Gerrymandering

[muon2]

Abolishing FPTP = best solution to prevent gerrymandering

Finding another redistricting method would be better.

See for example the method proposed in OH in my signature.

[muon2]

Abolishing FPTP = best solution to prevent gerrymandering

Finding another redistricting method would be better.

See for example the method proposed in OH in my signature.

Your map is just as gerrymandered as Texas or Illinois or Maryland. It's gerrymandered to promote a supposedly nonpartisan goal, but it's still a highly unnatural grouping of individuals and territory.

I have to disagree. The current IL map has essentially no criteria other than the VRA and equal populations. Since there are no specified public goals in state law, the map makers can create rules based on partisan interest. A process that is based on public goals such as in the OH competition is what distinguishes it from a gerrymander.

Definitions of gerrymander involve creating a specific advantage for one party (or race in the case of a racial gerrymander). Here's dictionary.com:

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Gerrymandering typically involves packing and fracturing of a particular interest group such as a party or ethnic group to dilute their strength ina legislative body. Gerrymandering does not mean the creation of a district that might not suit an individual's taste for the shape or combination.

The key is creating specific definitions of terms like compactness, competitiveness, and communities of interest. When they are left undefined, a map maker can usually find a suitable definition after the fact. When they are defined before the process begins, they represent public policy, and work against maps that are gerrymanders in the true sense of the word.

[muon2]

No district should be more then D+5 or R+5

That is gerrymandering.

Fine. Then tell me how is it possible to make every district a toss up?

If public policy is to make as many districts be within a 5% margin of the two-party statewide vote, that is not gerrymandering. It will probably give some bizarrely shaped districts to accomplish the feat as was demonstrated by opponents of the 2005 OH constitutional amendment. When competitiveness was the only factor, geographic considerations like compactness and political boundary integrity are irrelevant.

There's nothing wrong with creating a system that balances different factors to create a map. IA does this to some extent. When the judiciary has tossed out some racial gerrymanders it was due to an approach that only looked at race and did not apply other principles.

Different mixes of factors will create different maps. The role of policy is to find what mix of factors best suits the needs of public.

[muon2]

No district should be more then D+5 or R+5

That is gerrymandering.

Fine. Then tell me how is it possible to make every district a toss up?

Every district shouldn't BE a toss-up. Districts should be made so that the people of a geographic location within a state are represented as best as possible. Compton should not be part of a toss-up district. And it's impossible to make WY at-large a toss-up. Besides, in a wave year, the House would end up going 396-39 for whatever party benefits. That's ridiculous.

Of course they shouldn't all be toss ups, nor can they be in a state which tends strongly to one party or the other. That doesn't mean that a goal can't be a increase the overall number of competitive districts.

[muon2]

No district should be more then D+5 or R+5

That is gerrymandering.

Fine. Then tell me how is it possible to make every district a toss up?

If public policy is to make as many districts be within a 5% margin of the two-party statewide vote, that is not gerrymandering. It will probably give some bizarrely shaped districts to accomplish the feat as was demonstrated by opponents of the 2005 OH constitutional amendment. When competitiveness was the only factor, geographic considerations like compactness and political boundary integrity are irrelevant.

There's nothing wrong with creating a system that balances different factors to create a map. IA does this to some extent. When the judiciary has tossed out some racial gerrymanders it was due to an approach that only looked at race and did not apply other principles.

Different mixes of factors will create different maps. The role of policy is to find what mix of factors best suits the needs of public.

Altering the electorate that is to be represented in order to achieve a predetermined electoral outcome is gerrymandering.

No, the goal of gerrymandering is to increase one group's power over another group by the act of drawing districts in a particular way. If, for instance, the public goal is to have districts that foster competition, that is not inherently increasing one group's power over another. There are wave elections where the effect of competitive districts may be to cause a greater swing to one party or another than if competitiveness were not a factor when the districts were drawn. If both groups could have wave elections, then neither is favored and it does not constitute gerrymandering.

[muon2]

Muon, by your definition a bipartisan incumbent protection gerrymander like California's or indeed Illinois' is no gerrymander. That is obviously ridiculous.
(Actually, they do increase the strength of one group over another - they strengthen the incumbents over the voting public, and indeed over other aspiring politicians. Similarly, a map trying to artificially create as many competitive districts as possible could be said to artificially increase the strength of the other party's bench in the area over the incumbents. And if they lead to the cutting apart of party's stronghold areas, they artificially increase the power of swing voters over partisans. Take the artificial example of a single-district-sized heavily Democratic city surrounded by an equal-population heavily Republican countryside, with two competitive districts drawn from 50% of the one and 50% of the other.)
A conscious effort to draw as closely balanced seats as possible is a gerrymander just like a conscious effort to render everybody safe is or a conscious effort to give one party as many seats as possible is. It's just that your map follows some sane criteria as well, and doesn't go to nearly as ridiculous lengths as, say, the current Illinois map.
The only sane criteria are approximate equality of population size and a regard to political boundaries and communities of interest (which includes "racial gerrymandering").

There is a fundamental difference between drawing boundaries to protect incumbents and using competitiveness as a factor among others to draw maps. Many note that incumbent protection is a gerrymander, but technically it is not according to textbook definitions. What is true about incumbent protection plans is that it is not supported by the public, as your comments suggest. Many of you seem to use the term gerrymander to imply maps that work against the public interest, or are unfair.

The public desire is to see races that matter in November, and that requires conscious effort to create. Similarly the public wants to protect communities of interest, but that turns out to be difficult to define as a general term. By using geographic compactness, respect for political boundaries, and information about racial and language minorities, one can provide some support for communities of interest. Using these criteria alone will still tend to produce districts that are generally uncompetitive in November. These districts will protect incumbents since the primary will become the only race of significance in those districts.

I support a balanced approach to foster a greater number of competitive districts. The community of interest factors that I've identified should take precedence, but some weight should be given to competitiveness. That way, when there is a choice of which political subdivisions to link or compact shape to create, a map should favor the choice that leads to competitiveness. Many districts will still be uncompetitive due to their geography and intrinsic populations. However, an approach that I describe does further a real goal that is desired by the public.

[muon2]

There is a fundamental difference between drawing boundaries to protect incumbents and using competitiveness as a factor among others to draw maps.

There are arguably two, but one fundamental difference lies in the "a factor among others" bit.

It is interesting that the same voting data can be made to work either in favor of incumbent protection or against it.

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The "in november" part is quite relevant here. A district representing a community of interest, or a number of readily definable non-divided smaller communities of interest, is much more liable to throw up a primary challenge if the incumbent becomes unpopular.
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Unfortunately there are a variety of reasons why the primary process does not work as effectively as you suggest. The voting statistics show clearly that the primaries do not draw as much interest as the general election, even when an incumbent has popularity problems. Some voters don't wish to be identified with a specific party, but do wish a meaningful say in their representation. Parties often have some control on resources for their primaries and this can make a primary challenge to an incumbent quite difficult. For all these reasons many voters see the November election as their chance to have a say, but incumbent protection plans frustrate those voters.