🇭🇷 Croatian General Election, April 17th 2024: HDZ-DP coalition to be formed

[DavidB.]

Croatia will hold a general election in 2024. Officially, the election can be held no later than in September, but it is assumed it will be in the middle of March, before Easter. Once the Parliament is dissolved, President Zoran Milanović (SDP) gets to decide on the date within a certain range. The governing center-right HDZ would prefer a short campaign; Milanović will try to avoid that.

The Parliament has 151 seats; 140 of those are elected in ten multi-member constituencies with each 14 seats. 3 are elected by the diaspora and 8 are elected by the so-called 'national minorities'.

History
Croatia became independent in 1991 and has mostly been governed by HDZ, which can be considered the country's 'natural party of government'. The only exceptions were 2000-2003 and 2011-2015, in which the country was governed by a coalition led by the SDP, the social democratic successor of the Croatian faction of the Yugoslav communists. HDZ, on the other hand, started off as a very strongly nationalist and rather authoritarian party under President Franjo Tuđman (1990-1999); after his passing, however, HDZ moderated into a more typical pro-European right-wing party, albeit with a base that is partly much more conservative.

After the 2011-15 Milanović government, during which Croatia entered the European Union, an election followed in which HDZ came first but could not form a stable coalition under the very outspokenly right-wing Tomislav Karamarko. He was then replaced by the more centrist Andrej Plenković, who succeeded to form a coalition with (then) centrist Most. In July 2020, Plenković's HDZ managed to surprise - partly riding the COVID-19 rally-around-the-flag wave - by winning in a landslide by Croatian standards in what was supposed to be a neck-and-neck race. Although with only 46%, turnout was extremely low. This time, Plenković's HDZ was already very close to a majority in Parliament: he only needed two centrist/liberal splinters and the 8 seats for 'national minorities' for a stable majority.

Under the last government, Croatia has entered both the Schengen area and the eurozone, meaning it is now embedded in all types of European and transatlantic cooperation. Plenković has been careful not to align himself with the Visegrad 4 countries and instead stay close to Germany, EU Commission President Von der Leyen, and the 'EPP mainstream'. Plenković is Von der Leyen's darling: he is the head of government with the most bilateral visits with her since 2019 - and he is widely rumored to be interested in a top EU or NATO job, which may mean his stint as Prime Minister is almost finished.

Party system
From left to right, the political spectrum consists of Možemo ('We Can'), a Western-style green-left coalition that was riding high in the polls but has come down a little after winning and governing in the capital of Zagreb, which apparently hasn't been to everyone's liking; of the aforemenetioned SDP, fairly typical European social democrats; the center-right natural party of government HDZ still led by Plenković; right-wing conservative Most ('Bridge'), which has shifted from a centrist position to a more decidedly right-wing course over the years and which seems to be running in an alliance with the Croatian Sovereignists this time; and nationalist right-wing Homeland Movement (DP, Domovinski Pokret), which was catapulted to great heights due to patriotic singer Miroslav Škoro's shock performance in the 2019 presidential election, in which he almost reached the runoff - but has faced lots of infighting, splitoffs and Škoro's departure ever since.

In addition, some splinters will take part in the election, such as liberal Fokus and Centar, the regionalist Istrian Democratic Assembly, the Social Democrats (an SDP splitoff), and representatives of the Serbian minority.

Current polls look as follows...
https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1734268023454724256?s=20
... but Croatian polls absolutely blow, to the point where I almost assume they're made up - and they have often tended to underestimate HDZ support.

Anything can still happen, but the safest bet right now is a HDZ victory at the same or perhaps a slightly lower level than in 2020, with a similar outcome in terms of government formation. But things could get more complicated if HDZ don't reach a majority with the centrist splinters and the minority representatives, which is also very possible.

Electoral geography
In terms of geography, HDZ rack up the score in Dalmatia and Slavonia. These areas are more rural, religious and conservative in the first place, but there is also a very clear correlation between HDZ support and the extent to which areas were affected by the Homeland War for independence - in the first place the areas which were then located within the secessionist Serbian 'Krajina' statelet.

SDP do very well in Istria, on the Northern Adriatic Islands, and in northern Međimurje and Zagorje - the former two had no love for Croatian nationalism in the first place due to their cultural and historical ties to Italy, while Yugonostalgia is strong in the latter two. Možemo depend almost entirely on a good performance in the capital of Zagreb. The Homeland Movement does best in Slavonia, where Škoro is from, while Most do best in Dalmatia.

Within Dalmatia, it's mostly Northern Dalmatia and, further south, the Hinterland - the zagora - that push up the score for HDZ. The Southern Dalmatian coastline is more of a bellwether with higher SDP scores - the difference between the South Dalmatian coastline (and islands) and the strongly right-wing Hinterland is partly related to a historical orientation towards Italy vs historical orientation towards Herzegovina thing, as well as to a Partisan in WWII vs Ustaše in WWII thing. Like the South Dalmatian coastline, Central Croatia is also a bellwether. The runoff in the 2020 presidential election shows quite a good picture of a 50/50 left/right election.

Former election results - by election, constituency, municipality and precinct - can be found here.

[DavidB.]

Thanks for the very detailed post.

It seems that HDZ is also pretty weak in Zagreb. Any other reason than "big city so more left-wing"??

Are very any voter demographics from past elections?? Like voting behaviour by age, gender or occupation??

HDZ underperform in Zagreb compared to the national average, but that should be expected considering the fact that Zagreb is much more secular and progressive whereas HDZ is seen as more religious and conservative. Still, they get more than 20% in Zagreb too.

Haven't seen any detailed demographic stats for the previous elections - but that doesn't mean they're not around. Maybe someone else can help out.

[DavidB.]

Thank you, and good addition regarding Istria.

I don't think the idea that diaspora voters are 'all' or mostly Ustaše is a fair characterization. Most descendants of high-ranking Ustaše members who fled Croatia after 1945 probably don't have Croatian citizenship in the first place.

Croatian diaspora voters are often either a) guest workers in countries like Germany, who often come from poorer, rural areas, are disproportionately blue collar and often traditional/religious - just like the average guest worker from Turkey is likely to be quite conservative and religious, or b) refugees, often Croats from Bosnia or Herzegovina, because they faced ethnic cleansing there - an event that is likely to make someone more nationalistic (but that doesn't make them 'Ustaše').

And let's not forget that HDZ isn't some kind of far-right party in the first place - it barely deviates from the EPP mainstream.

Anyway, the total dominance of HDZ among diaspora voters makes it rather pointless for diaspora voters to vote in parliamentary elections. The seat distribution in the diaspora constituency is almost a foregone conclusion, which understandably makes a lot of people less inclined to travel for hours to their embassy or consulate to cast a vote. This is different for presidential elections, of course.

[DavidB.]

I am not that well acquainted with the history of HDZ in the 2000s, but my impression is that the moderation of the party was mostly driven by the desire to access the European Union, with all its financial and geopolitical perks - more so than due to any changes 'from the heart'. HDZ leader and Prime Minister Ivo Sanader's instincts were more nationalist, but in order for Croatia to enter the European Union he was forced to compromise on his principles all the time - for instance on the extradition of suspects to the ICTY. Sanader successfully managed to fend off a right-wing faction within HDZ that opposed all of this.

Plenković, on the other hand, is the type of careerist, bureaucrat-like politician you'll find across pretty much every center-right party in Europe, from the Swedish Moderates to the Spanish PP. He is the least 'Tuđmanite' of all the HDZ leaders. The present day left-wing side of HDZ is more like him, while the right-wing side - of which former president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, internationally best known for supporting Croatia in the 2018 World Cup, was an exponent - attaches more value to Croatian nationalism and its symbols. Once Plenković leaves, it is not impossible for the HDZ pendulum to swing a bit more to the right again - in line with the times.

My impression is that parties to the right of HDZ like Most and DP recruit their people more from local politics or from civil society organizations (Homeland War veterans, regional interests, agriculture, Catholic organizations) and less from disappointed HDZ right-wingers, but people should feel free to correct me if I'm wrong here.

[DavidB.]

Whatever happened to that very weird populist outfit Živi zid?

The party was founded by Ivan Pernar, who had organized protests against the pre-2011 HDZ government, but its popularity was mostly fuelled by the successful presidential campaign of Ivan Vilibor Sinčić, who came third in the 2014 election. Afterwards, the party was doing quite well in the polls for some time. They had fallen down a little by November 2015 already, but still won 4.6% and 1 seat (in Central Croatia), for Sinčić. Then, in the early election in 2016, followed by HDZ leader Karamarko's failure to form a government, ŽZ did better: they won 8 seats in a coalition with a number of minor parties.

In 2019, Sinčić successfully ran in the EP election and won a seat, but shortly afterwards he fell out with Ivan Pernar, who seems not only a controversial but also a confrontational person (check out his Wiki for an impression). Pernar and a number of other people then left the party, which seems to have disintegrated ever since, probably partly due to Sinčić spending most of his time in Brussels. In the 2020 parliamentary election, they lost all of their seats.

On the demand side, the Zeitgeist has changed: among younger left-wing people, there seems to be a little less appetite for radical left-wing proposals with regard to the economy these days and more appetite for green and 'woke' politics, which Možemo has on offer. It is probably no coincidence that Možemo entered parliament when ŽZ dropped out. ŽZ also attracted some non-left-wing protest voters and they could have gone anywhere - given the 2020 election's low turnout, abstention isn't an unlikely guess for many of them.

Ultimately, ŽZ seems to have been too much of a one-man project and not enough of an actual movement to succeed in the long run.

[DavidB.]

The 'before Easter' stories proved to be untrue, but there is an update as of today: Prime Minister Plenković (HDZ) has decided to dissolve the Parliament (Sabor) on March 22nd by the latest. This means President Milanović (originally SDP) now has to pick an election date between 30 and 60 days after the dissolution of the Sabor. The election will therefore take place somewhere between the end of April and the end of May. A date very late in the window would coincide with Pentecost and also come very close to the European Parliament election, held in Croatia on June 9th. I suppose that makes an election in early May the best guess.

[DavidB.]

It will be April 17.

[DavidB.]

President Zoran Milanović has announced he will lead the SDP list (as an "independent"... lol) and be the candidate for Prime Minster for the SDP. A massive move, as he is by far the SDP's most popular figure and would otherwise be cruising to re-election for President easily.

Dear citizens, Croats,
I decided to run as an independent and non-partisan candidate on the SDP list in the elections for the Croatian Parliament, which will be held on April 17 this year. After the electoral victory, of which I am certain, I will step down from my position as the President of the Republic and, with the support of the new majority in the Croatian Parliament, assume responsibility for leading the Government of the Republic of Croatia. Until assuming a new position, I will continue to perform my duties as President of the Republic of Croatia in accordance with my constitutional obligations and duties.

Certainly a little questionable to stay on as President while campaigning, but I suppose he knows he can get away with it. He is certainly Plenković' most formidable opponent. It changes the game: an SDP led by Milanović is suddenly attractive to "left-conservative" voters who could otherwise abstain or perhaps vote for the nationalist right (DP), while HDZ could extend its reach towards younger, centrist voters who are skeptical of both parties (and politics in general) but are wary of squandering the country's economic progress and Euro-Atlantic integration - the latter being an issue on which the SDP in general has been as pro-Western as HDZ, but on which Milanović himself has been giving mixed messages (let's say a little more Smer, a little less PSOE), while HDZ has a proven record.

HDZ, meanwhile, held an event in Vinkovci, in the Slavonian HDZ heartland; they seem to be are basing their campaign on the slogan "credible" and are positioning themselves as the centrist, responsible force guiding Croatia to progress, development, prosperity, and international relevance, as opposed to the "retrograde/old fashioned left". This tweet by MEP Karlo Ressler, one of the up and coming people within the party, encompasses the message:

Croatia is stronger. The economy is growing. The state is more organized. We are more respected internationally than ever before. Why would anyone want to go back to the old and proven incompetent?

Certainly hitting the right notes in a campaign that is suddenly a race against Milanović; smart angle for HDZ to attract centrists who are not in love with HDZ but want 'progress' and are skeptical of SDP, while attracting right-wingers who oppose 'the left' alike - I'm sure this is focus grouped very well. The term "incompetent" also implicitly refers to the 2011-15 SDP-led government under Milanović, which was rather widely seen as such.

[DavidB.]

While attractive to "left-conservative" voters, could it conversely help Možemo scrape more "left-progressive" voters from the SDP? I notice that that party was left out of your post.

Theoretically this could be true, but my impression is that Možemo will still suffer because of tactical voting. This is the left's chance to finally oust HDZ. Left-wing voters will flock to Milanović with or without liking his personality. Možemo will take a hit and I expect the same to happen to Domovinski Pokret on the right (in their case not 100% to HDZ, some will go to Milanović).

[DavidB.]

so the courts rules against milanovic running now what?

The court hasn't been very clear about what is not allowed, exactly - perhaps because they want to give Milanović some additional time to reconsider his actions. The issue is that 'candidate for PM' is no official function with a definition in the constitution. If the SDP manage to form a majority after the election, nobody can prohibit Milanović from resigning as President and becoming PM. However, the constitution does note that the incumbent president cannot engage in partisan electoral activities. It would therefore be logical for the court to ban Milanović from being on a list (meaning he cannot be elected to parliament) and from taking part in campaign activities, such as election debates or handing out flyers on market squares. I suppose the solution will be along these lines.

[DavidB.]

Exciting. Very curious to see who benefits from the higher turnout. Common wisdom says SDP, with HDZ benefiting with low turnout (see 2020) as they rely on older, high-propensity voters. But this doesn't feel like a change election. It feels like the gap between HDZ and SDP has been widening during the campaign. People generally seem to appreciate Milanović as president, but not as PM candidate making weird moves. And while people are worried about corruption, they generally do support the record of HDZ when it comes to the economy and Euro-Atlantic integration and do not necessarily trust Milanović on these topics. That would point towards a HDZ victory. My guesstimate is that the result will resemble the 2020 result very closely. But with polling in Croatia being so bad, anything could happen. If there is a shocker landslide one way or another, it seems to me that it would be HDZ doing much better (40%>). But perhaps I'm missing something completely.

One of the anti-establishment undercurrents is the growing anti-immigration sentiment; Croatia has been receiving quite a lot of labour immigrants from Nepal and the Philippines recently. This could benefit DP and/or Most. But it wasn't much of a theme in the election.

The number to watch for HDZ is 60 seats - if they don't reach those, coalition formation will get more difficult. They can probably go with DP and they can go with the national minorities, but a combination with Milorad Pupovac' SDSS (Serbs) and DP would seem impossible. Also, DP is an alliance - I don't think it's likely the Pravo i Pravda component (which will win around 2 seats) will support an HDZ government even if DP itself does.

My prediction: HDZ 40, SDP 25, DP 10, Most 9, Možemo 9. Almost identical to 2020. But again, this could be totally off.

[DavidB.]

So compared to 2020 HDZ do a little worse, SDP a little better; Možemo are a little up, Most and DP a little down if this exit poll is correct. Overall a very similar picture to 2020, in line with expectations before Milanović entered the race and in line with my OP. I overestimated HDZ in my previous post (this exit poll points at a result in the mid-30s) but this would still be a solid result for Plenković after almost 8 years in government, although less than HDZ may have hoped. SDP don't have a path to a majority. The question is now how difficult HDZ's path will get. Last time, the exit poll underestimated HDZ quite a bit. With 58 seats, it won't be easy to get to 76-77, so every additional seat they would get compared to the exit poll would help them greatly.

[DavidB.]

The exit poll turned out to be very accurate. HDZ have only 60, including the three diaspora seats. DP without PIP takes them to 73 and 5 minority seats (all of the non-Serbs) to 78. Let's see if it can be done, and if so, how stable it would be. A new election cannot be completely ruled out.

[DavidB.]

I'm pretty certain that it's impossible. At least as long as Plenković leads HDZ. Remember that Most already governed with Plenković (in his first government) and left that government — at a time when Most had a less pronounced conservative profile. The ideological differences between them and HDZ have only increased ever since.

Croatian media report that Plenković would ideally like to avoid DP. But I don't see how. Even with all 9 minority seats, the Istrians of IDS (2), the Northerners of NPS (2), and Fokus (1, and he has already said he will not support HDZ) Plenković only gets to 75. Yet another alternative path would run via Možemo and the 9 national minorities, which does get him over the barrier, but I think quite a lot of water would have to flow through the Sava for that to happen.

[DavidB.]

Andrej Plenković has announced an agreement on the imminent formation of a government consisting of HDZ and DP (minus PiP, which has left the ad hoc alliance). The two parties don't have a majority and will therefore rely on some of the minority representatives, but not on the Serbs. DP will get a Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Economic Affairs and a new Minister of Demographic Affairs.

Next change to be expected: PM Plenković's departure for some job in Brussels and Defense Minister Ivan Anušić taking over his position. In the April election, Anušić received the most preferential votes of all candidates.

[DavidB.]

Next change to be expected: PM Plenković's departure for some job in Brussels and Defense Minister Ivan Anušić taking over his position. In the April election, Anušić received the most preferential votes of all candidates.

Basically every single EU national leader wants some kind of Brussels top job, Costa, Mitsotakis, Plenković, Frederiksen, you name it.

Yes, but Plenković is arguably in a better position than some of those others for being EPP and for being from a relatively new member state from Central/Eastern Europe, which are now underrepresented in the top jobs (and now probably won't get the NATO gig either). Mitsotakis would seem to be his biggest competitor, as he shares many characteristics with Plenković, except for the Central/Eastern Europe thing. In any case, Plenković can become the Croatian Commissioner if he wants to, possibly in a Vice Presidential role too. He also leads the HDZ slate for the EP election, but whether he'll take up his seat is an open question.

Anušić is supposed to be more right-wing than Plenković but not quite as right-wing as Plenković's predecessor Karamarko.