Italian Elections and Politics 2018: Yellow Tide

[palandio]

So what is this Rosatellum system?

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-election/italy-calls-confidence-votes-in-senate-on-new-electoral-law-idUSKBN1CT289

Is it just as the article says;

The proposed election law would distribute almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament on a proportional basis, while a third would be decided in a first-past-the-post vote on specific candidates.

Sounds like a version of the Japanese system except with less FPTP MPs?

Wait, is that just MMP? Or are the proportional represenation alloted independently of the FPTP seats?

No, it's not MMP but some kind of MMM where your PR vote already determines your FPTP vote (or the other way round: Your FPTP vote forces you to give your PR vote to one of the supporting lists).

[palandio]

The Bologna senate seat which normally should be ultra-solid Center-Left might become a four-way toss-up between Center-Left, LeU, Center-Right and M5S. The Center-Left is running Pierferdinando Casini, long-time ally of Berlusconi and a "family values" conservative who in his private life doesn't live according to the values that he has been promoting for most of his political carreer. LeU is running Vasco Errani, long-time governor of Emilia-Romagna. This is also going to hurt the PD in the PR vote because they abolished the disjoint vote and now voters have to decide between the packages PD/Casini and LeU/Errani and even if Casini wins, he will have costed them many many PR votes. It seems that the PD has not understood the electoral law that they crafted themselves. In the old times under the Mattarellum law running high-profile allies in ultra-solid seats that were not a good fit for them made sense as long as they won. But now it is going to cost you thousands of PR votes.

[palandio]

Yes, tradition/legacy plays a huge role in Italian political orientation and voting patterns. I find the strong divides that cannot be that easily explained to be even more fascinating than the ones that are easier to explain.

[palandio]

That sounds very plausible, but keep in mind that Tuscany and Modena-Reggio were not part of the Papal State but are emblematic parts of the Red Belt and that on the other hand large parts of Latium and the Southern Marche were part of the Papal State but are not extremely red.

[palandio]

There will be exit polls at 23?

Yes, but speaking from experience Italian exit polls are amongst the crappiest in the Western world.

[palandio]

SWG for La7:
M5S  29.8% (+-1.0)
FI     14.5% (+-1.0)
Lega 13.3% (+-1.0)
FdI     4.9% (+-0.5)
NcI     2.1% (+-0.3)
PD    22.0% (+-1.0)
+E      3.1% (+-0.3)
CiPo   0.7% (+-0.3)
Insieme 0.8% (+-0.3)
LeU    5.7% (+-0.5)

[palandio]

Mediaset:
M5S   31% (+-2)
FI      14% (+-2)
Lega 14% (+-2)
FdI      5% (+-1)
NcI      1.5% (+-1)
PD     19.5% (+-2)
+E       3.0% (+-1)
CiPo    0.7% (+-0.3%)
Insieme 0.8% (+-0.3%)
LeU     4% (+-1)

[palandio]

Also, I am presently going through all the Lower Chamber FPTP seats, heres a question. Can anyone tell me why Genoa is a M5S stronghold now? Comparatively, other northern cities still have a Left core and Right suburbs, but Genoa is yellow. This also shows up on the senate map for Genoa as well.

That's a good question. For comparisons:
Genoa city: M5S 31.4%, CDX 31.5%, CSX 27.5%, LeU 5.5%;
Milan city: M5S 18.9%, CDX 37.6%, CSX 35.6%, LeU 4.5%;
Turin city: 24.2%, CDX 33.1%, CSX 33.7%; 5.5%

As you can see, the Center-Right actually won Genoa city because the bourgeois Eastern coastline was included in the Rapallo constituency. But your point still stands of course.

The next thing is that the Milan and the Turin agglomeration are much bigger than the cities alone, which does not hold true for Genoa. And when you look at the results in detail, the working-class suburbs (e.g. Collegno for Turin) are more M5S-friendly than the core cities, except that in Genoa they are administratively part of the city. But this still does not explain everything.

Genoa is very post-industrial, Milan is not. Turin is to some degree, but it also has a M5S city government and I don't know how competent it is. Plus Grillo is from Genoa, that might count.

When reading your post I stumbled over the word "still". Traditional sociological and electoral patterns in Northern Italian cities were different from what most Americans would expect. The quarters close to the city center are usually quite bourgeois (with notable exceptions like Genoa's historic center) and right-leaning, while the working-class quarters and suburbs are more peripheral and left-leaning. And this has changed very much within a few years.

For example in Genoa until very recently much of the city delivered Center-Left super-majorities with the Eastern coastline dragging down the overall result. Now the Eastern coastline (i.e. the Genoese quarters in the Rapallo constituency) had a CSX result of 29.6%, above the city average of 27.5%.

[palandio]

When reading your post I stumbled over the word "still". Traditional sociological and electoral patterns in Northern Italian cities were different from what most Americans would expect. The quarters close to the city center are usually quite bourgeois (with notable exceptions like Genoa's historic center) and right-leaning, while the working-class quarters and suburbs are more peripheral and left-leaning. And this has changed very much within a few years.

I used still in relation to 2013, not of course to the 2000s when Berlusconi was winning his home turf of Milan easily. I am not ignorant to the fact that the right in Europe still has city strongholds when compared to America, places like Kensington in the UK, and the 16th and 17th arrondissements in Paris for example. However, both of our posts touch on how these places, populated by social liberals/fiscal conservatives are slowly moving towards the left around the globe for a variety of reasons beyond a simple comparison. Its just in the Us, these types of people fled for the suburbs in the 50s, so the trend is witnessed with "hillary flipping the suburbs."

Yes, these developments are definitely comparable. (And sorry if my answer sounded arrogant.)

An issue there o/c being how left is the centre 'left' under Renzi anyway?

And going even further, is it the voters who are moving towards new parties or the parties who are moving towards new voters? Or both?

Thinking about it, i would almost expect Turin rather than Genoa to be the M5S hotspot in the North, considering it's historical association with Southern immigrants (Juventus etc...). Is that sort of thing likely to have played any role at all?

Genoa had a lot of Southern immigrants as well, particularly from Sardinia and Calabria and Sampdoria is also more immigrant/peripheral than Genoa CFC.

[palandio]

This is so weird that the League wins some constituencies in the south. They change their name and their positions, but until recently they delivered populist anti-southern speeches

The League did not win any constituencies in the south.

CoD Campania 2-10 (Agropoli) went to Marzia Ferraioli (Forza Italia),
CoD Calabria 06 (Vibo Valentia) went to Wanda Ferro (Brothers of Italy),
CoD Calabria 07 (Gioia Tauro) went to Francesco Cannizzaro (Forza Italia),
Senate Calabria 04 (Reggio di Calabria) went to Marco Siclari (Forza Italia).

I was surprised, too, that the League got 5% or more in basically all of the South outside Naples. But they did not win any constituencies.

[palandio]

Milan has been shifting to the left for quite some time. E.g. in 2011 it elected left-winger Giuliano Pisapia as mayor, succeeded by center-left Giuseppe Sala in 2016. This would have been unthinkable during Berlusconi's best times. I think that this can be attributed both to Berlusconi's star fading and to societal changes.

The relatively strong center-left results in the recent election are not limited to Milan, but can be observed in most Northern cities. And it's mostly the more central and affluent quarters, while the traditional working-class strongholds show steep declines. I think that a part of this has to do with Renzi being more attractive to certain voters than e.g. some ex-commie like Bersani. And keep in mind that in 2013 there was Civic Choice with Mario Monti. I'm pretty sure that many Monti voters went with Renzi. (Some exit polls say otherwise, but I think that they're crap.)

Just to name an example: Castelletto is a quarter of Genoa on the slopes over the city center. It is one of the richest quarters and also traditionally one of the most conservative. In 2013 it was Monti's best area in the city and now in 2018 it was the center-left's stronghold. All the traditional left-wing strongholds in the Western part of the city like Voltri(-grad) and Sestri, where in two-way races the center-left would get up to 70% of the vote, have now less than 30% for the center-left, while the center-left is at 38.4% in Castelletto. It's a realignment of shocking dimensions.

(+ what Worried Italian Progressive said)

[palandio]

odd map

In which way?

LeU is stronger in traditionally left-leaning areas and in the cities. Only Bari is strange, because Emiliano is still in the PD.

Regarding Genoa: As I expected LeU are strongest in the historic city center (which sociologically is very, ehrm, mixed). Apart from that its support is relatively evenly distributed, being slightly above average in some of the old PCI/DS strongholds. Altogether the LeU voting pattern is less "radical chic" than the PD voting pattern, which quite surprised me.

[palandio]

"Nothing can keep out of my head that the Five Stars Movement were an American and Israeli invention to influence our politics. An attempt that later slipped out of their hand."

Holy sh*t, Prof. Sapelli!

[palandio]

What if Salvini's secret mission isn't to stay in the Euro or not to stay in the Euro, but to win the next elections? The League is already polling in the 20-30% range. When Salvini saw that Mattarella would reject any government including Savona because "the financial markets...", he saw the opportunity for electoral gain. I don't of course deny that it's a gamble; and by that I mean a gamble at the cost of his would-be coalition partners and in the first place a gamble at the cost of the Italians and Europeans.

[palandio]

Well, the PD's March 4 result was quite underwhelming. The remaining voters preferred the Renzian PD over the populist M5S. Why should they go now to the far-right populist Lega or a M5S that is in a coalition with the far-right populist Lega?
The bigger challenge for the PD will be to re-broaden its electoral appeal and break out from the left-liberal 20% electoral niche. Sitting on their hands and waiting for the M5S to fail seems like not enough to me. Many voters who abandoned PD for M5S on March 4 actively turned away from the PD in the state in which it presented itself.
I don't advocate for the PD to abandon its current stances for more populism. But it is rather sad to observe that the inner-party current that for a long time had been fighting for majoritarian appeal has now fallen into the minoritarian trap itself.

[palandio]

On the one hand quite likely considering Italian political culture in general and what happened to the Five Stars caucus during the last legislature. On the other hand I think that they have vetted their candidates more carefully than last time and that it was much clearer this time that M5S is not at all the right vehicle for leftist idealists to make the world better. Additionally an alliance with the PD is not feasible because the PD does not want it with the Five Stars as a whole, and because any Five Stars splinter wouldn't have a majority together with PD and LeU.

[palandio]

Ixè's voter flows are not supported by other pollsters:

http://www.demopolis.it/?p=4992

According to Demopolis, out of 100 people who voted M5S in 2017, 67 had already voted M5S in 2013, 14 had voted PD, 8 had abstained or were new voters, 5 had voted PdL (now FI), and only 6 had voted for other parties (including Lega, Monti, SeL, RC, etc.).