(Associate Justice Marokai Blue delivered the majority opinion which Justice Opebo joined.)Opinion
At issue here in this case is the constitutional basis, or lack thereof, of the
Protection of Public Health Act. More specifically, two points about the aforementioned act. First, being the Senate's ability to ban smoking, and secondly, the Senate's ability to apply a different standard to some businesses with regard to smoking than
others.SPC argues that the Senate lacks the expressed authority to prohibit smoking, claiming that under Article 1, Section 5, Clause 13 & Clause 14, as well as the 22nd Amendment, the Senate nowhere has the authority to restrict smoking.
However, as will be explained, the Court disagrees, for a variety of reasons.
Un: "Demonstrations."
SPC opens his argument by stating that within Article 1, Section 5, Clause 13 & Clause 14, as well as the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, "there cannot be found any constitutional justification for prohibiting smoking for public health reasons."
He further specifies by stating "Clearly there is nothing in the Protection of Public Health act pertaining to research" and "The Protection of Public Health Act does not specify anything regarding quarantine, vaccination, and treatment of smokers or tobacco."
What SPC does not seem to recognize here, is the word "demonstrations" included in Article 1, Section 5, Clause 13:
What is the meaning of "demonstrations" in this context? It clearly does not mean scientific experiments, as "experiments" is already included in the aforementioned clause. It clearly doesn't refer to the showing of research, as "research" is already included in the aforementioned clause. It clearly can't mean the disclosure of investigations, as "investigations" is already included in the aforementioned clause.
The word "demonstration" can mean many things, but chief among such definitions includes a showing of force or the undertaking of an action generally. While "force" isn't to suggest military action or anything of the sort, we believe this definition is consistent with what a smoking
ban is itself.
"Demonstrations" can thus only mean, in this context, the taking of action that "promotes the public health." This is not to say that the Senate can do anything it likes in the name of "promoting health" however, as such actions must pass mustard with the scientific community and therefore must have a legitimate purpose.
We believe, however, that smoking and second-hand smoke qualify as legitimate concerns for the Senate to engage in demonstrations, authority we believe
is granted by Article 1, Section 5, Clause 13, to prohibit, and this includes the Protection of Public Health Act.
Deux: "Protection of those in employment."
SPC goes on to state: "The Protection of Public Health Act says nothing about protecting those in employment or natural resources, as it bans smoking in any establishment open to the public. Thus, there cannot be found any constitutional justification for prohibiting smoking for public health reasons."
We, however, don't see how any other interpretation of the 22nd Amendment can be made. The 22nd Amendment states, in part:
Would that not include people in these establishments, the restaurants, the cinemas, the libraries? Would the prohibiting of smoking, a potentially dangerous activity not only to one's self but others around that person, protect the health of "those in employment"? We can't imagine any other interpretation other than that. Prohibiting smoking in places such as restaurants or cinemas quite clearly protects those in employment and thus, under the 22nd Amendment, we view the prohibiting of smoking to be a "necessary regulation."
Trois: The specificity of "open to the public."
SPC also states that individuals have a "right" to smoke in public areas, saying "the right of the people to smoke in public areas cannot be denied."
It deserves stating for the record, as alluded to in a section above, that the smoking ban affects only establishments
open to the public, and not private establishments not open to the public, or private property such as individual homes. In fact, the Act specifically uses the word "public" four times.
Atlasian law prohibits a number of harmful activities that one individual could inflict upon another. It is a simple scientific fact that smoking is harmful, not only to one's own body, but to everyone around that person, and can inflict serious harm on another individuals body in as short a time as just thirty minutes. We note this because we strongly hold that the Atlasian Constitution does not grant the right to harm
others.
We do not view the prohibition of smoking as it affects
other individuals any different than the government's existing power to prohibit theft or physical abuse, etc, and so we hold that there is no "right" to smoke in public.
Quatre: Consent and non-consent.
SPC states on the issue of Clause 4 of the Protection of Public Health Act, that "...how can there be equal protection under the law when the law may be unequally applied depending on the revenue of the establishment in which you are smoking? For that matter, how can there be equal protection under the law when the law may be unequally applied depending on whether the building you are in is open to the public?
We can only assume the reason this being written into the bill in the first place was to exempt (or indirectly, create) establishments that were built or run specifically for these types of activities, smoking included. Thus we believe, given the passage of this act, that
a different kind of establishment has been created,
necessitating different standards to accommodate individual consent.
If someone goes to an establishment where such a heavy amount of the revenue is built on smoking,
they clearly have the intent to go there, and they clearly consent to the harm that it does their body, as opposed to something like going to a cinema, where one person working there or their family attending are
not consenting, implicitly, to getting their lungs filled with smoke.
There is a line, the court believes, where some people are consenting (implicitly or directly) to this, second hand smoke that is, and where some people are definitely not intending on breathing harmful substances like cigarette smoke. That line of consent is important, and is why we believe the Senate has the authority to treat these two types of establishments differently, as they are now, inherently, different,
deserving of different standards.
Cinq: Conclusion Summary
Section
Un: The Court dismisses the claim made by SPC that the Senate lacks the authority under Article 1, Section 5, Clause 13 of the Constitution to prohibit smoking, believing instead that the word "demonstrations" in Clause 13 includes a smoking ban.
Section
Deux: The Court disagrees with the claim made by SPC that the Senate lacks the authority under the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution to ban smoking "to protect those in employment."
Section
Trois: The Court disagrees with the claim again made by SPC that individuals have a "right" to smoke in public, believing that preventing the harmful effects of
second-hand smoke is no different than the government preventing physical abuse.
Section
Quatre: The Court disagrees with the claim from SPC that the Senate is violating Article 1, Section 5, Clause 4 by treating establishments with different regulations and standards, believing that, with the passage of the Protection of Public Health Act, there have been
two inherently different business establishments erected regarding smoking, thus
necessitating different standards. The Court also emphasizes the difference between consent to and the lack of consent to breathing in second-hand smoke.
Therefore, for the reasons outlined, the Court has ruled that the Protection of Public Health Act shall stand as constitutional.
