Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://www.ft.com/content/8c541f09-27d2-4d0c-bee8-731b9744e7c5

"Volodymyr Zelenskyy pledges to shake up Ukraine’s leadership"

Last week Zelenskyy met Zaluzhny in a bid to mend ties, but the talks grew heated over the contentious issue of mobilisation. Zelenskyy has questioned the need to conscript 500,000 new troops, which Zaluzhny allegedly called for, a figure the general later denied having floated. A draft bill on the issue continues to be hotly debated in Ukraine’s parliament.

Before the meeting ended, Zelenskyy informed the general that he planned to replace him, according to four people with knowledge of the meeting. Two of the people said Zelenskyy had made clear to Zaluzhny that regardless of whether he took on a new role, he would be removed from his current position.

According to FT the blowup between Zelensky and Zaluzhny has to do with Zelensky's demand that Zaluzhny  come out openly in favor of the mobilization bill which Zaluzhny refused.  It was that refusal that led to the final break between the two.

Zelensky wants cover.

Even if he's a Russian enemy and embraces the West, the man still grew up under eastern European political norms.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Edit: I suppose his Russian-like command tendencies shouldn't be a surprise since according to wikipedia:

"In 1986, he graduated from the Moscow Higher Military Command School ."

Everyone of a certain age from all of the former Soviet Union states all received the same training. The oldest people technically free of Soviet military influence (although Soviet military thinking obviously carried forward in teaching post-1990) would be in their 40s still.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1720814139600232737?s=20

General Syrski's leadership is bankrupt, his presence or orders coming from his name are demoralizing, and he undermines trust in the command in general.  His relentless pursuit of tactical gains constantly depletes our valuable human resources, resulting in tactical advances such as capturing tree lines or small villages, with no operational goals in mind. This approach creates a never-ending cycle of fruitless assaults that drain personnel. His failure to withdraw troops from Bakhmut in a timely manner earlier this year, coupled with his obsession to retake it, by utilizing Wagner Group's tactics, further depletes our resources and has more far-reaching consequences than people might realize.

Another post from an active AFU member:

"He took credit for Kharkiv from local commanders. He meat waved in Bakhmut. He got his men killed in Debaltseve in 2015 and should have lost any command authority after that. There's a reason he's called "the butcher"

Now he's gonna do the same thing in Avdiivka."

Edit, I found another post from an AFU member:

"No, no, tell me it's a joke. B*tch"

""We're all f**ked" - Chat of people who passed all stages of Bakhmut's defense with Sirsky"

So it seems this is true: "Syrsky is Zaluzhny’s replacement. His popularity with the troops is not amazing, to say the least"

I read this and kind of imagine in my head what American servicemen would've said at the time serving under our generals without the benefit of hindsight we enjoy now. "That Eisenhower's a f#cking idiot. Threw all our men onto the beach to get mowed down like cattle."

Everything you post is insubordination. Generals aren't supposed to be popular. They're supposed to get the job they are assigned to do done. If that's being nice to their charges, so be it. If that's being an asshole to their charges, so be it. Bakhmut you've no idea what his orders were from the government. I certainly read at the time the rumor the Ukrainians were told not to withdraw even when it made heckuva lot of sense too.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Why didn't all of Europe think of this in 1939-41? All that suffering until 1945 could have been avoided by simply accepting permanent Nazism.

"The ambassador of Russia to the UK has told @SkyYaldaHakim that Mariupol would not have been destroyed if Ukraine had 'surrendered sooner'

Watch the ambassador of Russia to the UK interview in full on The World with Yalda Hakim at 9pm 🌍📺➡️ https://trib.al/I1kGazI"

https://twitter.com/SkyNews/status/1757482255134478539?s=20

It's pretty much the "surrender or be destroyed" point the U.S. made to Japan before dropping 2 nukes and before a 3rd when the Japanese did surrender.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1757497314749407328

When we say "coke" do we mean a form of coal, cocaine, or Coca Cola?

[Open Source Intelligence]

Great military academic article.

https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/01/making-attrition-work-a-viable-theory-of-victory-for-ukraine

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1757484618385592413

I've no comment on whether it's the correct military move to make or not. But can you imagine conflicts like World Wars I or II or the Civil War with all the Twitter and TV experts commentating on it simultaneously?

"WHY HASN'T LINCOLN FIRED GRANT YET?"

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1758446592988680587

I suggest people read the IISS military academic study of the war I linked to.

‘A lot higher than we expected’: Russian arms production worries Europe’s war planners"

As Ukraine has scrambled to source ammunition, arms and equipment for its defence, Russia has presided over a massive ramping up of industrial production over the last two years that has outstripped what many western defence planners expected when Vladimir Putin launched his invasion.

Meanwhile we have a defense industry in the U.S. that is solely built for maximizing the amount of money they make in peacetime with an ever more vertically integrated structure. Meanwhile the Europeans let their infrastructure rot and die.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Imagine if there was a Mexican-American war and the Americans celebrated the capture of Ciudad Juarez after eight years of fighting and huge losses.

Americans really don't have good track record in recent times in actually fighting the wars on the ground.

America isn't well prepared for a peer-to-peer fight right now.

false (or, at worst, we are far more prepared to fight a peer-to-peer fight than any of our peers)

The Navy hardly has a shipbuilding strategy for its surface fleet with less than 0.2% of global shipbuilding capacity inside the U.S., and one thing that has come out of this war is our procurement system for military items is seriously effed up. At least in this instance we discovered this in a war we were not in, and the Pentagon have noticed.

For future, we need to be able to procure military goods cheaper and faster, have some level of inventory builds, with multiple supply options instead of a limited defense industry base that has monopolized whole industries, and what we buy doesn't need to be the A plus plus plus article, a la the F-35. Just because we win the Super Bowl this year doesn't mean we automatically will in 10 years.

[Open Source Intelligence]

After being conned by Biden to cut off all ties with Russia and now faced with the prospect of Trump coming in and abandoning them to face Putin alone there is now talk in Europe of getting European nuclear weapons.

France has nukes.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Great military academic article.
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/01/making-attrition-work-a-viable-theory-of-victory-for-ukraine

Restoring Ukraine’s advantage

In a prior article discussing the course of the war in 2022, we assessed that combined-arms training and precision-strike systems would not prove sufficient to escape attrition in the coming offensive. Assuming Ukraine and the West now accept the unavoidability of a long war, both need to settle on a long-term strategy to effectively defend against Russian offensive operations, reconstitute Ukrainian forces and maintain pressure on the Russian military with the goal of restoring a battlefield advantage to Ukrainian armed forces. The strategy should cast 2024 as a pivotal year, with an eye to restoring the ability to conduct a successful offensive in 2025.

At this point, Russia has several material advantages. It is likely to retain an artillery-fire edge over the course of the year and beyond. Russia will also continue regenerating combat power, recruiting more than 10,000 troops per month. It will probably hold the strategic initiative along much of the 1,000 km front line and expand its strike campaign against Ukraine given increased production of drones and cruise missiles. Moreover, Moscow is now set to spend 6% of GDP on defence – a significant increase – and the real figure may be closer to 8%. Its apparent intent is to overwhelm Ukraine through defence-industrial mobilisation and sustained regeneration of combat forces.

The most effective way for Ukraine to rebuild its advantage is to mount an effective defence in depth, which will reduce Ukraine’s losses and ammunition requirements. At present, Russia holds the defensive advantage, on account of dedicated engineering brigades, machinery and the capacity to fortify quickly, as well as extensive minefields and sophisticated minelaying systems, including those capable of distance mining. A better defence would also permit Ukraine to restructure its force deployments, rotate brigades and free up parts of the military for reconstitution.

Ukraine will also have to replenish its force. Based on our field research, Ukraine’s average soldier appears to be in his 40s, which is ill-suited for certain combat tasks. Ukrainian leadership needs to review policies on the ages of those conscripted. The West can assist by scaling up training programmes, which need to be adjusted on the basis of lessons learned in the 2023 offensive and Ukrainian experience in this war. Within Ukraine, expanded facilities and training ranges will be needed to rotate units off and onto the front line. Further, units that have been on the front lines since the beginning of the war – particularly those at Bakhmut – need rest and recuperation.

More broadly, Ukraine’s military requires recapitalisation. Ukraine and its Western backers need to increase industrial capacity and output of key systems in order to ensure that Ukraine will have the requisite fires advantage. For supporting countries, the challenge is to significantly increase production of artillery ammunition and air-defence interceptors. Our field research indicates that Ukraine will need around 75,000–90,000 artillery shells per month to sustain the war defensively, and more than double that – 200,000–250,000 – for a major offensive. At this stage, the Western coalition depends mostly on US stocks to sustain the lower range of this figure and does not have the ammunition to support a major offensive next year. Ukraine can reduce its requirements for artillery ammunition by significantly increasing production of strike drones, both first-person-view drones for use in close battle and long-range strike drones to target Russian critical infrastructure. To do this, Ukraine will have to resolve several financing, contracting and industrial-capacity issues. The West, for its part, will need to support Ukraine in procuring or developing munitions to use with drones, as such munitions from other sources are in short supply. Ukraine’s indigenous ability to maintain and repair Western armoured fighting vehicles and artillery is growing, and the West should work to advance the localisation of maintenance, parts replacement and production of strike systems.

Naturally, defence and reconstitution by themselves are not enough, and Ukraine will have to be careful about being drawn into costly battles like Bakhmut, which tend to lead to a sunk-costs mentality. These may be politically symbolic, but they trade short-term gain for strategic costs that hamper reconstitution. At this stage of the war, the West is neither expecting nor desirous of fleeting or isolated battlefield victories for the continuation of its support. Instead, Ukraine should plan for and execute strike campaigns – for example, against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Russian air bases in Crimea or key supporting infrastructure. Heading into 2024, it is clear that the optimal strategy is one that avoids a costly stalemate, or worse, a mounting Russian advantage that leads to Ukraine’s defeat. Both Ukraine and the Western countries involved retain good options, but success will require better alignment on strategy.

This analysis was formed and written pre-Avdiivka of course, but the last bolded point pretty much describes it.

So the rest of it, how are they reconstituting their armed forces if they think the average age of a soldier in the field is in the 40s? Based on their marketing material it seems they're trying to encourage more women to enlist.

How are they getting arms and ammunition when all we're doing is eating up inventory? The ammunition supplier in Missouri are already running 24/7 giving everything to Ukraine and have no production time left for civilian purposes (including police). Defense contractor procurement at the moment is simply put a little troubling. I get anything going to Ukraine is DX and would jump to the front of the line, but my criticism of Western defense structure probably ever since the Persian Gulf War is this belief we can do war half-ass and still succeed. This is not a half-ass war, it's a full-scale war. If we and by we I mean all the countries supporting Ukraine are 2 years into this conflict and collectively still can't provide to Ukraine enough ammunition for purely defense operations without dipping into inventory stocks, let alone no offensives on offer...they've permanently lost Crimea and Donbass. They need a million artillery shells per year currently, just to play defense. Be cold and unemotional here, what is the Ukrainian grand hope at this point of gaining back all their pre-2014 territory? The Americans play Deux Ex Machina?

I read some NATO military officers' comments on conflicts beforehand not tied to this. The non-American ones are highly critical of their own capacity to do anything without the Americans as the central coordinator. For the Europeans, their control of the ISAF operation mid-00s in Afghanistan exposed they were not fit to task. I think this war is further exposing it on simply a supply and logistics level. The thing above about the German tanks, the Germans being a paper tiger has been known for years, because it was known about Von Der Leyen when she ran the German Defense Ministry when her name was mentioned and voted on for the EU Presidency that German soldiers were training with broomsticks. Obviously little has improved since then.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-20/us-failed-to-plan-upkeep-for-weapons-sent-to-ukraine-watchdog-says

"US Failed to Plan Upkeep for Weapons Sent to Ukraine, Watchdog Says"



I have been warning about this for a while now.  In weapons systems, just like in real life, diversity is not a strength since, in the case of weapons systems, it merely multiplies the cost of maintenance and repairs.

"How to do maintenance?" is designated an export by our government and these are obviously ITAR items. One major unreported aspect of this conflict and our shipping of anything to the Ukrainians to help them is how this is all working via ITAR. We're giving an export license of course, but the Ukrainians obviously have less controls for controlling all this data and info than would a typical partner. There's certainly Russian spies inside Ukraine that will try to get a hold of this info plus all the equipment sent in the field when a Ukrainian falls in combat his equipment is still there. There were American tanks in good condition left in Avdiivka that the Russian military apparatus should ship off to somewhere in interior Russia and dissect and look at to improve their own designs.

One other thing regarding maintenance is this has now become the realm of defense contractors and they want to own it all, and the Ukrainians simply put can't afford what those contractors charge the U.S. government. The government can tell all the contractors to back off but to do effective maintenance you still need the know-how and that's limited by design.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4481737-russia-broken-stalemate-ukraine-gates/

"Russia has broken the stalemate in Ukraine: Former US Defense secretary"

The Russian military has broken the stalemate in the Ukraine war, Robert Gates, former CIA director and secretary of Defense, said Wednesday, following Moscow’s successful push to take the front-line city of Avdiivka.

“It’s no longer a stalemate. The Russians have regained momentum,” Gates told The Washington Post’s David Ignatius in a streaming interview. “Everything I’m reading is that the Russians are on the offensive along the 600-mile front.”

Gates noted that European allies in NATO, “who we so often criticize,” have stepped up their support to Ukraine, but lack the ability to immediately send weapons. Production timelines will see NATO support reach the battlefield in 2025, he estimated.

Right now, “the only real military lifeline comes from the United States. And as we all know, that is, shall we say, on pause right now,” he said.

They're all out of inventory...except for us. I'm left with the impression no one in Western capitals thought this war would last this long and didn't plan for the possibility it would. We're now 2 years from war start, that's more than long enough to organize mass small arms procurement.

The lessons learned from this conflict from a material and strategic perspective for the West will be something. To give a flippant answer, surface ships and tanks are approaching obsolescence in a hot war, helicopters as well to some degree, drones have removed the ability for ground forces to maneuver, drones are dirt cheap as well. Cheap and plentiful with B-level performance for equipment is more important than rare and costly with A-level performance. Some of that of course may be rejected and for good reasons, but the Europeans for example are going to have to spend the funds to completely rebuild their militaries whether they like it or not when it comes to equipment. For the U.S. we're carrying a lot of very expensive inventory they'll want to reach end of life before making drastic changes and any changes are always tied up in politics, both military politics and Congress politics. But conflicts where "cheap and plentiful with B-level performance" is the most important thing is not really how our military operates. Or maybe there are just no lessons and the U.S. military has moved on to no one fights us conventionally so military equipment effectiveness shouldn't be judged via conventional means, although the Iraq War and occupation would've gone differently to say the least if al-Qaeda had access to drones.

Russians almost counterintuitively, this conflict has allowed them to clear out a lot of old equipment rusting (there were stockyards with obsolete tanks they've cleared out to send to Ukraine, from an equipment standpoint why not? you might as well) so if they spend the money which unlike the Europeans it's no problem for them to do so at the moment, they can completely reorganize their military and the equipment they use with little holdover.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Rob Lee reporting that the U.S. Army are setting up 3 production lines in Texas that will produce up to 30k shells per month. Funding tied up in the defense supplemental.

This should speak volumes about our present defense industry base by the way. It's not built for hot war to the point they're having to build new production lines.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/

"Ukraine Can’t Win the War"



Yes, Ukraine cannot win the war in the sense that 1991 or even 2022 borders are no longer possible. But there is every reason to believe they can avoid losing the war.

These thinkpieces show that the press are willing to try to profit from selling doom. If there's not enough evidence for that already.

That's not how this works. Stuff like this doesn't get written unless high-up people in government are already whispering it to them. You can throw in to that also op-eds from connected folks in the New York Times and Washington Post.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/

"Ukraine Can’t Win the War"



Yes, Ukraine cannot win the war in the sense that 1991 or even 2022 borders are no longer possible. But there is every reason to believe they can avoid losing the war.

These thinkpieces show that the press are willing to try to profit from selling doom. If there's not enough evidence for that already.

Huh? All I see is evidence that ignorant neocon and leftists lose their minds when anyone has a different narrative with your own.  It's PBS?  That's a government nonprofit Organization, so your assumption of their motivation is completely wrong.      

Well, I would say the press narrative surrounding this war has never tracked with reality no matter who was winning.

Fair.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/artilleriemunition-fuer-die-ukraine-europas-verzweifelte-jagd-nach-munition-a-e80d84c5-b95a-49ca-b100-9c4c8e147b2d

"Europe's desperate hunt for ammunition"

Spiegel: The AFU will exhaust their reserves of shells before June, and possibly earlier, citing German intelligence services

Shells has to be among the worst supply bottlenecks afflicting Ukraine at the moment, right?

I would think so.   The largest cause of death on the battlefield is being killed by artillery so if Ukraine is running short on shells that takes away their ability to inflict losses on the Russians  

And the military tactics for both Ukraine and Russia are reliant on artillery to become dominant on the battlefield. This means they are particularly hungry for shells.

That was always Soviet defense structure to worship the god of artillery (they're both post-Soviet states). Some Western military comments after the start of the conflict was one reason the Russians performed poorly at the outset was they were trying to win without artillery in a U.S. in Iraq-style delusion of "they will welcome us as liberators" when heavy artillery use was how their army was setup strategically and was how they always trained.

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/26/russia-ukraine-war-live-missiles-drones-kharkiv-dnipropetrovsk-eu-leaders-summit-elysee-zelenskiy

"Russia-Ukraine war: several Nato and EU members considering sending soldiers to Ukraine, Slovak PM claims – as it happened
"



Fico says some EU members are now talking about sending troops into Ukraine.

This coming from Fico is interesting. Is he catering to domestic supporters here?

Doesn't really match the tone of this Politico Brussels Playbook Newsletter from today. https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/europes-leaders-want-their-mojo-back-to-help-ukraine-win/

[Open Source Intelligence]

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/french-president-emmanuel-macron-sending-western-troops-ground-107563148

"French President Emmanuel Macron says sending Western troops on the ground in Ukraine is not 'ruled out' in the future"

It's interesting that he didn't say '"French Troops".  This is not the type of thing I'd advertise to the French People on social media if I wanted Macron to stay in in power after July.  

I can see a possible future scenario where there is some partition of Ukraine between Russia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania with a rump Ukraine in the middle with NATO troops entering the zone to be taken over by Poland Hungary and Romania.

#nothappening Poland, Hungary, and Romania would be threatened by their partners they're out of the club if they went for it.

[Open Source Intelligence]

All things equal many other EU leaders are rejecting  Macron idea of NATO troops in Ukraine.  I think Lithuania did indicate that they were for Macron's idea.  Most likely Macron saying this might be a trial balloon as well as setting the stage for this idea to be part of public discourse in EU.  

I believe Western and Central European troops will deploy to Ukraine when I see it.

http://www.warontherocks.com/2024/02-the-russo-ukrainian-war-at-two/

podcast

On the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ryan and Mike Kofman sit down to chat about where the war stands today and where things are heading. It is, to be candid, a pessimistic conversation. They cover the fall of Avdiivka, military leadership changes, Ukraine's mobilization challenges, Congressional dysfunction, European defense spending, and more.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Pro-Russian sources report continued Russian advances West of Avdiivka.  It seems they will just keep on moving until the Ukrainanas can form a defense line

ISW from yesterday.

Russian forces are attempting to exploit tactical opportunities offered by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and appear to be maintaining a relatively high tempo of offensive operations aimed at pushing as far as possible in the Avdiivka area before Ukrainian forces establish more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area. Russian forces temporarily decreased their tempo of operations as they cleared Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of the settlement on February 17, but have since resumed a relatively high tempo of assaults further west and northwest of Avdiivka.[1] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on February 27 that Russian forces have recently increased the size of their assault groups in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) from small squad-sized groups to platoon-sized and even company-sized groups.[2] Russian forces are currently focusing assaults west of Avdiivka in the direction of Berdychi, Orlivka, and Tonenke, where Ukrainian forces established immediate defensive positions to cover their withdrawal from Avdiivka and to receive oncoming Russian offensive operations.[3] Lykhovyi and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have stabilized their defensive lines along the Tonenke-Orlivka-Berdychi line as of February 27.[4] Ukrainian military observers characterized Ukrainian fortifications west of Avdiivka as “disappointing” and ”problematic,” however.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are struggling to hold defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka and forecasted that Ukrainian forces will concentrate on a defensive line further west that Ukrainian forces began constructing in November 2023.[6]

Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to advance in order to deprive Ukrainian forces of the respite that would allow Ukraine to establish a more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive line in the immediate vicinity of Avdiivka. The seizure of Avdiivka has allowed Russian forces to press on positions that Ukrainian forces have manned for a shorter period than Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka or further west, and Russian forces are likely sustaining a high operational tempo to try to exploit this tactical opportunity. Russian forces may be able to seize settlements immediately west and northwest of Avdiivka in the coming weeks, but terrain and water features further west of Avdiivka, particularly the body of water that runs between Berdychi-Semenivka-Orlivka, will likely slow the already relatively slow rate of Russian advances in the area. This difficult terrain will likely constrain further Russian tactical gains and allow Ukrainian forces to establish prepared defensive positions that will likely prompt the eventual culmination of the current Russian offensive effort in the area at least until or unless the Russians reinforce their attacking elements.[7]

This force posture does set the Russians up for the feigned retreat trap that the Ukrainians were reportedly adopting (German Army strategy post-1943 on the Eastern Front). But the Ukrainians have to get setup first.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Also from the same ISW report, there's been a lot of Russian military reorganization this past week. There's what is stated below plus the military districts of Russia proper were reorganized. The Eastern (Far East) and Central (Siberia and lands west) Districts are largely unchanged. They reinstituted the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts. Leningrad takes over all of the former Northern District. The Southern Military District incorporates 4 or 5 Ukrainian oblasts in addition to Crimea which was already in the Southern District. Meanwhile the naval assets of every military district are stripped out and are under one Russian Navy Command.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024

Russian forces are likely attempting to create an operational maneuver force for the exploitation of recent Russian advances in the Avdiivka direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 27 that Russian forces have formally transferred responsibility for the Donetsk City-Avdiivka axis to the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and formally transferred the Central Grouping of Forces’ previous area of responsibility (AOR) in the Lyman direction to Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces.[8] Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces (likely comprised almost entirely of elements of the Western Military District [WMD]) assumed responsibility for at least a portion of the Lyman direction in late fall and early winter 2023 after the Russian command transferred the bulk of the committed formations of the Central Grouping of Forces (primarily comprised of elements of the Central Military District [CMD]) to the offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023.[9] Russian officials have recently praised the Central Grouping of Forces for the seizure of Avdiivka and have notably highlighted CMD Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev and increasingly identified the Avdiivka direction as the AOR of the Central Grouping of Forces.[10] The Russian command may have decided to codify the de facto command structure that has existed in the Avdiivka area since late Fall 2023 to explicitly establish a maneuver force intended to exploit recent Russian advances in the area. The Avdiivka-Donetsk axis is a relatively narrower AOR compared to the AORs of other Russian force groupings in Ukraine, and this focused responsibility suggests that the Russian military command likely intends for CMD elements to continue offensive efforts in the Avdiivka area in the near and medium term.

The Russian command likely hopes that the reorganization of command structures will establish more cohesive Russian grouping of forces throughout the theater in Ukraine. Russian forces recently reorganized the command structure of the Russian grouping of forces in southern Ukraine, abolishing an unnamed grouping of forces that defended against the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive and distributing its elements between the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces (AOR in Kherson Oblast and western Zaporzihia Oblast) and the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (AOR in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and western Donetsk Oblast).[11] The Russian Western Grouping of Forces has launched an ongoing multi-axis offensive operation along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and has designed elements of that operation based on its control over a cohesive force grouping along a wide AOR.[12] Mashovets noted that the transfer of the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis to the Central Grouping of Forces bisects the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces, which previously had responsibility for the frontline from the Bakhmut direction through the Marinka direction.[13] It is unclear if this bisection will generate further command and control (C2) difficulties for Russian forces near Bakhmut and west and southwest of Donetsk City beyond the pervasive C2 issues that Russian forces already face writ large in Ukraine.[14] This apparent Russian reorganization effort suggests that the Russian command may be attempting to implement lessons it has learned about organizing command structures in areas in which it intends to prioritize offensive efforts as the more cohesive Russian groupings of forces are engaged in more concerted or broader offensive efforts.

[Open Source Intelligence]

I continue to believe that for 2024 Russia's plans are much more limited and will just focus on clearing all fortified positions in the Donbass and completely clear Donbass.  This frees Russia up in 2025 to advance in several possible directions.

Unless they're content and wanting to end the war soon, why be limited when your opponent is outmanned and outgunned?

[Open Source Intelligence]

I continue to believe that for 2024 Russia's plans are much more limited and will just focus on clearing all fortified positions in the Donbass and completely clear Donbass.  This frees Russia up in 2025 to advance in several possible directions.

Unless they're content and wanting to end the war soon, why be limited when your opponent is outmanned and outgunned?

Maybe.  I think for domestic reasons concerning excess losses I think Russia will take it slow.  Meaning I think Putin would view excessive casualties as a greater political problem than the war dragging on an extra year or two.

Now as in the next month is the time to move from the Russian perspective. To analogize this into sport because war and sport are philosophically the same thing, I played rugby for 12 years which is very much a winning territory game in contrast to American football where ball possession is more important than territory. Coaches of mine would hammer into us that in the immediacy of the turnover or after breaking through the defensive line you gain so much territory as the defenders have to react in an unorganized fashion and setup their defensive lines correctly as opposed to having to grind through phases into a well-prepared defensive structure. With the Ukrainian defensive line broken through at Avdiivka, now's the time to push forward for Russia. If you just wait six months, then go again, you're just giving them more time to setup a defensive structure right there, especially when this has been a heavily attrition-based conflict. You don't harm your enemy through attrition and then let them recover.

If Russia were content and like the de facto borders they have now to play for a treaty, that's one thing, but I don't think this conflict is at that point, and why would you play for a treaty now with the current state of Ukrainian military readiness unless you think the Ukrainians are so desperate they'll agree to bad terms from their point of view?

I would take any pause here from Russia as a sign more that they need the pause themselves or don't think the current operating conditions are advantageous (e.g. waiting for the thaw of winter and mud to go away).

[Open Source Intelligence]

I disagree with the ISW analysis of the terrain.  The thin line of very tiny communities near the stream and lakes doesn't provide for much cover from aerial assaults, which have become terrifyingly more frequent in recent weeks.  There aren't many roads to move supplies or manpower, and nothing but low terrain farmland behind this position.  The ISW is kind of downplaying the speed of the Russian advance into this area, suggesting that Ukraine has time to prepare defensive positions.  The Russians have already entered Berdychi, Orlivka and Tonenke, and are continuously rotating men between the battlefront and the men resting in recently captured towns in the rear position. In contrast, many UAF troops are getting gassed from these tireless Russian attacks. 

I think a better analysis of the situation would be that Ukraine is holding this line of town to slow the Russian advance, so Ukraine can build a second defensive line from Novoselivka to Novaprokrovske, and prevent Russians from getting around their best defensive positions.

ISW has a natural Ukrainian bias in their reporting, which is fine. Combine that with what jaichind is linking to, yhe truth is probably somewhere in the middle.