My instincts tell me that Truman is right and that we should give the discretion to the regions on how to structure them. However, once such has been given I: would certainly encourage the regions to make it difficult to abuse the process.
This opens up a bit of a can of worms, though - if you’re going to consider this sort of provision acceptable for special elections, you’re one step away from having it be acceptable to apply it to regular elections as well - establishing a grandfather claus and a permanently fixed voter base. And this sort of provision is, to my understanding, entirely constitutional for the regions to do - there are no restrictions on how they select either their Senators or their own government - making this entirely an issue of what provisions are considered acceptable in the Overton window.
After all, this sort of provision would mean that someone could literally be elected to a second straight full term in their regional legislature and still be ineligible to vote for Senate. Once you’re there...it’s not much of a reach to go even further.
Also, in marginal regions, if Party A has several people fall off the rolls or deregister in the region after a federal election, but also several new registrants, while Party B has fewer people do either, then all of a sudden Party B can initiate a recall with an electorate that is more favorable to them than both the initial electorate that elected the Senator in question and the regions current electorate.
Post-reset Atlasia has thankfully been free of this sort of electorate manipulation by statute, but this already starts doing that and opens the door for even more.
So this approach really causes several other issues to spring up.
