The opinion below summarized historical statute use:
Our peer circuits have applied the statute to reach a wide range of obstructive acts, not just those limited to tampering with documents or objects. Those courts have found "otherwise" obstructive conduct under subsection (c)(2) to include: (1) lying in written responses to civil interrogatory questions, Burge, 711 F.3d at 808–09; (2) soliciting information about a grand jury investigation to evade surveillance, Volpendesto, 746 F.3d at 286; (3) seeking a false alibi witness, Petruk, 781 F.3d at 444, 447; (4) tipping off the targets of criminal investigations, United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324–25 (10th Cir. 2012); (5) asking third parties to create fraudulent physical evidence, United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d 221, 230–33 (2d Cir. 2013); (6) giving misleading testimony in a preliminary injunction hearing, United States v. Jefferson, 751 F.3d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 2014); (7) attempting to orchestrate a grand jury witness's testimony, United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007); [8] making false statements to a grand jury, United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir. 2009); and (9) burning an apartment to conceal the bodies of two murder victims, United States v. Cervantes, No. 16-10508, 2021 WL 2666684, at *6 (9th Cir. June 29, 2021).
I'm not gonna hang my hat on SCOTUS muddying all that. One of the consolidated defendants also contended in district court that the statute's "corruptly" mens rea for the actus rea of "obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], and imped[ing] any official proceeding" is unconstitutionally vague, but Rehnquist already discussed the definition of 1512's use of "corruptly" for a unanimous Court in
Arthur Andersen & not only didn't suggest that it's vague, but went so far as to explicitly state the exact opposite in the opinion: that "in any event, the natural meaning" is "clear" - probably why the "corruptly" question was dropped at consolidation & no U.S. federal court has ever held that "corruptly" under 1512 is unconstitutionally vague, as applied to J6 defendants or otherwise, incl. both Nichols (who opted with his reasoning to not reach the corruptly-vagueness argument) & Katsas in this case, so I won't bet on SCOTUS starting now.
inb4 '"Damaging a document counts but damaging the building & harming everybody inside it doesn't" sounds exactly like something that this SCOTUS would think makes sense.'
