French Municipal Elections 2014: Hashemite's Guide and Official Thread

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Municipal elections will be held in every single commune in France (over 36000) in March 2014, the first nationwide elections since 2014. I know it's a long way out, but preparations are already in full swing for all parties and the intrigues have begun. Besides, if I start early, I'll eventually cover most/all of the most important and interesting races in the big cities and towns.

Here's a brief breakdown of how I intend to structure this guide:

1. A primer on local government in France and a brave attempt to demystify and explain the utter incomprehensible mess which is local government in France; in particular the role of the communes and the 'intercommunalités' (EPCI) or the special systems in Paris, Lyon and Marseille
2. The current 'decentralization' reforms of the government (Valls and Lebranchu laws), their goals and potential impact
3. A brief history of municipal elections since 1945 or 1959; the particularities, oddities and specificites of French local politics
4. The national outlook for the major national parties (how they performed in 2008, and a quick list of high-profile 'targets' for the major parties.

And the main scope of this guide, which will start later:
5. A guide to the municipal elections in every major city in France (probably the top 50 or so cities in terms of population; plus smaller but important towns in each region and overseas); including:
-history of local government and municipal administrations since 1945 or 1959
-a political description of the city in question, including electoral history (and trends) and voting patterns
-the 2014 outlook: hopefully with an updated list of candidates and other stuff
6. Probably some room for Hashemite's irrational hatred of certain politicians

I'll try to get a head start on this soon. In the meantime, I guess this can be used as the official thread for general discussion.

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1. Primer on local government in France

Although France remains one of the more centralized states in the European Union, it nonetheless has an absurdly complex structure of local government which is riddled which few can fully understand. Everybody in government, however, tends to have something to say about it and every government since the first decentralization laws in 1982 have tried to leave their mark on the local government framework, largely by messing it up even more.

Indeed, one of the hallmarks of French local governments is that a small clique of Parisian technocrats pretend to have the magic solution which will fix all problems overnight. Most of the time, nobody likes their solutions and they end up failing miserably; leaving local government as a total mess until a new clique comes and the cycle starts again.

The beginning of true decentralization in France, long influenced and guided by the Jacobin heritage of the Revolution, began in 1982 under the leadership of Gaston Defferre, the Minister of the Interior and Decentralization (1981-1984). The 1982 laws, which greatly expanded the powers and administrative responsibilities of existing local government structures (departments and communes) and created regions as full-blown territorial collectivities (collectivités territoriales), is often known as "Act I" of decentralization. It was subsequently followed by minor reforms (1992, 1999), a major reform in 2003-2004 under Raffarin (styled as '"Act II" of decentralization), another major structural reform with Sarkozy in 2010 and now the bases of another significant reform (sometimes called "Act III").

Although the powers devolved by the State to territorial collectivities have increased significantly since 1982, they remain rather modest compared to other European countries (particularly Spain, Germany or even Italy). The heads of French regional executives, for example, are hardly comparable to Minister-Presidents in Germany or presidents of the CCAA in Spain. Nevertheless, despite the limited scope of their powers, territorial collectivities have been able to be quite influential/powerful because of the clause de compétence générale, which has allowed communes/departments/regions to intervene in all matters which they can argue to be in the local public interest. The 2010 reform abolished the clause de compétence générale for departments and regions, the new PS government has signaled that they might reinstate it in their reform of the reform.

Here is a rundown of the main structures of local government in France (nb: this only applies to Metropolitan France and the five DOMs; the 'overseas collectivities' have more devolved powers and a very different structure of local government):

1. The State (and the European Union) retains much power - most importantly legislative power. The state passes the laws and policies which may then be administered by the 'territorial collectivities' (Collectivités territoriales). In terms of local government structure, the state more often than not has the lead in spearheading (if not imposing) new structures and reforms; it retains the final word and law-making powers on all matters relating to territorial collectivities and changes to the structure of local government.

2. 27 Regions: There are 27 regions in France, 22 of which are in Metro France (including Corsica); metropolitan regions are composed of two or more departments. The current regions were defined in 1956 for purposes of economic development, strengthened a bit in 1972 with the creation of embryonic regional councils (which were unelected and largely useless) before they became territorial collectivities with significant powers and an elected regional council in 1982. The first regional elections were held in 1986. The regional council is elected for six-year terms and it is led by the president of the regional council; since 2004, the regional council is elected at the regional level (with departmental sections) under the two-round system. 75% of seats are allocated proportionally to all lists which have won over 5% of the vote in the decisive round (in all but one case since 2004, this is the runoff where only lists with over 10% of the vote in the first round are qualified although those over 5% may 'merge' with another list), the remaining 25% are given as a majority bonus to the winning list.

Regions are responsible for: vocational training/professional development (defining and applying regional policies under a national policy), high school (lycées) infrastructure and maintenance, culture (shared with the State and the two lower levels), sports, tourism, territorial planning (preparing regional plans in collaboration with the State), environment (regional parks, shares responsibilities for protected zones and water with the State and the two lower levels), infrastructure (river ports), roads (regional planning), rail transport (TER services), economic development and some international promotion.

Exceptions:
-Corsica: The island has a special status since 1982 (it held direct regional elections in 1982), reformed in 1991 and 2002, and has slightly more powers than a mainland region. The regional government is structured differently, with the directly elected legislature (Assembly) and a distinct regional executive (executive council)
-All five overseas regions (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Reunion, Mayotte) are made up of only a single department; four of the five overseas regions (all except Mayotte) have a regional council in addition to a general council
-Mayotte has no regional council but it is considered as a region.

Each region also has a 'regional prefect', nominated by the President, who is the representative of the State who controls the decentralized public services of the State, territorial administration and public safety.

3. 101 Departments: Departments, 101 in total, 96 in metro France, are a Revolutionary creation (1789). Prior to 1982, although departments (continuously since the Third Republic except for the occupation) had a directly elected general council, the departments were largely administrative divisions in which executive power was held by the prefect, nominated by the President. The 1982 reform transferred executive powers to the president of the general council, leaving the prefect as the representative of the State with authority over public safety, territorial administration (implementing, in some cases deciding on, changes in local government structures). The prefect also has oversight over the actions of territorial collectivities, but only a posteriori control. The general council, as it currently stands, is elected by a two-round system in single-member constituencies (cantons). There are 4,055 cantons in France - with huge population inequalities (largely overrepresentation of rural areas) because most cantonal boundaries have not been redistributed for at least 100 years (!).

Departments are responsible for: middle school (collèges) infrastructure and maintenance, culture (shared power), social action and welfare policies (organization and administration, including the RMI and RSA), advice and approval for territorial planning, environment (shared power over water, protected zones; departmental plan on waste management), seaports (commercial or fishing), departmental roads, transportation (including school transportation) outside urban areas, a role in social housing and some security-related matters (road safety, fire, emergencies).

Exception:
-Paris is a department and a single commune at the same time, with the municipal council (Conseil de Paris) serving as the general council.

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Communes and EPCIs (Intercommunalité)

4. 36,681 Communes: At the base of French local government, and of particular interest for the purposes of this guide, are over 36,000 communes (municipalities) in metro France and the DOMs. In addition, 3 overseas collectivities - Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (2), French Polynesia (58) and New Caledonia (33) - are also divided into communes, like the rest of France, and they vote at the same time in municipal elections. The only parts of French territory which are not covered by communes are Saint-Martin (a single overseas collectivity), Saint-Barth (like Saint-Martin), Wallis-et-Futuna (3 traditional kingdoms), French Southern and Antarctic Lands (no permanent residents) and Clipperton Island (uninhabited atoll).

France has, by far, the most communes of any EU country: Germany has about 12,000, Italy and Spain have a bit over 8000 each. The vast majority of French communes have less than 3,500 inhabitants - in fact, about half of all communes have less than 500 inhabitants. A good number of communes have under 100 inhabitants, in a few cases some have less than 10 people (the smallest populated commune, Rochefourchat, has a legal population of one). Six communes, symbolically, have no inhabitants: these six communes in the Meuse were destroyed during the Battle of Verdun in 1916 and never rebuilt. They have retained a status as communes (officially, communes mortes pour la France), but they are totally uninhabited and administered by a mayor and two deputies nominated by the prefect.

Communes are a Revolutionary creation, dating back to 1789 when the new Revolutionary authorities established about 40000 communes, largely corresponding to religious parishes. Indeed, almost every single commune in France has a Church (in addition, nowadays, to the obligatory local monument aux morts for the war dead). Until 1870, the State's policy was to abolish communes with excessively low populations which were no longer viable and creating communes in areas where the original map was problematic (large territory, hamlets blocked by physical features). By the waning days of the Second Empire, municipal mergers (fusions) were unpopular with the local populations, and the Republican opposition promised emancipation for communes. A 1884 law established the main structures of local government, the broad principles of which have remained unchanged to this day. Each commune has a municipal council directly elected by the population and a mayor elected by the municipal council. The 1884 law also established the clause de compétence générale for communes.

In part because of their long history and Revolutionary heritage, communes are still largely perceived as the base of local democracy and decision-making - a core "republican value". Citizens are very attached to their commune and they have always tended to care a great deal about local politics and local democracy (particularly in rural areas), much more so than in other countries - such as the United Kingdom or Canada/USA - were few people care all that much about local government.
 
The extremely large number of communes in France, combined to successive rural exoduses since the Industrial Revolution which have reduced the populations of thousands of small rural communes, has made local governance problematic. Successive governments since the 1890s, and particularly since 1945, have struggled to come up with solutions to this fundamental challenge to local democracy. Given that communes, by and large, are hostile to mergers with larger (more viable) communes; most governments since the 1890s have usually shied away from promoting ambitious municipal merger schemes.

The main exception to that tradition came in 1971, with the Marcellin law (after interior minister Raymond Marcellin), which sought to promote municipal mergers. Individual prefects were instructed to come up with merger plans, which were to be approved by municipal councils. These could either be full mergers, in which one commune would disappear entirely within another, or retain some individual autonomy (for example, a delegated mayor and a decentralized town hall providing vital records) as a commune associée (associated commune). The Marcellin law was a failure: individual prefects acted differently (either proposing vast mergers, or limited and partial mergers depending on the region) and created a mess, and the associated commune status was unattractive. Between 1971 and 2009, only 1100 communes effectively disappeared (most in the 1970s). There are currently 712 associate communes. A good number of the original mergers and associations were later dissolved, with old communes regaining their independence.

The 2010 Sarkozy reform has, once again, tried to encourage municipal mergers and effectively replaced the moribund Marcellin law's associated communes with the status of commune nouvelle (new communes) which is pretty much the same thing as associated communes (although slightly closer to a full merger) with the guidelines for their creations not all that different from the ones in the Marcellin law. It has had some success thus far, the most notable creations might be the merger of Bois-Guillaume and Bihorel in the Seine-Maritime and the amalgamation of a few towns around Baugé to create Beaugé-en-Anjou (Maine-et-Loire).

However, given the utter failure of the Marcellin law and the general impracticality of merging communes, governments have been forced to consider other structures to make local governance viable.

Still straight-forward at this point? Don't worry, you will blow your brains out with the next part: the "intercommunalities"/EPCI

Any questions/comments etc?

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Addendum to the last post:

Communes or EPCI are responsible for: elementary school (buildings, equipment), culture (shared power), youth (nurseries, recreation centres), sports (equipment and subsidies), tourism, local urban policy/planning, advice and approval for territorial planning, environment (shared power over water, protected zones; waste management, water sanitation and distribution), local marinas, communal roads, urban transportation/public transit, school transportation, management of local public/social housing, municipal police forces, traffic and parking.

EPCI (Intercommunalité)

To remedy to the challenges to economic viability posed by municipal fragmentation in France, communes have been compelled to cooperate amongst themselves. Intercommunal cooperation first emerged in the last decade of the nineteenth century, but it only began to take its current form in the 1960s following rapid post-war urban/suburban expansion, rural depopulation and the creation of villes nouvelles (new towns).

Intercommunal cooperation takes two distinct, but overlapping and co-existing, forms: loose "associative" cooperation to provide certain public services or utilities (water, electricity, waste management, school transportation) or more cohesive "federative" cooperation which has more powers, responsibilities and more ambitious aims including economic development.

The structure of intercommunal cooperation is thus complex, but at the same time increasingly important. Intercommunal structures have gained more and more powers and financial resources, at the expense of communes but also from departments, regions and the State. Given that a major revamp of the communal map of France is next to impossible, intercommunalities are widely recognized as the solution to the problem.

Intercommunal cooperation structures are known as établissements publics de coopération intercommunale (EPCI) or intercommunalité.

EPCI without fiscal autonomy

The oldest form of intercommunal cooperation is the very loose "associative" form whereby communes - but also other territorial collectivities (departments, regions) - join together to provide one or more public services or utilities. The first such form of intercommunal cooperation was created in 1890, expanded in 1935 and 1959.

1. 10,055 Syndicat intercommunal à vocation unique (Sivu) The oldest form of basic intercommunal cooperation created in 1890, the Sivu may only provide one service. At the outset, communes joined together to provide services such as electricity or running water which they could not provide on their own. Today, Sivu includes syndicates with resposibility for waste management, school transportation and so forth.

2. 3,296 Syndicats mixtes Created in 1935, the syndicats mixtes associate different territorial collectivities (EPCI, departments, regions) and, in some cases, distinct legal personalities. They do not directly provide services, but they are a forum for different territorial collectivities and actors to cooperate amongst themselves or debate certain issues. The 2010 reform allowed for the creation of Pôles métropolitains, a kind of mixed syndicate, aimed at associating different urban areas (for example, the 'Sillon Lorrain' between Metz, Nancy, Thionville and Epinal).

The Paris Métropole is an example of a mixed syndicate, made up of 203 territorial collectivities including general councils, the regional councils and over 100 communes. It serves as some kind of vague think-tank/study group on issues related to the Greater Paris projects.
 
3. 1,329 Syndicat intercommunal à vocations multiples (Sivom) The Sivom were created in 1959 and are similar to the Sivu, with the exception that a Sivom provides more than one service.

Communes may belong to more than one such structure.

These 3 structures do not have fiscal autonomy - meaning they cannot set their own tax rates - and they are dependent on the individual contributions from each communes/territorial collectivity; but also additional taxes distinct from communal taxes and state transfers.

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EPCI with fiscal autonomy

EPCI with fiscal autonomy are now the most common, widespread and important form of intercommunal cooperation in France. They coexist alongside and overlap with the plethora of EPCI without fiscal autonomy (Sivu, Sivom etc), but the number of EPCI without fiscal autonomy has generally declined as EPCI with fiscal autonomy are increasingly attractive to all kinds of communes.

The first kind of intercommunal structures were the 'districts', created in 1959. Districts were abolished in 1999 and entirely phased out by 2002. The second major step in intercommunal cooperation came with the creation of urban communities (CU) in 1966. A 1992 law created the communautés de villes and the communautés de communes to deal with intercommunal structures in urban and rural areas respectively. The communautés de villes were a total flop, but the communautés de communes (CC) in rural areas have been a huge success.

The Chevènement law in 1999 marked a key moment in intercommunal cooperation. It beefed up the responsibilities of urban communities and the communautés de communes, abolished the failed structures (communautés de villes, districts) and created a new kind of structure: agglomeration communities (CA).

The 2010 Sarkozy reform sought to clean up the intercommunal structure. According to the law, by 2014, all communes in France (except Mayotte) must be part of an EPCI - the law charged prefects with drafting proposals which must be approved by the departmental commissions in charge of intercommunal cooperation (CDCI). The reform also created a new structure, the "metropolis" (métropole) for very large urban centres. Finally, the 2010 reform included a controversial fiscal reform, which I will come back to later.

For all its grandiose ambitions, the law has been a mixed success so far. The reform of the EPCI structures have been carried out in contradictory manners by local prefects, which either proved too trigger-happy to create bigger EPCI or which were quite timid and allowed smaller EPCI, many of them with 'weird' shapes, to subsist.

To fix the 'messy' map of EPCIs built over the years; the 2010 reform reiterated that all EPCI with fiscal autonomy must be geographically contiguous without enclaves. In reality, this condition is not met.

1. 1 Metropolis (Métropole) The métropole was created by the 2010 reform and is designed for large cities and urban areas. The law reserves the status to those territories with a population of over 500,000 and/or the four original urban communities created in 1966. This meant that 8 current urban communities were eligible to gain the metropolis status; thus far, only one has become a metropolis: Métropole Nice Côte d'Azur, with a population of 545,000 - created by the merger of the old Nice CU and 3 CCs.

The component communes transfer some of their powers to the metropolis. These responsibilities include social, cultural and economic development; urban planning and policy; management of local social housing plans; management of public services (sanitation, water, cemeteries, slaughterhouses); environmental policies including recycling and air pollution reduction. The department transfers responsibilities such as departmental roads and school transportation, with the possibility of the metropolis gaining full powers over social action, middle schools and other services from the department. The region and the State may also devolve powers to the metropolis.

2. 15 Urban Communities (Communauté urbaine, CU) The urban communities were created in 1966, meant to cover the largest urban areas. Four urban areas were created by the law in 1966 (Lyon, Lille, Bordeaux, Strasbourg), today there are 15 CUs in France (Lyon, Lille, Marseille, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nantes, Strasbourg, Nancy, Brest, Dunkerque, Le Mans, Arras, Creusot-Montceau, Cherbourg, Alençon). Although the 1999 Chevènement law reserved the CU status to territories with a population over 500,000; urban communities created before that date have been allowed to retain their status, so 9 of the 15 CUs have a population under 500,000 - the smallest CU, Alençon, has only 48.7k people. The 2010 reform, creating the metropolis, lowered the threshold for the creation of new CUs to 450,000. Future CUs include Rouen, Grenoble, Montpellier amd Metz-Thionville although only Rouen's current EPCI meets the 450,000 threshold.

Every CU has mandatory powers, transferred from the component communes. These powers are: social, cultural and economic development; urban planning and policies; public transit; management of social housing; management of public services (sanitation, water, cemeteries, slaughterhouses); and environmental policies including recycling and air pollution reduction. Communes may devolve further powers to the CUs, while they may gain some power over social action from the department.

3. 213 Agglomeration Communities (Communauté d'agglomération, CA) Agglomeration communities were created by the Chevènement law in 1999 for urban areas including medium or large cities. According to the law, CAs must have a population of over 50,000 with at least one commune of at least 15,000 inhabitants (unless the CA includes the capital and/or largest city of a department). However, the law allowed for the transformation of districts, communauté de villes or CCs into CAs even if they did not meet the population requirements. The CA scheme has proven to be extremely popular, from 50 CAs in 2000 there are now 213 CAs.

Every CA has powers, transferred from the communes, over social, cultural and economic development; urban planning and policies; social housing; and public transit. Each CA must also choose 3 of 6 additional powers from the following powers: road maintenance, sanitation, water, environmental protection, social action in the community's interest, and cultural/sports equipment. Communes may decide to devolve other powers to the CA. Furthermore, the CA may decide to define additional powers which it judges to be in the community's interest.

4. 2,223 Community of Communes (Communautés de communes, CC) The CCs, created in 1992 for rural areas, are the loosest type of EPCI with fiscal autonomy. Although the other creation of the 1992 law (the communauté de villes) was a huge flop, the CC has been extremely popular and they have, slowly and incompletely, replaced Sivu or Sivom structures. CCs have two main advantages for small rural communes, which remain very closely attached to the "republic traditions" of communal independence and local democracy. Firstly, they allow them to provide local services in cooperation with neighboring communes. Secondly, the CCs are a form of territorial organization which allows them to maintain their independence vis-a-vis larger urban areas (CAs) which would like to gobble them up. There were 2,223 CCs as of January 1 2013; their number has been declining from a high of 2,409 in 2010 as a number of them are dissolved to join larger CCs or CAs.

The CCs have two mandatory powers transferred from the communes: economic development and spatial planning. They must also choose one power from the following six 'options': environmental protection, housing policy, road maintenance, construction and management of preschools, elementary school, cultural and sport equipment, social action in the community's interest, and sanitation.

5. 4 Syndicates of New Agglomerations (Syndicat d'agglomération nouvelle, SAN) The least common type of intercommunalities, the SAN were created by the Rocard law in 1983 and were meant to cover specifically new towns (villes nouvelles) such as Cergy-Pontoise, Marne-la-Vallée, Sénart or Ouest Provence (Rives de l’Étang de Berre). The 1999 law gradually phased them out, from a maximum of 9 SAN in 2000 there are now only four left, 3 of them in the Paris region. Many former SAN have become CAs, the remaining 4 SAN are expected to do likewise.

Although the State and prefects in each department have often played a large role in spearheading the EPCI, they cannot usually unilaterally force any commune to join an EPCI. With some exceptions, the final decision for joining an EPCI rests with individual communes. Mayors, especially those from thinly populated rural communes, remain closely attached to the notion of communal independence and many respond unfavourably to decisions and instructions from above.

As of January 1 2013, 36,049 communes in metro France and the 4 DOMs (except Mayotte) are members of an EPCI leaving only 615 communes as 'isolates' which are still outside an EPCI. 98% of all communes and 92% of the French population are currently covered by an EPCI. 11.8% of the population lives in a metropolis or CU, 38.7% live in a CA and 41.3% live in a CC.

Most 'isolates' are found in Ile-de-France, where intercommunal cooperation is a headache for every government. Paris itself is not a member of any EPCI, and although the three Petite Couronne departments have an increasingly larger number of CAs, a substantial minority of the population in those three departments still live outside an EPCI.

The 2010 reforms did not concern Ile-de-France, ostensibly because works on the perennial "Grand Paris" project was put off till later. Outside the Parisian region, only a tiny handful of communes remain outside an EPCI.

Here is a map of EPCIs as of 01/01/2013: http://www.dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr/workspaces/members/desl/documents/intercommunalite/carto_epci_fp/2013/carte_epci_a_fiscali1037/downloadFile/file/Carte_EPCIaFP2013.pdf?nocache=1361536288.81

Here are stats and numbers on EPCIs as of 01/01/2013: http://www.dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr/workspaces/members/desl/documents/intercommunalite/bilan_statistique/2013/bilan_statistique_au/downloadFile/file/BilanStat_EPCIaFP_2013.pdf?nocache=1360768738.52

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Governance of EPCIs with fiscal autonomy

Each EPCI with fiscal autonomy (metropolis, CU, CA, CC, SAN) has a deliberative assembly, the Conseil communautaire or community council, which has a similar role to a municipal council.

Each commune which is a member of an EPCI is represented in the community council proportionally to its population, with each commune holding at least one seat. In addition, no single commune may hold over half of the seats in the community council. All community councillors are municipal councillors or mayors.

Each community council elects a president (in addition to vice-presidents) which has a role similar to a mayor, except for the whole EPCI.

EPCI executives form a "loophole" in the current regulations concerning the cumul des mandats, which means that most presidents of EPCIs tend to be the mayor of the largest commune in the EPCI (or another large town in the same EPCI), provided that the largest commune and the EPCI are of the same political 'colour'.

In the past, all community councillors were elected by the respective municipal councils - which meant that the opposition group(s) in any commune were almost always excluded from the community council and whole delegations from a commune represented the governing majority. Given the significant and ever-increasing powers of EPCIs, their management by unelected bodies was often criticized and weakened their democratic legitimacy.

In 2014, community councillors will be elected semi-directly in communes with over 500 inhabitants. Community councillors from villages with less than 500 inhabitants will still be elected indirectly by the respective municipal council. The election will be 'semi-direct' because voters will not be able to choose who will sit in the community council. Rather, on every list for municipal elections the names of those chosen to sit in the community council will be indicated by an arrow. As I understand the current legalese language of the draft law, this will allow opposition groups to be represented in a commune's delegation to the community council.

EPCI financing

Communes and intercommunalities have three main sources of funding: taxes (about the three-fifths of their revenues), unconditional transfers and grants from the State and loans.

The main local direct taxes are the housing tax (taxe d'habitation), the land value taxes (taxe sur le foncier bâti, taxe sur le foncier non bâti) and the cotisation foncière des entreprises (CFE). Communes and the five types of EPCI outlined above are said to be fiscally autonomous. While they are not allowed to create or levy taxes on their own (the taxes are created and collected by the State) they have the power to set the rates for local taxes. Fiscal autonomy, however, is conditioned by the State which has set various guidelines, limits or rules for local taxation.

The 2010 reform introduced a major, and rather controversial, change to local finances. The professional or business tax (taxe professionnelle, TP) was abolished and replaced, partially, by the Territorial Economic Contribution (contribution économique territoriale, CET). The TP was a tax paid by every business/corporation and was the largest single source of revenue for all territorial collectivities, which set the local rate. Arguing that the TP was hindering the country's economic competitiveness, Sarkozy abolished the TP. It was replaced, but only partially, by the new CET.

The CET is the sum of two taxes paid by businesses/corporations: the cotisation foncière des entreprises (CFE) which is a land value tax (taxe foncière) and the cotisation sur la valeur ajoutée des entreprises (CVAE) which is a value added tax based on a business' annual turnover. The entirety of the CFE is directed by the communes and EPCIs, who have retained the right to set the local rate. The CVAE, whose rate is set by the State, and is distributed between the region (25%), department (48.5%) and communes/EPCI (26.5%). The replacement of the TP by the CET meant that territorial collectivities not only lost a major source of revenue but also a good deal of their fiscal autonomy. Nevertheless, the State promised to fully compensate territorial collectivities for any loses incurred by the transition. Since the CET rakes in less revenue than the TP, new taxes or fiscal transfers (from the State or between territorial collectivities) have been created to make up the difference. One of those new taxes is the imposition forfaitaire sur les entreprises de réseaux (IFER), a tax on energy equipments (wind turbines, electricity generating plants, electrical transformers etc). The IFER is split between all territorial collectivities.

There are two (and a half) kinds of financing/funding for EPCIs with fiscal autonomy:

1. 'Additional taxation' (régime de la fiscalité additionnelle) This is the initial and basic system, which applies for 1,110 CCs and 2 CUs created before 1999 which have switched to the other system. The intercommunal structure in question has the power to set intercommunal tax rates (for the four local taxes: housing tax, land value taxes, CFE) but these tax rates are 'additional' to the local tax rates set by the component communes. The intercommunal tax rate in effect sets a 'ceiling' on the tax rate for each commune, but this system allows for variations in the tax rates (especially the CFE) between communes in the same EPCI. The communal fraction of the CVAE is divided between the intercommunality and the communes.

1.1. Fiscalité professionnelle de zone, FPZ) Some CCs may choose to create economic activity zones (ZAE) within the territory of the EPCI which will have a single, uniform intercommunal CFE rate (all transferred to the EPCI). Businesses located within the ZAE will pay the intercommunal CFE, but business located outside a ZAE will pay different tax rates depending on the commune.

2. 'Unique professional taxation' (régime de la fiscalité professionnelle unique, FPU) This is the newer system, which is mandatory since 1999 for all CAs, SAN and since 2010 for the new metropolises. The FPU is also mandatory for all CUs created after 1999 and is automatically granted to those created before 1999 unless they decide otherwise. 13 of the 15 CUs have chose the FPU system, as have 1,123 CCs. Under the FPU (formerly TPU) system, only the intercommunality decides on the CFE rate and it receives the entirety of the CFE's revenues (and all of the communal fraction of the CVAE). Therefore, communes member of an EPCI which has opted for the FPU do not receive any part of the CFE or CVAE. The EPCI still sets 'additional' tax rates on the three other taxes.

The 2010 reform also allowed for a further harmonization of tax rates for some or all three other taxes (housing tax, land value taxes). The EPCIs would set the rates and receive the entirety of the revenue. I have no clue how widespread this new system is.

I should cover the electoral system for municipal elections (finally!) next, before explaining a bit of the current government's reforms. Any questions/issues/complaints etc?

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Generally speaking, North-Eastern France has way more communes by département than the rest of the country. I would guess this is due to much less secularization in this part of the country before the Revolution, and therefore more individual parishes being turned into independent communes in 1789, but maybe I'm wrong, Hash ?

See this map :

I'm pretty sure it has a lot to do with settlement patterns. The map corresponds pretty well (except along the Mediterranean) to the map of dispersed vs. nucleated populations in the 1800s. Settlements in northeastern France, with some exceptions (like the Thiérache), have tended to be extremely nucleated with the population concentrated in the 'chef-lieu' of the commune rather than dispersed in hamlets/lieux-dits throughout the communal territory as was the case in western France (the bocage vendéen, for example).

Re: Metz-Thionville. It appears to be an old idea which comes up every now and then and nothing ever gets done about it ever. See: http://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/28125/metz-et-thionville-pensent-leur-espace-partagee/

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1.1 Electoral System for municipal elections

All French and EU citizens, aged over 18 with full civic and political rights, may register to vote. Since 2001, EU citizens are allowed to vote granted that they have resided in the commune for the past six months and/or pay local taxes. Although EU citizens are allowed to run for office and serve as municipal councillors, they are constitutionally banned from becoming mayors or deputy mayors (adjoints au maire).

Unlike in some other EU countries (Scandinavia, Ireland, Benelux etc), resident non-EU foreigners are not allowed to vote in local elections in France. The extension of voting rights in local elections to non-EU foreign citizens has been a matter of hot political debate for years, and it returned to the spotlight during and after the 2012 presidential campaign. François Hollande promised to extend voting rights to foreigners in his presidential campaign, but since the left lacks the required majority in both houses of Parliament to affect such constitutional change, it has been dropped from the government's agenda for constitutional reform. Some right-wing politicians, including Sarkozy, personally supported it in the past but since 2007, it has become more steadfast in its opposition.

Number of seats in municipal councils

Population	# of seats
1-99	9*
100-499	11
500-1499	15
1500-2499	19
2500-3499	23
3500-4999	27
5000-9999	29
10000-19999	33
20000-29999	35
30000-39999	39
40000-49999	43
50000-59999	45
60000-79999	49
80000-99999	53
100000-149999	55
150000-199999	59
200000-249999	61
250000-299999	65
300000+	69
Lyon	73
Marseille	101
Paris	163

* Leménil-Mitry (Meurthe-et-Moselle) has more municipal councillors (9) than registered voters (8)!

The mayor is elected by the municipal council. In the first and second rounds, a mayoral candidate must win an absolute majority of valid votes. In the third round, a plurality is sufficient. In all communes, a mayor also has one or more adjoints (deputies).

Communes with over 3,500 inhabitants except Paris, Lyon and Marseille

Municipal councillors are elected by a two-round semi-proportional system, not all that dissimilar to the current electoral system for the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The commune forms a single 'constituency', it is not further subdivided into any sections. Since 2000, lists must respect gender parity - this means that lists must alternate between men and women.

A list must obtain an absolute majority of valid votes (50%+1) and 25% of registered voters to win by the first round. If no list meets this requirement, a second round is organized one week later. All lists which have won over 10% of valid votes are qualified for the runoff. Lists which have obtained between 5% and 10% of the valid votes are allowed to merge (fusionner) with a qualified list for the runoff, which will change the ordering of candidates on that list. A list which is qualified for the runoff may choose to drop out or merge with another list.

In the second round, a plurality of the votes is enough to win.

The list winning the most vote automatically wins half of all seats in the municipal council, rounded up to the nearest whole number if necessary. The remaining half of the seats are attributed proportionally to all lists which have won over 5% of valid votes using the highest averages method. Therefore, the main difference with the Italian system is that even the winning list not only receives a huge majority bonus, it also receives a good share of the other half of the seats (proportional to its vote share).

Obviously, the result is that whichever list wins the election - even if it is by a single vote and/or with something like 35% of the vote - will have a huge super-majority in the municipal council. For example, in Pau in 2008, the winning list won 39% of the vote and 71% of the seats. In Toulouse, again in 2008, the winning list won 50.4% and 75% of the seats.

The mayor often tends to be the top candidate of the winning list.

Paris, Lyon and Marseille

The three largest cities in France have a special electoral system, adopted in 1982 with the so-called 'PLM law'. Unlike other communes with over 3,500 inhabitants, the commune as a whole does not form a single 'constituency'. Rather, these cities are subdivided into de facto constituencies. Paris has 20 arrondissements, Lyon has 9 arrondissements while Marseille has 8 sectors each made up of two arrondissements.

The election is played in each individual arrondissement/sector, with the same system as in other communes with over 3,500 inhabitants.

Each arrondissement or sector has a local council with a variable number of seats. In turn, the municipal council is composed of representatives from each arrondissement/sector, whose number of seats on the municipal council is roughly half the seats in their arrondissement/sector council. The first name(s) elected on each list in each arrondissement/sector will sit in the municipal council.

Each arrondissement or sector also has a mayor (maire d'arrondissement/secteur), and the arrondissements/sectors have limited autonomy and manage a small budget given by the city-wide municipal government.

In Paris, there are a total of 354 conseillers d'arrondissement, with a minimum of 10 seats in each arrondissement's council. The 9 least populated arrondissements (arrdt. 1-9) each hold 10 seats, which has the effect of significantly overrepresenting the four core arrondissements (arrdt. 1-4) with the smallest populations, at the expense of the more populated 'outer' arrondissements. The city council (Conseil de Paris) has 163 seats, with a minimum of 3 councillors by arrondissement, which, once again, overrepresents the core arrondissements with smaller populations.

In Lyon, there are a total of 148 conseillers d'arrondissement, again with a minimum of 10 seats for the least populated arrondissements (arrdt. 1, 2, 4). The municipal council has 73 seats, with the least populated arrondissement (arrdt. 1) holding four seats. The over/under-representation is less egregious in Lyon than in Paris.

Marseille has 16 municipal arrondissements, but unlike in Lyon or Paris they serve no administrative role. Elections, instead, are held in eight sectors which are made up of two arrondissements each. Each sector has a local council, for a total of 202 sectoral councillors in the entire city. The city council has 101 seats.

Therefore, to summarize, there are no city-wide municipal elections with a single list in Paris, Lyon or Marseille. There are, instead, elections in each arrondissements/sector which decide the city council. You could compare this system to the electoral college in the United States, with some differences.

Unlike the electoral college, the individual elections in each administrative division does not give a WTA result, although each arrondissement/sector's delegation to the city council will be heavily dominated by whichever list won the election in that arrondissement/sector. If a list was to win every single arrondissement or sector, it would have a governing majority comparable to governing majorities in other French cities. However, because of the PLM law, there is a small chance that no singe list could win an absolute majority. Furthermore, if the election is close and the main rivals each win roughly the same number of arrondissements/sectors, it is quite likely that whoever wins will have only a thin absolute majority on the council (this is currently the case in Marseille, with 51 seats for the mayor's majority against 49 for the left and one for the FN).

Like in the United States, the PLM system means that one party's lists may win the most votes in the city as a whole but still win less seats than some other list on the city council. This has happened in the past, most famously in Marseille in 1983 when Gaston Defferre lost the popular vote but held a majority on city council because he had, as interior minister, gerrymandered the sectors in such a way to win reelection. The right-wing government under Jacques Chirac changed the sector map in Marseille to what it currently is in 1987.

Communes with less than 3,500 inhabitants

Municipal councillors in communes with less than 3,500 inhabitants are elected by majority at-large voting (also called bloc voting or multiple non-transferable vote, MNTV). Gender parity laws do not apply.

These elections still feature lists of candidates, although lists are not mandatory. In communes with over 2,500 inhabitants, lists must be complete (candidates for every seat on the council). In communes with less than 2,500 inhabitants, incomplete lists are allowed. However, unlike in larger communes where the lists are closed, in these communes voters will vote for individuals (they have as many votes as there are seats) and panachage is allowed - voters may strike off the name of a candidate on a list, or they may reorder candidates on a list. They may also write-in the names of other citizens who are not candidates, and their vote is valid even if there are more or less names on the ballot than there are seats in the municipal council. Votes are then counted by each individual candidate rather than by lists.

Candidates are elected in the first round if they have won an absolute majority of valid votes (50%+1) and 25% of registered voters. If not all seats are filled by the first round, the remaining seats are filled in a second round a week later. In the second round, a plurality suffices.

Studies have shown that the actual use of 'panachage' by voters is extremely limited.

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The different electoral system for 'large' and 'small' communes reflects the different nature of local government in those communes. Municipal elections in large communes have been politicized, often along clearly identifiable national ideological and partisan divides, for decades now; and, since the 1970s, national political conditions have played an even larger role in municipal elections in large towns. In almost every single commune over 3,500 inhabitants, the concepts of 'left' and 'right', 'majority' and 'opposition' are very present and partisanship is high. However, in 'small' communes, local government still tends to be far more consensual. In most cases, there is no clear identifiable 'opposition' group in the municipal council and partisanship and ideology is often blurred, unclear or absent.

Evolution of the electoral system

The current electoral system was adopted in 1982 and first used in the 1983 municipal elections. It is tough to find information on electoral systems before that point, but I have patched together information.

Municipal elections in Paris have always been fought by arrondissement. In Lyon and Marseille, elections have been held at the arrondissement/sector level since 1965.

Under the Fourth Republic and in 1959, municipal elections in Paris and other communes with over 120,000 inhabitants were held under party-list proportional representation with no majority bonus (that I know of).

Say what you will about the limited proportionality of municipal councils, but the situation was even more disproportional between 1965 and 1983. PR was dropped in 1965, instead the list which won the election won every single seat on the municipal council. The division of Paris, Lyon and Marseille into sectors allowed the opposition there to hold some seats on the municipal council. In 1977, Toulouse and Nice were also divided into sectors, which again allowed the opposition to hold a few seats.

Paris has had a mayor and autonomous municipal government since 1977. The office of mayor was abolished in 1871 and re-established in 1975. While the city retained a municipal council (whose members were also general councillors of the Seine department until 1968), the city was directly administered by the prefect, nominated by the State. The president of the city council held only symbolic powers.

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What was the old sector map?

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2. Reforming French local government

Since the Defferre laws in 1982, practically every single government has 'reformed' local government and territorial collectivities in one way or another. The most important reforms to local government after 1982 were, as aforementioned, Raffarin's 'Act II' in 2003-2004 and Sarkozy's big reform in 2010. In most cases, instead of simplifying the administrative structure or engaging in a coherent and thorough reform of French decentralization, governments have preferred to add another layer to what is commonly called the mille-feuille (a delicious puff pastry with different layers). Critics of the current structure of local government say it is inefficient and wasteful. Indeed, there are many redundancies and overlaps between the different levels of government.

To be fair, however, it is hard to fundamentally shake up French local government. Mayors and their constituents are very proud of their commune's independence, which is widely seen as a core "republican principle" inherited from the Revolution and legally entrenched in 1984. That is the honourable side of the story. With France's unique cumul des mandats where most parliamentarians are also local elected officials, decentralization and the proliferation of local government structures has provided tons of jobs to current and former national politicians (for example, deputies who lose reelection often have a cushy local job to fall back on). It has also created a clique of local 'barons' who are very powerful actors keen on preserving their personal fiefdom and the advantages it procures.

The guiding principle of the 2010 Sarkozy reform was 'efficiency'. Inspired by the Attali and Balladur commissions (2008, 2009) which had decried the profligate 'excessive' and 'wasteful' spending of territorial collectivities, Sarkozy wanted to cut down on redundancies and make local government more efficient and cost-effective. Opponents, and there were many, said that his reform amounted to 'recentralization' and the loss of fiscal autonomy (with the elimination of the TP).

The central aspect of his reform was the creation of the 'territorial councillor'. The Attali commission proposed abolishing departments, the Balladur commission proposed a de facto merger of the department and the region (he also proposed to reduce the number of regions from 22 to 15). The new territorial councillor, elected in 3517 cantons after 2014, would sit in both the general and regional councils. This would have amounted, again, to a de facto merger of the department and regions, although without reducing the number of regions. The government argued it would make local government more efficient and reduce the number of elected officials (general and regional councillors) from 5800 to 3500. Opponents claimed that the government's reforms would mean 'recentralization'.

The Sarkozy reform also abolished and partially replaced the TP, strengthened EPCIs, removed the clause de compétence générale for departments and regions, and 'rationalized' the division of powers between all levels to prevent redundancies.

Ideas and models for decentralization and local government reforms

A lot of people have ideas about how local government should be reformed. Some of them are realistic ideas which can/will actually happen, others are wet dreams or unrealistic proposals.

• Abolishing departments: This is an old idea, which was officially endorsed by the Attali commission in 2008. Departments would be abolished, eliminating a whole level of local government and dividing their powers between the regions and communes/EPCIs. Departments are in a vulnerable position, being some kind of 'weak' level between the fairly strong regions and the ever-stronger intercommunalities. Still, a lot of people still identify with their department and there is some sense of 'departmental identity' in some regions and case - as evidenced by the reaction to eliminate the department's official number from license plates. And this is without taking into account the influence and power of the 101 presidents of general councils, who could be expected to fight tooth-and-nail against any reform which would even appear to dismantle departments.
• Reducing the number of regions: Some claim that France has 'too many' regions compared to other European countries (Italy, Spain, Germany) and that they are too small to be top-level European actors. This isn't really true, and the argument that less regions is better doesn't hold water for long. The Balladur commission proposed reducing the number of regions in metro France from 22 to 15, but the Sarkozy reform did not take up this radical idea. This is another story which will never happen, because regional councils would never agree to abolish their own regions and merge with some other region. If somehow it did work out, then it would create regions which are even more artificial and akin to technocratic 'economic regions' drawn up by gnomes (for example, some ideas for reducing regions include creating some 'Grand Ouest' region).
• Single collectivity (Collectivité unique) This idea, however, could actually happen - in some cases, it will happen. A single collectivity refers to merging the general and regional councils into a single council, which would have the powers of the department and the region. As Interior minister, Sarkozy promoted this idea in Corsica but it was voted down in a local referendum in 2003. However, Guyane and Martinique will become 'single collectivities' after voting in favour of such a project in 2011.
  A referendum on the creation of a single collectivity will be held in Alsace on April 7. If approved, it would create a single Conseil d'Alsace, structured similarly to the Corsican territorial collectivity (a deliberative council with a separate executive council). It would have the powers of the department and the region, with additional powers transferred from the State. Proponents say it would save lots of money and strengthen the region. The opposition, which appears weak and limited, does not really think it would reduce costs by all that much and some - like the FN or the far-left - fear that this change might lead to secession and so forth (as far as I'm concerned, this is ridiculous Jacobin bullsh**t which consists of panicking if you give some region more powers than just protecting birdies).
  The Alsatian example might inspire other regions to follow suit. Some regional councillors in Brittany, for example, have openly indicated interest. Though in the Breton case, the thorny issue of reunification will probably hinder progress.
• Strengthening EPCIs: Successive governments since 1999 have actively promoted the intercommunality and have been pushing all communes in France to join an EPCI, notably by offering additional fiscal goodies to EPCIs. It is unclear where the governments really intend to go with all this (assuming they know themselves...), but people hope/fear that it will eventually lead to a de facto replacement of the commune by the intercommunality, retaining communes as less powerful parts of a broader intercommunal structure (with powers perhaps similar to municipal arrondissements). But the EPCI scheme, in the long run, could be weakened by continued tensions between the dominant commune in the EPCI and smaller, peripheral communes which resent the dominant city for social, economic or political reasons (don't downplay the role of partisan intrigues and partisan squabbles in EPCIs!).
• Federalism/major decentralization: The Greens officially support 'differentiated federalism' which could involve giving law-making powers to strong regions. This will, naturally, never happen in a million years; and it is hard to say to what extent the Greens are serious about this or whether they just put it in there out of naive tradition. (This is, naturally, my preferred solution: Breizh Atao!)

Next: the current government's reforms

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You continue to be awesome, Hash.

Thank you very much.

2.1 Current reforms

In the 2012 campaign, François Hollande promised to abrogate the creation of the territorial councillor and engage in a broader reform of decentralized local government, which has been styled by the government as 'Act III' of decentralization.

The creation of the territorial councillor was repealed in November 2012 by the Parliament.

Debate on the so-called 'Valls law' (officially; Projet de loi relatif à l’élection des conseillers départementaux, des conseillers municipaux et des conseillers intercommunaux, et modifiant le calendrier électoral) is ongoing. The law follows on the abolition of the territorial councillor by proposing a new electoral system for the election of general councillors, sets the rules for the election of intercommunal councillors and modifies the electoral calendar.

Here is a brief rundown of the main aspects of this law:

• Binôme: This is the key aspect of this law and the subject of most heated political debate. For the election of general councillors - which will now be known as 'departmental councillors' in 'departmental councils' - the government has devised a novel electoral system. The number of cantons in each department will be divided by half (which means that there will be a redistricting of cantons), with each canton electing two departmental councillors by 'general ticket' representation in a two-round system. This means that everybody will run in pairs, with one man and one woman, forming a so-called 'binôme paritaire'. Voters, however, will not be able to split their votes between different pairs; they will only vote for a single pair just like they currently vote for a single individual in cantonal elections. The electoral system will not change from the system currently used for cantonal elections (need 50%+1 and 25% of registered voters to win by the first round, all candidates winning over 12.5% of registered voters qualified for the runoff), except that, of course, two members would be returned from each canton.
  The government argues that this new system would guarantee gender parity in departmental assemblies, which remain overwhelmingly male-dominated (parity laws are hard to apply with single-member elections). The new system, by requring a nationwide cantonal redistricting, would finally fix the egregious population disparities between cantons and the massive over or under-representation of certain areas within a single department. For the PS, this novel electoral system allows them to perpetuate the domination of departmental assemblies with the two main parties, but also set aside a few seats for their Green and PRG allies (through the binôme).
  Basically every other party, even the Greens and Left Radicals, oppose the binôme. The right is still bitter over the left repealing its reform, and it accuses the government of conspiring to gerrymander cantons (pretty rich coming from the masters of gerrymandering!). The Greens and smaller parties would have much preferred to elect departmental assemblies by proportional representation.
  Many local elected officials are concerned by the plans to cut the number of cantons in each department in half. Indeed, the binôme idea opens a can of worms on this topic. The plan would not fix the major differences in the average number of voters in each canton from department to department. To make matters even worse, the Senate managed to get the National Assembly to agree to a very loose 30% deviation limit from the departmental average. Secondly, by reducing cantons by half, sparsely populated departments will have small assemblies with councillors representing large cantons with little grassroots connections to local voters. The text currently adopted by the National Assembly includes an article stipulating that no department with a population over 500,00 may have have less than 17 councillors and that no department with a population between 150,000 and 500,000 may have less than 13 cantons.
• Lowering the population threshold for semi-proportional election of municipal councillors: The Valls law would lower the population threshold for the election of municipal councillors by two-round semi-proportional list voting from 3,500 inhabitants to either 500 or 1,000 inhabitants. The Senate, mayors and the right wants the threshold set at 1,000; the government, the left and the National Assembly want the threshold even lower, at 500. This would also apply to the election of EPCI councillors: in communes with over 500/1,000 inhabitants, EPCI councillors would be elected semi-directly by the fléchage system.
  Since the National Assembly will have the final word, the threshold will probably be lowered to 500 people. The proponents of this change argue that it would ensure gender parity in even more municipal councils and allow for the representation of opposition factions. Many, however, are critical of this change despite these laudable goals. As explained previously, small communes - like those with 500 to 1,000 inhabitants - are used to consensual and non-partisan/non-ideological government. By lowering the threshold, this could create two situations: breaking up the old traditions of consensual non-partisan local democracy in small towns by forcing politicized elections on them; but also uncontested elections due to the inability of a particular side (like local opposition) to put together a full list of candidates (this is a major factor: even in towns over 3,500 people, small parties have a hard time finding enough people to put together the mandatory full list of candidates). All in all, this sounds like another Great Idea^TM from the Parisian technocrats who know best.
• Semi-direct of intercommunal councillors: As described above, intercommunal councillors (for communes which use list PR for municipal elections) will now be semi-directly elected by the fléchage system at the same time and on the same list as municipal councillors.
• Modification of the electoral calendar: Regional and 'departmental' elections are postponed from March 2014 to March 2015. Officially to prevent 'electoral overload' in 2014 with municipal elections in March, European elections in June and indirect Senatorial elections in September. Unofficially to save the left's thin Senate plurality in September 2014.
• Minor modification to the number of seats in municipal councils: The number of municipal councillors in communes with 1 to 99 inhabitants would be lowered to 7.
• Re-apportionment of seats in the Conseil de Paris The 7th, 16th and 17th arrdt would lose one seat each in Paris' municipal council while the 10th, 19th and 20th arrdt each gain a seat. This appears to be a slightly more proportional apportionment, but the right complains that the government is adding seats in left-wing sectors and removing seats from right-wing sectors (which is factually correct).

The bill was presented in the Senate first, which rejected it in first reading on January 18 with 165 votes against and 142 votes in favour. Only the PS and Greens voted in favour, the Communists and RDSE (PRG) abstained, the UMP and UDI-UC voted against. The National Assembly adopted an amended text in first reading on February 26, with 272 in favour and 241 against. Only one non-Socialist voted in favour. In second reading, the Senate adopted a version which removed the binôme and rejected lowering the threshold from 1,000 to 500. On April 2, in second reading, the National Assembly adopted a version which reinstated the binôme and 500 threshold. No non-Socialist voted in favour, with the Greens and Left Radicals abstaining. The usual Commission mixte paritaire used to resolve differences between both houses was unable to reach a compromise. This means that both houses will read the final text once again, but the National Assembly will then read it a final time and adopt it.

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Not sure if this has become too boring, tedious and legalese for readers; but I'll get through it.

"Act III" of decentralization?

The Valls law deals with the electoral system and calendar for local elections, rather than with the organization and division of powers between territorial collectivities and the State. The present government has been talking up its plans to mark a new step in decentralization, flaunting its project(s) as "Act III" of decentralization. Marylise Lebranchu (Minister for State Reform, Decentralization and the Public Sector) and Anne-Marie Escoffier (Junior Minister for Decentralization) are the two cabinet ministers responsible for this "third act". Lebranchu came up with a gigantic draft law, nearly 200 pages long, which dealt with everything under the sun from intercommunalities, metropolis, the organization of local government in the greater Paris, regions, departments and local finances.

The draft law was due to be debated in cabinet this month, but before it could even be formally presented to cabinet, the government backtracked and announced that it was changing tack on the issue. Instead of presented it as a single piece of legislation (some kind of 'omnibus bill'), Lebranchu's draft will be broken up into three separate bills which will each be presented at different times. The first bill, which will come up for debate in cabinet and later in Parliament the soonest, deals with intercommunalities and the new metropolis status. It is the least controversial subject out of the three main themes addressed in Lebranchu's original law, and the government does not seem to be anticipating significant opposition or resistance. However, the most controversial parts - dealing with local finances, budgets and responsibilities - will not come up for at least a few months. The original bill had sparked much vocal criticism from local elected officials and even Socialist local 'barons' (well represented in the Senate), and it appears as if the government wants to do without a public spat over the issue (like Sarkozy got in 2010) and prefers dialogue with critics and opponents. The second part of the bill, dealing with regions, should come up for debate later this year.

I went through the 20-page overview of the original draft law, a rather verbose, legalese and boring document. I really have no life.

The most relevant aspects, for now, deal with intercommunalities and the metropolis.

The bill wants to strengthen intercommunalities, by devolving more powers - mandatory and optional powers - to all types of EPCI with fiscal autonomy.

CCs, CAs and CUs will now have mandatory responsibility over the promotion of tourism (opening tourist offices), collective and non-collective sanitation, the management of water bodies and the management/maintenance of areas for vagrants/Travellers (gens du voyage). Additionally, CCs will have two additional options to choose from when choosing their optional powers, including urban policy. The population threshold for creating CUs will be lowered to 400,000.

The main aspect of the draft law at this point is the metropolis, to entrench the latest echelon of intercommunalities created by the Sarkozy reform in 2010. Thus far, only one metropolis has been created - Nice - no doubt helped out by the fact that basically every commune in there has a UMP mayor!

The government's bill wants to 'resolve' the complete mess which is intercommunal governance in Île-de-France/Greater Paris. Commentators in France often point out how Paris proper has a fairly small population and a tiny land area, in contrast to the Greater London which governs a far larger (and populous) area. Successive governments have had no clue how to deal with intercommunal governance in Île-de-France, a very touchy topic politically because of how economically, socially and political polarized the region is. More so than in any other urban region in France (even Marseille), partisan differences - tied to class and economics - have made any type of intercommunal governance in the Parisian region a major headache. Right-wing mayors in affluent suburbs don't want to be forced into a big structure with the poorer, left-wing parts which would, they fear, overpower them and force feed them awful things such as poor people in social housing. Left-wing mayors in proletarian suburbs don't want anything to do with right-wingers who would, they fear, overpower them economically and fiscally. And this isn't even taking into account the longstanding fraternal enmity between Socialists and Communists, the clan wars of the UMP in the Hauts-de-Seine or the amusingly Medieval turf wars between mayors (for example, the Balkany-Catoire warfare).

The 2010 reform postponed the issue of Parisian governance till later; this year, the government seems to have the intention of tackling the issue (although I wouldn't hold my breath). According to the bill, the entirety of the Petite Couronne departments (92, 93, 94) will need to be part of an EPCI with fiscal autonomy by January 1 2016.

The bill would also create a kind of super-structure, the Métropole de Paris (to be created in 2016), which will include Paris proper and all EPCI in the statistical 'unité urbaine'. It will not be an EPCI with fiscal autonomy, but rather something akin (in my understanding) to the pôles métropolitains created by the 2010 reform. The goal of this super-structure will be cooperation 'in the metropolitan interest' for economic and sustainable development. From my reading of the draft law, it seems as if most of its responsibilities would be in housing and accommodation. So we would be left with the region, the departments, a metropolitan structure which isn't fiscally autonomous, EPCIs, communes and the city of Paris.

One of the most important parts of this bill, which will probably happen, is the transformation of the Grand Lyon into a territorial collectivity, on January 1 2015. The territory of the current Lyon CU (Grand Lyon), likely expanded, will be transformed into a territorial collectivity which will entirely replace the department (Rhône), and which will have the powers of a EPCI metropolis, a department and some regional responsibilities. This means that what is currently the Rhône department will be amputated of the vast majority of its population, and will have authority and responsibility over the northern half of the current department (the Beaujolais region). The Lyon metropolis will take its place, entirely, in the south of the current department. This, more or less, already appears to be nearly a fait accompli - the mayor of Lyon and president of the CU Gérard Collomb (PS) and the president of the Rhône CG Michel Mercier (UDI) have already reached an agreement.

The bill would create an expanded Aix-Marseille Provence metropolis, on January 1 2015, which will consist of the current CU Marseille Métropole Provnce, the Aix CA, Aubagne CA, and CAs around the Étang de Berre (Salon-en-Provence, Istres, Martigues). It will have the regular powers of a metropolis. However, to alleviate the usual tensions in intercommunal governance in the region, the metropolitan structure will be divided into 'territories' each with a council, which will have a consultative role but could receive some mandatory and/or optional powers from the metropolis.

Finally, the bill would extend the metropolis status, by decree, to all EPCIs with over a population over 400,000 in a statistical urban area of over 500,000 inhabitants. The metropolis, furthermore, will also receive additional powers in environmental protection (public distribution of electricity, creation and maintenance of infrastructures for electric cars/hybrids and management of water bodies) and housing. If it signs a convention with the department, it could be transferred responsibilities over some departmental powers (including social action). These metropolis could, if they so choose, create consultative 'territorial councils' on their territory (but unlike in Marseille, they would not have any powers).

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"Act III" of decentralization?

A brief overview of the other parts of the original omnibus draft law, which may or may not appear in the final bills.

Regional powers

• Increased powers in economic development - responsibilities for aid to businesses, supporting innovation, business promotion abroad...
• Management of some or all EU funds for 2014-2020
• Increased powers in transportation - reopening railway lines, inter-regional passenger road transport, coordinating regional transport and transit policies (with the State and other organisms and territorial collectivities)...
• Increased powers in professional training, apprenticeships, teaching, orientation, higher education and research (regional scheme), and student housing

Organization and division of powers

• The Clause de compétence générale for regions and departments will be re-established
• Each level of decentralized government is designated as the 'leader' for certain shared powers: regions will be leaders in economic development and transportation; departments will be leaders in social action, social development, tourism, internet connectivity and territorial solidarity; communes/EPCI will be leaders in air quality, 'the ecological transition' and 'sustainable mobility'¹
• Creation of a Territorial Conference of Public Action (CTAP) in each region. The CTAP will promote dialogue and cooperation between territorial collectivities (in some cases the State), with the aim of organizing and dividing responsibilities for shared powers. The CTAP will be made up of the president of the CR, the presidents of the CG, representatives from each EPCI and, in some cases, the regional and departmental prefects
• A 'Pact of territorial governance' in each region to clarify responsibilities of various territorial collectivities and rationalizing their actions. Only territorial collectivities and EPCIs which have signed on to it will need to respect it, but there will be fiscal incentives to sign on to the pact and those who do not respect the pact will not receive subsidies
• Creation of a High Council of Territories (HCT) to promote direct dialogue between the State and territorial collectivities. The HCT will formulate proposals for reforms affecting territorial collectivities and could deliberate on any draft law affecting the organization of territorial collectivities and their responsibilities. It will be presided by the Prime Minister
• Communal/intercommunal responsibility for energy and management of water bodies is clarified

Local public finances and 'transparency'

• 'Financial transparency' - the executives of territorial collectivities will be held accountable to deliberative assemblies on actions taken following audits
• Stricter rules on budgets in large territorial collectivities
• Mandatory impact studies for all investment projects
• 'Financial responsibility' - regions and departments will participate in paying French fines to the EU in certain cases
• A finance commission will be mandatory in each commune with a population over 50,000
• Each voter will have the right to petition for the inclusion of any matter on the agenda

¹ Jesus Christ, isn't all this fluffy bullsh**t horrible? What the flying hell is 'sustainable mobility'?!

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People still kinda interested?

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Thanks for reviving this thread!

I mean to come back to continue my work/guide if anybody is interested, I've just been way too busy and will continue to be busy for the next month or so... Besides, nothing you could find my thesis-like diarrhea posts you can't find elsewhere probs.

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Everyone is spinning this as "Mennucci in the lead", but to my knowledge no newspaper has been able to read the right piece of news in that poll : FN is within the margin of error of PS in the first round. With low turnout (which is almost certain), this could easily end up a UMP-FN runoff. I'm even surprised the PS hasn't been using the "vote utile" bullsh**t with this result. I guess they need to install the possibility of MEnnucci winning in the end first, then they will shove the "vote utile" down every left-wing voter's throat throughout the campaign.

Not quite. Remember that Marseille has not one runoff, but up to eight runoffs, so these city-wide polls are a bit silly and I don't care much about them. There will be a lot of triangulaires, because the threshold it set at valid votes and not 'électeurs inscrits', and maybe a few UMP/PS runoffs in those sectors where the FN is weaker (1, 4) and maybe the off-chance of a fluke PS/FN runoff if the UMP polls like crap in the north (8) or maybe a UMP/FN runoff somewhere. It's all quite unpredictable, and possible that no list will win a majority on council.

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So there is no chance I will ever even continue this guide (not that it matters) but I will do a shorter but still thorough (hopefully) on my blog in March and I guess I can continue to use this thread and I can obviously answer any questions about anything.

I can start with a few polls:

Paris (Ifop, Dec 13-17)
Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 39%
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 38%
De Saint-Just (FN) 9%
Najdovski (EELV) 6.5%
Simonnet (PG) 5%
DVD 1.5%
Other 1%

Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 52.5%
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 47.5%

Paris-14 (Ifop, Dec 10-12)
Petit (PS-PCF-PRG) 39%
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 36%
Leost (FN) 8%
Blauel (EELV) 8%
Chaïbi (PG) 6%
Carrère-Gée (DVD) 1%
Other 2%

Petit (PS-PCF-PRG) 57%
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 43%

Paris-15 (Ifop, Dec 10-12)
Goujon (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 44%
Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 37%
Saint-Just (FN) 8%
Dumesnil (EELV) 5%
Poirault-Gauvin (DVD) 2.5%
Giboteau (PG) 2%
Other 1.5%

Goujon (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 48%
Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 44%
Saint-Just (FN) 8%

Goujon (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 54%
Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 46%

Older stuff

Pau (Ifop, Nov 11-13)
Bayrou (MoDem-UDI) 29%
Habib (PS)^ 27%
Urieta (Ind. [DVD]) 16%
Boëll (FN) 9%
Dartigolles (FG) 8%
Saubatte (UMP) 8%
Bled (EELV) 3%

Bayrou (MoDem-UDI) 42%
Habib (PS) 41%
Urieta (Ind. [DVD]) 17%

Béziers (Ifop, Nov 8-12)
Aboud (UMP)^ 36%
Ménard (FN) 35%
Du Plaa (PS-EELV) 18%
Couquet (FG) 10%
Other 1%

Aboud (UMP)^ 41%
Ménard (FN) 32%
Du Plaa (PS-EELV) 27%

Argenteuil (Ifop, Nov 4-6)
Doucet (PS-EELV)* 37%
Mothron (UMP) 33%
FN 15%
FG 13%
Other 2%

Toulouse (Ifop, Oct 28-30)
Cohen (PS-PCF-PRG)* 35%
Moudenc (UMP) 35%
Laroze (FN) 10%
Maurice (EELV) 7%
Sellin (PG) 5%
EXG 3%
de Veyrac (UDI) 3%
Plancade (DVG) 1%
Others 1%

Cohen (PS-PCF-PRG)* 51%
Moudenc (UMP) 40%
Laroze (FN) 9%

Cohen (PS-PCF-PRG)* 54%
Moudenc (UMP) 46%

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Another one:

Nice (Ifop, Nov 27-29)
Estrosi (UMP-UDI)* 47%
Allemand (PS-EELV) 18%
Arnautu (FN) 17%
Injey (FG) 6%
Icart/Peyrat (DVD) 5%
Bettati (UMP diss) 4%
Vardon (Nissa Rebela/EXD) 2%
Roullier (Parti niçois) 1%

Estrosi (UMP-UDI)* 54%
Allemand (PS-EELV) 24%
Arnautu (FN) 22%

Christian Estrosi won the 2008 election, comfortably defeating Patrick Allemand (PS) and incumbent mayor, since 1995, Jacques Peyrat. Peyrat is a distasteful Algérie française type, ex-FN (FN deputy in 1986) who was close to Jean-Marie Le Pen but, having been defeated by a hair in several close races, quit the FN in 1994 to move closer to the right while still publicly supporting much of the FN's policies. He was elected mayor in 1995, defeating incumbent RPR mayor Jean-Paul Baréty (1993-1995) by over 10 points in a quadrangulaire with the left and the FN.

Peyrat was also close, however, to the Médecin clan - he was first elected to the municipal council in 1965 when mayor Jean Médecin (1928-1944, 1947-1965) took him under his wing. Médecin the elder, a right-wing nationalist (but, formally, close to the Radicals), was an enthusiastic Pétainiste in 1940 and until the Italian occupation in 1942, and viscerally anti-Gaullist. Médecin is an interesting guy, who successfully set up a 'système Médecin' - a clientelistic network, a distributor of patronage, a local lobby, the expression of a local 'notable' who refused all ties with national parties - a right-winger who could be called a fascist without exaggeration who was on good terms with the local PCF deputy, Virgile Barel; nationalistic but more pro-European and pro-American/NATO than most Gaullists. He was deputy from 1932 to 1962, of some relevance nationally (he ran for President in the 1953 clusterfark) but ultimately not very interested by national politics and, because of his independence and localism, kept away from most Parisian cabinets.

Jacques Médecin succeeded his father in 1965. He was less anti-Gaullist than his father, being instead very much anticommunist; he was still very right-wing (if not far-right; he said he shared 99.9% of the FN's idea, he was pro-apartheid and anti-abortion) and racist. Very crooked, he resigned and fled to Uruguay in 1990, before being extradited to France in 1994 and sentenced in four separate trials but somehow fled back to Uruguay and escaped jail in 1996. While Peyrat wasn't an ally of Jacques Médecin, there was a rather friendly entente between the two men, whose political differences didn't go much beyond the fact that one was open about being in the FN and the other was too closely tied to the dynastic family history to do so. Indeed, in 1995, Peyrat visited Médecin in jail and presented himself as his natural successor. Peyrat, however, didn't set up a 'système' of his own, and joined the RPR in 1996, serving as deputy (1997-1998) and senator (1998-2008).

His time was up in 2008, when the now Sarkozyst UMP had little interest in the old man and was, locally, led by Christian Estrosi - who in those years was known as one of Sarkozy's most loyal footsoldiers. Estrosi is hardly more likable, as far as this horrible bobo leftie is concerned, he's a very law-and-order guy who recently prided himself on his administration beating up Roma and proposed to help other mayors with tips on how to do so. He's also not the brightest bulb, but that's another matter.

Estrosi, along with his sidekick Éric Ciotti, his successor as president of the CG, control the UMP fed in the department. They supported Fillon in 2012 against Copé, who had the backing of local deputies Michèle Tabarot (an irrelevant idiot) and Lionnel Luca (a fascist douche). Fillon's victory in the 06, certainly helped out by some rigging from Estrosi/Ciotti, was a major issue in the clusterfark aftermath (Copé's guys pointed to the 06 to cry fraud).

Marie-Christine Arnautu, the FN candidate, is a vice president of the party and was a regional councillor in Ile-de-France until 2010. She's said to be closely supported by Panzerdaddy, but not on the best of terms with Panzergirl. In fact, Panzergirl wanted her rival Bruno Gollnisch, a charming neo-fascist/Holocaust denier, to run here even if he's more closely tied to the Lyon region. It appears as if Panzerdaddy convinced/imposed her nomination over that of two local candidates, one of whom had Panzergirl's favours. Panzergirl is still walking a tight rope with daddy, and she's careful not to alienate him on major issues so she gave in here. Panzerdaddy, as regional MEP and regional councillor, is granted some free rein in FN affairs in PACA.

Arnautu, Panzerdaddy and Louis Aliot oppose an alliance with Nissa Rebela, the local branch of the racist/white nationalist Bloc identitaire, a rather charming bunch of skinheads, hooligans and neo-fascists who are electorally irrelevant but always getting media coverage because of their provocative actions. Certain Panzergirlites like Nicolas Bay or Steeve Briois (both ex-MNR, and not very well perceived by Panzerdaddy or the old guard) favour an alliance with Vardon's thugs.

Meanwhile, since 2008, Peyrat has moved back towards the far-right and Nissa Rebela in particular. In 2011, he ran in the cantonal elections in Nice-14 with the FN's support, a seat which he held from 1992 to 1998 (winning for the FN), but placed third with only 21.4% and was therefore not qualified for the runoff, in which Estrosi's wife picked up the seat from the PS. In 2012, he backed Panzergirl and was the candidate of the 'Rassemblement Bleu Marine' (aka FN + various sidekicks) in the 1st constituency in Nice against Ciotti and Allemand, winning third with only 16.2%. Peyrat is running for mayor again, originally in an alliance with DVD CG Jean Icart, a UMP dissident who hates Estrosi too, but Icart just broke off said deal.

Also in the running on the right is Olivier Bettati, a UMP CG and former 'adjoint au maire' who has always distrusted Estrosi. Bettati, a copéiste, defeated Estrosi in a cantonal election back in 1994. A few other councillors from the majority also resigned. Estrosi obviously downplays it, for good reason.

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Ugh... Paris seems awfully close.

Still little chance of a UMP victory, especially if the 14ème is still that far out of reach for the UMP.

I also figure it won't help that the Parisian UMP, which has been increasingly divided since the dissident clusterfarks in the 2011 senatorials, still thinks airing its dirty laundry is fetch. Charles Beigbeder, a copéiste businessman and brother of the crazy writer Frédéric Beigbeder, is running a dissident list in the 8ème (a right-wing stronghold) which he says is to be equidistant between the FN and the UMP and he wants to 'federate' the various dissident lists springing up everywhere (notably Dominique Tiberi, the son of criminal Jean Tiberi in the 5ème).

On Saturday, NKM hit hard in an interview in Le Parisien, talking about the party (UMP, UDI) HQs complicating her plans by intervening; striking back at Beigbeder quite harshly (Le problème, avec Charles Beigbeider, c’est qu’il m’aime trop ou pas assez. Il a fait devant moi, et pendant des semaines, une danse du ventre endiablée pour être sur mes listes. Quand cela s’est avéré impossible, il m’a agonie d’injures.) and striking down Rachida Dati who had been criticizing her (je crois aussi qu’elle devrait se consacrer à son arrondissement, dans lequel elle mène une bataille difficile). Dati is in fact facing two (largely filloniste) dissidents in the 7ème - former mayor Michel Dumont and former 'premier adjoint' Christian Le Roux. Dumont rightly points out that Dati is completely useless and has no record (Le Petit journal's old episodes about the Conseil de Paris sessions would confirm that she does nothing except laugh, play Tetris, text on her phone, annoy her colleagues or leave early/arrive late).

But now Dati is pissed (C'est trop facile de m'insulter. Nathalie devrait faire attention), Borloo is fuming about the UDI not getting what it bargained for on the UMP-UDI-MoDem lists (and threatening to scuttle even the EP election deals) and the bitchfest is running wild. Le Monde details it with some private details they got their hands on; apparently Borloo considers NKM a liar, NKM is apparently pissed off at him and others and so forth. And the Guiding Star of the 21st Century himself, Poison Dwarf, is not pleased.

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If anybody cares, here are the most recent polls:

Paris (CSA, Jan 3-7)
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 39%
Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 38%
Saint-Just (FN) 8%
Najdovski (EELV) 7%
Simonnet (PG) 5%
Others 3%

Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 51.5%
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 48.5%

Paris (Ifop, Jan 2-4)
Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 39.5% (+0.5)
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 38.5% (+0.5)
Saint-Just (FN) 9% (nc)
Najdovski (EELV) 6.5% (-0.5)
Simonnet (PG) 5% (nc)
DVD 1% (-0.5)
Others 1% (nc)

Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG) 52.5% (nc)
NKM (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 47.5% (nc)

Marseille (Ifop, Jan 2-4)
Gaudin (UMP-UDI) 33%
Mennucci (PS-PCF-PRG) 25%
Ravier (FN) 21%
Coppola (FG) 7%
Zéribi (EELV) 6%
Bennahmias (MoDem) 4%
EXG 1%
Le Sursaut 0.5%
Others 1%

Mennucci (PS-PCF-PRG) 41%
Gaudin (UMP-UDI) 40%
Ravier (FN) 19%

My usual bitching about the usefulness of these polls apply.

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Nationwide, communes over 3500 ppl (CSA, Jan 17-21)
Right/Centre (UMP, UDI, MoDem, DVD) 46%
Left (PS, EELV, PCF, PG, PRG, MRC, DVG) 41%
FN 9%
Others 3%
EXG 1%

Hénin-Beaumont (CSA, Jan 13-14
Steeve Briois (FN) 36%
Eugène Binaisse (PS-EELV)* 34%
Jean-Marc Legrand (UMP) 8%
Pierre Ferrari (DVG) 7%
David Noël (FG) 7%
Gérard Dalongeville (DVG) 6%
Georges Bouquillon (MRC) 2%

Eugène Binaisse (PS-EELV)* 54%
Steeve Briois (FN) 46%

Avignon (Ifop, Jan 16-18)
Cécile Helle (PS-EELV) 28%
Bernard Chaussegros (UMP-UDI)^ 24%
Philippe Lottiaux (FN) 24%
André Castelli (FG) 15.5%
André Seignon (MoDem) 4.5%
Kader Guettaf (DVG) 2%
Jean-François Ceccaldi (Provence Libre/REG-EXD) 1.5%
Olivier Baudry (DLR) 0.5%

Cécile Helle (PS-EELV) 44%
Bernard Chaussegros (UMP-UDI)^ 32%
Philippe Lottiaux (FN) 24%

Cécile Helle (PS-EELV) 33%
Bernard Chaussegros (UMP-UDI)^ 29%
Philippe Lottiaux (FN) 22%
André Castelli (FG) 16%

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Paris (Ifop, Jan 23-27)
Anne Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG)^ 39.5% (nc)
Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 36.5% (-2)
Wallerand de Saint-Just (FN) 8% (-1)
Danielle Simonnet (PG) 6% (+1)
Christophe Najdovski (EELV) 5.5% (-0.5)
DVD lists 4% (+3)
Other lists 0.5% (-0.5)

Anne Hidalgo (PS-PCF-PRG)^ 54% (+1.5)
Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet (UMP-UDI-MoDem) 46% (-1.5)

Ifop says that it asked questions based on actual lists/candidates in every arrondissement.

Pau (Ifop, Jan 23-24)
François Bayrou (MoDem-UDI-UMP) 36%
David Habib (PS)^ 27%
Yves Urieta (Ind) 13%
Olivier Dartigolles (FG) 9%
Georges de Pachtere (FN) 8%
Eurydice Bled (EELV) 5%
Jean Pichai (DVD) 2%

François Bayrou (MoDem-UDI-UMP) 42%
David Habib (PS)^ 40%
Yves Urieta (Ind) 18%

François Bayrou (MoDem-UDI-UMP) 53%
David Habib (PS)^ 47%

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Marseille (CSA, Jan 27-28)
Jean-Claude Gaudin (UMP-UDI)* 37% (+3)
Patrick Mennucci (PS-EELV) 31% (-1)
Stéphane Ravier (FN) 17% (-5)
Jean-Marc Coppola (FG) 9% (+1)
Jean-Luc Bennahmias (MoDem) 3% (nc)
Other list 2%
EXG 1%
Le sursaut <1%

Other lists: Lisette Narducci (PRG) in 2nd sector, Robert Assante (UDI) in 6th sector

Jean-Claude Gaudin (UMP-UDI)* 42% (+1)
Patrick Mennucci (PS-EELV) 41% (nc)
Stéphane Ravier (FN) 17% (-1)

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Paris-7 (TNS-Sofres, Jan 16-18)

Rachida Dati (UMP-UDI-MoDem)* 49%
Capucine Edou (PS-PCF-PRG) 20%
Michel Dumont (DVD) 11%
Christian Le Roux (DVD) 9%
Bernadette de la Bourdonnaye (FN) 6%
Bernard Bourdeix (EELV) 3%
Bruno Percebois (PG) 2%

Rachida Dati (UMP-UDI-MoDem)* 53%
Capucine Edou (PS-PCF-EELV-PRG) 25%
Michel Dumont + Christian Le Roux (DVD) 22%

Strasbourg (TNS-Sofres, Jan 9-11)
Roland Ries (PS)* 34%
Fabienne Keller (UMP) 33%
Alain Jund (EELV) 10%
François Loos (UDI) 8%
Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (FN) 7%
Jean-Claude Val (FG) 4%
Elisabeth Del Grande (EXG) 3%
André Kornmann (EXD-FN diss.) 1%

Roland Ries (PS)* 54%
Fabienne Keller (UMP) 46%