Hard to top Washington-Adams-Jefferson-Madison-Monroe. Hell I'd even extend that to Washington-Adams-Jefferson-Madison-Monroe-JQA-Jackson.
Washington and maybe Monroe are the only not-bad Presidents on that list. John Adams brazenly violated constitutional rights and utterly failed to unite the country during the Quasi-War, Jefferson catastrophically mismanaged foreign policy (Exhibit A: the Embargo Act), Madison launched a stupid war that resulted in the worst consequences for the Native populations in American history up to that point, even the man in my signature was a completely failed President - it's his career before and after the White House that is worth celebrating -; and Jackson was of course a genocidal tyrant.
Oh, and under all of these Presidents sectional conflict over slavery grew, along with the institution of slavery itself -- proving that the States were anything but United. Hard to ignore all of the moral depravity, political cowardice, and outright incompetence wrought by this early era of the Republic.
This perspective mischaracterizes the essential nature of the Early Republic, and the social and political events of the period. It's hard to understate just how much the United States was a radical experiment. In a world of constitutional monarchies like the UK, absolute monarchies like France, autocratic despotisms like Russia, post-feudal fossils like the Holy Roman Empire, and tiny mercantile city-state republics that were functionally oligarchies, the basic concept of an expansive, self-governing republic that was run truly for, by, and of the people was unthinkable. The Founders, despite their careful and thorough study of republics throughout history, were uncertain and divided on a number of issues, and basic points like the role of the President, and even whether to have a President, were uncertain.
Washington stepped into the Presidency with a massive personality cult, universal adoration, and an absence of well-developed political factions. In some ways this made his task much easier, because this combined with his sheer force of will allowed him to move mountains, and his moral restraint helped him set the tone for future Presidents, which he did very skillfully. Because we don't disagree on Washington, I won't spend too much time there.
John Adams brazenly violated constitutional rights and utterly failed to unite the country during the Quasi-War
John Adams, upon taking the oath of office, stepped into a political scene very different than it had been eight years before. Emerging victorious from a fiercely contested election, he did not have the unanimous backing that Washington received twice. Even among his supporters, he did not enjoy anything like the cult of personality around Washington. And by this time well-developed political factions had emerged and partisanship was fierce. The unique contingencies of Washington's presidency allowed him to act, in many ways, almost like a constitutional monarch. Adams did not have this benefit, so even though Washington had laid out the basic bounds of the Presidency, Adams was still walking on much untrodden ground. For this reason I give him a lot of benefit of the doubt that I would not give to later presidents.
I agree with you on the Sedition Act, and even though he was not an active advocate of its passage Adams certainly did choose to sign it. However, it's worth noting that up until Jackson, the President was exceptionally deferential to the Legislative branch. In the Early Republic, vetoes were exceptionally rare. Presidents only vetoed bills that they believed were unconstitutional, and even then only if they thought they had damn good reason to think so. Otherwise, even if they strongly disagreed with its aims, they would sign it into law. Washington vetoed only two bills during his presidency, both on strictly constitutional grounds, and it was not until 1811 that another President would veto a bill.
Looking at the Quasi-War, Adams' "failure to unite the country" is not a particularly salient criticism. Like I've mentioned, the cult of personality under Washington was gone and Adams was operating in much more conventional political territory. And much more crucially, the situation in Europe had deteriorated tremendously, fierce war had broken out, and America's fragile existence hung in the balance.
Let's situate this in its historical context. Ever since France and England went to war in 1793, the United States became caught in the middle of a game of chicken as both warring countries sought to cut off American trade with their enemy, effectively trying to force us to choose one side or the other. France asked us to join them in the war against England. Washington rightly recognized that our young and fragile nation could not afford another war, and declined. He issued a proclamation of neutrality, but the reality on the ground wasn't so simple.
At this time the US had significant trade with both countries but the UK was our most important trade partner by a large margin. The UK wanted to force us into trading with them to the exclusion of France. They (and France) saw trade with their enemy as aiding and abetting the enemy in the war. At this time the UK seized hundreds of American ships trading between French and British colonies and engaged in other acts of agitation. America, still very fragile and small, negotiated a treaty (the Jay Treaty) to secure continued peaceful trade and avoid war. In this treaty America won some concessions from Britain, but not everything it wanted, infuriating anti-British Jeffersonians. France was angry at the treaty because it established most-favored-nation status between the signatory countries and allowed British fleets to sack American ships trading with France so long as they paid compensation to the US.
As I've alluded to, foreign policy orientation was most defining issue of the First Party System, and this was especially the case after the Jay Treaty. Many Jeffersonians, by this point in time, had been swept away in the moment and attached themselves far too firmly to Jacobinical radicalism, and demanded a strong US-France alliance against the UK. Many Hamiltonians had been skeptical of republican democracy from the very beginning and favored a more aristocratic system or even outright constitutional monarchy; they abhorred the French Revolution and demanded closer attachment to Britain.
In this context, any foreign policy approach whatsoever would have sharpened political divisions, so it's wrong to judge Adams' course of action harshly for failing to smooth over these divisions. In his handling of the XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War, he avoided direct war with France, allowed us to avoid humiliation by either France or Britain, and engaged in an important military buildup of both army and navy that allowed us to more effectively defend our sovereignty. Importantly, he also resisted the Hamiltonian ultra-Federalists, in his own party, who were demanding outright war with France; he also ensured that Hamilton's attempts to raise a massive army and put himself at its head went nowhere. Most importantly of all, he succeeded in preserving our independence for another four years, avoiding shackling us in suzerainty to either France or Britain, and keeping us as far out of the fray of Europe's wars as was realistically possible.
To be continued, with Jefferson next. Above all, we are incredibly lucky that our first seven Presidents all had such a strong conception of independence and Union.
