Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited (user search)
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  Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited (search mode)
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Author Topic: Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left Revisited  (Read 29662 times)
TheOnlyOne234
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« on: June 07, 2020, 08:56:37 AM »

The great commoner falls, a bleak day Sad
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TheOnlyOne234
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« Reply #1 on: June 28, 2020, 08:23:36 AM »


John Mitchell of the UMW Arrives in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, April 17th, 1902 - Source: Wiki Commons

Anthracite, otherwise known as hard coal, was an invaluable resource in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, powering factories and providing homes across the industrialized world with a basic source of heat. Mines in northeastern Pennsylvania were the primary source of this substance within the continental United States. Workers assigned to these dangerous and unsafe mines, mostly first-generation Eastern European and Italian immigrants, were expected to procure the coal for a pittance.

The United Mine Workers of America, or UMW/UMWA, entered the arena in the 1880s as a counterbalance to hegemonic coal mine operators and owners. With no exception for race or national origin, nor skilled versus unskilled, the union effectively organized over 140,000 anthracite coal miners in this period. Led by John Mitchell, the union found tremendous success in its organizing drive and began securing minor victories in the 1890s. It became apparent by the spring of 1902, however, that the UMW-affiliated laborers were no longer willing to settle for half-measures and inadequate conditions. They fiercely desired recognition of the union and a joint-agreement to collectively bargain with the mine owners. The miners agreed upon several other demands, including a pay raise, a shortened work week, and an honest weighing of each day's coal (the basis for their earnings.)

In April, representatives of the UMW approached George F. Baer, President of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, and offered to arrange fair arbitration to discuss the workers' demands. Insisting the illegitimacy of the union and the impossibility of granting raises to the miners employed by his company, Baer laughed off the deal. His dismissive opinion was that the workers did not suffer whatsoever, "Why, hell, half of them can't even speak English." In prompt response, the anthracite miners in Scranton, Pennsylvania declared a work-stoppage. With neither side willing to budge an inch, tensions erupted into a full-fledged labor strike.

No end appeared in sight as the summer months flashed by. The miners' determination to succeed was surely matched by Baer's unending arrogance. In the belief that the status quo was pre-determined by divine action, Baer declared, "The rights and all interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for - not by the labor agitators - but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the control of property interests of the country, and upon the successful management of which so much depends." The miners were not dealing with your average, everyday hubris. This was advanced hubris.

As the months carried on and coal prices steadily rose, the tide of public opinion began shifting in favor of the strikers against the elite owners. Hearst egged on the persistent workers and called for then-President Beveridge to consider federal intervention in the matter. The publisher implored the federal government to prosecute Baer and the owner of Reading Railroad, J.P. Morgan, for their role in prolonging the strike. "Divine Right Baer," he stated, "has made the fateful choice that Americans will need to survive this winter with no heat. Do not fret, so says Baer, for the Omnipotent shall keep us warm with his glorious light."

Beveridge finally admitted in late October that the problem deserved attention. Winter lied on the horizon, and as the nation delved into an unprecedented coal shortage, Northern states faced a cataclysmic coal famine. Beveridge handed to Interior Secretary Lyman Gage a decree to explore all available options for arbitration in order to swiftly resolve the strike. The Hoosier, seemingly confiding in Gage his alignment with public sentiment, indicated his intention to hold accountable the mine owners. He wrote, "Upon my return to Washington, the matter will be addressed and Morgan will sit at the table." To the detriment of the anthracite miners, Beveridge died prior to settling the case. Accordingly, the responsibility fell to President Depew.

Depew, monitoring the situation closely alongside his personal friend, J.P. Morgan, came to the conclusion that little could be done legally. He was vastly distrustful of political interference in the affairs of private businesses and sharply disagreed with those who wanted intervention. Insofar as the federal government was concerned (at least under the Depew Administration), any and all plausibility for neutral arbitration halted in its tracks.

    To address our viewer's question, I would say no. Not every household knew exactly what and who Depew represented, politically. Even those who familiarized themselves with his famous speeches were unlikely to associate his name with arch conservatism and corporatism in the same regard we do today. Much of that association was born with his response to the Anthracite Coal Strike. With the entire country calling out for the president to do something - anything, really - do intervene in Pennsylvania, many had trouble fathoming continued inaction. His abject refusal to break from the ranks of the wealthy aristocracy did a number on his reputation.

    Theodore Roosevelt, then serving as the nation's War Secretary, observed the phenomenon as well as the president's reaction to it. He asked Depew, over and over to the point of annoyance, to consider peaceful mediation for the sake of preventing calamity. Roosevelt viewed the issue as one that required government intervention as the operators were disallowing negotiation, especially in the case of coal which could be seen as a public service. He believed it absolutely necessary to disrupt private business to preserve the public welfare. It was a moment that greatly refined Roosevelt's thoughts on labor and the role of the federal government to guide change.
         Marvin Everett, UBS American Presidents: Life Portrait of Chauncey Depew, Aired 2000

President Depew ignored the recommendations of his allies. It was inappropriate, he declared, to mandate a settlement on behalf of the respective parties. The New Yorker represented the prevailing philosophy of government in which representatives in federal and state legislatures protected the interests of businesses rather than individuals. To Depew, the UMW-affiliated miners courted anarchy and were instigating socialistic action while the benevolent owners merely wished to remain afloat. He wholeheartedly agreed with Baer that, "The duty of the hour is not to waste time negotiating with the fomenters of this anarchy and insolent defiance of law, but to do as was done in the Civil War, restore the majesty of law."

Although unable to declare an injunction as a result of the American Safeguards Act, the president eventually did endorse the strategy of Governor William A. Stone (R-PA) to call upon the Pennsylvania National Guard. Stone planned to station these forces at the anthracite mines to protect a small contingent of strikebreakers. In utilizing this method, they believed, the operators could guarantee an adequate sum of coal was extracted to end the fuel shortage and, thereby, prevent a calamitous winter famine. Therefore, hundreds of strikebreakers, guarded by members of the National Guard and the private Coal and Iron Police, were sent into the mines to resume coal production. Intimidated by police firepower and warned against initiating conflict by the UMW, strikers could do little but somberly observe.

The Coal Strike endured throughout the winter before its inevitable fade in early 1903. Thousands of miners moved on to other professions and others opted to return to their respective home countries. Mitchell did nothing as the strike waned from national significance, aside from issuing repetitious pleas that President Depew defend the rights of the workers. This, the failure of the UMW, served to radicalize scores of unionized workers who grew disillusioned with the nature of begging for arbitration and moderate change within the framework of reform capitalism. In March of 1903, three weeks after the disappointing end to the strike, membership in the newly founded Socialist Party of America skyrocketed.
*insert spongebob voice* "The miners were not dealing with your average, everyday hubris. This was advanced hubris."
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