https://tass.com/economy/1753173
"Russia's annual GDP growth reached 4.6% in January after 4.4% in December — ministry"
Russia's Jan 2024 economic momentum continues. These numbers look more in line with the IMF's 2.6% growth estimate for Russia in 2024. If true then in 2024 Russia's GDP growth will exeed all G7 economies in 2024 just like in 2023.
When this war is over it'll be wise to examine the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of sanctions to see if they really worked against Russia.
These numbers are probably something of a political failure for the Western sanctions regime.
I said when this all started that sanctions being meaningless was proved out how 7 years' worth of sanctions post-Crimea resulted in nothing. Not to say examples from other conflicts.
The U.S. then took steps to completely freeze Russia out of the international financial system, which at the time I thought was a ballsy and strong move. However, with the benefit of hindsight all it did was made everywhere not West in the world seek to increase distance between their economic system and the U.S. so they could remove the potential of this threat in the future. So the U.S. actions here the end result was it darkened a line between the West and the Global South. I'm not talking Russia and China, I'm talking more benign countries geopolitically like Malaysia.
Soft power is good, but has real limits and gets beat by hard power almost all of the time. The problem with the post-Iraq War West is they think soft power can fix everything, and if your only tool is soft power you're more a paper tiger than anything. Syria should've been a giant glaring example to the West of you can't do everything with soft power as we see now that Assad is still in power and Obama said that he must leave, but did nothing to actually make that happen.
Sanctions are very effective at inconveniencing individuals, and the post-Crimea sanctions regime provided a basis to go after any Russian national or their investments whenever a government or competitor wanted to. The criteria for what we were sanctioning Russia for had expanded to the point any Russian could be added for almost any reason. Which may well have contributed to the political climate of frustration with an endless Minsk process which did not resolve the key demand of the entire Russian political class
1. Ending the sanctions regime
2. Recognizing Crimea as Russian
Better-targeted sanctions might well have introduced divisions within the regime, or undermined it capabilities, but these did the opposite. It united every viable Russian political force behind those two points and set Moscow on a course for either dropping #2 or war. As dropping #2 could only be carried out by Putin personally, and perhaps not even then, that left war.