Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

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https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1568695429658984450

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This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

Well the plan to freeze out Europe seems now like a total fail with the collapse of the Russian lines screwing up the narrative of a long slow hellish stalemate seeming without end, and for what, for the Russian symps to hawk (what's Tucker Carlson going to do now)? So I don't know. That is beyond my pay grade. Saber rattling of nukes did not seem to fly either.  

And the other option that is mentioned quite often (general mobilization of the population) wouldn't be a short-term solution either since such a thing would take significant time to carry out. Not to mention that it's clear Putin is aware of the political risks that involves given that he has so far preferred to replenish his losses with criminals and impoverished conscripts from the hinterlands.  

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Speaking of missile tantrums of 10+ projectiles, here we are:

https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1568723608327049217
Maybe they're being used to hinder the offensive, but most are probably just being thrown at Kharkiv City as usual.

Given that their targeting systems are seemingly stuck in the 1980s, I doubt that Russia is capable of identifying and tracking the highly mobile mechanized infantry that Ukraine is using to carry out this counteroffensive. As you said, they are probably just targeting population centers, but they could also be firing them at their own ammo/supply depots that they left behind in their retreat (lol).

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Northern Donetsk Oblast:

https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1569269482060914688

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Northern Donetsk Oblast:

https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1569269482060914688

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1569392057071853568

Another settlement along the T0521 road liberated. This is about 8 kilometers east of Bohorodychne (see above), which was liberated earlier. It seems like the Ukrainians are attempting to flank the Russian defenders in Lyman. 

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I'd await further confirmation, but the Ukrainians may have liberated Kyselivka in Kherson Oblast. If true, that puts the Ukrainians about 10 kilometers north of the Kherson airport via the M14 highway.

https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1570117317849403395

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I'd await further confirmation, but the Ukrainians may have liberated Kyselivka in Kherson Oblast. If true, that puts the Ukrainians about 10 kilometers north of the Kherson airport via the M14 highway.

https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1570117317849403395
 

Doubtful as just yesterday even Stremousov visited the town. Also, this is 7th time it's been said to have been liberated.

But at the same time, big things can happen in under a day..

It doesn’t help matters that there are at least two towns with this name near the frontline in Kherson.

I believe the other town is a bit north in Mykolaiv Oblast. The claim - whether accurate or not - came from a member of the official Kherson regional government, so I think it's okay to assume that he was talking about this town (maybe).

Btw, Stremousov is having a normal one today:

https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1570137074581344257

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https://twitter.com/IikkaKorhonen/status/1569536372012195841

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https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1570526838933557248

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https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1570526838933557248

Only 600M? I don't understand why they do it in small drips instead of a full long-term aid package numbered in the billions.

There have been previous aid packages in the billions. I believe the largest one so far amounted to $3 billion, which was announced to coincide with Ukrainian Independence Day.

As to your question, my best guess is that the aid is drip fed to reflect what is most needed at that moment in time given ammo burn rates and conditions on the ground. You wouldn't want to apportion all of the aid for artillery only to find out several weeks later that the Ukrainians are in desperate need of something else, like Humvees for example. That said, I kind of think the Biden Administration should seize on the recent success of the counteroffensive to double or triple the most recent aid package that they have requested from Congress. The current request might be enough to last until lame duck session but why not go bigger and let the Ukrainians build up some ample reserves?

 

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https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1570872935803654144

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https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1571210067860459525

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Snip

Wasn't this identified as some sort of Russian propaganda video they were filming?

I think that question has been raised given that Russian reporters were are/were conveniently in the area, but I don't think it's been conclusively proven. 

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I still don't understand how mobilization will benefit Russia in the short-or-medium term. I mean, most observers have witnessed the under-equipped, ill-trained, impoverished masses that Russia has sent to the front in the past several weeks. Will multiplying that recruitment strategy yield dividends for overall troop cohesion or morale when their recruits can't even be properly supplied or fed as it is?

The annexation of Ukrainian provinces seems like an even more desperate to shape the narrative of the war. Ukrainians currently control fractions of all of the oblasts in question and they've been carrying out attacks in Belgorod and Crimea for months, so I don't see how annexing these territories would provide Putin with a pretext for further escalation or mobilization that he doesn't already possess (if he seriously wanted it).    

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https://twitter.com/evangershkovich/status/1572688378604421120https://twitter.co...

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More prisoner swaps:

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1572695157002342400

https://twitter.com/myroslavapetsa/status/1572696145582866432

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Take this for what it's worth (not much). But it's still interesting that the North Koreans apparently felt the need to come out and say this, regardless of the veracity.

https://twitter.com/phildstewart/status/1572696716301811712

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On the one hand, even partial mobilization is enough to raise the stakes to the point where Putin's regime could plausibly be threatened. If the Ukrainians continue to make gains then the backlash could be serious, though up to this point Putin has demonstrated far more fear of some sort of ultranationalist coup for backing down than of any kind of anti-war uprising.

On the other, I think a lot of people are underestimating the potential difference it could provide in the war. For one thing, most of those called up are unlikely to be just thrown into combat as cannon fodder but to fill either logistical or specialist roles that were previously lacking. In theory, a Russian BTG is supposed to have two such conscripts for each fighting professional soldier but up to this point they've had to pull troops and leave equipment aside to supplement the lack of logistical support. If Russian supply issues are global then partial mobilization won't help but if they're local then it will significantly strengthen their ability to keep heavy pressured forces armed and loaded despite Ukrainian pressure. They also indirectly increase the number of experienced fighters on the Russian side by freeing up those who were partially or fully relegated to logistical work.

A lack of specialists also means that the Russians haven't necessarily been able to fully utilize all of their equipment. The clause against refuseniks in particular could improve their capacity in the use of jets, artillery and tanks that were previously lying idle at garrison bases as well as their capacity to repair and refit damaged equipment.

Finally, partial mobilization basically eliminates the significant manpower advantage the Ukrainians have had up to this point. Arguably the biggest reason they were able to make such significant gains in Izyum is because Russian forces were stretched too thin to simultaneously hold Kherson and Izyum while attacking Bakhmut head on. The forces there were composed of geriatric DPR conscripts with DP-28s backed up by riot cops with rifles. Without a 2-1 advantage in troops the Ukrainians will have to punch through prepared Russian forces, a much tougher proposition judging by their progress in Kherson.

Zelensky has, optimistically, a month to pull off another significant victory before the weather makes further advances impossible. By the time winter has frozen the ground to the point where tanks are useable he'll have to contend with a Russian force of equal or greater size compared to his own and he'll have a difficult time making further gains short of Russia literally running out of ammo or a WW1 style collapse in morale. Even without the threat of nuclear weapons this could easily become a long, bloody, grinding war.

That's all fair and well in theory but whether Russia can put something akin to what you're saying into practice is another question. If the media's characterization of the mobilization order is correct, those being called up are only being trained for around two weeks (or less, see below) before being deployed. I am skeptical of how much 'specialization' and logistical know-how Russia can import into these sad souls within such a short period of time. It's one thing if the task is moving artillery shells from point A to point B. It's quite another to predict where resources are most urgently needed and prevent shortages of materials before they occur. So far, Russia has shown a stunning lack of logistical acumen in this war and I am hesitant to believe that throwing more bodies at that particular problem will help much.

Yes, those being rounded up are all supposed to have prior military experience but will that experience be matched with Russia's current needs? I have some doubts.

https://twitter.com/PjotrSauer/status/1572664720901152773

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War is unpredictable but the Russian defense of Lyman may be untenable. They are flanked by the Ukrainians on three sides and it now seems that their rear is exposed. I wouldn't be surprised if they decide to "regroup" soon if the Ukrainians can capitalize on their (unconfirmed) breakthrough.

Also:

https://twitter.com/TadeuszGiczan/status/1572969458112544770

https://twitter.com/ABarbashin/status/1572953405051609089

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https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1572985692099317760

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https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/1573337663561777155

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https://twitter.com/myroslavapetsa/status/1573307059621318657?s=20&t=hBgTrys...

Snihurivka is really close to the front line. I have to wonder if there is an actual uprising against the occupation there, if th Ukrainian army could be able to move in and expel the occupiers.

There are some settlements along the front that are essentially "demilitarized" (not occupied by either the Ukrainians or the Russians). The Russians have withdrawn or only have a very light presence but the Ukrainians haven't moved in because that would put their forces within better range of Russian artillery and the settlements aren't that important strategically. I am not sure if Snihurivka is one of those places, but that could perhaps explain why the local civilian population felt safe enough to make such a public protest.

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https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1573367460283154433

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1573314121285734401

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Russia’s unsustainable equipment losses in Ukraine - Yahoo News

Very old T-62M tanks have been increasingly appearing, as Russia runs out of newer, more capable tanks. Using these tanks will also exacerbate the Kremlin’s manpower shortages: The T-62 does not feature an autoloader, which automatically loads shells into the main gun, unlike more modern Russian types, so it needs a four-man crew, compared to the three-man crews required by T-72, T-80, or T-90 models.

Russia’s sophisticated vehicles will be difficult to replace, given Western import restrictions. The Russian T-72B3 uses a “Catherine” thermal imaging system made by the French multinational defense contractor Thales. Russia imported these systems because it does not have the capability to build them domestically and because few other sources of this sophisticated equipment are available. China — notionally Russia’s ally — has scaled back the export of microprocessors necessary for Russia’s newer missiles, almost certainly because of the fear of secondary sanctions if it is seen to be feeding Putin’s war machine.

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https://twitter.com/HenryJFoy/status/1573378102469738497