The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.Today the Court examines the question of whether the Social & Economic Development Zone Improvement Act (SEDZIA) is constitutional. In particular, we shall determine whether Section 3, Clause 2 and the entirety of Section 4 of this Act is valid under the Atlasian Constitution.
I. Powers of the Senate – OverviewBefore the Court tackles the crux of the petition, we think it necessary to step back for a moment and discuss the concept of the Powers of the Senate section (A1, S5) and Senate powers in general. Since prior court decisions have often created or added confusion to the extent of Senate powers granted under A1, S5 and other sections of the Constitution, not to mention the means of application, it is understandable how legal minds and the Court itself can misunderstand the present scope of such powers
The basic tenet of
Fritz v. Ernest is that
the Senate must be granted affirmative power in order to make laws. Without this affirmative creation of lawmaking ability, laws passed by the Senate are merely suggestions to the Regions and to the people of actions to take. As a result of that decision, a Constitutional amendment was quickly passed which gave the Senate such affirmative powers, and which largely remains the body of A1, S5 today.
While the extent of such powers is broad, it is certainly not universal. Prior court decisions have correctly found that laws passed by the Senate must fit within the scope of its affirmative powers, as defined by the plain meaning of words and phrases that the drafters utilized, or those powers necessary and proper to carry out the aforementioned, in order to be found constitutional.
However, as the Court shall stress today, these powers are “affirmative” grants of lawmaking ability. Except where limited within the actual grant of power itself, each affirmative power given to the Senate does not limit the other affirmative powers of the Senate. They exist separately, in and of themselves. And even where separate powers duplicate each other, each affirmative grant of power to the Senate is not limited by this overlap. Rather, each provision supplements the other respective power.
The Court cannot emphasize enough that the sole limitation to these powers of the Senate is provided by the other parts of the Constitution, whether written in an affirmative grant of power to some other entity/group or in a negative denial of some part of the power granted to the Senate. Moreover, there is no requirement that the Senate actually utilize its powers by writing laws. Where the Senate has not legislated under its powers, the Regions possess full police powers, except where limited by other clauses of the Constitution, to enact laws.
II. SEDZIA – Section 3, Clause 2Petitioner argues that Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA is unconstitutional because, under
Bono v. Atlasia II, (1) non-uniform taxes violate the Constitution under A1, S5, C1 and (2) laws that do not promote “a single market where competition is free and undistorted” violate A1, S5, C4. As shall be discussed below, to the extent that the ruling of
Bono v. Atlasia II, specifically Sections 2 and 9 of that decision, conflicts with this decision, it shall no longer hold force in our jurisprudence.
Initially, the Court thinks Petitioner goes about his argument the wrong way. Our presumption, with regards to any law passed by the Senate, is that
any Senate law is unconstitutional unless found within those powers granted to the Senate in A1, S5 or through other parts of the Constitution. We, therefore, examine the law in question, with the Senate’s stated purpose in mind, as expressed by the Senate itself or by counsel for the government, to see if the Senate has legitimately passed the law according to its Constitutional mandate.
Section 3 of SEDZIA reads as follows (with Section 2 bolded):
Petitioner has chosen not challenge Clause 1 of this section, wisely in the Court’s view. After all, we think it abundantly clear that distributions of funds for infrastructure improvements and projects is allowed under A1, S10, among other clauses.
Moreover, the Court finds that the Senate legitimately used its broad powers in Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA to “lay… taxes”, as prescribed by A1, S5, C1. However, Petitioner insists that this A1, S5, C1 does not apply, referencing our previous decision in
Bono v. Atlasia II. We disagree.
The plain text of the Constitution could not be clearer. A1, S5, C1 gives the Senate “the power…To lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises,
but all duties, imports and excises shall be uniform throughout the Regions of the Republic of Atlasia and the District of Columbia.” The exclusion of the word “taxes” from the list of things that “must be uniform” can only mean that the Senate’s power to lay and collect taxes that are not duties, import taxes or excises need not be uniform.
Furthermore, the Court thinks that the terms “duties, imports and excises” cannot, in any way, cover the types of taxes defined with Clause 2. First, duties are typically associated with customs or goods that travel between countries and states. They differ from more common taxes in that they are imposed on commodities, financial transactions and estates, not on individuals. The decision to suspend a tax in Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA clearly deals with taxes individuals pay on the sale of goods, not taxes on goods because of their particular movement. An import tax, also, fits within the same basic type of tax as that imposed by a duty, namely the tax on movement of goods. Excises, on the other hand, function as taxes on goods produced within the country. For example, taxes on alcohol or tobacco production within Atlasia would be examples of excises. A tax on the sale of goods is, once again, not applicable.
Altogether, the gist of this examination is to lead to the Court’s unquestioned conclusion that the decision of the Senate to suspend sales and business taxes within SEDZs is valid under the Constitution.
As for the impact of A1, S5, C4 upon our holding, the Court finds it irrelevant to our conclusion. While we certainly acknowledge that a valid justification for the Senate’s passage of laws could be found by promotion of “a single market where competition is free and undistorted”, as noted above in Part I, there is no requirement that the Senate must promote “a single market where competition is free and undistorted” when it appropriately legislates under its other powers derived from the Constitution.
In sum, the Court holds Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA constitutional as a valid use of the Senate’s power to “lay taxes” under A1, S5, A1.