City of Hudson's weighed voting system under scrutiny

[jimrtex]

Carole Osterink, Victor Mendolia, and I sat next to each other watching the count. I was ready to sue to get a court order to keep the challenged ballots from being counted, by serving the BOE with a temporary restraining order on Monday if Volo had been ahead after the ballots not challenged were counted. But he slipped to five votes behind, so game over. Victor and I went over the ballots to be challenged carefully. Rick Scalera and Bill Hughes complained about the Crosswinds votes already counted, and I pointed out that they were a separate category of ballots, not absentee ballots, but yes, it raised an interesting legal issue to be adjudicated, but the court would not deem the appropriate remedy to be counting more illegal votes, but rather either hold the milk had been spilt, and too bad, or order a new election, or ala Texas (per Jimtex's remark), maybe depose the crosswinds voters (there were not many of them). Rick said he didn't think that had happened in NY before. I told him there was always a first time.

And there you have it. Oh, Nastke also ruled that despite a police report that someone who had secured an absentee ballot because he was going to be out of the county on election day, was actually in the county, and thus his absentee vote was invalid, would be counted anyway because everybody gets to vote. He didn't care about the law, unless it helps his team, rather than hurts it. The guy challenging the ballot, said, well, my guy is going to win anyway, so we are not going to spend thousands of dollars going to court. So then Virginia Martin allowed the challenged ballot to be counted, after the objection was withdrawn. Volo however was prepared to go to court, with me representing him. I had all my research done, including finding some interesting law on how to handle buildings bisected by district lines (the action was mostly about the Firemen's Home absentee ballots), and that the failure to sue prior to the election to expunge the illegal vote rolls, was not a legally fatal waiver.  I may go to the Board of Supervisors to suggest that Nastke be removed. We shall see.

Election contests are quite interesting. When you start scrutinizing a close election, there are always irregularities that ordinarily would go unnoticed. An example is all the discrepancies we have discovered in Hudson.

In Texas, at least, election contests are definitely legal proceedings, and I suspect that are lots of precedents that are specific to individual states, and a court in one state might not accept a precedent from another. In Texas, the burden of proof in an election contest is more akin to a criminal case than a civil case - "clear and convincing evidence".

The Richards-Frost gerrymander from 1992 was intended to produce a Hispanic opportunity congressional district in Houston. The Democratic primary was closely contested between then state senator Gene Green and city councilman Ben Reyes. The primary runoff was extremely close. Texas doesn't have party registration, but doesn't permit voting in both primaries, are cross-over voting between the primary and runoff. It turned out that a number of voters had voted in the Republican primary and the Democratic primary runoff.

When these "voters" were questioned as part of the election contest, one voter told the judge something like, "I'm 75 years old, I worked hard, own my house, raised a family, and have had a good life, but you might as well put the handcuffs on me now, because I'm not going to tell you who I voted for."

Before a decision was made on the cross-over voters it was discovered that some voters had been excluded from the district, and other voters had been included, and the runoff was rerun. Green won the re-runoff in 1992 and is still in Congress from the district. A graduate student from Taiwan had been mapping the results, and discovered the misplaced precincts. Apparently, neither candidate had noticed, perhaps relying on the list of precincts from the county.

=====

The supervisors from Hudson are elected from the wrong areas and their votes misweighted. Columbia County probably is not going to want to switch to a legislature elected from equal population districts. So instead they should adopt the Saratoga County system where voting weights are identical to the population of each town, and thus 0% deviation from the population. The largest towns (or cities) have an extra supervisor such that the deviation between Banzhaf voting power and population is reasonable.

In Columbia County, this would result in two supervisors from Hudson and Kinderhook. In Saratoga Springs, the two supervisors are also non-voting members of the city council. One town also has two supervisors, one is the town supervisor, and his head of the town board and a supervisor, while the county supervisor is only a member of the county board of supervisors.

[jimrtex]

This is the previous attempt to switch to equal population districts.

March 18, 2003 Common Council minutes. Resolution for equal population wards is at Page 15 of PDF

Gossips of Rivertown has suggested that it was a vote to switch to 6 districts, and has produced a map drawn by the city clerk, which was indeed based on 2000 census numbers, but I have not found any official record. There is a glitch in the common council minutes beginning in about August of 2003, with a couple of months missing, so it is conceivable that there was a replacement in the few months before the November election. The results of the referendum are on the Columbia County BOE web site.

This is my interpretation of the text.

[jimrtex]

Friedman's remonstrances and grievances without substance

"Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has held that weighted voting is a constitutional manner of voting in order to preserve historical jurisdictional boundaries such as towns within a city."

This is not true. Abate v Mundt was not about weighted voting. Rockland County apportioned whole numbers of county legislators among the five towns in the county. It would be the equivalent to Hudson apportioning 4 aldermen to Ward 5; 2 aldermen to wards 2 and 3 each; and 1 alderman to each of wards 1 and 4.

In making its apportionment, Rockland County was slightly outside the 10% deviation range that was just emerging at that time. IIRC, Rockland County was at 12%. The SCOTUS ruled that the burden was on Rockland County to to justify its slightly excessive deviation. It found that the county had met that burden based on the historic relationship between the town and counties, and that town officials could concurrently serve in the county legislature.

In later decades, the deviation increased. When it was over 20%, Rockland County lost. They could not justify that amount of deviation - in a sense representation was no longer based on population. In addition, the federal court found that there was a stronger identity in the suburban county between villages and school districts, which in no way conformed to town boundaries; and that town officials could no longer concurrently serve in the legislature.

In Hudson, you would have to first show that Hudson was outside the 10% safe harbor. This would be impossible to do if 2nd Circuit bozo math is used; but Hudson can probably get inside the 10% safe harbor using weighted voting, or be just outside.

But Hudson's rationale of not wanting to always be redistricting may be reasonable justification. The fact that Hudson does not administer its elections based on the chiseled-in-stone 19th Century ward boundaries; or calculate the weights based on the actual populations of the wards (per the charter or the BOE) will not matter.

If you were to file a lawsuit claiming:

(1) Weighted voting is unconstitutional;
(2) The BOE doesn't administer elections according to the charter; and
(3) The city didn't calculate the ward populations correctly, and therefore the weights are wrong.

A court will agree on points (2) and (3), and (1) will not even be considered.

If Hudson is inside the safe harbor, a legal challenge will be difficult. That is at issue in the Arizona legislative redistricting case that the SCOTUS will hear this December. And weighted voting has a lot more merit than partisan gerrymandering.

[jimrtex]

My approach would be:

(1) Correct the current Hudson weights. This does not require a referendum, and the populations for the wards were so badly calculated that there is a clear equal protection violation, and possibly due process. Changing voting weights based on an improved estimate of the populations does not count against the once-per-decade change (it would if it were a switch from equal population districts).

(2) Reform the county board of supervisors. It makes no sense that Hudson has more voting weight than Kinderhook, given that Kinderhook has a larger population. In addition, the supervisors from Hudson are paid by the county. The town supervisors are ex officio members of the board of supervisors.

(a) Banzhaf-Papayanopoulos weighting violates equal protection since it mathematically requires that some combinations of supervisors who represent a minority of the population can prevail, and the complementary combination that represent a majority of the population will lose.

Simple weighting, where each supervisor has a number of votes equal to the population they represent (or perhaps divided by 10 so that weights are smaller) solves this problem.

(b) If there is a concern that the variation in the Banzhaf Power is too great, this can be resolved by adding supervisors for the smaller entities. In Columbia County, this would give two supervisors each to Kinderhook and Hudson. This is the same situation as in Saratoga County.

Saratoga Springs city elects two supervisors at large. They are also ex officio, non-voting members of the Saratoga Springs city council. The town of Clifton Park also has two supervisors. One is the town supervisor who is a member of the town board as well as the board of supervisors, while the other is designated the county supervisor and sits on the board of supervisor

(3) Switch to equal population wards in Hudson. The Home Rule law permits structured referendums, so there could be a 5x2 plan, and a 8x1 or 6x1 plan, which could appeal to those who favor a smaller council. Set out specific maps, since it will be updated by 2021.

(4) Keep the redistricting committee as a separate item. It makes it too complicated a measure to bundle the two.

[jimrtex]

You forgot about voting power and the deviations involved in that, and the assumption that alderpersons elected at the same time from the same ward will vote randomly from each other, and that all of the precedents you cited are with respect to counties, where the rationale for having districts hew to town and city lines is far more compelling, in internal to a city where there are no political subdivisions. There is no public policy reason for weighed voting in a city, other then never needing to change the ward lines. As it is, it so happens, that because the 5th ward is diverse, having it be too big, is now a subtle form of gerrymandering, which is why it is so contentious an issue.

I have provided a simple weighting (0.0% deviation between population and weights), that has a 8.4% deviation between voting power and population; and a plan that has a 10.4% deviation between voting weight and population, and 5.1% deviation between voting power and population.

The 10% safe harbor applies to state and local governments generally.

"As you can see, judge, the deviation between population and voting weights between voting weight and population is well within the norms promulgated by the SCOTUS. The plaintiff Torie has suffered no cognizable injury, and doesn't even have standing."

Summary dismissal would be granted.

[jimrtex]

I agree with some of the above. However:

1. The attorney general has opined that the council without a referendum can redraw the alderman ward lines, so that can be done to equalize population, and then weighted voting goes away. The council must equalize population of the supervisor wards within a 5% variance under the Home Rule Law. Local law says the supervisor districts must match the alderman wards, so between local and state law, there must be population equalization within the 5% variance of the alderman wards without ever reaching federal Constitutional issues.

Supervisor is not a city position. Hudson does not pay their upkeep nor the cost of their election. It is the county's decision to make.

2. A structured referendum has some appeal but it's complicated. And there is a risk that nothing will get passed as those who favor 3 wards (that seems to be where the Scalera faction is going) will vote against a 5 ward proposal, and those who favor 5 wards will vote against a 3 ward proposal, and nothing will get passed. Maybe it is possible to vote first on whether equal population wards should be adopted, and if that passes, then the proposal with the most votes wins as to the structure, with both questions on the same ballot. That would mitigate that concern admittedly.

The home rule law appears to anticipate that proposals may be structured. If proposals for 5 wards electing two alderman, and 6 or 8 wards electing one alderman, then if multiple proposals were passed, then the one with the most support would take effect.

3. The proposed referendum drawn by Friendman has language that is in the form of a question, so if it passed (it won't even make the ballot), a question would be inserted into the charter (very odd), and assuming a court interprets that mess as requiring the council to have equal population districts, given that no number is specified, I am not sure that the court would find that the matter is subject to remedy, unless it concludes that in the absence of action the default choice for the court is to keep five wards. So we have an unneeded referendum proposal that is a mess.

Was that the complete proposal? I figured he had just written the whereases?

4. Hudson does not have more voting strength than Kinderhook. The 11% of whatever the percentage is of Hudson's share of the board of supervisors vote is split between the 5 Hudson supervisors, so each Hudson supervisor has his or her allocable share of the 11% based on the population of the ward (using erroneous numbers admittedly). Kinderhook's lone supervisor has  about 15% of the vote, or however the math plays out based on its population share of the county. It's no accident that he is the chairman of the board of supervisors.

The voting weight of the supervisors from Hudson is calculated independently based on the population of the ward they represent.

Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent have a smaller share of the total votes, than their share of the population. The Hudson supervisors collectively have a larger share of the total votes than Hudson's share of the population.

5. Beyond the population counts being wrong, we also have folks voting in the wrong wards. And the Mayor vetoed filing a lawsuit by the city against the Board of Supervisors, so the illegal voting will continue.  

If a direct challenge were made to weighted voting, this might have an impact on the decision. "We want to keep the 1885 boundaries, but we don't want to use them."

[jimrtex]

You forgot about voting power and the deviations involved in that, and the assumption that alderpersons elected at the same time from the same ward will vote randomly from each other, and that all of the precedents you cited are with respect to counties, where the rationale for having districts hew to town and city lines is far more compelling, in internal to a city where there are no political subdivisions. There is no public policy reason for weighed voting in a city, other then never needing to change the ward lines. As it is, it so happens, that because the 5th ward is diverse, having it be too big, is now a subtle form of gerrymandering, which is why it is so contentious an issue.

I have provided a simple weighting (0.0% deviation between population and weights), that has a 8.4% deviation between voting power and population; and a plan that has a 10.4% deviation between voting weight and population, and 5.1% deviation between voting power and population.

The 10% safe harbor applies to state and local governments generally.

"As you can see, judge, the deviation between population and voting weights between voting weight and population is well within the norms promulgated by the SCOTUS. The plaintiff Torie has suffered no cognizable injury, and doesn't even have standing."

Summary dismissal would be granted.

What plan is that? I need my "expert" to examine it.   I assume this is assuming one alderperson per ward, right (to nix the business of the random voting of alderpersons from the same ward)?

See 2nd and 3rd plans

I don't see how you are going to convince a court that the calculation of voting power should be calculated in a different manner than it has been.

Did you ever come up with agreed populations for the existing 5 wards (provide numbers based on the Firemen's Home being in Ward 4 and Ward 5).

[jimrtex]

Everyone Wins Electoral System

Current ward boundaries are maintained. Each voter may vote for two candidates. If they only vote for one, it counts as two votes for that candidate.

The top vote-getter in each ward is elected. In addition, the top five among the remaining candidates will also be elected as aldermen.

The remaining candidates, up to a maximum of ten will be designated alternate aldermen.

In common council votes, each alderman and alternate alderman may cast as many votes as they received when elected. The Common Council will exercise 1/10 of the total votes cast for all alderman candidates.

If there are additional candidates not in the Top 20, they may transfer the votes they received to any of the elected aldermen and alternate aldermen.

The role of alternate aldermen is to vote on formal motions before the Common Council. They would not be paid, or perhaps only a nominal amount. They could participate in council discussions on the same basis as any citizen. Quorums would be based on the full alderman and council president.

Advantages

Representation will likely be more pluralistic. Larger wards will have more representation in terms of voting strength, and possibly in terms of elected members, but that representation will be reflective of the diversity of those wards. Voter turnout is incentivized since the votes cast determine voting strength.

[jimrtex]

What plan is that? I need my "expert" to examine it.   I assume this is assuming one alderperson per ward, right (to nix the business of the random voting of alderpersons from the same ward)?

See 2nd and 3rd plans

I don't see how you are going to convince a court that the calculation of voting power should be calculated in a different manner than it has been.

Did you ever come up with agreed populations for the existing 5 wards (provide numbers based on the Firemen's Home being in Ward 4 and Ward 5).

OK, then you think the court will probably accept the assumption that two alderpersons from the same ward elected at the same time will vote randomly from each other. I think the opposite. That's OK. There really isn't much justification for weighted voting other than not having to move the lines every ten years, and I just don't think that's going to fly. That is particularly given the history of how screwed up the lines are, and the population counts.

Yes, the city clerk and I have some to agreement on the population numbers. The Firemen's Home ward placement is open to dispute, but having found and read some court decisions on it, odds are it's going in the 5th ward, (60% of the rooms are there), particularly if the eating facilities are also there, for those who don't eat in their rooms.

Federal court or state court?

A federal court is only going to care about population equity. Federal court decisions assume that the representatives elected from an area represent the entire area.

See the decisions concerning the New York City Council and the Board of Estimate.

The city council was elected from single member districts, some of which crossed borough boundaries; in addition there were two members elected from each borough, plus the city council president who was elected citywide. The two borough members were elected in a manner that would ensure political minority representation (ie Republicans).

The representation for a borough was calculated using the number of districts within a borough, plus a pro rata share of the districts that crossed a borough boundaries. For example (numbers totally made up), Brooklyn might have 10 districts, plus 23% of the population of district that crossed into Queens. Brooklyn would be treated as having 10.23 + 2 = 12.23 members. The representational share (12.23/City Council Size) was compared to the population share (borough population/city population). Since the 2 member bonus for Staten Island was relatively large, it put the deviation outside the safe harbor. The 2nd Circuit did not include the city council president in the calculation - but this was likely an error, and would not have made a difference in the decision.

In the Board of Estimate decision, the SCOTUS suggested that the 3 at-large members should have been included in the calculation of borough representation, including their voting weights, distributed on a pro rata share. That is the borough representation =

1 (for borough president) + 3 at-large x 2 votes x (borough population / city population). Again, the SCOTUS found that using the "correct" calculation was way outside the safe harbor. The 2nd Circuit had not included the at-large members, citing their city council decision. The SCOTUS rejected that part of the 2nd Circuit Board of Estimate decision, suggesting that the city council president should have been included in the earlier decision (though this would have no material effect on the result).

For Hudson:

Ward Voting Weight:  president_weight x (ward_population/city_population) + 2 x (alderman_weight)

Ward Representation Share: ward_voting_weight / city_total_voting_weight
Ward Population Share: ward_population / city_population

The deviation is the relative difference between Representation_Share and Population_Share.

Hudson is inside the safe harbor. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that equal protection is somehow violated.

Are you going to get a federal court to rule that the Banzhaf Power Index was miscalculated, because of the two aldermen from each ward?  Is the Banzhaf Power Index even the proper metric to be used? You will have dueling mathematicians, and the court will give up and decide that the population deviation is de minimis.

[jimrtex]

I didn't see any discussion about about the critical point - the assumption for calculating voting power of random voting vis a vis each other by aldermen from the same ward.

Even if the court accepts the random voting assumption, there still is the issue of whether there is any public policy reason at all for weighted voting. The only one out there is that you don't have to move the lines. That's weak. For counties, there is a real rational - that the boundaries of the districts conform to the town and city subdivisions. That is a particularly compelling argument when as is the case the supervisor for towns also sits on the town council, wearing two hats.

It is not critical. And your claim of injury is that it violates your public policy sensibilities.

The voting weights can be set so that the deviation range between vote share and population share is less than 10%. In fact, the vote weights can be set so that there is no deviation at all.

At this point, you no longer have a case in federal court.

You may have a case against the county board of supervisors.

The basic concept behind weighted voting is that a representative casts a vote for each of his constituents. Kinderhook has 8501 persons and under a simple weighting system, then the town's supervisor casts 8501 votes, or at least a proportionate share of the votes. The 8501 persons represented 13.53% of a Columbia County's 62,829 residents, so the supervisor might have 1353 of 10,000 total votes, or perhaps 135 of 1000 total votes, or 478 of 3535 total votes.

This system is analogous to corporate governance where a shareholder may cast one vote for each share they own. In a county government, each resident may be thought of owning an equal share of the government. Since it is impractical for all persons to attend meetings of the board of supervisors, each supervisor in effect holds a proxy for each of his town's residents.

If supervisors who represent a majority of the county's residents vote for a motion then the motion carries. Simple weighting preserves the fundamental concept of majority rule.

Equal population districts perform somewhat similarly. If the board of supervisors had 23 members, we could divide the county into 23 districts of equal population (2732 residents), and give each supervisor 2732 votes, or each supervisor 0.043 votes (1/23 = 4.3%), or 1 of 23 total votes. Regardless of the weights used, if a majority (12) of the 23 supervisors votes for a motion, then the motion passes, but more importantly that majority of the board also represents a majority of the county's residents.

The weakness of equal-population districts is that the districts are arbitrary and capricious and subject to gerrymandering.

If the districts are malapportioned, then there is a risk that those who represent a majority of the population may not prevail on a vote, or those that represent a minority would win. This was the reasoning behind Reynolds v Sims - a faction representing a minority could prevail defeating an opposition faction representing a majority.

If each supervisor in Columbia County had one vote, then the supervisors from the 12 smallest towns and Hudson wards, who collectively represent only 28.1% of the population could carry a vote.

If the districts were not precisely equal, but roughly equal, then a faction that represents a majority will usually but not necessarily prevail. For example if 11 supervisors each represented 2868 (105% of the ideal of 2732), they would collectively represent 50.2% of the county's residents, yet would lose on a 12-11 vote.

But if the districts were drawn using some neutral criteria such as following major roads, town boundaries, and physical features, then it is quite unlikely that this situation would occur, and even more unlikely that the 11 supervisors from overpopulated districts would form a coalition.

Now back to weighted voting. If the weights are adjusted away from simple weights based on population, then some combinations of supervisors who represent a majority of the population will be unable to pass a motion.

Remember that the reason Dr. Papayanopoulos modifies the weights, is to change the distribution of critical votes. A critical vote is one in which a combination of supervisors have a majority of the total vote, but removal of a supervisor from the combination will reduce the remaining combination to a minority.

Consider all the ways critical votes can be changed:

Make a critical vote non-critical:

(1) K (for Kinderhook) is a member of a combination, and therefore the combination represents a majority of the population. Voting weights can be reduced such that the combination has a minority of the vote, yet represents a majority of the population.

{A,B,C ... K} have a majority of the population.
{A,B,C ... K} have a minority of votes.

(2) K is a critical member of a combination, and therefore the combination with K removed does not represent a majority of the population. Voting weights can be increased such that the remaining combination has a majority of the vote, even though they represent a minority of the population. Since K is no longer necessary for a majority, he does not have a critical vote.

{A,B,C ... K} have a majority of the population, but {A,B,C ... K} - {K} does not.
{A,B,C ... K} have a majority of votes, but {A,B,C ... K} - {K} also does.

Make a non-critical vote critical.

(3) T (for Taghkanic) is a member of a combination that does not represent a majority of the population, and therefore T is not a critical vote. Voting weights can be increased such that the combination has a majority of the vote, even though they represent a minority of the population. T is likely to be a critical vote, since the vote majority is likely to be slim.

{A,B,C ... T} does not have a majority of the population.
{A,B,C ... T} has a majority of votes, and if {A,B,C ... T} - {T} does not have a majority of the votes, T is critical to the combination.

(4) T is a member of a combination that represents a majority of the population, but even if T left the combination, would still have a majority. T is not a critical vote. Voting weights can be reduced such that the combination without T has a minority of the votes, making T a critical vote.

{A,B,C ... T} has a majority of the population, but so does {A,B,C ... T} - {T}, and therefore T is not critical.
{A,B,C ... T} has a majority of votes, but {A,B,C ... T} - {T} does not, and therefore T is critical to the combination.

In all four cases, a combination that represents the majority of the population does not have a majority of the votes; or a combination that represents the minority of the population, does have a majority of the votes.

It can be said that the purpose of modifying voting weights is to convert winners to losers, or losers to winners. It doesn't matter whether there was affirmative intent, or merely gross negligence. The Alabama constitution called for the legislature to be reapportioned every decade. It had never been done from 1900 through 1960 when Reynolds v Sims was rendered. Gross negligence was not a defense.

The diminishment of the right to vote under adjusted voting weight system is directed at an identifiable class of voters, those who live in more populous towns such as Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent; just as the apportionment in Alabama was most discriminatory against voters in larger counties such as Jefferson, Mobile, Montgomery, and Madison.

The system in Columbia is made more invidious by dividing Hudson's representation among 5 wards, four of which are smaller than Taghkanic the smallest town, by which voters in Hudson escape the injury incurred by the voters in the larger towns. And Columbia County is stuck with paying the salaries of the Hudson supervisors.

[jimrtex]

I understand what you wrote jimrtex, but I am not persuaded by your assertion that the non random voting assumption is irrelevant. If there were but one alderperson per ward in Hudson, Dr. Papa's mathematics would fall about, and there would be no way for him to fix it. He could not effect the objection function of getting both population and critical voting within the 10% parameter. 

But he could get the population deviation, which is what the SCOTUS cares about, to within 10%. I've already shown that you can get to 0%.

In Roxbury Taxpayers Association the federal court never even considered the reason for the adjusted weighting in Delaware County. The SCOTUS has rejected the use of the Banzhaf Power Index to prove an equal protection violation (Whitcomb v Chavis) or to disprove an equal protection violation (Board of Estimate v Morris).

How far is your claim that Hudson may properly used the Banzhaf Power Index to adjust voting weights, but that Dr. Papayanopoulos is calculating it wrong, going to get?

Now consider this analogy. There is a certain bus route with two buses, a half-hour apart. It turns out it is random whether each regular passenger takes the early of late bus. One passenger is superstitious and flips a coin to decide which bus to take. A waitress play's liar poker at the cafe to determine who has to do table prep for next day, and thus takes the late bus, and so on.

One of the potential passengers is named Mountain. He is 6'5 well over 300 pounds of solid muscle. No one knows if Mountain is first name, last name, or a nickname, but it fits. He is probably a longshoreman. Tim is your prototypical 98-pound weakling. His twin sister Tina is a 99-pound weakling. Though twins, they make independent determination of which bus they ride. Some days they both are on the early bus, other days on the late bus, and sometimes they ride different buses. There are a few Joe and Joanna Averages, which are not atypical.

The incident in question took place on the late bus, so there would not be another bus. The bus came upon a terrible accident, where the victim had been pinned under a car. It was critical that he be extracted from under the car, and quickly.

Mountain jumps out and begins to lift on the car, but can't quite lift it. A couple of Joe Average folks join Mountain. They lift the car an inch, but can't go further. Maybe they will relieve the pressure enough for the victim to survive. Maybe ...

But it turns out that Tiny Tim (or perhaps it was Tiny Tina) were also on the bus. With their help, the car is lifted, and while the others hold the car up, Tim (or Tina) drag the victim clear.

Who was critical to the survival of the victim? Mountain assuredly. Without his initial effort, the others wouldn't have even tried. Joe Average as well, he did what any average person would do. But Tim (or Tina) were also critical. It was dark, and they look a lot alike. We will have to check the photo from the hospital when the survivor of the accident thanks them for their critical effort. It turns out that he is quite wealthy, and wants to give each of the samaritans a reward for saving his life.

But what if both Tim and Tina had been on the late bus? They would likely be sitting next to each other. As soon as they saw the accident, they would simultaneously exclaim, "Let's Go!" and jump up. Clearly they would both be critical to survival of the victim. But that is if we use logic.

A lawyer, we will call him Banzhaf, might argue that using a power index he had devised showed that neither Tim or Tina were critical. If Tina weren't there, Tim would have been, and the car would have been lifted. If Tina were there, then Tim would be superfluous.

So if I understand it, you are going to argue that the Banzhaf Power Index, the use of which has been rejected by the SCOTUS, and the calculation of which might not actually measure what it purports to, is being calculated incorrectly?

[jimrtex]

That is what I am going to do, if it reaches the Constitutional stage. And Benzhaf is not dead. It still tries to address a real issue of fairness. The assumption about two persons elected from the same place at the same time voting randomly has never been litigated before, but the assumption is fundamentally flawed, and there is no real offsetting public policy advantage to weighed voting within a city without subdivisions as there is with counties. Moreover, the current lines are a form of gerrymandering because one faction in the 5th ward consistently outvotes the other, and the two election districts in the ward vote quite differently from one another. It is not homogeneous. If spit in two, the two pieces would elect different kinds of candidates.

The SCOTUS has agreed that the Banzhaf Power Index is based on hypothetical voting patterns that probably are not realistic at all. Re-read Chavis v Whitcomb, particularly including Justice Harlan's opinion.

Explain to me why a resident of Ward 2 has standing.

Are you claiming an equal protection violation?

BTW, on the motion to sue the BOE, weren't several wards split?

[jimrtex]

The SCOTUS has agreed that the Banzhaf Power Index is based on hypothetical voting patterns that probably are not realistic at all. Re-read Chavis v Whitcomb, particularly including Justice Harlan's opinion.

Yes, it said that in the context of being a substitute for matching the weighted voting to populations (it certainly should not), and the issue as to whether it should serve as hurdle two was never addressed.

Explain to me why a resident of Ward 2 has standing.

I would be representing a group, but first Ward 2 is undercounted, and second, all the wards but Ward 5 are screwed in voting power absent the assumption of random voting.

Are you claiming an equal protection violation?

Yes, one man, one vote, but I can win as I said based on existing state and local statutes. But I would argue the Constitutional argument, so that it would preclude the remedy being fixing the local statute, and fixing the population counts, and illegal voting.

So apparently you are going to sue:
(1) City of Hudson;
(2) Columbia County;
(3) Columbia County Board of Elections; and
(4) Dr. Papayanopoulos.

These are going to be your claims:

(a) Board of Elections does not maintain accurate maps.

(b) Board of Elections lets residents of Crosswinds and two houses on Harry Howard vote in Ward 4; and residents of the Columbia triangle vote in Ward 3.

(c) Board of Elections let residents of Firemen's Home vote in Ward 4. Alternatively, the city failed to convey to the Board of Elections where the ward boundary was.

(d) Hudson and Columbia County miscalculated ward populations which they used for computing voting weights, and they failed to document their populations estimates as required by state law.
(i) They misapportioned (grossly malapportioned) the Front Street block.
(ii) They included the Harry Howard notch in Ward 5's population.
(iii) They included Crosswind and the two Harry Howard addresses in Ward 5, while condoning voters voting in Ward 4.
(iv) They included the Columbia triangle in Ward 3's population.

(e) Columbia County failed to provide for equal population election areas for supervisors from Hudson, violating state law.

(f) Columbia County violates the two-cap state law.

(g) Columbia County violates equal protection by adjust voting weights away from simple population-based weights. This ensures that some combinations of supervisors who represent a majority of the population will not carry motions, and some minority combinations will succeed. The injury is directed at an identifiable class of voters, those residing in larger towns such as Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent.

Arguably this injury is intentional, given that the purpose of adjusting the voting weights is to change the distribution of critical votes which can only be done by permitting the majority of the population to lose, and the minority of the population to succeed.

(h) Columbia County permits Hudson to escape this injury by dividing its representation. Since they pay the salaries of the Hudson supervisors, they incur an unnecessary and irrational expense.

(i) Hudson miscalculated the voting weights, by considering the two aldermen from each ward as being independent actors.

(j) If the voting weights were calculated correctly, it would be too easy for the aldermen to dominate voting (semi-dictator).

(k) Voters in parts of Ward 5 are denied equal protection through the device of a multi-member election. This is essentially, the same claim that minorities make. Note to have standing you have to a victim who resides in Ward 5. A claim that the residents of parts of Ward 5 would elect someone more to your liking is too tenuous. This may also be a violation of state law by limiting partisan expression.

I think you have a clear win on a, b, d, g, and h.

[jimrtex]

So apparently you are going to sue:
(1) City of Hudson;
(2) Columbia County;
(3) Columbia County Board of Elections; and
(4) Dr. Papayanopoulos. Why on earth would he be sued?

He is responsible for devising the method of adjusting voting weights. He knew or should have known of the problems.

These are going to be your claims:

(a) Board of Elections does not maintain accurate maps.

(b) Board of Elections lets residents of Crosswinds and two houses on Harry Howard vote in Ward 4; and residents of the Columbia triangle vote in Ward 3.

(c) Board of Elections let residents of Firemen's Home vote in Ward 4. Alternatively, the city failed to convey to the Board of Elections where the ward boundary was.

(d) Hudson and Columbia County miscalculated ward populations which they used for computing voting weights, and they failed to document their populations estimates as required by state law.
(i) They misapportioned (grossly malapportioned) the Front Street block.
(ii) They included the Harry Howard notch in Ward 5's population.
(iii) They included Crosswind and the two Harry Howard addresses in Ward 5, while condoning voters voting in Ward 4.
(iv) They included the Columbia triangle in Ward 3's population.

(e) Columbia County failed to provide for equal population election areas for supervisors from Hudson, violating state law.

(f) Columbia County violates the two-cap state law. I don't understand what this means.

MHR law says: "(b.) A plan of apportionment adopted by a county under this subparagraph may provide that mayors of cities or villages, supervisors of towns or members of the legislative bodies of cities, towns, or villages, who reside in the county shall be eligible to be elected as members of the county legislative body"

In one of the state lawsuits that proceeded Abate v Mundt, a state court interpreted this to mean that supervisors could not be members of a county legislative body by virtue of their election as town supervisors - since the State had said that a county could permit a person to run and be elected to both offices. The SCOTUS noted:

"Rockland County responded with a plan that substantially remedies the malapportionment and that, by preserving an exact correspondence between each town and one of the county legislative districts, continues to encourage town supervisors to serve on the county board."

I had misread this to mean town supervisors would be members of the county board by virtue of their being town supervisors, but that would not necessarily make sense in Rockland County, where each town, other than the smallest, had multiple legislators.

A federal court a couple of decades later overturned the Rockland County apportionment scheme. Most importantly this was because the deviation had increased significantly, but the judge also noted that Rockland County had made it illegal for someone to be a town supervisor and county legislator.

It is possible that Columbia County escapes by having a traditional board of supervisors. But if that is true, they may also escape the application of equal-size county legislator districts within a city.

(g) Columbia County violates equal protection by adjust voting weights away from simple population-based weights. This ensures that some combinations of supervisors who represent a majority of the population will not carry motions, and some minority combinations will succeed. The injury is directed at an identifiable class of voters, those residing in larger towns such as Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent. Don't understand this either. Are you saying that in order to avoid gross disproportions in voting power, sometimes representatives representing a majority of the population need to lose a particular vote? If, so that is kind of an interesting twist of the conundrum.

Arguably this injury is intentional, given that the purpose of adjusting the voting weights is to change the distribution of critical votes which can only be done by permitting the majority of the population to lose, and the minority of the population to succeed.

Yes. But it is not as benign as you state it. It is not sometimes. It is all the time. If you want to change the voting power, you must change the voting weights such that the result (success or failure) is changed.

Think what a critical vote is. First we will use simple, population-based weighting:

P(  ) is the population represented by a particular set of members.  P(ABC) is the population represented by A,B, and C. P(ABC...K) is the population represented by the members of a coalition that includes K.  And P(ABC...) is the population with K removed, or where switches his vote to No.

Condition I.

P(ABC...K)/P(all) > 1/2, but P(ABC...)/P(all) <= 1/2

K (for Kinderhook) is critical, because if he leaves the coalition, the motion fails.

Condition II

P(ABC...T)/P(all) > 1/2, but P(ABC...)/P(all) > 1/2

T (for Taghkanic) is not critical, because if he leaves the coalition, it still succeeds.

Condition III

P(ABC...T)/P(all) <= 1/2

The coalition is not successful, so T is not critical.

The Banzhaf Power Index for a given set of vote weights, is defined as the proportion of critical votes for each member of the representative body. The distribution of voting power can be changed, by changing the voting weights. That is the motivation for changing the voting weights. The way to change the voting power is to convert some critical votes to non-critical and some non-critical votes to critical.

We will switch to an alternative vote weighting W.

Condition I.

P(ABC...K)/P(all) > 1/2, but P(ABC...)/P(all) <= 1/2

W(ABC...K)/W(all) > 1/2, but W(ABC...)/W(all) > 1/2

We have augmented the votes of some of the members, such that now they represent a majority of the vote. K for Kinderhook is no longer critical if (ABC...K) since (ABC...) is also successful. They didn't need Kinderhook to have a majority of the vote. But P(ABC...) was not a majority, since that was necessary for Kinderhook's vote to be critical.

In addition, (ABC...) is likely to be critical to all its members since it now represents a majority of the vote, and is likely to be just a bit over 1/2.

Condition II

P(ABC...T)/P(all) > 1/2, but P(ABC...)/P(all) > 1/2

W(ABC...T)/W(all) > 1/2, but W(ABC...)/W(all) <= 1/2

Here were have reduced the voting weights of some of the other members. Before, Taghkanic was not critical, because the remainder of the coalition was successful without him. Now they need him, and he is critical.

If you were to examine all 8 million combinations of the 23 members of Board of Supervisors, and extracted those where a vote was critical using the Papayanopoulos weights, but was not critical using simple, population weights, or vice versa (not-critical with population based votes, but critical with Papayanopoulos weight), you will find that in every instance a population majority was converted to a weighted vote minority, or vice versa.

This is not just an inadvertent side effect. It is the reason the voting weights are modified - to convert majorities to minorities and minorities to majorities.

Dr. Papayanopoulos was involved in a lawsuit in Chenango County, where a similar effect was noted with regard to a 2/3 vote, where using the 1/2-decision weights, the supervisors from Norwich could not block a 2/3 vote even though Norwich was more than 1/3 of the population. He then devised a set of 2/3-weights which permitted the supervisors from Norwich to block a 2/3 vote. But what was failed to be recognized was that this necessarily resulted in another faction that represented 1/3 of the population from blocking a 2/3.

Any change in voting weights that causes a change in the results (success or failure of a motion) will necessarily have this effect. And it would be pointless to change the voting weights except to change the results.


(h) Columbia County permits Hudson to escape this injury by dividing its representation. Since they pay the salaries of the Hudson supervisors, they incur an unnecessary and irrational expense. How does this effect an escape?

Residents of Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent are injured because the voting weight share of their supervisors is less than their population share. The same would be true if Hudson had only one supervisor. By splitting among 5 supervisors, they don't suffer this harm.


(i) Hudson miscalculated the voting weights, by considering the two aldermen from each ward as being independent actors.

(j) If the voting weights were calculated correctly, it would be too easy for the aldermen to dominate voting (semi-dictator). Is this another way of stating the rationale for the voting power concept?

(k) Voters in parts of Ward 5 are denied equal protection through the device of a multi-member election. This is essentially, the same claim that minorities make. Note to have standing you have to a victim who resides in Ward 5. A claim that the residents of parts of Ward 5 would elect someone more to your liking is too tenuous. This may also be a violation of state law by limiting partisan expression. Is this another iteration of the voting power concept, and the assumption of random voting, in lieu of just one representative, which would then give the 40% vote of Ward 5 the power to sustain mayoral vetoes on its own? Anyway, the courts in NY have embraced the idea of voting power diverging from population weights as a finesse of the unfair domination issue. The clearest example is where one jurisdiction has a majority of the population. The state fix was by law to require two supervisors in such a town, playing the random voting game. I am not sure the federal courts have agreed that such a fix flies. I will have to reread the federal cases on Hempstead.

The MHR law says:

"iii.) The plan shall provide substantially fair and effective representation for the people of the local government as organized in political parties"

Isn't this the essence of your claim?

Delaware County no longer uses power-adjusted weighting. Saratoga County no longer uses power-adjusted weighting.

Maybe the New York courts were wrong. Maybe the Banzhaf Power Index is wrong.


I think you have a clear win on a, b, d, g, and h.

My comments are in red above.

Mine are in blue.

[jimrtex]

"Residents of Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent are injured because the voting weight share of their supervisors is less than their population share. The same would be true if Hudson had only one supervisor. By splitting among 5 supervisors, they don't suffer this harm."

Assuming Hudson is underrepresented in vote weight vis a vis its population, how does having 5 supervisors change that result?

Hudson is not underrepresented in vote weight vis a vis its population.

Hudson wards have 1.15%, 1.23%, 1.82%, 2.04%, and 3.96% of the county population, and 1.22%, 1.27%, 1.90%, 2.07%, and 4.02% of the total voting weight.

Kinderhook has 13.53% of the population, and 12.50% of the voting weight.

Kinderhook, Claverack, and Ghent are given reduced voting weight, so that when they could have been in the majority they aren't. Greenport and Chatham are about even, and everyone else is advantage.

Have you read Banzhaf's law review article on why supposedly, weighted voting does not work?

[jimrtex]

Have you read Banzhaf's law review article on why supposedly, weighted voting does not work?

I read where he said it had been misused, but no, that he had decided it was a fail, or had a serious flaw to ponder.
[/quote]
See "Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis" 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 317 1964-1965

This was written soon after the first SCOTUS OMOV decisions. At the time Banzhaf was a law student at Columbia.

In the summary he states:

"This article demonstrates that an assumption necessary to the validity of systems of weighted voting is incorrect. This is done by showing that there is no necessary correlation between the number of votes and voting power, by developing a method of measuring voting power in weighted voting situations, and by applying this measure to various examples of weighted voting systems."

But what proof is there that the Banzhaf Power Index measures "voting power"? What he demonstrated was that the Banzhaf Power Index did not correlate with the number of votes. Note that here he uses number of votes as equivalent to population.

In effect he set out to prove that there was not correlation between voting weight and voting power, and then devised a metric that did not correlate with voting weight, and therefore the metric must measure voting power.

I don't know that there is any connection between Banzhaf and Dr.Papayanopoulos. When some counties started implementing weighted voting for their boards of supervisors, state courts started striking them down, and cited Banzhaf's article. They pointed out that it was practically impossible to calculate the "voting power" without a supercomputer (there are 8 billlion voting combinations in Columbia County).

Dr. Papayanopolous at the time worked for IBM in upstate New York, with apparently the job of developing applications for an IBM 360. Somehow he hooked up with a court and calculated the voting power using the population-based weights proposed by the county. He then had the insight that not only could you calculate the "voting power" for a given set of weights, you could choose a set of weights that produce correlation between "voting power" and population.

He developed a set of voting weights for the county, which the court ordered the county to adopt.

[jimrtex]

An alternate scheme:

3 aldermen elected from each of:

(A) Wards 1 and 3
(B) Wards 2 and 4
(C) Ward 5

Alderman would be elected by simplified cumulative vote. Under a cumulative vote system, a voter may cast three votes, and distribute them among the candidates. But it is simpler to let a voter vote for one, two, or three candidates. When calculating the results, a voter is assumed to have 6 votes:

(i) Voted for 3 candidates, counts as two votes each.
(ii) Voted for 2 candidates, counts as three votes each.
(iii) Voted for 1 candidate, counts as six votes for that candidate.

This system limits voter mistakes such as using too many votes, or too few votes. The only possible mistake would be to vote for four or more candidates. For that reason the "six votes" is internal to avoid use of fractional votes.

Three candidates will be elected, and their voting weight will be proportional to the population of their area, and their share of the vote. Votes will be redistributed to ensure that all votes are transferred to three elected candidates, and that no candidate will have more than 40% of the vote.

Procedure:

(1) Count ballots, allocating each voter's six votes based on whether they voted for 1, 2, or 3 candidates.

(2) If any candidates received 40% of the total vote or more, they are elected, and have a surplus. There will be at most two such candidates.

(3) Distribute any surpluses. The largest surplus will be distributed first. The elected candidate may transfer his surplus to any remaining candidate who has less than 40% of the vote. If the transfer causes another candidate to reach 40%, then any unused surplus may be transferred to another candidate.

(4) Eliminate candidates until three remain.

(5) Candidates will be eliminated in rounds. The candidate with the fewest votes will be eliminated. He may choose another of the remaining candidates. If his transfer causes another candidate to reach 40%, then he may transfer the remainder of his vote to another candidate.

(6) If a candidate fails to transfer his vote, then it will be distributed equally among all remaining candidates.

(7) The weighted vote for each elected alderman is calculated:

votes = population * 0.9 * share_of_votes.

Example:

A candidate from Ward 5, receives 25% of the vote.

votes = 2509 * 0.9 * 0.25
votes = 564

( Council President elected at large has city_population * 0.1 = 6403 * 0.1 = 641 votes.

The 3 aldermen from each area will be more pluralistic, removing your concern about them voting the same. Their voting weight will depend on their personal support. Voters have an incentive to vote, since each vote will enhance the voting weight of their preferred candidates. Candidates will have an incentive to push GOTV. While wards 1 and 4 will lose their own aldermen, they can always plump for someone from their part of town.

Sweetener:

Adjust the ward boundaries, eliminating the ambiguities.

1st Ward:

Warren extended, Warren, South Third St to city limits.

2nd Ward:

Warren extended, North Third St, Robinson, Strawberry Alley, North 2nd Street to city limits

3rd Ward:

South Third St, Warren, Park Place, Columbia Street to city limits (Paul Avenue)

4th Ward

North 2nd Street, Strawberry Alley, Robinson Street, Warren, North 5th Street, North 5th Street extended to Harry Howard, Harry Howard to city limits.

5th Ward

Harry Howard, 5th Street Extended, North 5th Street,  Warren, Park Place, Columbia Street to city limits.

[jimrtex]

I rather like your scheme, and it would eliminate the random voting assumption issue, but of course it is never going to happen. Among other things, the odds are pretty good that the gentry would win a majority of the council votes. They would likely win all three alderpersons from wards 1 and 3, and one each from the other two wards. Well maybe not, since the 5th ward still has more votes.

An interesting part of the plan is that it would reduce the common council to an even number, 9 aldermen and the president. With weighted voting, 5 members that represent a majority of the population could carry a motion. In an equal-population scenario, that would be a tie vote. When there are 11 members, a simple majority is actually a super-majority of 54.5%.

Another plan would be to elect one alderman from each ward, except for the fifth ward, which would elect two aldermen. Three aldermen would be elected citywide by cumulative voting. The fifth ward could be formally divided into two wards.

Currently, Hudson has a hard time getting enough candidates to contest the common council. In part this is because there is little chance to defeat an incumbent of the dominant party in a ward.

[jimrtex]

Having 5 equal population wards essentially divides the 5th ward into two wards. Team Scalera does not want that to happen, because at the moment one half of the ward dominates the other half, which is more evenly divided (we know that based on the election results from the two voting districts in the ward). So a division would end the gerrymander regime that needs to be protected. That is what this fuss is mostly about. If the 5th ward were more homogeneous, there would be far less of a fuss.

My guess is that the white gentry is going to lose the mayoral election next week. Team Scalera has done a good job creating a coalition with the minority community to take down the white gentry. Favors are flying all over the place. In Hudson, the more things change, the more they stay the same. And team Scalera has figured out, that if there are to be equal population wards, what is most favorable to them are 3 wards, which essentially enable the Scalera faction to control one ward, the minority community a second, leaving the gentry with the third, and absent control of the common council president, essentially toothless. Fun stuff! Oh, and I think the Scalera candidate might win the Common Council president too. The Dem candidate dropped out (my pal Victor Mandolin), and the independent candidate has basically hardly campaigned at all, and does not say much. So the Pub might actually win it - a lady I have never met or spoken too, and have never noticed at Council meetings.

More chat about weighed voting and all here, including by yours truly.

This is getting really fun

Had the correct ward populations been used, and the weighted votes been based on the correct figures, the resolution would have failed.  Or maybe not

As you know:

Ward 1 benefited at the expense of Ward 2 because of the misallocation of Hudson Terrace Apartments.

Ward 5 benefited at the expense of Ward 4, because of the misallocation of the Harry Howard notch.

Ward 3 benefited at the expense of Ward 5, because of the misallocation of the Columbia Triangle.

Winners: Wards 1 and 3.
Losers: Wards 2 and 4
Both: Ward 5

Now look at the results of the vote on the resolution:

Aye: Wards 1 and 3, and President.
No: Wards 2 and 4
Split: Ward 5

The current voting weights are based on the erroneous calculation that the population of
wards 1+3 is 1912; and
wards 2+4 is 2006 (4.9% larger)

This is close enough that with Ward 5 split, the president decides the issue.

But the correct populations are:
wards 1+3 is 1669
wards 2+4 is 2268 (35.9% larger).

Now whether the motion fails or not hinges on how much voting weight the president has. In an equal population scenario, each alderman would represent 1/10 of the population, or 640 persons, and that would be the value of the presidents vote (it doesn't matter whether each member has one vote or 640 as far as outcome). The difference between Wards 1+3 and 2+4 is 599. So if the aldermen had simple voting weights based on population, and the president had 640 votes, the resolution would narrowly have narrowly passed.

But let's look at some alternatives:

Hudson Voting Weights

The first was your voting weights, which were intended to demonstrate that the assumption about the alderman voted independently could produce reasonable weights, but would fail badly if that assumption was wrong.

The resolution would have passed using your weights. You helped out a bit by giving wards 1 and 3 a bit of a bonus, and penalizing Ward 2 (voting weight relative to population).

The second was my model where I used simple population weights, but varied the president's weight with the goal of optimizing the relationship between population and voting power. It happens that this would given the President 6.0% of the total vote, rather than the 9.1% he would have had under a equal-population scenario. In effect he has a light thumb which can not overcome the larger population of the northside. This could be considered an illustration of how changing voting weights can change results. With one caveat - how much population does the president represent?

The third was where I let all voting weights float so as to produce an optimum relationship  between voting power and population. The resolution would have passed using these weights, largely because the president would have a relatively strong weight.

If you could give me what you believe to be the correct ward populations, I can update these spreadsheets.

Who knows affirmatively that the population numbers are wrong? The city clerk and city attorney, I'm pretty sure do. Does the Common Council and mayor?

[jimrtex]

The correct ward populations, on which the City Clerk and myself agree, are posted here by Carole Osterink. She got that screenshot from me. The numbers assume that all of the Fireman's Home population goes to the 5th ward, which involves 85 people.

Everybody knows the population counts are wrong, everybody. The Mayor disingenuously expresses some confusion about the details, but is stonewalling and vetoing, because he wants the ward lines to be changed to match were folks are currently voting improperly.

The numbers I used then are the same, except for the Firemen's Home.

So we almost managed a jackpot, a vote on weighted voting, where the result was changed by use of voting weights which were miscalculated due to the erroneous population figures.

[jimrtex]

SCOTUS briefs Harris, et al v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.

The briefs have quite a bit about the 10% deviation burden-shifting threshold, sometimes thought to be a safe harbor.

Generally, the commission and its supporters argue that getting precleared under Section 5 of the VRA was a rational state interest that justified underpopulating Democrat-leaning districts. If you read carefully, you will recognize a pitfall of citizen redistricting commissions. They rely on their expert consultants' advice. Expect to hear the words "minimal" dozens of times.

The Secretary of State, who was a named defendant in the district court case, in his/her role as administrator of the commission gerrymander, did not participate in the lower court proceedings, but has submitted a brief before the SCOTUS. Since the AG is representing the SOS, the State of Arizona is opposing its redistricting commission.

Amicus briefs of interest are:

Navajo Nation: They argue that the majority Indian district is justifiable because it is largely rural, and it permitted an increase in the share of the Indian voting population.

Sam Wang, a political scientist, who argues that the correct way to measure partisanship in redistricting is to compare the two-party share of the vote in the median district, with that of the state average. He assumes that population distribution is not skewed.

Southern Coalition for Social Justice in support of neither party. They oppose setting a bright line test for deviation, because they are involved in a North Carolina case where they are arguing that minority districts were overpopulated.

[jimrtex]

Sam Wang, a political scientist, who argues that the correct way to measure partisanship in redistricting is to compare the two-party share of the vote in the median district, with that of the state average. He assumes that population distribution is not skewed.

I appreciate Wang's contention that a difference between the median and mean is evidence of skew. However, I'm not sure that the statistics hold up when there are districts averaged in that only have one party on the ballot. The distribution of districts is certainly not normally distributed at the edges. There can also be significant bias introduced if one of the uncontested districts would normally be near the median, but is uncontested due to a popular incumbent. I think the better measure is to look at the results of a statewide race in each district (I use the presidential results).

With respect to election precincts the median is definitely more Republican than the mean, and the distribution is definitely skewed. But this is not an indication of gerrymandering.

[jimrtex]

This is the previous attempt to switch to equal population districts.

March 18, 2003 Common Council minutes. Resolution for equal population wards is at Page 15 of PDF

Gossips of Rivertown has suggested that it was a vote to switch to 6 districts, and has produced a map drawn by the city clerk, which was indeed based on 2000 census numbers, but I have not found any official record. There is a glitch in the common council minutes beginning in about August of 2003, with a couple of months missing, so it is conceivable that there was a replacement in the few months before the November election. The results of the referendum are on the Columbia County BOE web site.

This is my interpretation of the text.

Yeah, that is the map. The City clerk went on a hunt for me, since it was missing from the minutes, and found it in another file. Of course, given the population errors for the split census tracts, the map if a fail because the population numbers are wrong, but that will all be fixed soon. See below.

Why do you want to maintain the split blocks?

What about coming across Warren to Columbia?

What was the area in the green circle on my map as the intersection of Warren and Worth. It is a tire store now, correct? It has a mansard roof, so it theoretically could have been an apartment, but it doesn't look large enough for 75 persons.

The block is bounded by Worth and Warren (Warren extends past the intersection and curves south as a residential street), and a short line on the south that does not appear to correspond to anything that looks like a road. It is sort of parallel to the alley south of Warren (Cherry Alley?), but isn't.

BTW, have you ever looked at the referendum results from 2003? They are on the Columbia Board of Elections website.

[jimrtex]

This is the map that I drew that I think is best, and following my advice as the premier map junkie in the City of Hudson (you would be of course, but you don't live in Hudson, so thus I assume the honor ), it has been approved by the appropriate cabal. The split of the census block involving the projection of Fifth Street maintains the status quo. The split of the Hudson Terrace Apartments census block also hews to the status quo, and using Warren Street as a dividing line, is politically almost required absent compelling reasons to depart from that line, and there are no such compelling reasons. The census block population splits were carefully calculated by the City Clerk using data from the assessor's office as to the number of residential units per legal parcel, and I am accepting her numbers.

The division of Hudson Terrace Apartments splits a predominately black community, and submerges the southern part in a ward that will now extend to the southeast part of the city. At the time Hudson was divided into four wards, Warren extended west of Front Street, and the extension was from the Promenade to the middle of the river. The division also confuses the board of elections since the street addresses for the two sections are 19 North Front and 19 South Front, and people either did not know their street address or it was unclear on their registration form. The addresses also includes building numbers, so the post office will probably deliver mail using that. The 5th Street split has also caused problems, plus splits a house.


Below is the legal description of the wards. Fun stuff. I am writing the balance of the referendum now, although it is still unclear what text goes on the petition and/or the ballot, and what not. That is the toughest part. Nobody seems to have gone the referendum by petition route before in New York State, and thus, now going where no person has gone before, there is a lack of a suitable template that has been legally tested, or at least used in the past. The Home Rule Law provides little guidance. I fear that at the minimum the whole darn text will need to go on the petitions, above the signature lines. Ugh!

A.  First Ward.  All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where a northwesterly extension projecting the center line of Warren Street intersects the northwesterly bounds of the City, and thence along said projection and the center line of Warren Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Worth Avenue, and thence along the center line of Worth Avenue in a southerly direction to the southerly bounds of the City, and thence along the southerly and then southwesterly and then northwesterly bounds of the City to the place of beginning, shall be the First Ward.

Missing article

B.  Second Ward.  All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where a northwesterly extension projecting the center line of Warren Street intersects the northwesterly bounds of the City, and thence along said projection and the center line of Warren Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Third Street, and thence along center line of Third Street in a northeasterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Second Street, and thence along the center line of Second Street in a northeasterly direction to where the center line of Second Street intersects the boundary of that certain United States census block described in the 2010 United States census as Tract 12, Block 1000 in the City of Hudson, and thence along said census boundary line in a northerly direction to the northerly bounds of the City, and thence along the northerly and northwesterly bounds of the City to the place of beginning, shall be the Second Ward.

Census Tract numbers are relative to counties. I am pretty sure that the road you are following is now considered to be Second Street (it is by the Census Bureau). Presumably, you will have a map, inventory of census blocks, and populations associated with your plan. The tax office also shows this as being 2nd St, but they are using Google as part of their mapping application, and Google is likely getting their maps from the census bureau.

In addition, the intersection of Second Street with Block 1000 is ambiguous since Second Street forms the boundary of Block 1000 from Strawberry Alley northward.

I believe that North and South are parts of the proper names of the numbered streets.

I would substitute the following for the text in red.

"thence along the center line of North Second Street in a northeasterly and northerly direction"

If you look at the map used for the 1940 Census at the very edge of map it says "to brick works", and the boundary of the enumeration district is described as being formed by Second Street and the road to the brick works. The area to the east of the road was used for mining clay for bricks, and then was used a a dump. The area is now capped to prevent leaching into the groundwater and into the Hudson. The city want to do something with the area, but hasn't figured out to avoid penetrating or eroding the cap. Your secret trail is the remnant of an access to the dump from the east.


C.  Third Ward.  All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where the center line of Worth Avenue intersects the southerly bounds of the City, and thence along the southerly and then easterly bounds of the City to the center line of Fairview Avenue, and thence along the center line of Fairview Avenue in a southwesterly direction to the center line of Green Street, and thence along the center line of Green Street in a northwesterly and then westerly direction to the center line of State Street, and thence along the center line of State Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Sixth Street, and thence along the center line of Sixth Street in a northeasterly, direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Dodge Street, and thence along the center line of Dodge Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of State Street, and thence along the center line of State Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of North Fifth Street, and thence along the center line of North Fifth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of Warren Street, and thence along the center line of Warren Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Worth Avenue, and thence along the center line of Worth Avenue in a southerly direction to the place of beginning, shall be the Third Ward.

Extraneous comma. That little tab bounded by 6th, Rope Alley, Dodge, and State Street is not needed. Personally, I would start the description at 5th and Warren. It is easier for me to understand the lines that separate wards, and use the city limits for a middle portion or final part of the description.

D.  Fourth Ward.  All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where a northerly extension projecting the center line of Fifth Street intersects the center line of Harry Howard Avenue, and thence along said projection and the center line of Fifth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of Washington Street, and thence along the center line of Washington Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Sixth Street, and thence along the center line of Sixth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Dodge Street, and thence along the center line of Dodge Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of State Street, and thence along the center line of State Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Fifth Street, and thence along the center line of Fifth Street in a southwesterly direction  to the center line of Warren Street, and thence along the center line of Warren Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Third Street, and thence along the center line of Third Street in a northeasterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Second Street, and thence along the center line of Second Street n a northeasterly direction to where the center line of Second Street intersects the boundary of that certain United States census block described in the 2010 United States census as Tract 12, Block 1000 in the City of Hudson, and thence along said census boundary line in a northerly direction to the northerly bounds of the City, and thence along the northerly and easterly bounds of the City to where said boundary line intersects the center line of Harry Howard Avenue, and thence along the center line of Harry Howard Avenue in  southwesterly direction to the place of beginning, shall be the Fourth Ward.

I think the starting point is odd. I'd start at well known point such as 5th and Warren, and then when you get to Washington and 5th, you can use 5th and 5th extended to Harry Howard. See the comments above regarding the Dodge-Rope tab, and North 2nd Street above.

E.  Fifth Ward.   All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where a northerly extension projecting the center line of Fifth Street intersects the center line of Harry Howard Avenue, and running thence along said projection and the center line of Fifth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line Washington Street, and thence along the center line of Washington Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Sixth Street, and thence along the center line of Sixth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of State Street, and thence along the center line of State Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Green Street, and thence along the center line of Green Street in an easterly and then southeasterly direction to the center line of Fairview Avenue, and thence along the easterly bounds of the City in a northerly direction to where said boundary intersects the center line of Harry Howard Avenue, and thence along the center line of Harry Howard Avenue in a southwesterly direction to the place of beginning, shall be the Fifth Ward.
[/quote]

I would start at 5th and Washington, or 6th and State, and go counter-clockwise.

[jimrtex]

The division of Hudson Terrace Apartments splits  ...

I know all of the above, but I am sticking to the existing map here for political reasons.

Cracking of minority population, and disregard for census geography are not legitimate political reasons.

B.  Second Ward.  All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where a northwesterly extension projecting the center line of Warren Street intersects the northwesterly bounds of the City, and thence along said projection and the center line of Warren Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Third Street, and thence along center line of Third Street in a northeasterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Second Street, and thence along the center line of Second Street in a northeasterly direction to where the center line of Second Street intersects the boundary of that certain United States census block described in the 2010 United States census as Tract 12, Block 1000 in the City of Hudson, and thence along said census boundary line in a northerly direction to the northerly bounds of the City, and thence along the northerly and northwesterly bounds of the City to the place of beginning, shall be the Second Ward.

Census Tract numbers are relative to counties. I am pretty sure that the road you are following is now considered to be Second Street (it is by the Census Bureau). Presumably, you will have a map, inventory of census blocks, and populations associated with your plan. The tax office also shows this as being 2nd St, but they are using Google as part of their mapping application, and Google is likely getting their maps from the census bureau.

No, 2nd street goes all the way to the end to the factory facility, and this intrudes into census block 1000.


The Register-Star is not a definitive source, neither is the Census Bureau.  It is normal to be assigned a postal address based on the nearest street. At the time of the 1990 Census, Second Street was shown with a more northerly alignment, matching the 1940 Census Map and extending to the northern city limit. It formed the western boundary of what is in the 1990 Census, Block 101.
Were you describing your ward boundary in 1996, you would have referred to the boundary as Second Street.



During the mid-1990s, the dump was capped, the button factory built, and the road rebuilt to the west of the dump cap. In 2000 and 2010, this new road formed the boundary of the census block.

The button factory is on what used to be Second Street. The street is on property owned by the City of Hudson as is the former dump site. The plant itself is on a different parcel.

So when the dump was capped, the new road was built, looping around the west side of the dump cap to the city limits. The old alignment was truncated at the button factory where what you are calling 2nd Street flows into the parking lot. While it is along the former alignment, it is functionally a driveway.

In addition, the intersection of Second Street with Block 1000 is ambiguous since Second Street forms the boundary of Block 1000 from Strawberry Alley northward.

I don't think so. When 2nd street intersects census block 1000, you then depart from the 2nd street boundary line, and follow the census block line to the city border.
You are using the Census block boundary, but are rejecting the census name for that boundary. And that is not an "intersection" even if it 2nd Street going to the button factory.




I believe that North and South are parts of the proper names of the numbered streets.

Yes, I agree, although the existing legals for the wards don't use north and south.
It is also possible that North and South are part of the postal address designation - the census bureau is particularly interested in having postal addresses for verifying their enumeration.

The existing ward description also refers to Gifford Place. Third Street was first used as a ward boundary in 1815, when Hudson included parts of of Stockport and Greenport had not been created. The ward boundary went north-south, and used 3rd Street across Hudson. Postal addresses did not come until much later. The use of Warren as a ward boundary did not begin until 1854.

Incidentally, South 7th Street begins at Columbia, and not Warren (at least according to the Census Bureau), but that doesn't match what the Tax Office thinks.

C.  Third Ward.  [...]thence along the center line of State Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Sixth Street, and thence along the center line of Sixth Street in a northeasterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Dodge Street, and thence along the center line of Dodge Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of State Street, and thence along the center line of State Street in a northwesterly direction [...]

That little tab bounded by 6th, Rope Alley, Dodge, and State Street is not needed. Personally, I would start the description at 5th and Warren. It is easier for me to understand the lines that separate wards, and use the city limits for a middle portion or final part of the description.
What do you mean the tab is not needed? Are you suggesting that the map be changed. The tab is there to equalize populations better.
The population is equal enough without the tab. Ward 4: +2.8%, Ward 5: -2.4%. When 13 persons represent 1% of the quota, you could probably justify going outside 5% limits. You've quartered a city block without any reason to do so.

D.  Fourth Ward.  All that part of the City lying within the lines beginning at a point where a northerly extension projecting the center line of Fifth Street intersects the center line of Harry Howard Avenue, and thence along said projection and the center line of Fifth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of Washington Street, and thence along the center line of Washington Street in a southeasterly direction to the center line of Sixth Street, and thence along the center line of Sixth Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Dodge Street, and thence along the center line of Dodge Street in a southwesterly direction to the center line of State Street, and thence along the center line of State Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Fifth Street, and thence along the center line of Fifth Street in a southwesterly direction  to the center line of Warren Street, and thence along the center line of Warren Street in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Third Street, and thence along the center line of Third Street in a northeasterly direction to the center line of Rope Alley, and thence along the center line of Rope Alley in a northwesterly direction to the center line of Second Street, and thence along the center line of Second Street n a northeasterly direction to where the center line of Second Street intersects the boundary of that certain United States census block described in the 2010 United States census as Tract 12, Block 1000 in the City of Hudson, and thence along said census boundary line in a northerly direction to the northerly bounds of the City, and thence along the northerly and easterly bounds of the City to where said boundary line intersects the center line of Harry Howard Avenue, and thence along the center line of Harry Howard Avenue in  southwesterly direction to the place of beginning, shall be the Fourth Ward.

I think the starting point is odd. I'd start at well known point such as 5th and Warren, and then when you get to Washington and 5th, you can use 5th and 5th extended to Harry Howard. See the comments above regarding the Dodge-Rope tab, and North 2nd Street above.
I did it because that is the way the existing legal starts, albeit from the city boundary of the fifth street extension rather than the intersection of Harry Howard avenue.
The original (1815) ward boundary was 3rd  Street, then going up the Dugway and out what is now Harry Howard. The city was divided into 4 wards in 1854, dividing the existing two wards on Warren (and Columbia and Columbia Turnpike). By that time Greenport had been created, so for practical purposes, 3rd Street within the grid was the ward boundary. The extensions to the city limits were just mathematical exercises. In 1886, the 5th ward was divided off from the 4th ward. it was easy enough to copy the 3rd Street extension in the definition. At that time the extension really did not present the problems it does now.

If we want a consistent definition, you could use a well-understood intersection with the city limits, followed by the boundary within the city, and completed by the city limits. Note that current desription of Wards 1 and 2 do not include a loop, but simply describe a quartering of the city.

Ward 1: Warren (extended) & west city limit, traversed CW.
Ward 2: Warren (extended) & west city limit, traversed CCW.
Ward 3: Worth & south city limit, traversed CW.
Ward 4: Harry Howard & (north)east city limit, traversed CCW
Ward 5: Harry Howard & (north)east city limit, traversed CCW

For Ward 3, this would make the traverse to the intersection of Fairview&Graham, and then following the city limits. Since Fairview doesn't cross the city limits at a point, this would be easier to understand.