Computer89 v. The Atlasian Senate

[FairBol]

Amicus Brief of Dennis Millhouse, Concerned Citizen:

On the question, the plaintiff argues that he is not subject to impeachment because he is not a "civil officer" of the government. 

Article III Section 1 Clause 6 of the Atlasian Constitution says thus:

The Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members; but no Senator shall be expelled but with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

The Atlasian Constitution also says, as in Article III Section 3 Clause 17, that the Senate has the power

to impeach the President, Vice President, Justices and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and other officers of this government for high crimes and gross negligence

.

It should be clear to all present that OSR is a duly elected "member" of the Atlasian Senate.  As such, even if the plaintiff is correct about not being a "civil officer", he is still subject to possible impeachment. 

I refer again to Article III Section 1 Clause 6: since OSR is a member of the Senate, the Senate has the authority to punish him (as in "the discipline and expulsion of (the Senate's) members") for "high crimes and gross negligence". 

The plaintiff does not contest this fact. 

As such, I contend that the petitioner's arguments are wholly without merit, and should be dismissed in their entirety. 

[FairBol]

Requesting leave to file as a concerned party/citizen, Mr. MILLHOUSE submits this brief.

I. Through counsel, Plaintiff continues to argue that they are not subject to impeachment because the party is not a "civil officer" of the government. 

The Free Dictionary describes a "civil officer" as thus:

"A person who exercises authority over civilian affairs". 

Logic suggests that as an elected senator, the plaintiff has such authority, and has used it in the performance of their lawful duties.  As such, it must properly be found that plaintiff is indeed a "civil officer". 



II. This is a matter involving enumerated powers, and if the Atlasian Senate has the power to discipline (and possibly impeach) its own members.  Article III of the Constitution makes clear that the Senate does indeed have this power. 

To this end, Plaintiff's case relies on an assertion that "impeachment" means the same thing as "expulsion", even as counsel concedes the issue concerning "discipline".

In this, they are in error.  The legal definition of impeachment is not the removal of a sitting official (which rightly can be described as expulsion), but rather the formal charging of that official with "high crimes and misdemeanors".  The two words simply do not share a common meaning. 

Also, it is not "redundant" or a sure thing that allegations of committing "high crimes" will result in expulsion.  As with any legal case, accusations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before judge and/or jury. 

Only then may the accused be removed from office, and thus "expelled". 



III. It is clear that Plaintiff believes their impeachment, and subsequent removal, to be unconstitutional. 

Yet the impeachment process, and as such expulsion, was determined and carried out in a lawful manner.  At all times, it was consistent with the blueprint of law, and in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.   

Plaintiff is now asking this Court to "throw out the baby with the bath water", and effectively ignore key principles of the Constitution. 

Brief filing party believes this to be inadvisable, and prays that this Court will find for the defendant Senate. 

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[FairBol]

Requesting leave to file as a concerned party/citizen, Mr. MILLHOUSE submits this additional brief.

I.  On the question of mootness, counsel for the Plaintiff has stated that they believe that the matter of impeachment remains "live".  Brief filing party strongly suggests that this is incorrect.  

For a moment, let us examine the "mootness doctrine", which holds as such:

"If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 'personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit' at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed, and must be dismissed as moot"

To clarify, the precedent is that where a question/issue ceases to be relevant, courts no longer have the authority to deliver rulings in regard to such matters.  

As prior amicus briefs have pointed out, the prescribed terms of office for the Plaintiff(s) in this case have now expired.  Therefore, there is no longer any relevance to the issue in question.  


II.  Bolstering this point is the question of recurrence.  

The Plaintiff was elected to office by a majority vote, then removed from such office by vote of the Senate.  Opposing counsel's position is that this removal was unconstitutional, and thus should be declared invalid as a "violation".  

To this, brief filing party refers back to the Doctrine as presented, asking, can it be "said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur"?

It is clear that since the expiration of the term, Plaintiff can no longer be considered in any way to be a member of the Atlasian Senate.  As such, Plaintiff cannot be removed from office again, at least not for the term in question.  That is to say that the "violation" (unconstitutional removal from office) alleged by counsel cannot reasonably be expected to recur.  


III.  Even if this Court was to decide in the petitioner's favor, it could not "fashion (any) form of meaningful relief" in this case.  The elected term of office has ended; begging your pardon of the use of a cliche, that ship has sailed.  

As such, brief filing party strongly suggests that the issue should be regarded as moot, and the case subsequently dismissed in its entirety.