Computer89 v. The Atlasian Senate

[reagente]

On behalf of my client, OSR (Computer89), I am bringing suit to quash an unconstitutional impeachment trial against my client.

OSR is not in the category of persons of whom the Atlasian Senate has impeachment power over:

The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the Republic of Atlasia, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

Members of the Atlasian Senate are not "civil officers." Officers are those nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See the following:

to confirm or reject nominations for the Supreme Court and the officers of executive departments;

to impeach the President, Vice President, Justices and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and other officers of this government for high crimes and gross negligence.

to establish, consolidate, alter, or terminate independent agencies led by non-playable officials, leaving it to the discretion of the President to control department structure and the existence of any playable principal officers, if any at all, which the President may appoint to roles in the agency, with the advice and consent of the Senate;

The fact that the Atlasian Constitution separately speaks of the expulsion of Senators is further proof that Senators are not in the category of persons who can be subject to impeachment:

The Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members; but no Senator shall be expelled but with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

Historically, impeachment in Atlasia has only been limited to executive, judicial officers, and GMs (Truman was Attorney General. OBD was President. Attorney General AL was Attorney General, etc.), none of whom are legislators. The current impeachment of OSR represents an unconstitutional departure from this tradition.

Common law tradition also suggests that legislators are not "civil officers" (see trial of U.S. Senator William Blount and see Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution)

---

I request an immediate injunction against the Atlasian Senate (1) barring them from continuing an "impeachment" trial against OSR and (2) against any future impeachment trials against any persons who are not the President, Vice President, or a civil officer of the Republic of Atlasia


---

Addendum below added on May 31, 2023 at ~9:30 EST:

Expanding further upon the common law tradition surrounding impeachment, I once again bring attention to the fact that under the U.S. Constitution, members of the US Senate and US House cannot be impeached, and that the Atlasian Constitution lifts language from the U.S. Constitution. While not dispositive, this should be informative as to the intent and operation of the words in the Atlasian constitution, absent evidence to the contrary (of which none has presently been provided).

Exhibit A:

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

The Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members; but no Senator shall be expelled but with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

Exhibit B:

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

The Senate shall have the sole power to adopt and try articles of impeachment. No articles of impeachment shall be adopted without the concurrence of three-fifths of the voting Senators. The Chief Justice shall preside over all trials of impeachment save when the impeachment is against a sitting member of the Supreme Court. No person shall be convicted on any article of impeachment without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate. In all cases, the penalty for conviction shall be removal from office and disqualification from any office under the Republic of Atlasia for a period not exceeding two years.

Exhibit C:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the Republic of Atlasia, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

[reagente]

Response to Amici from North Carolina Yankee.

Impeachment is a separate enumerated power from discipline and expulsion. Impeachment carries different penalties, penalties that extend beyond the legislative branch (see Article III, Section 1, Clause 3). Impeachment is limited to the President, Vice President, Justices and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and other officers of this government (see Article III, Section 3, Clause 17), is limited to only "high crimes and gross negligence" (id.), and requires the Chief Justice to preside (see Article III, Section 1, Clause 7).

Given these restrictions, it is ridiculous to assert that impeachment is a purely legislative branch function that escapes all judicial review. To grant the Amici's request to dismiss would severely weaken separation of powers within Atlasia.

[reagente]

Response to Amici

The meaning of "other officers of this government" is absolutely a triable question by this court. Amici are simply asserting that legislators are "other officers of the government" without providing proof to that effect.

The only other time "officers of this government" appears in the Atlasian Constitution is in Article VIII, where such officers are referred to as "executive and judicial".

The phrase "civil officers" appears only in Article IV, which is the Article that concerns the executive branch.

Even if one includes the presiding officer of the Senate - there is still no cause to impeach. OSR is not a presiding officer of the Senate.

[reagente]

Question for Amici Yankee:

If I am understanding your argument correctly, are you saying that the discipline power of the Senate allows the Senate to ban its members from serving in other offices, executive and judicial, federal and regional? And despite that, such discipline is not reviewable by the court in any capacity except as it relates to threshold (and this somehow strengthens separation of powers)?

Do I have that correct?

[reagente]

As the Atlasian Senate has proceeded to a vote on "impeachment" without waiting to see if this court has even accepted certiorari (much less ruled on the merits), I request an emergency injunction from this court that stops the current vote in the "Trial of OSR" thread from having any legal effect until further guidance from this court can be found.

[reagente]

As the Atlasian Senate has proceeded to a vote on "impeachment" without waiting to see if this court has even accepted certiorari (much less ruled on the merits), I request an emergency injunction from this court that stops the current vote in the "Trial of OSR" thread from having any legal effect until further guidance from this court can be found.

The senate has every right to proceed, and to enforce the result, until and unless the court directly prohibits it from doing so.

Just as I have every right to request an injunction from the court to stop unconstitutional actions.

[reagente]

As the Atlasian Senate has proceeded to a vote on "impeachment" without waiting to see if this court has even accepted certiorari (much less ruled on the merits), I request an emergency injunction from this court that stops the current vote in the "Trial of OSR" thread from having any legal effect until further guidance from this court can be found.

The senate has every right to proceed, and to enforce the result, until and unless the court directly prohibits it from doing so.

Just as I have every right to request an injunction from the court to stop unconstitutional actions.

You have no right to receive an injunction to just because you may have a right to request one. It must suck to be a traitor.

I'd recommend you dedicate some time towards improving your reading comprehension. I never said I had a right to receive an injunction. Request =/= Receive. Does that help?

[reagente]

Introduction

At fundamental issue is whether or not the Atlasian Senate has the power to impeach Senators. Petitioner does not dispute the Atlasian Senate's power to expel Senators - such a power is firmly rooted in the text of the Atlasian Constitution:

The Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members; but no Senator shall be expelled but with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

In contrast, the Atlasian Constitution makes no such explicit reference to the power to impeach Senators. The inability or ability to impeach Senators must accordingly be inferred from the entire text of the Constitution. To that end, Petitioner will demonstrate that the Atlasian Senate's impeachment power does not extend to ordinary Senators.

The Atlasian Senate derives its impeachment power from the list of enumerated powers in Article III, Section 3:

to impeach the President, Vice President, Justices and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and other officers of this government for high crimes and gross negligence.

The plain reading of Article III, Section 3, Clause 17

Amici for respondents make the claim that "other officers" in Article III, Section 3, Clause 17 includes all Senators and hold that as a justification for the supposed legality of OSR's "impeachment." This is a rather fantastical assertion - if Senators were meant to be included in the class of persons subject to impeachment, why wouldn't they have been listed in this clause? Is the argument seriously being made that a clause which took the time to specify that both Justices and Associate Justices are subject to impeachment (rather than just saying Justices) decided not to list Senators out some desire economy of words? Baffling.

The meaning of "Officers"

The rest of the Atlasian Constitution makes it clear that regular Senators are not meant to be considered "officers."

Our first clue comes from Article IV, Section 4:

The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the Republic of Atlasia, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

"Civil officers" is not defined in the Atlasian Constitution - but the fact that the reference to civil officers appears in Article IV suggests that Civil Officers are members of the executive branch.

to confirm or reject nominations for the Supreme Court and the officers of executive departments;

In this section, "officers" of executive departments, much like Supreme Court justices, are said to be individuals that require confirmation by the Senate. Indeed, before this current action against Petitioner OSR, as far as petitioner is aware, only directly elected executive branch officials or positions appointed with advice and consent of Senate have been impeached (or attempted to be impeached) by the Atlasian Senate - never an ordinary legislator elected in their own right.

to establish, consolidate, alter, or terminate independent agencies led by non-playable officials, leaving it to the discretion of the President to control department structure and the existence of any playable principal officers, if any at all, which the President may appoint to roles in the agency, with the advice and consent of the Senate;

Under this clause "Principal officers" are again confirmed to be individuals appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.

As this clause directly succeeds Article III, Section 3, Clause 17  (the impeachment clause) - it naturally stands to reason that these are the "other officers of this government" the impeachment clause refers to. This would explain why the impeachment clause (which otherwise listed with exacting specificity the officers subject to impeachment) would have a non-defined class: the constitution empowered the creation of a non-defined class of executive officers. That certainly is a much more natural reading than presuming that "other officers" means "all Senators"

This Constitution, and those laws, treaties, and other acts made by the Republic of Atlasia in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the executive and judicial officers of this government and of the several Regions shall be bound thereby, any thing in the laws or constitutions of the several Regions notwithstanding.

This clause suggests that officers "of this government" are persons of a judicial or executive character. Another strike against the notion that ordinary members of the legislator are "officers."

The Atlasian Constitution does recognize the position of "presiding officer" of the Senate - but the existence of such a position does not make OSR subject to impeachment for a number of reasons. First, OSR is not the presiding officer of the Atlasian Senate, nor did he hold any sort of special position within the Senate upon his supposed "impeachment". Second, "presiding officer" is always modified with "of the Senate" - which makes it distinct from "of the government." Only officers "of the government" are allowed to be impeached. In either case, OSR is not in the class of persons subject to impeachment - and any "impeachment" action against petitioner should be voided as constitutionally invalid.

Structural Arguments

The presence of the expulsion powers clause (Article III, Section 6) further undermines the assertion that the Senate has the power to impeach its ordinary members. From a structuralist perspective, why would it make sense for the Senate to be granted both expulsion and impeachment power over its own members when impeachment can accomplish everything that expulsion does? If we believe the amici, the expulsion clause is essentially redundant - included for some inexplicable reason.

Under the Petitioner's viewpoint, the expulsion clause actually serves a valid function: allowing the Senate to police its own membership, while shielding Senators from the additional penalties impeachment can carry (namely the ban on running and serving office). This framework affirms the people of Atlasia's ability to elect representatives of their own choosing.

As a government of limited, enumerated powers, it may further stands to reason that the Atlasian Constitution should be construed in the manner that limits federal powers (i.e. impeachment) when there is any ambiguity.

Comparisons with the U.S. Constitution

Indeed, this is the reality found within the U.S. Constitution of which Atlasia Constitution takes strong inspiration (and accordingly should be viewed as persuasive common law authority).

In the United States, members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate are not "civil officers" subject to impeachment. The trial of U.S. Senator William Blount inaugurated that tradition, and Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution promulgated a definition of "civil officers" that clearly excluded legislators. There are many similarities between the US and Atlasian Constitutions as it relates to the impeachment power:

Example A:

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

The Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members; but no Senator shall be expelled but with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

In both the Atlasian and U.S. Constitutions, we see a separate enumerated expulsion power. The Atlasian Constitution obviously reflects the Atlasian Senate's unicameral structure, but otherwise the text is little changed.

Example A:

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

The Senate shall have the sole power to adopt and try articles of impeachment. No articles of impeachment shall be adopted without the concurrence of three-fifths of the voting Senators. The Chief Justice shall preside over all trials of impeachment save when the impeachment is against a sitting member of the Supreme Court. No person shall be convicted on any article of impeachment without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate. In all cases, the penalty for conviction shall be removal from office and disqualification from any office under the Republic of Atlasia for a period not exceeding two years.

Again we see striking parallelism, from the sole power to try impeachments, two-thirds conviction requirement, the role of the Chief Justice as a presiding figures, and the possibility of a bar on office. Deviations from the text again come down to the fact that the Atlasian Constitution provides a unicameral legislature, but otherwise the substance is hardly changed.

Example C:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the Republic of Atlasia, shall be removed from office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

The clause referencing the ability to try "civil officers" within the Atlasian Constitution is almost word-for-word the same - with only "United States" and "Atlasia" being swapped out and some capitalization differences. This again demonstrates just how much the impeachment sections of the Atlasian constitution were inspired by the U.S. Constitution, a document which has not been found to recognize Senators as being subject to impeachment.  

Atlasian Tradition

Even if one wants to completely discard the document which serves as the primary inspiration for the Atlasian Constitution, we should still consider Atlasian tradition. Petitioner is not aware of any prior use of impeachment against legislators under this Constitution or its predecessor document. Attempted and realized impeachments have always been against executive, judicial, or game moderator positions, but never legislative. Truman was Attorney General. OBD was President. Attorney General AL was Attorney General, Averroes Nix was President, etc.

It further appears the regional constitutions have also maintained this non-legislative / legislative distinction in terms of who can be impeached. The South only allows the President, Vice President, or "any other executive officer" to be impeached. I am less familiar with the other two regional constitutions, but if the Wiki is up to date, it seems that Lincoln appears to only allow a governor to be impeached, and the Constitution of Fremont is seemingly silent on impeachment / expulsion. Atlasia would really be standing alone if it allowed impeachment of ordinary legislators.

Closing Remarks

In closing, since petitioner has demonstrated that the impeachment power of the Atlasian Senate does not extend to ordinary senators, petitioner requests the following relief:
1) A Court order invalidating the "impeachment" vote against OSR
2) An injunction against any future "impeachment" trials against persons over whom the Senate lacks impeachment power
2) An injunction against any executive branch officials (federal or regional) from enforcing the consequences of any future "impeachment" against persons over whom the Senate lacks impeachment power

(EDIT: Relief item two was modified at ~12:50pm EST on June 11, 2023, original version was preserved with strikethrough).

[reagente]

Counsel, I for one am concerned about the separation of powers implications of this Court issuing an injunction against a proceeding of the legislature. From your perspective, is there any satisfactory way to resolve this without blocking the legislature from proceeding, perhaps instead instructing the executive and other authorities on implementing the results follow a supposed impeachment?

The concern about the implications this would have on the separation of powers are a valid - to that end, I amend the requested relief to instead bind the executive branch of the federal and regional governments from implementing the results that follow an invalid impeachment, rather than to bind the Atlasian Senate.

[reagente]

     Counsel, do you see any practical implications of how the Court rules in this matter on the vote of the Senate that has already concluded on this matter?

The main distinction between expulsion and impeachment is that impeachment may carry an accompanying disqualification from "any office under the Republic of Atlasia for a period not exceeding two years."

As the Senate did not specify a term of disqualification (merely stating "all constitutional penalties" which does not specify an actual term of years, indeed a term of zero years would be just as constitutional as two years), I would assume that none apply to OSR (indeed, I think it would be strange to assume that in the case of an explicitly variable penalty, that the maximum penalty automatically gets applied when there is ambiguity regarding what the penalty should be).

If I can be correct in making that assumption, then no, there wouldn't be much of a practical implication for how the court rules, since the case would quickly be mooted by the upcoming elections this weekend. However, if I am incorrect regarding that, then how this court rules would have an impact insofar as it would impact my client's ability to run for federal office in the future.

[reagente]

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

Given the enumerated discretion of the Senate to adopt its own rules and proceedings, I would imagine that the adoption of rules need not be explicit or even done ex ante, so long as it is sufficiently clear to the Senate as a body what "rules" are being adopted. Past practice or conduct not objected to could implicitly create the adoption of rules.

To that end, I don't think there is a constitutional bar to implicitly "adopting rules" that structure an expulsion like an impeachment trial, so long as the impeachment-specific penalties that go beyond the scope of the Senate's powers do not attach in the end (i.e. ban on running for offices under the Atlasian Constitution). If the Senate meant the impeachment as a simple expulsion, then I think that expulsion would be valid, but I can't speak for the Senate on this front.

[reagente]

With leave the court, I request to file a response brief by 11:59:59pm EST on July 7th.

[reagente]

Mootness
Amici by NewYorkExpress and weatherboy1102 have raised the question of Mootness, so I thought I would say a few words on the matter. As I see it, this case raises two fundamental questions:

1) Does the Senate have the enumerated power to impeach a Senator?

2) Assuming the Senate does not possess that enumerated power, did the “impeachment” of Computer89 function as a constructive expulsion?

I do not believe that the first issue is moot. Impeachment carries penalties beyond simple expulsion – an impeached person also faces “disqualification from any office under the Republic of Atlasia” (i.e. Federal Offices) for a period not exceeding two years. In the case of Computer89, a defined term of disqualification was not specified in the articles of “impeachment” presented against him (leaving it unclear if my client faces a disqualification penalty and if so for how long) – so my client cannot be certain that an election administrator wouldn’t try to disqualify him as a candidate for federal office in the future. As such, the issue is very much live.

As to the second issue, as Computer89’s term for Senator expired today at noon, I do agree that the question of whether an invalid “impeachment” can act as an expulsion is moot as to the fact-specific case of Computer89. However, as weatherboy1102 notes, it may still be useful for this court to decide that question, as it could provide helpful constitutional guidance to future Senates, and it seems possible that due to the duration of litigation, that situations like this could escape judicial review in the future, so it may be proper to find sustained standing in this case and try that second question.

While my initial brief did not address this question in much detail, my reply to the Honorable Justice ilikeverin on June 25th offers some of my thoughts on what it would look like for the Senate to “adopt its own rules and proceedings”.

Now, onto my response to Lumine’s brief – organized by opposing counsel’s subheadings:

Response Brief

1. Introduction

I think opposing counsel is fundamentally wrong to characterize this case as one involving “procedural quibbles” and to suggest it is a mistake to limit ourselves to “war of semantics about the literal meaning of a single expression.” Atlasia is a government of limited powers, and this case concerns enumerated powers. That “single expression” which opposing counsel references is the sole and only authority from which the Atlasian Senate derives impeachment power from. As such, the meaning of that clause takes supreme precedence over any other situational “context” – the Senate either has the power or it doesn’t.

2. The Impeachment Trial

Opposing counsel dedicates much into the history of the “impeachment” trial of Computer89 – I believe such information has no relevance to this case. However noble the motivations of the Senate may or may not have been, it matters nothing if they lack the enumerated power to impeach legislators. Likewise, if the Senate has an unqualified enumerated power, it matters little to look at their justification. For example, my client and I have never disputed the Senate’s authority to expel and discipline its members (derived from Article III, Section 1, Clause 6). Just as it would be improper to consider the motives behind actions unsupported by an enumerated grant of power, it would be just as inappropriate to look at the motivations of a body acting according to an unqualified grant of enumerated power. If the Senate wanted to expel Computer89 for his bad Star Wars takes, that would be just as valid if they wanted to expel him for missing votes or criminal conduct. The expulsion clause is only qualified by the condition that two-thirds of members sign onto an expulsion, there is no requirement that it be justified.

Among other things, the impeachment power is qualified by limiting it to a certain class of persons (Article III, Section 3, Clause 17) – “the President, Vice President, Justices and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and other officers of this government.” An impeachment against a class of persons not on this list cannot be made valid just because it had an allegedly good justification. Would this court sanction the Senate “impeaching” an ordinary citizen who had never served in any elected office because the Senate made a persuasive case that they had committed high crimes and misdemeanors? I think not.

3. The Charges

Regarding the first two paragraphs of this section, I remind opposing counsel that in Atlasia there is a presumption of innocence until proven guilty. I further take issue with the insinuation that this case was “not born out of a genuine alternative interpretation of the Constitution.”
This is preposterous for a number of reasons. First, the idea that the Senate lacks impeachment power as it relates to legislators is not an idea unique to my client or myself as his counsel. Take this for exhibit for example:

Correction:

Since one cannot impeach a senator, impeachment will be defined as expulsion from the senate. The procedures are operating under expulsion rather than impeachment

What?

A "senator" cannot be impeached", a senator can only be expelled or censored.

Second, as my initial brief (filed on June 10th) demonstrates, there are several textual and structural reasons in the Atlasian to come to the conclusion that impeachment power cannot extend to ordinary senators. I find it curious that opposing counsel didn’t bother to rebut any of those arguments directly, but instead chose to primarily attack the supposed motivations of the arguments. The closest opposing counsel comes to directly rebutting arguments is to suggest that it is improper to look at other clauses and structure of the Constitution containing “officer” in order to determine the meaning of a term not defined in a certain clause. Such a suggestion runs contrary to past practice of this court. If an ambiguous term is used elsewhere in a document, how else is the court to determine its meaning but by looking at the rest of the document?

Third, as far as I am aware “impeachment” has never been used against a legislator before in Atlasian history. Prior to this current case, I’ve only found examples of impeachments or attempted impeachments against executives, judges, or game moderates – never a legislator. Additionally, impeachment of legislators isn’t recognized in any of the regional constitutions either. Thus, if anything, opposing counsel is the one offering an alternative interpretation.

Finally, while it is well acknowledged that the U.S. Constitution is not controlling over Atlasia, does is not raise questions when text is directly lifted from the U.S. Constitution and is purported to have the exact opposite effect with little justification?

As far as I can gather, the opposing argument regarding the meaning of “other officers” boils down to “a Senator is an ‘other officer’ because we say so.” There is no explanation for why “civil officers” appears in a section of the Constitution concerning executive branch officials. There is no explanation for why “officers of this government” is modified with the qualifier “executive and judicial” in Article VIII, Section 8.

And perhaps most importantly, there is no explanation for why Article III, Section 3, Clause 17 (which decided to separately list associate and chief justices as covered by the impeachment power) decided under opposing counsel’s interpretation to group together Senators and non-elected executive branch figures in the same category despite not doing so anywhere else in the Constitution out of some supposed economy of words.

Also, opposing counsel seems to have gotten my argument regarding the redundancy of expulsion power backwards. The expulsion power doesn’t make impeachment power redundant (since as opposing counsel correctly noted, they can carry different penalties) but opposing counsel’s interpretation of the impeachment clause would make the expulsion power redundant. Under the impeachment power, the Senate may, but is not required to, impose a term of disqualification from offices under the Atlasian Constitution. If we were to adopt opposing counsel’s view of the impeachment power, every single conceivable expulsion could have been brought as an impeachment. As such, why would the framers of the Atlasian constitution include such a redundant power? (the answer is simple – the expulsion power exists and is not actually redundant because the impeachment power doesn’t apply to senators).

4. Conclusion

Opposing counsel is incorrect that a ruling in my client’s favor would deny the Senate the right to “discipline its members” – the Senate retains that power through the expulsion clause. Further, I contend that the Constitution is not “defended” by sanctioning the Senate usurping powers beyond those explicitly enumerated to it. The text of the Atlasian Constitution is clear – the Senate lacks the power to impeach ordinary senators, and the “impeachment” (and associated penalties) against my client, former Senator Computer89, should be voided from having any legal effect.
I thank the Justices for their time.