Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Vosem]

I'm presuming that the "disturbing news" will be that, according to Russian sources, Ukrainians have suddenly decided that since a large majority of the Russian military is camped out near their borders  desperately looking for an excuse for war, they would be kind neighbors and give them one?  I suppose there are people who would be dumb enough to believe that.

No prizes for guessing correctly.

https://twitter.com/SputnikInt/status/1494215992599363588

[Vosem]

Having listened to Putin's speech, he is very clearly going to go beyond just the DNR and LNR. The three specific locations mentioned were Odessa (especially: there were violent clashes between pro- and anti-Russian demonstrators there in 2014 where ~30-40 pro-Russian demonstrators died, and the one specific promise made was "to bring the perpetrators to justice"), Poltava (where a monument to Alexander Suvorov was removed), and Ochakov (where Russian soldiers fought a decisive battle in 1788).

Hard to imagine this doesn't go at least to Odessa, which, uh, is not close to the Donbass.

Multiple references were made to the "Novorossiya" concept, which covers most of the southern/eastern half of contemporary Ukraine. Poltava is actually (barely) outside its borders as they were defined by the DNR and LNR in 2014, though.

[Vosem]

There are actually lots of states which shouldn’t exist on some level because the borders are strange or illogical (basically everyone in Africa). Nevertheless, they already do, and we fought a whole World War from 1939-45 to defend the principle that country borders are inviolate even when illogical. This principle has since stopped enormous conflicts and protected millions of lives.

So the correct answer here is “doesn’t matter; it does”.

(This is an interesting question to ask about unrecognized entities, like — to name a spectrum — Taiwan or Palestine or Kosovo or the DNR/LNR. But of course Ukraine, a universally recognized UN member, does exist and therefore has a right to.)

[Vosem]

I wonder if Yanukovych feels any moral confusion right now from his Russian exile or if he really doesn't care about the Ukrainian people

Yanukovych has spent 71 years not caring about the Ukrainian people and isn't starting today.

[Vosem]

https://twitter.com/eigenrobot/status/1497377520663941121

[Vosem]

https://twitter.com/alexeyguzey/status/1497774158578548738

[Vosem]

I sort of wonder if the Suez crisis felt a little like this in real time. On one hand, the stakes here are obviously higher due to the extreme irrationality of the aggressor power. On the other hand, at least in this case there was already a general sense among sane people that Russia's glory days were behind it, whereas my understanding of the events of 1956 was that many people still thought of Britain as a more or less equal partner to the USA and USSR until it tried to intervene in Egypt and got soundly thrashed by a bunch of pissed-off Arab nationalist boat pilots.

In the Suez Crisis it felt like the notion that Britain and France were yesterday's powers had the aspect of self-fulfilling prophecy to it, in that their military objectives were obtained easily but it was revealed that they could not operate without the backing of the United States, which insanely refused to support them. This time around it seems like plenty of sane observers, both within and without Russia (Samo Burja comes to mind immediately) had a very high opinion of the Russian military, but while it will probably end up winning, belief in its fundamental competency, both at the operational and propaganda levels, has been pretty much shattered.

For this to be similar to the Suez Crisis, Russia would've had to walk over Ukraine and then give them back their independence when China backstabbed them. It doesn't seem like that is what's happening (although any sane observer knows, after this, that inasmuch as a Sino-Russian partnership exists Russia is very much the junior partner, much as Britain was obviously the junior partner in an Anglo-American partnership after 1956).

[Vosem]

I sort of wonder if the Suez crisis felt a little like this in real time. On one hand, the stakes here are obviously higher due to the extreme irrationality of the aggressor power. On the other hand, at least in this case there was already a general sense among sane people that Russia's glory days were behind it, whereas my understanding of the events of 1956 was that many people still thought of Britain as a more or less equal partner to the USA and USSR until it tried to intervene in Egypt and got soundly thrashed by a bunch of pissed-off Arab nationalist boat pilots.

In the Suez Crisis it felt like the notion that Britain and France were yesterday's powers had the aspect of self-fulfilling prophecy to it, in that their military objectives were obtained easily but it was revealed that they could not operate without the backing of the United States, which insanely refused to support them. This time around it seems like plenty of sane observers, both within and without Russia (Samo Burja comes to mind immediately) had a very high opinion of the Russian military, but while it will probably end up winning, belief in its fundamental competency, both at the operational and propaganda levels, has been pretty much shattered.

For this to be similar to the Suez Crisis, Russia would've had to walk over Ukraine and then give them back their independence when China backstabbed them. It doesn't seem like that is what's happening (although any sane observer knows, after this, that inasmuch as a Sino-Russian partnership exists Russia is very much the junior partner, much as Britain was obviously the junior partner in an Anglo-American partnership after 1956).

Is that good or bad that Russia is falling into the orbit of China instead of vice versa?

Vice versa hasn't really been an option since Project 596, and was unrealistic by the end of the Chinese Civil War.

(Similarly, vice versa for Anglo-American partnership was never really an option after the end of the Civil War, and was unrealistic by the signing of the Oregon Treaty).

Anyway, obviously bad, but if that particular die hadn't been cast this invasion wouldn't have happened in the first place and the world as a whole would look extremely different.

[Vosem]

I think he stops at Ukraine, but I'd be very doubtful he tries for a NATO state.

The ideological justification for this war ("Nazi apologists are trying to tear down the Russian language") in many ways works rather better for Estonia and Latvia than Ukraine, since the Russian language is actually in decline in those countries and you've had controversies about taking down Soviet-era memorials to the victory in WW2, which the Estonians/Latvians understand as memorials to Soviet rule.

They are both NATO member states, however. Non-NATO member states that Russia (or, Russian-backed puppet states) have territorial disputes with are Moldova and Georgia; the former has historically had a significant pro-Russian contingent in its politics, though much like pro-Russian politics in Ukraine it has been in decline since 2014. Georgia would be kind of an odd target, since outside the puppet states there are no Russians there and, of all the formerly Soviet states, it is probably the next pro-Western after the Baltics. Given the lack of a Russian ethnic minority, in fact, Georgia is probably the next most pro-Western after Lithuania.

[Vosem]

In another indicator that the Russian government has not made clear what its actual goals are in this war, a Kremlin-aligned newspaper published an article speculating about what the goals of the conflict might be. I translated it, because it's a short and deranged piece which gives you an idea of the flavor of Russian state media right now. Mods, take down if inappropriate.

The specific newspaper this is from is Komsomolskaya Pravda, which has a very high circulation in Russia and is avowedly pro-Kremlin but is also sort of known for publishing conspiracy theories, or just weird speculation about events. It isn't likely that their source is actually someone within the Kremlin. However, the tone is generally consistent with pro-war news reports, and the confusion regarding ~~what the goal of the war is~~ is telling.

Title: Three possible scenarios of the future set-up of Ukraine after the Russian special operation

The scenarios are:

1. Optimistic plan: Ukraine remains at her former size, with the exceptions of the DNR and LNR in their administrative boundaries

At first glance this looks attractive: see, this way the country could preserve, albeit with a few losses, its international position, and if the newly elected Verkhovna Rada officially recognizes Crimea as belonging to Russia, the independence of the Donbass, and constitutionalizes its neutrality, the unaligned status of the state, and its non-nuclear status, and gives up war criminals to investigators from the Russian Federation and officializes the position of Russian as a government language, then it seems that the goals of the Russian special operation would be reached.

But that would not be the case! After some time, the nationalists, accustomed to forcing political decisions through protests, would come out of the underground, and then all of these decisions and guarantees would be worth only the cheap paper they are written on.

Scrappy Ukraine, gathered over several decades from territories forced from Russia or gifted by Russia, cannot remain united.

2. Realistic plan: divide Ukraine into several parts

Probably the most optimal solution. It can be realized by stages. In the first stage, analogously to the DNR and LNR, several formally independent republics could be organized in the mostly Russian-speaking oblasts of the historic Slobozhanschina and Novorossiya - [the oblasts of] Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhia, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa. In the second stage, at a unifying congress of peoples' representatives, they, together with the DNR, LNR, and Pridnestrovia, could declare themselves a new government with a very close relationship to the Russian Federation -- Novorossiya.



Red: Novorossiya together with Pridnestrovia
Yellow: Ukraine (Little Russia)
Sky blue: Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia)
Purple: Zakarpattia* (Hungarian territory)
Green: Bukovina* (Romanian territory)
*Protectorates

Along these lines, [Novorossiya] would have large economic and scientific potential, and be an economically viable state.

The remainder of the former Ukraine could be divided into two relatively small countries -- Ukraine itself (Little Russia) on the lands of the Hetmanate of the 17th century (today the oblasts of Kiev, Sumsk, Zhitomir, Kirovograd, Poltava, Chernigov, and Cherkassk), and a separate Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), to comprise today's oblasts of Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Volhynia, Ternopol, Khmelnytsk, and Rovensk.

In this case the fates of Zakarpattia and Bukovina (the Chernovitsk oblast) are unclear, but most likely, they would fall under the total or partial protection of Hungary and Romania.

<vosem>this section struck me as particular insane, where the author of the piece says he has no idea what might happen to specific parts of Ukraine and they might as well be ceded to EU states</vosem>

3. The most radical plan -- total annihilation of Ukraine as a state

This is possible only in the case that the collapse of Ukraine after the special operation takes on an irreversible and uncontrollable character. In that case, in Novorossiya and Little Russia there could emerge powerful centralizing tendencies which would lead these territories to simply become part of the Russian Federation as regular krais or oblasts. Bukovina or Zakarpattia could be annexed by Romania and Hungary, and the six westernmost oblasts -- by Poland, to whom they belonged before 1939.

In any case, the political set-up of the territories that today belong to Ukraine are a question that will be decided in the near future. The only clear thing is that the former country no longer exists.

This is followed by a response from a political scientist arguing that the Kremlin's goal is likely option 1, but noting that the West is likely to organize a government-in-exile (in London; he's very specific about this taking place in London for whatever reason) and that guerrilla warfare in western Ukraine is likely to continue even in the case of a total Russian military victory -- a rather surprising admission.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Anyway, my point in posting this is simply to underscore that the Kremlin has not communicated a coherent goal for this war and that some of the plans the Russian media are discussing -- including ceding parts of Ukraine to NATO countries -- are extremely fanciful and unrealistic.

[Vosem]

My only prediction after reading that article is that the phrase "special operation" will become a common Orwellian-turn-of-phrase in many languages meaning "war", because the article is very insistent that what is going on is a "special operation", not a "war".

[Vosem]

My only prediction after reading that article is that the phrase "special operation" will become a common Orwellian-turn-of-phrase in many languages meaning "war", because the article is very insistent that what is going on is a "special operation", not a "war".

If you want to be horrified and are a Russian-speaker, a very not-fun thing for you to read would be the edit wars on the Russian-language Wikipedia article about this conflict. There is an enormous discussion with pro-Russia editors insisting that this is a "special operation", and pro-Ukraine editors insisting that this is a "war", with the (somehow?!) neutral appellation "invasion" ultimately being cited.

Other classic edit wars are regarding whether it is fair to label Putin's claim of genocide in the Donbass as "false" -- which the article does -- and the classic «в/на» Ukraine dispute, with the Russian-language Wikipedia using the more traditional «на».

Anyway, many Western news sources have been blocked in Russia and it seems that Wikipedia -- which obviously cites Western news sources heavily -- is at significant risk of being blocked as well, or at least specific pages.

[Vosem]

More complex version of Russian-Ukrainian relations from Odessa, and perhaps indicative of what Russian troops might face as an occupying army in the future courtesy of The Economist:

Sorry don't want to overquote....

"Odessa finds its Ukrainian identity ahead of a Russian advance

But some continue to look both ways

NEON SIGNS advertising oysters and sparkling wine speak of an era that ended abruptly on the morning of February 24th, when Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine. The Odessa Food Market on Richelievska Street was once a place of hipsters and flat whites. For 12 days now, it has served as a logistical hub for the war effort. It’s a hive of activity, with dozens of yellow-jacketed volunteers buzzing between the market’s two floors. They sort donations—from food rations and medicine to tampons and shampoo—onto shelves ready to be taken to the front lines. Time may be of the essence, they say. So far the city has been spared violence, though there have been some attacks in its surrounding region. But on March 6th President Volodymyr Zelensky warned of intelligence indicating an imminent rocket-led attack on Ukraine’s third city.

Odessa, a cosmopolitan port founded in 1794 by Catherine the Great on the coast of the Black Sea, would be a big prize for Mr Putin. The city is both a strategic military prize and an important commercial centre. It has huge symbolic value, too: it holds a treasured place in Russia’s history and culture. Odessa featured prominently in Mr Putin’s rambling speech of February 21st, which laid the ground for the invasion. He specifically mentioned the events of May 2nd 2014, when 48 mostly pro-Russian protesters died in the city after clashes with Ukrainian nationalists. It appears that Mr Putin believed that his invasion would find support among the local population. But if it was a debatable proposition then, it is much harder to believe today.

The city, like the food market, has been transformed by war. From an unsentimental place reluctant to take sides, it is now adorned in yellow and blue. Ukrainian flags fly from every street corner, from cars, from apartments. The city’s diverse populations—intellectuals, gangsters, artists, workers—are pulling together ahead of the expected attack. Young volunteers pack sandbags at the beach. Engineers at the tram depot make anti-tank “hedgehogs” from old bits of rail. Some of these barricades have been installed on Deribasovskaya Street, Odessa's central boulevard, and around the nearby opera house and municipal buildings. As bloggers have noted, the scene has more in common with black-and-white prints from the second world war than it does with the reality of just two weeks ago.

Odessa’s heroic struggle against Nazi barbarism—the city lived through a siege, occupation and the mass murder of its Jews—has become a galvanising memory. It is being invoked in the most unexpected of quarters. Gennadiy Trukhanov, the city’s bruiser of a mayor, a man long accused of rooting for Russia, tells The Economist that he believes Mr Putin’s men are “behaving like fascists”. The indiscriminate bombing of residential districts and churches in Kharkiv and Mariupol in the Russian-speaking east is unforgivable, he says. The ferocity of the attacks has shattered any previous illusions he might have had. Mr Putin has become drunk on power and fame. “He seems to think he has supernatural powers.”

The invasion has united most strands of Odessa’s usually fractious politics. Mr Trukhanov not only finds himself acting in unison with political opponents, but also with the city’s usually disapproving intellectuals. They express mild bewilderment at the alliance. Speaking at his bungalow on the outskirts of the city, Boris Khersonsky, a writer and poet, argues that the mayor’s patriotic realignment was partly situational—”Authenticity and Trukhanov do not always go together,” he says—and partly reflects a genuine shift in the Russian-speaking population. Even before February 24th, Odessans were turning their back on Russia, put off by its draconian laws, the banning of free speech, and by “a time machine that only goes backwards”. After 12 days of war, the poet predicts, they will not be waiting for Mr Putin's soldiers with flowers.

...."





https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/03/07/odessa-finds-its-ukrainian-identity-ahead-of-a-russian-advance

Anyway to get around the paywall?

Pirate Party 2022: Yo Ho Ho Forever

https://github.com/iamadamdev

[Vosem]

I also just saw a UA-posted video of them loading dozens of bodies into trucks in Bakhmut & Soledar, so this doesn't surprise me.

But what I don't get is...

How did Prigozhin, with a ragtag group of cons, manage to do this to a group of well-trained, motivated & NATO-equipped professional soldiers?

https://twitter.com/Faytuks/status/1612951186981650434

I think this picture offers a hint as to why. Wagner are known to be masters of deception and tricks.
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1612862290788847618

I do believe that Ukraine has made the mistake of overcommiting their forces in Bakhmut. The Svatove offensive has stalled as a result despite being more strategically significant than Bakhmut.

This is a straight war crime, right? And one of the most classic ones.

Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV – The Laws and Customs of War on Land provides that: "It is especially forbidden....(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army....(f) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and military uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention".

Quote is from Wikipedia, but my understanding is that this is well-known, unless I'm missing something about how things went down in Soledar.

[Vosem]

In June of twenty-three there was a military coup /
Behind it was a gang called the PMC Wagner /
Who did not feel the need to be elected /

They had themselves a party at the point of a gun /
They were slightly to the right of Attila the Hun /
A bomb or two and very few objected! /

Yeah! Just one blast and the governments fall like rain! /
Kapow, die! They stumble and fall! Aim high! /
We're having a ball...that's how we get the government we deserve. /

[Vosem]

This is one of those weeks where decades happen.

Yup. Whether Prigozhin wins or loses, there is going to be a very different constitutional order in Russia after this plays out.

[Vosem]

Anyone know where we can watch the speech with translations?

Usually available on YouTube within a day for Putin content. If you want to listen to Putin live, you'll have to learn Russian like the rest of us

[Vosem]

Wrong thread Vosem

whoopsie-daisie, my b

[Vosem]

I disagree with the USA.  I think Ukraine striking Russia's energy assets is completely above board and justified. 

Yes, I very much agree. The Biden Administration is increasingly just stuck in a magical place where countries fighting existential wars can follow made-up feel-good rules rather than fighting in ways which match the context on the ground.

https://twitter.com/eigenrobot/status/1771186836175507543