, including the Solid South standing firm alongside Marshall. Some of the most heavily populated states, like Illinois, were divided betwixt the candidates. Illinois had 9 Progressive representatives, 9 Republicans, and 7 Democrats. As a natural result, 9 votes went to Roosevelt and 9 to Butler, resulting in a tie. For instances in which a state professed a divided delegation, it awarded no one candidate its support. States in the mold of Illinois, of which 10 provenly existed, would be burdensome to budge.

New York surprisingly ended in the divided column as well. Democrats in the Empire state's House delegation held a two-seat advantage over the other parties in the 62nd House, yet a portion of Hearst's allies consciously voted in favor of Butler to leave the state tied. Corruption was undoubtedly amok; however, Congress was now locked into the voting cycle. Legally, the deliberative body was not permitted to move forward on to other items until the presidential vote was set.

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Contingent Election Underway in the U.S. Congress, 1913 - Source: LoC

In response to the failure of the first tally, the House devolved into an unsettling uproar. Democratic House leaders confronted the Hearst men for their reprehensible tactics at the close of the kick-off ballot, most notably epitomized with the choice of Minority Whip Edwin Webb to engage in a shouting match with Congressman Conway on the floor of the legislature. Pounding his fist onto a desk and interrupting regular procedure, Webb yelped, "You blind fools! Do you have no shame?" Similar verbal sparring and shouting over the speaker's gavel encircled the divided delegations as respectable behavior faded to dust. When regained of his authority some thirty minutes later, Butler quieted the halls and led the congressmen to its second vote. Once more, ten states were tied.

An evaporation of decorum in the 62nd Congress was, play-for-play, precisely what Hearst desired. The president's actions effectively muddled the shape of the contingent election and decimated hopes of an orderly process. Democrats were extremely unhappy with the latest developments and acknowledged their chance at victory sharply diminished. The likelihood of Republican or Progressive victory appeared equally unreachable. Regardless of one's candidate preference, none were satisfied. Hearst had searched for this exact outcome, and now the figurative train was planted firmly on those tracks.

Speaker Butler placed a controversial lid on the boiling legislature as successive House ballots showed little movement and the presidential campaigns scrambled to alter the course. Urged behind the scenes to calm fears of an endless congressional session, Butler formally restricted the balloting to two per day. In the mix of Hearst-driven delays and an escalating Democratic schism, the reputation of the House of Representatives as a responsible authority dwindled by a discernable degree. Governor Marshall and Speaker Butler attempted to calm national fears with incessant pledges to "respect and honor" the selection mechanism, but there is little historical evidence that this type of messaging proved effectual.

A synchronous Senate too found itself stuck in a tar-laced electoral trap. No one party in the upper chamber held a clear majority, and the burden was placed on the Republican senators to choose either Democratic vice-presidential candidate George McClellan or Progressive Hiram Johnson. The GOP detested both rather severely and had difficulty stomaching the promotion of either to higher office. The Democratic Party was trekking along an unmitigated path to disaster and a complete sacrifice of federal power. Apparently, if left to its own devices, the multi-sect political organization could drown itself.

Republicans were not about to assist their political nemesis by tossing a self-defeating lifesaver. Therefore, repeating the essence of what had materialized in the House, the Senate failed to select its White House occupant on the first ballot. All 34 Republicans abstained as guided by the Republican National Committee and the Butler Campaign. The 43 Democratic votes went to McClellan and the 19 Progressives chose Johnson. The winner required a majority vote of 49 senators, so it was the duty of the Republican Party to side with one option or another. On the first ballot they outright declined to choose, and that strategy was replicated on the second, third, and fourth as well.

Deputies of the Hearst Campaign were later revealed to have offered a compromise to their Democratic counterparts in Congress at the height of electoral uncertainty. In several documents that came to light some decades afterward, Hearst's team pledged to support Marshall for president and McClellan for vice president if, and only if, President Hearst could be allowed the position of State Secretary. We do not know, for certain, what the Democratic response entailed, but historians have wagered that both candidates heartily turned down the opportunity. McClellan was no friend of Hearst's, and the former had gone through an extensive effort to expunge all relations with Tammany Hall since being elected in 1904. Marshall, of course, was not inclined to bargain. Be that as it may, as the days marched on near the end of February, the Marshall Campaign should have probably accepted the offer.

Time was running out. A Constitutional crisis was on the horizon in the event that neither chamber of Congress selected a new leading official. The next in line, by succession law, was the Secretary of State. Yet, recognizing Hearst's term expired on March 4th, his entire administration too would dissolve. Present statute did not outline a concise path for this dangerous eventuality. Senate Republicans understood the risk of a permanent stalemate and a drawn-out court battle over succession law, and came to terms with the options laid before them. As commanded to do so by Conference Chairmen Shelby Cullom of the GOP and Robert La Follette of the Columbians, a bipartisan group of six Republican and Progressive senators met in late February to reach a compromise. Roosevelt and Butler were informed of this as well, and each remained on call as needed. In the end, the group succeeded in forging a sufficient agreement. It mainly concerned the makeup of the next president's Cabinet (namely, a minimum of two appointees from the opposing party), but it did finally settle a long-standing dispute.

On February 28th, the Senate selected Governor Hiram Johnson for vice president on the 27th ballot with full-fledged support from all but three Republican incumbents. With the House deadlocked, the vice presidential choice would very likely serve as acting president as well. The Progressive governor, immediately thereafter, professed his understanding that the language of the 12th Amendment did not overrule the prospect of continued balloting in the House. In other words, an "acting president" was a temporary president, and it did not supersede the ongoing congressional sparring.

The House remained unmoving, though, locked in a state of chaos masterminded by the exiting president. Heightened tension and animosity shifted to quiet uneasiness with no end in sight for the presidential election. The puppeteer president accomplished just as he desired, to an extent, and the contingent process showed itself to be innately flawed. Albeit knowing full well who the eventual pick would be, Hearst was ecstatic to learn that the 62nd Congress would expire without choosing a new president. That responsibility now automatically changed hands to the new, 63rd Congress. In due time, Progressive Californian Congressman Wesley L. Jones would step into the role of House speaker and Thomas Butler would be completely stripped of his status within the party ranks. All things considered; the final line of Hearst's Memo now made perfect sense. "The people will have their say."

Washington, March 4. - William R. Hearst has said farewell to public life to-day and became a plain citizen of the republic. The twenty-ninth President handed the reins to acting President Hiram Warren Johnson, duly elected Vice President per his election in the United States Senate. Johnson has claimed his role shall be temporary. The inauguration took place in a private Washington office with a standard inaugural ceremony planned for next week. "I will do all that is required," he said. [...] The New Congress was inaugurated this morning to celebratory acclaim by the public at large. Congressman Jones of California tell us that the first order of business will be a resumed balloting. With a decisive advantage by the Progressive Party, it is expected that Theodore Roosevelt shall win on the first round. [...] Democratic losses in Illinois, New York, and many other states will all but assure an adequate number of votes for the Columbian nominee.

         Charles A. Green, "A New President At Last" The Washington Post, March 5th, 1913

1913 United States Contingent Election

PRES BALLOT		44th/1st Call		States		25 Required
Theodore Roosevelt ☑		25		AZ, CA, CO, ID, IN, IA, IL, KS, ME, MI, MN, MT, NE, NJ, NM, ND, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, WA, WI, WY
Thomas R. Marshall		13		AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, MO, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA
Thomas S. Butler		09		CT, DE, MA, NH, NY, RI, UT, VT, WV
Divided/Tie		01		MD

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Hearst vanquished and Teddy Roosevelt back where he belongs, quite an excellent outcome! (though somehow I suspect it won't be a successful administration if Europe goes up in flames)

It will be a wild ride, especially with TR in charge!

[Pyro]

Theodore Roosevelt, 28th and 30th President of the United States - Source: Wiki Commons

Part 6: Hail, Columbia

Chapter XIX: Beacon for Progress: The New Roosevelt Presidency

William J. Bryan's The Commoner printed a series of articles from February 4th to March 6th centering on the contingent election in Congress and speculating who the presumptive winner would be. It began with a standardized summation of current events, leading squarely into a lengthy endorsement of the Marshall/McClellan Democratic ticket. As the weeks shuffled by and the deadlock rose to prominence, the tone of the newspaper hardened against President Hearst and his revenge-fueled tactic to rob Governor Thomas Marshall of the presidency.

The Commoner rallied vigorously for its favored candidate but was ultimately witness to the expiration of the 62nd Congress and the subsequent election of Roosevelt by the new class of representatives. Perhaps framing the conversation and foreshadowing an eventual Democratic talking point, the final piece in Bryan's series relented, "The forces of regularity, once against [Roosevelt] are now behind him. His attitude on the trust question seems no longer to alarm those who appreciate the menace of private monopoly. His devotion to the progressive cause and the propagation of popular government is questionable. It is no wonder he excelled."

The above reaction was indeed one shared by most progressive Democrats. Bryan's party saw in Roosevelt the potential for a resurgence of a normalized Republican Party. Democrats understood the stakes of the arrangement reached in the U.S. Senate, one that essentially tied the Progressives and the GOP far closer together than ever before. Once there had been room for doubt regarding Roosevelt's affiliations with the leaders of the Republican Party, but with the Six Kingmakers willingly granting power to the Progressives (an event named by some Bryan and Hearst followers as a "Corrupt Bargain"), scarce few Democrats trusted in the validity of the Columbian position. Governor Marshall himself did not motion to such a charge, and in his concession respectfully recognized the party's defeat as a "rational conclusion to months of divisiveness and unfaithfulness."

Former Speaker Thomas Butler met with Theodore Roosevelt just after the House vote confirmed the election result, however all we know for certain of this engagement is that it lasted about an hour and presumably finalized the senatorial deal. Just as confirmed by Senate leaders La Follette and Shelby Cullom, Roosevelt was bound to promote at least two Republicans to the presidential Cabinet upon its creation. The left wing of the Progressive Party feared that their leader was dipping back into the days of the Grand Bargain, thereby fretting over the plausibility that his message would be softened. After one of the mostly hotly contested elections in history, succumbing to the demands of a bygone political faction seemed unfathomable to a sizable chunk of the Progressives. Roosevelt truly had no such intention and looked to solidify his progressive credentials at the inaugural event.

The official inauguration for President-elect Roosevelt took place on March 7th - about 48 hours following the final congressional contingent ballot. The Roosevelt and Johnson families gathered in Washington beside honored guests, Supreme Court justices, and an enormous crowd of onlookers. Chief Justice Edward D. White administered the Oath of Office to the incoming leader, followed directly by Roosevelt's Second Inaugural Address. Upon thanking the new Congress for following the people's will and Vice President Johnson for serving in the brief interim, the Rough Rider conducted the speech. The energetic and spry 54-year old recounted his support for a completed Square Deal, the enactment of a New Nationalism, and economic security for all Americans.

The great fundamental issue now before our people can be stated briefly. It is, Are the American people fit to govern themselves, to rule themselves, to control themselves? I believe they are. I believe in the right of the people to rule. I believe that the majority of the plain people of the United States will, day in and day out, make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than any smaller class or body of men, no matter what their training, will make in trying to govern them.

I have scant patience with this talk of the tyranny of the majority. Wherever there is tyranny of the majority, I shall protest it with all my heart and soul. But we are today suffering from the tyranny of minorities. It is a small minority that is grabbing our coal-deposits, our water-powers, and our harbor fronts. A small minority is battening on the sale of adulterated foods and drugs. It is a small minority that lies behind monopolies and trusts. It is a small minority that stands behind the present law of master and servant, the sweatshops, and the whole calendar of social and industrial injustice.

Friends, every good citizen ought to do everything in his or her power to prevent the coming of the day when we shall see in this country two recognized creeds fighting one another, when we shall see the creed of the "Have nots" arraigned against the creed of the "Haves." When that day comes then such incidents as this to-night will be commonplace in our history. When you make poor men - when you permit the conditions to grow such that the poor man as such will be swayed by his sense of injury against the men who try to hold what they improperly have won, when that day comes, the most awful passions will be let loose and it will be an ill day for our country.

Now, friends, what we who are in this movement are endeavoring to do is forestall any such movement for justice now - a movement in which we ask all just men of generous hearts to join with the men who feel in their souls that lift upward which bids them refuse to be satisfied themselves while their countrymen and countrywomen suffer from avoidable misery.

          Theodore Roosevelt, Inaugural Address Excerpt, March 9th, 1913

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The Second Roosevelt Cabinet, Approx. 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Theodore Roosevelt was thrilled beyond words to return to the White House. It had been a rough four years for the United States, from the discrediting of the Hearst Administration to an unceasing legislative paralysis. Time was nigh for a change, the Progressive believed, and it seemed a plurality of the country concurred. Columbian voters were likewise relieved when the contingent results concluded in a Roosevelt victory, and furthermore ecstatic during the new president's populistic inaugural address. The 1910s generally had a rather rocky start. Americans hoped that the worst was over and done with.

Hearst's departure from Washington represented a significant shift in American politics beyond partisan bickering and this-or-that legislative proposal. The Californian businessman was drenched in the stink of corruption from his days as governor. Hearst's shady business dealings and maligned yellow journalism may as well have foreshadowed the Manhattan Scandal: a proper culmination of his life's work. As was revealed in the latter part of the year, the Bureau of Investigation unearthed an additional chapter of misdeeds by the former president. An investigation found evidence of Hearst covertly funding Mexican rebellion in an area just adjacent to his estate in Mexico. If true, he most likely did so to whip up a growing fear of lacking national security and feed into anti-revolution hysteria. It was this exact brand of chicanery that Hearst fittingly embodied.

Contrary to the decomposing honor of the Hearst era, Roosevelt intended to provide the United States a federal government worthy of their trust and admiration. He fought for progressivism, certainly, but after witnessing the now-exiting calamity and an incredibly fractious election, the returning president plainly wished to unite a limping America. "Of course I would greatly have preferred if we could have made the Republican Party a Progressive party," Roosevelt penned in the autumn of 1912. "It was so when founded by Lincoln, and it could have been so today. As we are, the future cannot yet be determined, but at the moment our task is to try and make the Progressive Party the exemplary American organization." Reflecting that final line, President Roosevelt's first written appeal to Congress was the codification of "Hail, Columbia" into an official national anthem. Thus far, he had adopted the patriotic march as a campaign theme. Now, "...it belongs to all of America."

In shaping the Cabinet, Roosevelt adhered to the bipartisan pledge and reached out to several high-profile Republican politicians with regards to federal appointments, most of whom respectfully declined out of a clear desire not to be associated with the left-leaning party and president. Three responded in the affirmative, and that was a satisfactory figure to Roosevelt. First, he designated Representative James Jefferson Britt (R-NC) as the new Postmaster General. Britt was a moderate, Southern Republican, and most recently had ran for the U.S. Senate against incumbent Furnifold Simmons. The closeness of the race prompted a group of Carolinian Republicans to request Britt for a federal position. Killing two birds with one stone, Roosevelt easily convinced the congressman to take the role. The president also chose Republican farmer and journalist Henry Cantwell Wallace of Iowa to take up control of the Department of Agriculture, a nod to dairy farmers the Iowa Farm Bureau.

Roosevelt's last Republican appointment, and the most irksome to the Progressive Party's Left, went to Representative George B. Cortelyou (R-NY). Cortelyou worked within government for over two decades, and served under and alongside Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives alike. He was hired by President Cleveland as chief clerk, then for a brief period worked as Governor McKinley's personal secretary. In 1902, Cortelyou was brought into the Treasury Department of President Beveridge and stayed as a high-ranking official in that field for six years. Following the ascension of Hearst, the New York Republican successfully ran for an open congressional seat as a stout enemy of crooked politics. Now, Roosevelt called on Cortelyou to return to the Treasury. Upon confirmation, he would serve as Roosevelt's new Treasury Secretary.

The returned president made it a point to bring in as many members of his original Cabinet as possible. He did manage to re-appoint former War Secretary Leonard Wood to his original position, as well as Attorney General Joseph McKenna and Navy Secretary George von Lengerke Meyer. Unfortunately, Roosevelt's preferred State Secretary, John M. Hay, had died shortly after the expiration of his tenure in 1909. After immense consideration and a fair number of impromptu interviews, President Roosevelt chose to nominate Senator James R. Garfield. The two were close friends in the prior decade, with the latter serving previously as Interior Secretary in Roosevelt's first presidential term. Since 1908, Garfield had been elected to the U.S. Senate from Ohio and served on the Foreign Relations Committee alongside Senators Lodge and Bacon. The Ohioan supported moderate expansion abroad, both in terms of land as well as influence, and complied with the direction of the wind in affirming the protection of Pacific trade relations with Germany.

The Roosevelt Cabinet II

Office		Name
President		Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.
Vice President		Hiram W. Johnson
Sec. of State		James R. Garfield
Sec. of Treasury		George B. Cortelyou
Sec. of War		Leonard Wood
Attorney General		Joseph McKenna
Postmaster General		James J. Britt
Sec. of the Navy		George von Lengerke Meyer
Sec. of Interior		Henry W. Temple
Sec. of Agriculture		Henry C. Wallace

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Conservative Cartoon Mocking Roosevelt and the Square Deal, c. 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

Running for office is one thing, but governing is another entirely. Presidencies typically do not or cannot deliver upon promises made in a campaign. This was plainly and thoroughly exemplified by the tenures of Bryan and Hearst. Roosevelt did marginally succeed on that front in his first term, but an uncooperative Congress stalled a great deal of progress and fed directly into the Democratic narrative of executive shortcomings. Having been re-elected to his old post, the two-termer sought to push for the widest possible array of progressive policies whilst staying within a realistic framework. He later humorously termed his 1905-1909 period as an "educational experience". It was time to put his knowledge to the test.

Congress was a tricky horse to break for the young, idealistic leader not too long ago. Overcoming the imperial rule of Joseph Cannon and toppling the Old Guard of the Senate meant sacrificing much of his political capital, resulting in several smaller achievements in addition to the passage of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. Roosevelt had not budged from his original conception of the socio-economic landscape of the United States. To him, the old natural laws of the marketplace were ill-suited to address the concerns of workers and the unquestioning rule of big business threatened socialistic revolt on an unprecedented scale. Aside from Attorney General McKenna's triumphant prosecution of Northern Securities and Standard Oil, little regarding economic reform was set in stone. That facet had become a priority.

The Roosevelt Administration, voiced by the governing House Progressives and Speaker Wesley Jones, introduced the top-line of legislative proposals to Congress. As a test run, they offered to an always-wary congressional delegation a bill allowing for the creation of three novel units to add to the executive branch: The Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Social Welfare. These offices would assist in the administration's goal to found agencies based on the public good. Establishing two separate economic facilities district from the Treasury and Interior would, in the eyes of Roosevelt, dedicate crucial resources toward the fair facilitation between labor and capital. Likewise, a potential Secretary of Social Welfare could provide oversight on any future federal programs meant to increase the standard of living and provide a minimum standard of protection for the poorest Americans.

In essence, these bills did not explicitly change any federal policies on their own. The nature of the legislation was designed to keep in tow persuadable members of opposing parties, and thusly avoid the type of congressional deadlock that had plagued past presidencies. A small assortment of progressive Democrats and a core contingent of moderate Republicans did indicate a mostly positive reception to the opening legislation from the newly inaugurated administration. Both parties were dragged slightly leftward since the last decade, therefore allowing Roosevelt to act a touch more ambitious with the administration's projects. Not all were convinced, of course, including a deeply opposed bloc of Southern Democrats. When inquired as to their strategy to prevent passage, Senator William Stone answered, "We will do all we can." Others joined in the opposition, but the persistence of the Progressives in both houses of Congress to counter the conservatives' attacks and continue coalition building disallowed a complete stoppage.

The 63rd Congress more than quadrupled the output of its predecessor. Not only were the above proposals passed with room to spare, but a respectable selection of others eased by as well. The Progressive House coalition was extremely amenable to the president, and the early move to moderate legislation as necessary made it an arduous task for the Senate to bottleneck the process. In its first normal session lasting from April to December of 1913, Congress approved 17 bills. This included five national parks projects, a federal waterways commission, funding for roads and trails, an incentive system for factory construction, and the authorization of an investigatory, solidly anti-trust Bureau of Corporations managed by the Department of Commerce. In a far closer vote than in any of the above instances, Congress also passed the Federal Employers Liability Law which mandated public employers provide compensation to workers injured on the job. It initially granted this right to all workers, but the language was eventually amended in order to avoid a challenge in the courts.

Roosevelt was furthermore made to contend with an issue that seemed to loom over Washington, that being the question of suffrage. Ever-growing women's rights organizations consistently and heavily rallied for the right to vote. They held tremendous parades in city centers and mobilized their workforces to emerge in favor of enfranchisement. Women also composed a weighty segment of the Progressive Party base and ensured that a plank concerning universal suffrage remained locked-in when the 1912 delegation approved of its platform. Middle and upper-class women were especially pleased at the prospect of a new Roosevelt presidency, knowing that pivotal suffrage advocates like Jane Addams had become key components to the Progressive National Committee.

The president was more than merely familiar with that issue in particular. He indeed roared approval at the idea since the founding of the Progressive Party. However, never had the heat been turned up to the nth degree. The Workingwomen's Craft and Industrial League, the Women's Trade Organization, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association signed off on a joint statement in early 1913 asking Congress to approve a Constitutional amendment pertaining to voting rights. In their terms, as women composed an increasingly sizable portion of the American workforce and, as evident by the Triangle Strike, politicians elected by an all-male electorate tended to ignore women's issues, they too deserved the right to vote. Roosevelt and the Progressives were already in favor. The problem came down to congressmen with no interest whatsoever in the matter.

Radical women's organizations participated in varying methods of resistance and protest over the years, and not always restricted to the vote. Some simultaneously supported equal pay for equal work, an abolition of child labor, and an end to gender discrimination in labor unions. Universally, the fight was directed to grant suffrage to all women. Theodore Roosevelt took seriously the plight of women demanding to vote. He incorporated women into the presidential campaign and expressed admiration for Alice Paul on more than one occasion. Whether it be for political purposes or an honest wish to see it done, Roosevelt called on the Columbians in Congress to draft a resolution.

Over the entirety of 1913, the draft was amended, clarified, and finally brought before a vote. It passed on January 13th by one vote in the House [290 to 141, with 4 abstaining]. [...] Southern Democrats in the Senate filibustered, and thence the measure stalled. The Progressives' 28 seats were not sufficient to end the filibuster, and more than two-thirds of elected Republicans voiced opposition to the resolution. Roosevelt personally wrote to all remaining fence-sitters to beseech their vote, but to no avail. The measure never did reach a vote in the upper chamber. Suffrage activists were not pleased.

         H. William Ackerman, Columbians in Washington: Great Expectations and the Hope of a Nation, 2013

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Art Young's "Speaking of Anarchy," The Masses, June 1913 - Source: Wiki Commons

Recollecting the fateful decision by House Socialists to constitute a provisional pact with Progressives during the contingent election, President Roosevelt remained under considerable pressure to move on labor reform. He lightly committed to an eight-hour working day during the campaign, but the likelihood of passage was not so bright in the right-leaning U.S. Senate. As a temporary substitute, the Roosevelt Administration tackled the unaddressed, stark absence of labor arbitration on the federal level. Within the Department of Labor, federal officers were instructed to offer their assistance as a neutral third party to businesses saddled with workplace unrest. Initiating or offering an even-handed level of arbitration had the potential to stave off an ongoing spike in labor disputes and work stoppages stirred by a slight economic contraction, as well as stun detractors and critics in the Socialist Party who commonly upheld the notion of a federal government owned by corporate interests.

In February, just before the settling of the election, union organizers in a northward New Jersey city led a stunning work stoppage. Having been inspired by the successes in Lawrence and New York, the Industrial Workers of the World began recruiting downtrodden and mistreated workers operating in the prolific silk mills of Paterson. The working-class mill operators and weavers hoped to end a recent strain of factorial injuries and cut back on the unreasonably high productivity rates required by mill owners. More than anything, garment and textile workers aspired for the institution of the eight-hour workday. IWW organizers explained that such lofty life improvements were only attainable through agitation, organization, and protest. According to Bill Haywood, collective solidarity was the only tool suitable to fight back. "An irreconcilable class struggle existed between workers, who had nothing but their labor power, and the capitalists, who controlled the means of production as well as the forces of law."

Thousands of workers joined in a general strike. 25,000 in all. Scared stiff by the rise of the left-wing IWW, local law enforcement wasted no time in involving themselves in the affair. They arrested famed feminist organizer Elizabeth Gurley Flynn on charges of inciting a riot, and thereafter sought to bring down the entirety of the local leadership in a similar fashion. Flynn had not, in fact, broken any laws at the time of her arrest, and the actions of the police only served to illuminate the injustices taking place in Paterson. National IWW and SP officials including Bill Haywood, Max Eastman, and journalist John Reed traveled to the strike venue as the events gained national attention. The union continued its tried-and-true strategy of distributing multi-lingual speakers to match the multiple languages spoken by the workers (in this case, predominantly Italian and Polish), breaking through ethnic divisions.

In response to an assertion by Haywood that the flags of the world would someday soon be red, "the color of the working man's blood," city officials adjusted their calendars to schedule Flag Day three months early. They presumed that the brandishing of American flags by silk mills would counter the strikes and deem them 'un-American.' Taken aback but not completely off-guard, the IWW used this dirty ploy to their advantage. Workers marched in the streets of Paterson on Flag Day holding American flags of their own. Within the march, two individuals held up a banner reading, "We Weave the Flag. We Live Under the Flag. We Die Under the Flag. But Dam'd If We'll Starve Under the Flag." In a spectacular play, the IWW turned the tables on the city managers and redefined patriotism. Observant of the tide, Secretary of Labor Raymond Robins reached out to mediate the strike. In early June, as national sympathy lied exclusively with the strikers and a concurrent pro-worker pageant in Madison Square Garden captivated over 280,000 attendees, federal arbitration betwixt the novel silk union and the Paterson mill owners calmed the air. In the end, the workers did not win their eight-hour day, but they were no longer forced to run 3-4 simultaneous looms and the union itself won recognition.

Starting in late September of 1913, the United Mine Workers too became entangled in a new series of labor battles. The IWW-affiliated union, witness to the abysmal working conditions of the Western miners, struggled in dealing with unmovable mine owners. Coal companies repeatedly rejected proposed reforms by the labor organization, finding fault in their pleas for one reason or another. For instance, the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company claimed that it would be unable to afford refined compensation for coal digging or for so-called "dead work" like identifying coal impurities. Workers desired an end to the feudal company town system as well, including the abolishment of restrictive "scrip" as payment. The UMW made one final attempt to reason with the owners, but they would not agree to come to the bargaining table. Even messages from Secretary Robins went unanswered.

The miners struck for their demands, and in doing so were promptly evicted from their homes and forced to settle in make-shift tent villages. These camps were, purportedly, deliberately placed to impede the traffic of hired strikebreakers. Company agents and Pinkertons brought on by the CF&I countered with destructiveness. This hired militia consciously utilized vicious tactics against the strikers, raiding the tent colonies and assaulting men, women, and children alike. They deployed gatling guns, armored trains, and even sniper rifles against the tent-housed families threatening Rockefeller profits. Strikers persevered through the barrage of bloodshed, yet morale declined as the outnumbered and outmanned United Mine Workers tried to fight back to the best of their ability.

The Roosevelt Administration monitored the situation as it developed, unsure how best to go about ending the Coalfield War. UMW men, Haywood among them, lettered the president and plead for the safety of the workers, though the latter stayed uncharacteristically silent. Roosevelt regretfully observed as the ordeal unfolded, personally disgusted by the violence but hesitating to outwardly side with the strikers in violation of state encampment laws. It appeared the strike was dwindling as springtime rolled in (due primarily to National Guardsman protecting an influx of strikebreakers), so initially the president felt as though he would not need to act. Then, around the first week of April, newly stationed federal agents in Colorado learned that a small clan of camp guards and hired guns planned to forcibly eliminate the largest tent village located in Ludlow, Colorado. From their insight, it seemed a massacre was in the works.

Roosevelt had had enough. He communicated with Colorado Governor Moses Lewis and informed him that the United States Army would soon arrive at Ludlow to extinguish the chaos if nothing was done. "[Roosevelt's] record on the labor question is and will always remain mixed," wrote Thomas O'Conner. "His administration opting to intervene in Colorado, however, was unmistakably the correct move at the correct time. The strikers were facing an unmitigated avalanche, and it would only have grown worse if federal authorities neglected their duty to the American worker. It seemed a polar reverse of the Grover Cleveland perspective in regards to Pullman. Unlike Cleveland, Roosevelt comprehended the consequences of disrespecting labor. Violence could only stir more trouble for the president. If settling the conflict blockaded the potential for a sympathy strike wave, it was worth the conservative criticism."

Defeated and not keen on provoking the president, Governor Lewis quieted the National Guard and demanded the CF&I issue a ceasefire to its private detectives. Thenceforth, no additional violence plagued the impromptu tent villages. On April 20th, Roosevelt authorized the Labor Department investigate the Colorado strikes and reach a prompt conclusion on how best to remedy the tension. That commission found, some months after the fact, that the speech rights of the workers were flagrantly violated and that the violence had been a natural result of strikebreaker and law-enforcement provocation. Its end conclusion: Protect collective bargaining, restrict private land use, prohibit the use of armed guards, and redistribute company wealth. Results from the commission would not be released publicly for over a decade.

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Geographic Conception, Panoramic View of the Nicaragua Canal - Source: LoC

The Roosevelt Administration undertook the president's most well-known foreign policy proposal within days of the swearing-in. Presidential predecessors championed a wide variety of tactics in dealing with other nations, including limited interventionism, aggressive expansionism, "open door" diplomacy, and all-out war both in the Caribbean as well as the Pacific. Years had passed since the closing of the Philippine-American War, but the memory of that event appeared to repress a drive for overseas growth. Some contemporaneous analysts once theorized that the entirety of the Americas and Pacific island territories would one day adorn the Red, White, and Blue. Other than the United States' capture of Guam, the annexation of Hawaii, and its de-facto control over the economies of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, this speculation did not yet come to pass.

Roosevelt's major transatlantic success thus far was the mediation of the Morocco Crisis at the 1906 Algeciras Conference. That managed to conclusively award his nation a fair share of prestige as well as cement economic ties with friendly European powers, but it did not have the aura of a lasting monument. For the 1910s, the president's new international project consisted of an isthmian canal meant to bridge the gap between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. A cross-oceanic canal, in concept, could reduce travel times by a significant amount and grant the U.S. far more influence and economic value than anything yet accomplished in the twentieth century. U.S. strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere would also greatly benefit from such a path, and considering the understood reality of the nation as a regional powerhouse and overseer, the only true point of concern was where the canal ought to be constructed.

The choice narrowed down to two options, those being a route through Nicaragua or one through Colombia. Each had their dedicated backers who lobbied the administration intently. The conceived Nicaraguan waterway seemed the safe option with land surveyors having plotted the entirety of the project since 1825. It stood to be about 170 miles lengthwise and precisely at sea level, thus precluding any need for expensive canal locks. The San Juan River region was extensively mapped out by an isthmian canal commission authorized by President Beveridge, though the overall plan died with the former leader. Alternatively, the administration could side with the Colombian route. Colombia was more southward than Nicaragua, but due to a previous construction effort (since abandoned), part of the trench had already been dug out in the former location. More so, geologists estimated that the length of the canal would be discernably shorter, allowing for cheaper building and maintenance costs. The true downside with the Colombian plan involved the country itself and its associated caveats.

Colombia as a state was not particularly stable in the early 1900s, and its government was unlikely to relinquish existing deals in the name of supporting an American intervention. Rival powers in Colombia warred for control over the mechanisms of power from 1899 to late 1902, resulting in over 100,000 deaths and rampant destruction all throughout the country. This civil war was subsequently expanded with an uprising along the Isthmus of Panama, of which the ruling conservative government brutally suppressed. President Carlos Restrepo resented the United States for its frequent interference in the affairs of neighboring nations and would hardly be willing to allocate land use. Most significant of all was the fact that France currently held canal construction rights in Colombia. France was not on stellar terms with its Western acquaintance since the outcome at Algeciras, and attempted negotiations with Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the French manager of the New Panama Canal Company, were unable to move the needle so much as an inch.

It is not easy to understate the perilous state of uncertainly centered on (France and the United States). Theodore Roosevelt was a universally despised figure within the Poincaré Government for his needless meddling in Morocco and status-seeking venture in Central America. French political cartoons depicted him as a quintessential cowboy, commonly donning either his Rough Rider uniform or less subtle imperial attire. An emerging narrative of American irresponsibility and recklessness thrived in part due to cartoonist Jean-Luc Laurent, a vicious opponent of U.S. intervention on the world stage and the prodigal son of a wealthy landowner with vested interests in an occupied Morocco. He blamed the collapse of 1912 treaty discussions and increasing resistance on the part of Sultan Abd al-Hafid exclusively on Roosevelt.

France, by all accounts, did not intend on resuming construction in Colombia, but sacrificing the opportunity to the United States was frankly out of the question. The State Department's approach to unquestioningly act on the whims of the president backfired tremendously and led to an all-encompassing sense of belligerence.

         Brian Steel, Foreign Relations: A Summary of War, Peace, and Everything In-Between, 2015

Angered though unsurprised by the turn of events, Roosevelt tossed aside the Colombian option and settled wholeheartedly on Nicaragua. He was eager to press on and thereby treated the matter with a sense of supreme urgency, knowing from his first term how fast these opportunities can slip away. Secretary Garfield formulated a concise land lease agreement with input from others tied to the project, and swiftly departed to Central America. In August of 1913, President Adolfo Diaz Recinos of Nicaragua, a man referred to by Roosevelt as "the most reasonable leader in all of the Americas," signed off on the deal. This accordance granted the United States full canal rights in exchange for several million dollars. The venture came into existence without a hitch and work began almost immediately as the administration started its national recruitment drive for infrastructure workers. Congress soon signed off on the final deal with bipartisan support, awarding the administration its sole planned foreign policy victory.

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Author George Robertson, Chicago Tribune Columnist, c. 1912 - Source: Wiki Commons

George Robertson of the Chicago Tribune released an article on June 12th, 1914, reflecting on the first full year of the new administration and all that had been accomplished. It was unapologetically optimistic and left no question as to the author's personal leanings. "Mr. Roosevelt," the piece read, "has risen to the occasion. Brushing away the cobwebs of a static government and cleaning house of naysayers and unpatriotic scoundrels, our captain charts a course along the route of a New Nationalism. Our destination, so says the president, is America's Promised Land. With clear skies and a sturdy vessel, we may just arrive on time." This above celebration of President Roosevelt paints a rosy picture of an American future, brought into existence out of the pure willpower and patented charm of President Roosevelt. That somewhat featherbrained suggestion was not entirely exclusive to the Tribune's editorial staff.

Progressives insisted on framing the incumbent's leadership as the onset of a peaceful American Golden Age unseen in a generation. Analysts, writers, and ideologues in this vein considered the contemporaneous trends unstoppable and they relished in the associated Victorian positivity. Their country was trending leftward, that cannot be denied. One unaligned with progressivism in the early 1910s may as well have tossed away any chance of attaining elected office outside of conservative strongholds in the South and Northeast. The American march to Progress was too mirrored in other parts of the world, as in the United Kingdom where the novel Labour Party continuously gained steam and in Russia with the growth of the Constitutional Democratic Party (also known as the Kadets). Some historians note a generally wider acceptance of reform, the gradual lessening of political corruption, and a sense of mutual harmoniousness taking root in this period as well.

As if to put a feather in the cap of the administration, economists noticed signs that the mild recession of the past four years was finally nearing its end. Gross national product declined by a noteworthy amount during the Hearst President, leading to a steady monetary contraction, a slight increase in joblessness, and a deflation of the dollar. Production rates and unemployment figures remained unchanged in 1913, but an uptick in median income bolstered confidence. Treasury Secretary George Cortelyou presented these encouraging signs to the president, and Roosevelt, in turn, exclaimed the onset of a complete recovery to an insatiable press corp.

Democratic and Republican party leaders begrudgingly acknowledged the early success of the Roosevelt Administration, knowing full-well that any follow-up act to the embarrassing Hearst era would be greeted with open arms. The incumbent had not introduced an unreasonable agenda to Congress, so the opposition could not blame the president for acting out of step with the country. His labor department's measures to mediate workplace disputes may have been an overreach of executive authority to some (especially Southern Democrats), but settling strikes was a healthier alternative than allowing workers to be massacres by gangs of hired guns. Even to the most hardened partisan, Roosevelt and Garfield's management of the Nicaragua Canal ordeal was exemplary and epitomized the type of foreign policy admired by the forces of capital. Typically, a midterm election awards the opposition a weightier say in Congress. In the forthcoming race, a Progressive upsurge seemed extraordinarily likely.

Representative Champ Clark (D-MO), the former vice president and a commanding voice within Democratic ranks, wrote that he maintained a fear far more insidious than a Columbian tilt in the midterms. To Clark, the perception of the incumbent as a wise and patriotic entity, contrasted with his bullish, devil-may-care persona as once exhibited in the Spanish-American War, "leaves us with a president that may transcend party biases." That is, the popularity of Theodore Roosevelt, "risked not merely control of Congress, but all branches of the government." If, perchance, Roosevelt desired an additional term in the White House, winning it would be all but guaranteed. Senator Stone, furthering this point of view, was reportedly overheard in a meeting concerning his re-election campaign stating, "[Mark] Hanna was right to fear this godawful curse accumulating power for himself. He'll be made emperor by Christmas."

As insinuated in the aforementioned Tribune piece, few pictured the present administration in a negative light, and fewer still stood with Clark and Stone in devising a Roosevelt-led dystopia. Evidence is scarce that the American populace thought as far ahead, electorally, as Democratic congressmen fretting over future losses. George Robertson's Pax Americana may seem fantastical and rather unscientific to us today, but the prospect of unceasing progress beneath the umbrella of capitalism was indeed an accepted, apt outcome to the Americans of 1914. Students of U.S. History frequently judge this moment in time as the definitive peak of the Progressive Era, citing that exact rationalization. Nevertheless, it is an absolute truth that any peak must precede a fall. Even Robertson considered the feasibility that an ideal period of fairness and reason could one day meet its untimely end. That conclusion arrived sooner than he preferred, and not with a whimper. Courtesy of one Gavrilo Princip, it ended with a bang.

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The Capture and Arrest of Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo, June 28th, 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XX: Land That I Love: The War to End All Wars

Unbeknownst to much of the United States, tensions had been subtly rising abroad for some time. The great powers of Europe periodically spared over land, influence, and colonial investments, and that trend had not stalled by the twentieth century whatsoever. Market competitiveness and an urge to remain dominant in the affairs of the world drove European leaders to press on in that exact fight. For centuries, Great Britain ruled the game. From its multi-billion holdings overseas to its reputable naval power, it was often said, "On her dominions the sun never sets." Directly contesting her geopolitical throne was Germany: a nation formally founded less than a century ago, yet by 1914 an industrial powerhouse in iron and coal production. Unlike Britain, Germany did not possess a vast colonial empire, and as such it depended on continental expansion in order to bolster its prestigious position.

Germany linked itself tightly to its neighboring empire, Austria-Hungary. The latter nation was a patchwork of nationalities and ethnicities centrally controlled by the Hapsburg dynasty in Vienna, and its fate became intrinsically intertwined with that of the Germans. Austrian possessions along the Adriatic Sea and a joint venture with the Ottoman Empire to seep their influence into the Middle East amounted to a discernable threat to British hegemony over the global economy. France, Britain's closest ally and a living testament to the might of the German military (see Alsace-Lorraine and the Franco-Prussian War), naturally viewed the expansion of the German Reich as an inherent danger. Over the course of the previous decades, each of the above powers steadily increased armaments, naval expenditures, and recruited sizeable standing armies - all meant as a supposed preventative measure.

Nowhere was pressure closer to a boiling point than in what historians refer to as the Balkan "Powder Keg," a region embroiled in territorial claims, spikes of ethno-nationalism, and the cite of two fresh wars. Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir to the throne, made the fatal mistake of visiting this area in June of 1914. While traveling within a motorcade in the streets of Sarajevo, a Yugoslav nationalist named Gavrilo Princip stepped up to the car's footboard and shot Ferdinand and his wife with a pistol at point-blank range. The imperial couple lost consciousness and died shortly thereafter. In the moment, the event was treated as an unexpected and chaotic affair, accompanied soon after with the death of Princip in prison and anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo. In speculative theory, this spark could have failed to light the powder keg if the proper precautions were taken, but no such result came about.

Imperial powers throughout Europe reacted with utter shock and disgust, but most Europeans (and Americans) treated the matter as just another ordinary headline. Few journalists imagined it as particularly cataclysmic or with any long-lasting implications. In the words of suffragette Rheta Childe Dorr, "The Hapsburgs were always being assassinated." Of what importance is the untimely death of a Central European prince to a factory worker or a social reformer? President Roosevelt paid the event relatively little mind as well, requesting updates on the situation as it unfolded but otherwise focusing more intently on domestic reform measures in addition to responding to a downtown fire in Manchester, New Hampshire. As the days ticked by, however, and the government of Serbia refused to comply with Austrian prodding to either investigate or condemn the assassination, the ordeal evolved into something far more significant.

Austria-Hungary submitted a letter to Serbia on July 23rd demanding it combat anti-Austrian propaganda, arrest all participants in the plot, curb the trafficking of explosives, and allow Austro-Hungarian delegates to take part in an investigation. Serbia declined to acquiesce to Austria's ultimatum, prompting the latter to break all diplomatic channels. Prime Minister Nikola Pašić authorized the mobilization of the Serbian armed forces on July 24th. Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary responded with a mobilization of their own on the following day. This chain triggered an accelerated crisis that culminated in the involvement of allied parties. Russia began a partial mobilization, eventually stirring Germany and France into action.

The fact of the matter is war did not break out all at once. That high-school level concept is a simplified explanation of the July Crisis and is completely inaccurate. Granted, the span of time between the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum and the eventual declaration of war is short, but European powers truly did take extensive efforts to stall an eruption. (British Foreign Secretary) Edward Grey offered to calm Serbia and settle the air, but Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed him. Britain repeatedly warned that the potential for a localized conflict was null and that Russian mobilization was all but imminent. Roosevelt too openly asked for neutral mediation, but British and French ministers were said to have refused the notion of American intervention.

         Historian John Dickinson, Roundtable Discussion on the First Great War, Aired 1989

At last, the steam escaped the kettle. Austria-Hungary issued a declaration of war on Serbia on July 28th. Due to the mess of entangling alliances circulating throughout the continent like arteries in a body, war was swiftly inevitable. German troops advanced into Luxembourg and Belgium starting on August 1st, therefore leading to Britain's declaration of war on Germany. The stage had been set. The Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire now existed in a state of war with the British, French, and Russian Entente. President Roosevelt thereafter called a meeting with his military advisors to prepare all available options.

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Trade Unionist Keir Hardie Addresses the Trafalgar Square Peace Rally, 1914 - Source: Corbis

The world now plunged into war. European populations reacted with a mix of shock and perturbation, unsure as to why diplomatic negotiation failed so miserably to curtail the disastrous July Crisis outcome. Continental pro-war sentiment was, at first, largely restricted to conservative groups and the upper-middle class, though socialist and pacifist protest organizations ultimately failed in preventing this mood from seeping into the countryside and working classes. The prospect of British intervention manifested numerous peace demonstrations in early August, including one particularly massive London rally at Trafalgar Square, but, nonetheless, the government eventually voted in unanimity for war. In a matter of weeks, Princip and Ferdinand faded to the background. The march to battle now revolved around resolving old disputes and capitalizing on uncertainty for the purpose of imperial and commercial pursuits.

The United States was caught entirely off-guard, and like the men and women of Europe responded in astonishment at the crumbling of harmony. Samuel Gompers asserted that he had not considered it possible for "civilized nations" to wage war in the age of science. Industrialist Andrew Carnegie, a notable member of the Anti-Imperialist League and a purported pacifist, grew despondent in the face of global foolishness and the failure of negotiation. Well-known ranking Democrats, including a stunned and appalled former President Bryan, likewise expressed a strong distaste for European conflict. Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes, an anti-war proponent, famously described the outbreak of war as a doomsday scenario. "Suddenly, in the wink of an eye, three hundred years of progress is tossed into the melting-pot. Civilization is all gone, and barbarism come."

President Roosevelt met with his Cabinet in a string of meetings beginning on July 29th. He provided no official comment to the press at the onset of back-and-forth war declarations in Europe, hoping to draft a coherent response alongside knowledgeable input from Secretaries Garfield, Wood, and Meyer. Roosevelt understood that an enormous majority of the country desired the U.S. to stay neutral in the fray. Zero to none wanted involvement in the European theater, knowing the Atlantic Ocean guaranteed isolation by default. That is not to say, however, that Americans did not overtly favor one side or the other. Many empathized with the interests of their respective home countries, thus consulting cultural and ethnic identities. Most aligned with Britain, seen by a fair portion of Americans as their "mother country". To the 32 million Americans with roots in Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Ireland, however, supporting anyone apart from the Central Powers was absurd. This held true for the millions of Jewish Americans who opposed the vitriolic, autocratic, and fervently anti-Semitic Russian Empire.

The Roosevelt Administration settled on an option it deemed singularly appropriate for the unique position of the United States: Preparedness. In their view, it was fundamentally necessary for the federal government to do all it could to prepare for the eventuality of war. Imbedded in the national plan was economic and military readiness. If the country should find itself at the threshold of conflict, the greatest risk would be inattentiveness. Roosevelt had long since been an advocate of militarism and the expansion of the armed forces, and an outbreak of an overseas war presented a serendipitous opportunity to aggressively champion that idea. They deemed the oft-neglected Army and Navy insufficient for the modern era. In the words of Senator Lodge, an undefended and helpless nation, by its very nature, "invites aggression." Leonard Wood concurred on the need to substantially bulwark the nation's military, and indeed that notion unified Republicans and Progressives in a manner yet unseen.

In late August, as war raged betwixt the great powers of Europe, Roosevelt committed to the Preparedness program in a highly reported public address. He sustained the need to remain neutral for the purpose of national security and economic longevity but insisted that the country ought to remain vigilant regardless.

We need, more than anything else in this country, thoroughgoing Americanism - for unless we are Americans and nothing else, we are not a nation at all - and thoroughgoing preparedness in time of peace against war - for if we are not thus prepared, we shall remain a nation only until some more virile nation finds it worthwhile to conquer us. Americanism means many things. It means equality of rights and therefore equality of duty and of obligation. It means service to our common country. It means loyalty to one flag, to our flag, the flag of all of us. All privilege based on wealth, and all enmity to honest men merely because they are wealthy, are un-American - both of them equally so. [...] I advocate military preparedness not for the sake of war, but for the sake of safeguarding this nation against war, so long as that is possible, and of guaranteeing its honor and safety if war should nevertheless come.

         President Theodore Roosevelt, Preparedness Speech, August 27th, 1914

The presidential address encompassed a broad list of objectives for the federal readiness program, including not only military expansion (though it did mention Roosevelt's desire for a navy second only to Great Britain), but compulsory military training for all school-aged children. Comparing it to the Swiss system, Roosevelt stated that all young men, as a requirement for educational advancement, must serve at a West Point-like training center followed by six months of actual service in the field. Military preparedness advocates insisted on this point as one vital to the growth of the armed forces. Obligatory, universal service spat in the face of pacifism, a concept dubbed by Roosevelt an "utter folly" and stood to strengthen bonds that circumvented cultural ties and social identities. Knowing the fierce objection Democrats would invariably have to the above proposals, the speech also included a slight digression pertaining to the need for a Progressive Senate majority.

"Your Congress is tasked with the patriotic duty to enact Americanization," the president postulated. "The Party of Columbia is the party of one national identity, of one American language: the language of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Our citizens must be Americans, and nothing else, and if they try to be something else in addition, then they should be sent out of this country and back to the other country to which, in their hearts, they pay allegiance. This is not an age of cowardice, it is one of courage, of honor, truth and hardihood - the virtues that made America."

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1914 Congressional Elections      

Senate
Republican: 34 (+2)
Progressive: 31 (+3)
Democratic: 30 (-6)
Socialist: 1 (+1)

House
Progressive: 158 (+10)
Republican: 135 (-4)
Democratic: 117 (-4)
Socialist: 18 (+2)
Civic League: 6 (-3)
Independent: 1 (-1)

  Senate Leadership

Senate President Hiram W. Johnson (P-CA)
President pro tempore Eugene Hale (R-ME)
Conference Chairman Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN)
Conference Chairman Robert La Follette (P-WI)
Caucus Chairman Robert L. Owen (D-OK)

  House of Representatives Leadership

Speaker Wesley L. Jones (P-CA)
Minority Leader James R. Mann (R-IL)
Minority Leader Oscar Underwood (D-AL)
Minority Leader Victor L. Berger (S-WI)
Minority Leader Daniel A. Driscoll (CL-NY)

The Roosevelt midterm elections seemed to exacerbate 1912 voting trends. A quick glance at the 1914 results explained no less than a hearty examination of state-by-state vote totals. More Americans favored President Roosevelt's agenda than they opposed it, evident by the ten-seat expansion of the Progressive delegation in the House and three-seat boost in the Senate. The Columbians were united and did not allow for the war in Europe to disrupt that unity. Democrats, meanwhile, stayed very much divided throughout the 63rd Congress as in-fighting brewed continuously between Bryan Democrats, who empathized with the Progressive social and economic platforms yet held a hardline against the idea of Preparedness mobilization, and frustrated conservative Democrats that rejected the Progressive program in its entirety. Struggling to conceive a uniform messaging on the national level, the party had immense difficulty holding onto its slim senatorial plurality. An ascendant Progressive tide washed over Democratic officeholders, resulting in a six-seat loss in the upper chamber. In addition to factionalism endlessly plaguing the old bastion of Jeffersonian ideals, a component operating outside of the Democratic party also played into the inter-party divisiveness.

The non-affiliated Civic League of Independents in Congress attracted scores of candidates in hotly contested districts, as well as in a fair few senatorial and gubernatorial races. Despite former President Hearst's fourth-place finish in the 1912 presidential election, the 1.5 million voters that buoyed the Hearst candidacy now followed his plea to defend the young political faction. Those candidates in favor of the anti-establishment reform program exhibited much of the same style-over-substance approach to politics of the former president, lambasting Roosevelt for coordinating with Republicans and commonly citing corruption within the Democratic leadership. The Civic League of America fielded over sixty candidates for office in 1914, including the nine congressional incumbents. Thirteen altogether managed to secure electoral success that year, such as former Navy Secretary Lewis Nixon in an open race for a New York State Senate seat, but dozens of high-profile office-seekers like petroleum producer Thomas L. Hisgen in the Massachusetts governor's race failed to overtake leading Progressives and Republicans. Hearst personally devoted his time and capital into the CL, so it must have been dreadfully discouraging to learn that his congressional faction lost a third of its members on Election Day.

Western Populists, seated in Congress as Democrats, faced intense scrutiny from their own party for voting approvingly on Roosevelt's Square Deal legislation, and as a natural result lost in their respective primary bouts. Therefore, incumbent senators John C. Bell of Colorado and Henry Heitfeld of Idaho suffered for their voting patterns. Each were brought into Washington as members of the Populist Party, gradually transformed into Bryan-molded Democrats, and by 1914 were as faithful as anyone to the national committee. Senator Heitfeld served as the Class 3 senator of the Gem State for about 12 years and not once heard a word of caution of the state apparatus, leaving the incumbent completely unprepared when former Governor James H. Hawley (D-ID) launched a surprise crusade against him. Hawley won the nomination, but, to his discredit, failed to curb the seemingly insurmountable campaign of Idaho House Speaker Paul Clagstone (P-ID).  

Likewise, Senator Bell was felled by challenger Charles Spalding Thomas (D-CO), a former governor and Confederate Army veteran. Thomas, a thoroughbred conservative, obviously did not meet the criteria traditionally expected of Colorado Democrats, but indeed took home the nomination in a textbook upset. Thomas faced off against Republican State Chairman Hubert Work (R-CO) and reformist labor attorney Benjamin Griffith (P-CO). Utilizing a campaign fresh with references to a glorified U.S. military under the guidance of President Roosevelt, the politically inexperienced Griffith nearly toppled the poll-leading Democrat at the last minute. The final count put Thomas ahead, however, 40% to 39%, with Work catching up the rear with 11%. Thomas claimed the victory in the name of preventing U.S. entry into the European war, stating, "Sanity in Congress is all that prevents Colonel Roosevelt from dragging us into a fight that does not whatsoever concern us."

Senator James Garfield's transition to the State Department left that seat vacant at the start of the 63rd Congress. A subsequent special election for that seat led to victory for GOP candidate and former governor Myron T. Herrick (R-OH). Herrick soon opted in favor of running for a complete term, giving the conservative financier the opportunity to grip onto Garfield's old seat for another six years. His senatorial colleague, Theodore Burton (R-OH) made the fateful decision to retire in 1914, thereby leaving an open contest alongside the potential re-election of Senator Herrick. The recent inductee was considered a shoo-in for his election, but Burton's seat seemed a toss-up. Industrialist Arthur Lovett Garford won the Columbian nomination while Democrats settled on progressive reformer Representative James M. Cox (D-OH) for their choice. The Republican Party nominated incumbent Governor Warren G. Harding (R-OH) to succeed Burton - a nightmare scenario for Cox and Garford. The sitting Ohioan governor was tremendously popular in his home state and delivered safe, patriotic platitudes as opposed to the sweeping legislative pledges offered by his opponents. Skillfully lassoing mountainous Republican turnout, Harding handily defeated Cox and joined fellow victor Herrick in the all-GOP Senate delegation.

As with Ohio, the Republican Party experienced a political miracle in New York. Incumbent Governor Lewis Chanler (D-NY), who in 1912 hung onto the Governor's Mansion by the skin of his teeth, believed a third full term was untenable and announced his bowing-out in early 1914. Sensing an opportunity, Representative William Sulzer, then considered a prominent face of the New York Democratic Party, declared an intent to run. His chief competitor would be a returned and reinvigorated Charles Evans Hughes (R-NY), the anti-corruption GOP nominee who narrowly lost to William R. Hearst in 1906. Espousing a pledge to fulfill a progressive agenda that included cracking down on Tammany Hall interference in the political process and ramping up military recruitment efforts in conjunction with the Preparedness Movement, Hughes easily won the endorsement of President Roosevelt and the New York Progressive Party. Sulzer had not anticipated a unified opposition and was unequivocally decimated by the mammoth competitor in a 60-40 race. Likewise, New York Assemblyman and Republican Leader Elihu Root, a virulent Hearst opponent and champion of readiness in the war, demolished incumbent Senator William Sheehan (D-NY) for a seat in the Senate.

Lastly, perhaps the most influential race of 1914 took place in Nevada. Jingoist and white supremacist Senator Francis G. Newlands (D-NV) prepared to take part in the toughest re-election fight of his career. Newlands served in the Senate since 1902 and had yet to fall below 50% in an election. It would not be so easy in 1914, however, when he dealt with a repertoire of anti-incumbent opponents. Carson City attorney Samuel Platt (R-NV) ran harsh, negative advertisements against Newlands with assistance from a Vanderbilt-backed war chest. The Columbians ran local business owner James Johnson, who too held nothing back in criticizing Newlands above all else. Former Governor Denver S. Dickerson (D-NV), a beacon in statewide politics, even withheld an endorsement of the sitting senator, provoking outrage by the Nevada Democrats. Polling put Newlands neck-in-neck with the competition, with all candidates roughly within a point or two of one another. Reverend Ashley Grant Miller (S-NV), the Montcalm County Assistant Prosecutor and active member of the Socialist Party, initiated the surprise upset of the election and, by a margin of fewer than one percent of the vote (30.01% to 29.69%), defeated Senator Newlands and delivered the SP with its first ever win in the upper legislature.

Senators Elected in 1914 (Class 3)

Francis S. White (D-AL): Democratic Hold, 85%
Marcus A. Smith (D-AZ): Democratic Hold, 49%
James P. Clarke (D-AR): Democratic Hold, 72%
George C. Pardee (P-CA): Progressive Hold, 47%
Charles S. Thomas (D-CO): Democratic Hold, 40%
Frank B. Brandegee (R-CT): Republican Hold, 55%
Duncan U. Fletcher (D-FL): Democratic Hold, 89%
Thomas E. Watson (D-GA): Democratic Hold, 67%
Paul Clagstone (P-ID): Progressive Gain, 42%
Charles M. Thomson (P-IL): Progressive Gain, 38%
Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN): Republican Hold, 38%
Albert B. Cummins (P-IA): Progressive Hold, 58%
Joseph L. Bristow (P-KS): Progressive Hold, 57%
Augustus E. Wilson (R-KY): Republican Gain, 40%
John R. Thornton (D-LA): Democratic Hold, Unopposed
John W. Smith (D-MD): Democratic Hold, 45%
William J. Stone (D-MO): Democratic Hold, 53%
Ashley G. Miller (S-NV): Socialist Gain, 30%
Jacob Gallinger (R-NH): Republican Hold, 55%
Elihu Root (R-NY): Republican Gain, 52%
Lee Overman (D-NC): Democratic Hold, 57%
James H. Sinclair (P-ND): Progressive Gain, 40%
Warren G. Harding (R-OH): Republican Hold, 56%
*Myron T. Herrick (R-OH): Republican Gain, 48%
Thomas Gore (D-OK): Democratic Hold, 44%
William D. Hanley (P-OR): Progressive Gain, 39%
Gifford Pinchot (P-PA): Progressive Hold, 41%
Coleman L. Blease (D-SC): Democratic Hold, 98%
Philo Hall (P-SD): Progressive Hold, 50%
Reed Smoot (R-UT): Republican Hold, 54%
William P. Dilingham (R-VT): Republican Hold, 59%
Ole Hanson (P-WA): Progressive Hold, 44%
Isaac Stephenson (P-WI): Progressive Hold, 50%

*Special Election

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The British Grand Fleet Sailing in Parallel Columns, c. 1914 - Source: Wiki Commons

Secure in the knowledge that the U.S. voting population sanctioned President Roosevelt's call to action, the exiting 63rd Senate reluctantly agreed to take up the legislative proposals offered by the head of state. Preparedness, an idea that had gained a torrent of traction since the president's August address on the subject, seeped into the daily American lexicon and bubbled into a full-fledged movement by the conclusion of 1914. Advocates for war readiness spurred the growth of a handful of local and state "Defense Clubs," manifesting a lobbying force aside from war-hungry weapons manufacturers. Senator Fairbanks, the univocal leader of the Senate Republicans during Roosevelt's tenure, voiced his favor with the program and urged his party to follow suit. The Falconer-Colt Bill, also known as the Preparedness Bill, reached the floor of the Senate on December 10th.

Falconer-Colt, named for Senator LeBaron Colt (R-RI) and Representative Jacob Falconer (P-WA), furnished a base level of preparedness that included a dramatic upsurge in military spending, a wide-ranging expansion of federal recruitment efforts, the renewal of naval contracts, and a numbered increase in State and War Department officials. When Roosevelt took office, the State Department operated with a meager, bare-bones budget and employed only about two hundred workers. In the case of unexpected conflict, such an abysmal figure would leave the U.S. far below the typical requirements of a capable and advanced, industrialized nation. Falconer-Colt also outfitted expanded presidential powers in the eventuality of war involving the United States: a prospect exceedingly unacceptable to the Democratic Party. Indeed, congressional Democrats fought vehemently against Preparedness at every turn, exhaustingly reiterating their perspective that enlarging the scope of the Executive branch and dedicating a higher percentage of the national budget to the military would not stave off war, but perhaps have the opposite effect.

A secondary aspect to the bill in Congress concerned the economy. At the outbreak of war in August, insanity struck the London Stock Exchange and forced its indefinite closure. Demand for raw gold shot through the roof, draining U.S. reserves and stirring bank runs and panic hoarding by the American citizenry. Stocks crumbled, food prices rose, unemployment figures skyrocketed, and the export market dissipated short of nothingness. Any small chance of recovery appeared to evaporate, or at least that was how it seemed. Alongside its war fever, the late-summer Roosevelt Administration primarily focused on how best to deal with the national economy in a world rife with bloodshed and mistrust. Roosevelt and his political comrades believed that the answer to the United States' economic woes lied with its root problem: the war. After all, once the pure shock of the world plunging into a deadly battlefield wore off, someone needed to produce the means necessary to conduct said war. Therefore, the president insisted that the Preparedness legislation incorporate a portion that entailed looser restrictions on overseas trading and light subsidies for steel and cooper manufacturers (a major turnaround from Roosevelt's belligerent legal assault on U.S. Steel).

Roosevelt placed all of the nation's metaphorical eggs into the export basket, explicitly refusing to either advise the New York Stock Exchange to close or order the Treasury seize on depleting gold reserves. Some Progressives joined with Democrats in deriding the president's choice, albeit in private correspondence, wary of rolling the dice on exports. Fortunately for Roosevelt, the drying up of industry in Europe and a sudden rise in demand of most raw goods validated his decision. If managed and coordinated properly, the U.S. was on track to be a significant economic player despite its poor contemporaneous condition. Furthermore, the warring continent was ripe for investment, and that caught the eyes of Rockefeller and Morgan interests. Between 1910 and 1915, U.S. banking forces invested millions into various European governments and often served as their purchasing agents. Especially in the wake of favorable trading conditions with Germany, Morocco, and China from years of open-door negotiations and diplomatic endeavors, the House of Rockefeller operated as a benevolent, non-aligned lender to these countries. Historians estimate well over two billion dollars in loans were dispersed to the Central Powers prior to, and too at the start of, the Great War.

Congress signed off on Falconer-Colt in December, altering very little of the text and complying to much of the president's demands (it did not include universal conscription). Just as predicted, the American economy underwent an industrial boom in the first half of 1915 partially due to the Preparedness doctrine. Steel and oil demand bounced back from sharp cutbacks and overall unemployment dipped slightly with the reinforcement of naval bases, speedy construction of a revitalized Navy, and, of course, rising enlistment figures. The only piece of the puzzle that stayed unresolved was the stunted American exports wing. European need for American goods was at an all-time high due to the wartime draining of resources and ever-higher manpower costs, but Great Britain tactically made international trade abundantly nightmarish. The British Naval Blockade, established at the onset of war in August, effectively blocked off German ports from receiving any outside trade whatsoever, including from neutral powers. Britain forbade all commerce with Germany and mandated all merchant vessels, even if they held cargo unrelated to the war, dock in Entente-controlled ports for examination. For Americans, the Royal Navy exhibited especially strict scrutiny. It was not unheard of for seafaring traders to have their stock depleted or ruined in that process.

U.S. traders were endlessly frustrated at the idea that British intrusion culled profiteering opportunities, and many avoided the North Sea completely to stave off the risk of losing cargo. Britain and France were, in theory, more easily accessible trading partners with the restrictions of the blockade in mind, but German rates had been massaged over the last decade and U.S. industries preferred existing arrangements over being bullied into accepting uglier rates for the same work. Commercial forces had no love for Britain prior to the war, but this development sickened them and drove many to lobby the Roosevelt Administration to act. The president delayed the choice as long as possible, but now he either needed to acquiesce to British demands and start from scratch or bully London right back. Truthfully, Roosevelt's less-emphasized imperial ambitions, that of the United States as a world power, counted heavily on utilizing its standing deals with the Kaiser as a foundation. Trade with the British Empire and France was miniscule by comparison. Endangering relations with an amiable German Empire at a moment when France acted in an outright antagonistic manner to the administration and Britain mocked the U.S. with its snatching away of the "Freedom of the Seas" was no option at all.

Before the United States laid a golden valley. The omnipresent powers of international commerce, those interests that greedily profited off exploitation in the Philippines and colonialism in South America, viewed the Great War not as a catastrophe, but as an opportunity for new profits. In the unquestioning service of their home countries, men were driven off to war to die in one of the most inhumane conflicts in human history. They were ordered to dig their own graves, and capitalists happily sold the shovels. [...] U.S. financiers, banks, and investors long since coveted a plate at the table in Europe. Germany was their entry-point to total economic domination in the Eastern Hemisphere. Once the Ottomans completed their Bosporus-to-Baghdad railway, and forcibly swung open the doors of the Middle Eastern markets to plundering, investing in the Central Powers was all but inevitable. Desperate American merchants were offered fabulous riches by these same investors if they dared to traverse the Mediterranean or the North Sea. It just so happened that the Captain of the Rose took such an offer.

         Benjamin McIntyre, The Workers' Struggle: The Birth of a Columbian International, 2018​

Over the objection of Anglophile Leonard Wood, Theodore Roosevelt chose to, quite literally, test the waters. In a fateful, controversial move that has since become one of the most oft discussed resolutions of the Columbian president, Roosevelt personally sent notice to London that American commercial ships would no longer abide by the blockade. He decreed that the American economy would not "kowtow to [...] an assault on our freedom," insofar as the intercepting and forced docking of commercial vehicles was concerned. Noting the innate neutrality of the seas and the unprecedented nature of enforcing a blockade against peaceful traders, Roosevelt stated that vessels containing no war materiel had no reason to abide by the British government. He did not pass a formal issue contesting the status of European waters or otherwise officially challenge the blockade, but instead sent the above memorandum and waited for a return letter - presumably anticipating the British would back down from their hardline offensive. Secretary Garfield followed-up with a more cordial message, but that too was seemingly ignored.

Four days later, on April 30th, 1915, a transatlantic ship named "The Yellow Rose," sailed into the North Sea. According to a copy of its manifest, it contained fourteen crew members, twenty passengers, and a diverse stock of foodstuffs and medical supplies. The Yellow Rose was bound for the seaport town of Esbjerg in Denmark but was stopped by British authorities along the Western blockade just South of Dover. Reports vary, but the official assessment by the Dover Patrol was that the ship refused standard orders to dock at Dover and continued pressing East (though some historians assert that the shipping vessel was first halted and boarded). Declaring the rogue captain in criminal disregard to submit to their jurisdiction, and apparently under a premonition that it was carrying more nefarious goods than wheat and medicine, the Royal Navy unceremoniously fired upon the ship. The Yellow Rose sunk into the English Channel, and all onboard perished on that April afternoon.

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San Francisco Preparedness Parade, June 2nd, 1915 - Source: SF Chronicle

News of the Yellow Rose soon reached American shores. A horrified public had trouble comprehending the disaster. Humanists and intellectuals perhaps disbelieved the story, but learning of the tragedy was unavoidable. Plastered across every major newspaper read some variation of the same headline, accompanied by either a photograph of the ship itself or of its captain. The New York Times printed, "Yellow Rose Sunk By Royal Navy, 34 Aboard Believed Dead," and followed with a smaller subtitle remarking, "A Grave Crisis Is At Hand." Indeed, the unjust murder of American citizens did not merely invoke alarm, but immense anger at the perpetrators for ordering the assault. Editorials universally condemned the officers responsible for the deaths at sea, yet hundreds of publications took the extra step in insulting the British government for instituting the blockade to begin with.

The American answer to the destruction of the Yellow Rose in the English Channel was outrage and acrimony as much, if not more so, than it was grief and sadness. Not entirely unlike the Austrian knee-jerk reaction to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the people themselves demanded retribution. A wave of anti-British emotion washed over the United States at a level unseen in a generation. Articles from reputable sources freely referred to sailors aboard the blockading vessels as, "pirates," and "barbarians." The Nation famously named the event, "a deed for which a Hun would blush, a Turk be ashamed, and a Barbary pirate apologize." No longer were concerns about the blockade limited to commercial interests - the policy of interdiction was now personal.

Insofar as political leaders responded, they certainly proved more divided than the public at large. The Great War saturated political discourse since, at the latest, the debate over Falconer-Colt, and now that debate overshadowed all other issues. Five full months of preparation lessened war anxiety to an extent and left the country in a far better position, militarily, that it would have been otherwise. Few in Washington wanted U.S. involvement in the affairs of Europe, but at least the Army no longer upkept nineteenth century weaponry as it did at the dawn of the 1910s. Democrats who had fought the president on Preparedness struggled to gain a worthwhile foothold in the foreign policy debates moving forward. Former President Bryan consistently advised against the Roosevelt position on war readiness and stressed the need to establish diplomatic channels as an alternative. His fledgling Commoner, reduced by 1913 to a milquetoast, pro-Democratic paper, printed each week a heartfelt plea for arbitration. "Militarism will not stop militarism," it read.

Bryan and fellow war-wary advocates like Governor Woodrow Wilson labored twice as hard to silence the march to war after the sinking of the Yellow Rose. Before British authorities delivered their non-defense on the atrocity and hours prior to the official presidential statement, Bryan spoke to a gathering of the neutral Friends of Peace association. He indicated sorrow for the lives lost and empathy with those desirous of revenge, but urged a calm, measured counter. "Accountability can be achieved," he explained, "without rushing headlong into war." Millions of Europeans were already slaughtered in the bloody overseas conflict, lost in the spray of machine-gun fire and artillery shells. Europe was at a stalemate wrought with deplorable trench-warfare and poison gas attacks. No reasonable American, Bryan thought, could possibly crave embroilment in such a fiasco. That too quickly became the mindset of pacifists and proponents of international cooperation, but Roosevelt disagreed.

British officials and representatives reportedly touched base with the Roosevelt Administration on the morning of May 1st, regretting the sinking of the commercial ship but stopping short of apologizing or renouncing their ongoing naval policies. U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom Paul Drennan Cravath warned President Roosevelt that the British were unwilling to alter the state of their blockade. According to Cravath's testimonials, Prime Minister H.H. Asquith spared few words for the 34 American deaths, and in fact planned to coordinate with the recently created War Propaganda Bureau to frame the incident in a manner that reflected negatively on the United States. Cravath, as well as the presidential Cabinet, implored the president exhaust diplomacy. "[Wood and Garfield] advised against a sudden, emotion-driven reply," wrote Ackerman, "but one does have trouble reasoning with the unreasonable. Roosevelt itched for war, and he rebuffed every point against declaration. If Wood brought up the German advance in Belgium, Roosevelt retorted with reports of French and British atrocities in occupied Greek territory. When asked about the unstable U.S. economy, the president could answer that the recovery counted on the success of Germany. The dominoes fell one by one, and perhaps all it took was a smidge of disrespect by Asquith to push him over the brink."

Gentlemen of the Congress.

In their respective lifetimes, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln confronted crises of different types, and therefore in any given crisis it is now the example of one, now the example of the other, which it is most essential for us to follow. Each stood absolutely for the National ideal, for a full Union and of all our people, perpetual and indestructible, and for the full employment of our entire collective strength to any extent that was necessary in order to meet the nation's needs. The lesson of nationalism and therefore of efficient action through the national government is taught by both careers. At the present moment we need to apply this principle in our social and industrial life to a degree far greater than was the case in either Washington's day or Lincoln's.

Washington loved peace. Perhaps Lincoln loved peace even more. But when the choice was between peace and righteousness, both alike trod undaunted the dark path that led through terror and suffering and the imminent menace of death to the shining goal beyond. We remember that Lincoln said that a government dedicated to freedom should not perish from the earth. Our sacred past guides us to this day. Peace cannot reign where evil prevails. Freedom cannot breathe when tyranny looms near. On the 30th of April, we as a nation endured tremendous loss at the bequest of a tyrannical policy distilled by pirates on the open sea. American lives and property were ruthlessly and without provocation stolen away in a senselessly cruel and unspeakable act that exhibits an innate threat on our independence. This belligerence, an inhumane assault on neutrality and our right to free commerce, has made neutrality impossible.

          Theodore Roosevelt, War Message to Congress, May 8th, 1915

At once, upon learning that diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were formally severed, sprawling Defense Club branches, the pro-war Patriotic Society for American Security, the munitions-minded Navy League, and other such groups sprang into action. Congress, they understood, would only concur with the president on the need for war if swayed to do so by the people. Inspired by the enormously influential, Bryan-esque style of presidential campaigning, these groups initiated mammoth-sized parades featuring jingoistic speakers in the same vein as Albert Beveridge and his "March of the Flag." Processions donning patriotic themes reminiscent of Independence Day (Nostalgic banners with depictions of the Founding Fathers, the Betsy Ross flag, etc) flooded the streets of St. Louis, Chicago, Sacramento, New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., throughout May of 1915. In the words of one propagandist, "We're no strangers to British subjugation. Our forefathers wrestled for independence and for economic liberty from those blasted redcoats, and now we do the same. [....] Hail, Columbia, now and forever, land that I love."

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Peace Advocates in New York, June 11th, 1915 - Source: BoweryBoys

American popular opinion demonstrated a clear, intense disfavor with the prospect of entering the war at the start of 1915. Most preferred staying neutral, or, at the extreme end of the spectrum, siding with the Central Powers economically. Polling projects found public approval for war declaration hovering in the high teens. The Yellow Rose disaster shifted that figure upward, and President Roosevelt's speech further rocketed interest in engaging in the conflict. Enacting revenge seemed a more enticing plea than protecting the economy. Preparedness began to place the U.S. on relatively equal footing with the belligerents, and the growth of pro-war organizations and city-wide demonstrations increased notoriety of the militarist movement as it unfolded. In cities with substantial Irish Catholic, German, and Scandinavian communities, ever-larger Defense Clubs were especially vitriolic toward Britain.  

The Roosevelt Administration, in the immediate aftermath of the presidential address to Congress, worked to engineer the prevailing narrative concerning entrance in the war. Roosevelt founded an independent agency via executive order named the United States Information Council. Headed by Brigadier General William Wright Harts with assistance from illustrator Leon Barritt and "Cowboy Artist" Charles Marion Russell, the USIC sponsored a spree of propaganda to promote the administration's point of view. USIC materials flooded the mainstream press and blanketed prominent parks and city centers, all with positive, patriotic messaging aimed at young adults to enlist. On the flip side, the committee would seek to censor all British media that countered the administration. Some of the more blatant propaganda issued by the agency depicted imagery like a British lion tearing apart Europe with its teeth and claws. The sometimes-shocking illustrations incensed a public ill at ease with neutrality. "How many men must die before we act?" asked one pro-intervention editorial. "The English do not own the sea and they ought never to control our trade." All in all, it worked. Before much time at all had passed, the Republican Party and most Progressives pledged to support Roosevelt's War Declaration.

Even as the airhorns blared and the war drums thundered, an unmoving segment of the population refused to get caught up in the fervor. Swathes of working Americans (like working Europeans) were unaffected by the propaganda. Protestant religious leaders were vocally opposed to any involvement overseas, as was the brunt of the women's movement. Women, especially, became the centerpiece of an anti-war appeal to the president in 1914 and 1915. Notable social reformists like Lillian Wald and Jane Addams, individuals who had joined with the Progressives and fueled their push for universal suffrage, now broke with Roosevelt and incessantly urged he reconsider the choice to plead Congress for military action. Lasting members of the Republican Old Guard, labor union officials, progressive journalists, and industrialists like Model-T automobile developer Henry Ford denounced war as a waste of human lives and intervention as a thankless task. Adams frequently wrote to the president on such topics as isolation and rekindled diplomacy, but by April she no longer received return messages.

Of all four of the major American political parties, only the Socialist Party emerged forcefully and consistently against the U.S. dipping its toes into the cesspool of war. Socialist leaders like Eugene Debs quickly came to recognize the gigantic problem of warring nations and escalating jingoism in relation to cross-national working-class solidarity and international cooperation. In stark contrast to socialists in Europe who capitulated to patriotism and nationalist sentiment, Debs, and the majority of American Socialists (apart from a few Preparedness advocates like Mayor Daniel Hoan (S-WI) of Milwaukee), fended off any such inclination. Debate pertaining to their official position on the issue would not be cemented into party policy until 1916 at their national convention. Debs, however, jumped the gun, refusing to shy away from taking a stand on this delicate and malleable issue.

It is "patriotism" of the workers of one nation to fall upon and foully murder the workers of another nation to enlarge the possessions of their masters and increase the piles of their bloodstained riches, and as long as the poor, deluded toiling masses are fired by this brand of "patriotism," they will serve as cannon fodder and no power on earth can save them from their sodden fate. Ours is a wider patriotism — as wide as humanity. We abhor murder in uniform even more than we do in midnight assassination. Preparedness, from the working-class point of view, means for the workers that they are to cease fighting and losing for their masters and for once in the world’s history fight and win for themselves. [...] I am not a capitalist soldier; I am a proletarian revolutionist. I am opposed to every war but one; I am for that war with heart and soul, and that is the world-wide war of the social revolution.

         Eugene V. Debs, Socialism and Patriotism, May 29th, 1915

Looking to copy the seemingly fruitful tactics of the Preparedness and pro-war advocates, about 8,000 activists stemming from a variety of local organizations took to the streets of New York in a contentious march for peace. Dressed in monochrome attire to honor the fallen soldiers in Europe, as well as to signify future deaths of American enlistees, the collective of marchers stepped silently and in unison along busy metropolitan streets. This cadre included members of the New York Socialist Party, the Workingwomen's Craft and Industrial Union League, the New York Board of Women's Suffrage, and well-known figures like antimilitarist Crystal Catherine Eastman and suffragette Carrie Chapman Catt.

The Women's March for Peace was designed to promote peace and solidarity with grieving mothers off in Europe, and to the participants they anticipated quiet solidarity by observers. Still, regardless of the event's intent, the country was now more equally divided on the issue. War hawks equivocated pacifism with cowardice and a lack of patriotism. For them, marching for peace was outright traitorous. Therefore, marchers crossing the intersection of West 47th Street and 5th Avenue were greeted with blowback in the form of an attack by opposing war proponents. Banners were ripped from women's hands and promptly destroyed as marchers were pushed to the ground and berated. The situation devolved into panic and the scattering of activists, though local police on standby intervened and broke the engagement up. Officers arrested forty-two women marchers and three oppositionists. The New York Police Department went on to cite the Women's March for Peace as an instigator of "street violence and thuggery" and recommended the women abstain from repeating the event. Mayor John Mitchel (P-NY), a close ally to Roosevelt, went as far as to advise the city government to consider "preventative measures" to deter future incidents.

The failure of the Women's March, juxtaposed with the invariable success of the Preparedness parades, epitomized the transformation taking place within the country. Patriotism and Roosevelt-branded progressivism, sometimes viewed as one in the same, influenced the United States to an extent that cannot be underestimated. Swept up in the propaganda and vengeful, post-Yellow Rose sprit, the U.S. Congress brought to a vote a formal declaration of war. Overruling an attempted filibuster by Democratic Caucus Chairman Robert Owen, the senatorial Progressive-Republican coalition passed the proposal, 64 to 32. Senator La Follette famously cast his vote against the measure following a heartfelt plea to deny Roosevelt the war, although only two other Progressives joined the Wisconsinite in that direction. The House passed the proposal with minimal fanfare, 302 to 133. That evening, on June 28th, 1915, President Roosevelt announced that the United States now existed in a state of war against the United Kingdom. He finally had his war. Next came the tricky part.

[Pyro]

Benedict Crowell, Co-Architect of the Canadian Plan, c. 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons

Chapter XXI: In Service of the Nation: Breaking the Washington Doctrine

Officially embroiled in the Great War as of June 28th, the United States required nimble reflexes and a quick wit in order to gain an early upper hand. President Roosevelt authorized mass mobilization of the armed forces and put into motion a military operation meticulously constructed by his team long before entering the fray. Via secret diplomatic channels, the U.S. government was later revealed to have communicated back-and-forth with the German Foreign Office in the weeks preceding the passage of war declaration in Congress. Secretary of State James Garfield and German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow partook in this series of coded telegraph conversations through May of 1915, articulating their strategies and hypothesizing how best to bushwhack the overconfident Entente. This channel provided for the exclusive, direct input from President Roosevelt, Assistant War Secretary Benedict Crowell, and General John J. Pershing at the outset. Knowing Secretary Leonard Wood's objection to binding relations with Germany, the president deliberately kept him out of the loop on this matter. Shortly after the U.S. declared war on the United Kingdom, Roosevelt reassigned Wood to a co-commanding position under Pershing and, thereafter, called on Crowell to serve in Wood's place.

The Roosevelt Administration established these links with the German government for military as well as commercial purposes. According to historians dedicated to understanding the events leading up to U.S. entering the war, the president primarily aspired to supply the Central Powers with much-requested export goods like steel, cooper, and wheat. Collapsing the British blockade would be the easiest and most straightforward way to accomplish such an aim, but an overt combined naval offensive would likely spell disaster for all parties. A mutually beneficial economic assistance program counted on either discovering an alternative trade route or otherwise dismantling the Royal Navy's dominance of the seas. In cooperating with the German Empire, Roosevelt settled on, perhaps, the only available path to overcome the hurdle outlined above.

Insofar as the military-centric details of the communications were concerned, the two de facto allies covered a range of subjects. Crowell urged Germany more stringently monitor its submarine movements via tighter restrictions and discipline. He also recommended German troops focus their fight almost entirely on the Western Front while leaving the Eastern Front to the other Central Empires. More so than all else, the powers discussed the manifestation of the Canadian offensive. Crowell and Pershing conceived of a rapid, northward campaign tactic that could be developed and jumpstarted without interception by British officers. It was inspired, in part, by Alfred von Schlieffen's envelopment strategy as well as the German advance in Belgium. Due to Canada's lower base population and the shipping off of much of its military forces to engage on the tumultuous European front, the northerly neighbor of the United States was left vulnerable. Britain had not ended its diplomatic efforts to calm American leadership until June 28th, thus leaving more than enough room for the U.S. to prepare its clever play in secrecy.

Within days of announcing war, the president launched a lightning attack along the International Boundary. The maneuver propelled dozens of trained regiments across the border and into the neighboring nation whilst simultaneously dispatching a supportive fleet along the Eastern coastline. Unsuspecting British-Canadian police could not withstand the influx of American troops, and in the opening days of the offensive often surrendered without conflict. Canadian Minister of Defence Sam S. Hughes scurried to awaken those soldiers present nearest to the border and organized a swift, though disordered, defensive line.

By July, a section of the U.S. Army under direction of Generals LeRoy Eltinge and William H. Carter broke through the last of the often-criticized "hodgepodge of a garrison" and reached the city limits of Toronto, Ontario. Canadian military personnel stationed around Toronto managed to stall the American advance for roughly four days with pluming artillery fire, allowing for the evacuation of city residents. It was a true and honest effort, but the sheer abundance of practiced U.S. regiments easily overwhelmed the defenders. Military historian John Altmin summed up the engagement as a "shellacking of epic proportions. The decisive U.S. victory set the tone for the Northern Front as their lightning warfare thundered on through the provinces." Southeastern Ontario was fully captured and occupied by Carter and Eltinge's battalion within weeks, as were portions of Manitoba and Saskatchewan in a joint assault.

The invasion of Canada was swift, unforgiving, and viewed by contemporaneous war-skeptics as a unnecessary onslaught. It resulted relatively few U.S. deaths, but did end in massive casualties on the Canadian side (a fact mostly censured in the United States press). Still, these American victories on the battlefield, secured far ahead of schedule, boosted morale among the soldiers and fed into Roosevelt's projection of an unstoppable and unafraid league of warriors. Accompanying the ground assault was an active portion of the U.S. Navy commanded by Admiral William Sowden Sims. Sims' Northern Armada protected soldiers as they passed beyond the border into Canada and interrupted the North American supply route to Great Britain. Standing alongside Sims was fellow Admiral Hugh Rodman, a veteran of the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars and an individual well-experienced in naval combat. Rodman and Sims recognized that the amplification of the Navy was a work in progress, and not enough time had passed since the enactment of Preparedness to sincerely benefit from the law's advantages. Victory on the open seas against the Royal Navy, for instance, was an absolute pipe dream. The sheer number of British armored cruisers and destroyers outsized that of the U.S. almost 5 to 1. All depended upon a smart strategy.

Admiral Rodman oversaw a secondary operation: one built out of necessity rather than shock-and-awe. On the West Coast of the U.S., fortified naval bases constructed during the Beveridge and Depew presidencies launched a separate fleet of warships and cruisers to protect its Pacific territories and holdings - specifically, its puppet government in the Philippines. Rodman guided the mission throughout, ensuring the safe passage of his navy to the archipelago. The U.S. Pacific Fleet met with a small contingent of aggressive Australian cruisers en-route to Manila, but the U.S. vessels handily defeated them. Following that brief morning of combat and the hasty retreat of the Australian vessels, Rodman's crew safely entered Manila docks. The now-bolstered island brigades were now free to plot their next move. That aspect, one of a sitting tiger in the Philippines, terrified an Entente hyper-focused on the war effort in Europe.

With the summer overrun of Toronto imminent and Rodman's naval contingent muddling the security of Britain's Eastern allies, British commanders had little choice but to abandon a segment of their blockading fleet to reinforce Canada. Elsewise, they risked total capitulation in North America. Britain too called upon its Pacific allies, Japan as well as satellite governments in Australia and New Zealand, to prepare defensive campaigns. John Fisher, British Admiral of the Fleet, originally assumed that Japan could launch a counter-offensive from a presupposed base in British Columbia, but news of the U.S. Pacific advance scuttled such plans. The speed at which the U.S. forces descended upon the Pacific left Japan scrambled. Japanese officials did not wish to dedicate troops to a rag-tag venture in Western Canada if that risked losing control of their ongoing occupation in German-leased Shandong settlements and German Marshall Islands. At the close of August 1915, the United States, having made its rambunctious debut on the global stage, successfully jostled a rather hubristic Entente. In the words of President Roosevelt, "It is futile to speak softy while the world howls. Our lungs may be untested, but will produce a mighty roar."

[Pyro]

It’d be really interesting to see possible territorial gains!

I agree! It'll be a long and windy road, though